CONSERVATION The Economics and Politics of Conservation

Research

• Does the Salience of Risk Affect Large, Risky Asset Purchases?, by Garnache.
• Contracts and Induced Institutional Change, Harstad and Mideksa, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, forthcoming.
• Prices vs. Quantities for Self-Enforcing Agreements, by Harstad, Lancia, and Russo. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, forthcoming.
• Conservation contracts for exhaustible resources, in progress, by Harstad and Framstad.
• Technology and Time Inconsistency, Harstad, Journal of Political Economy 128(7), 2020: 2653-89.
• The Role of Research in Common-pool Problems, by Kuusela and Laiho, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Volume 100, March 2020, 102287.
• The Political Economy of Weak Treaties, Battaglini and Harstad, Journal of Political Economy 128(2), 2020: 544–90.
• The case for a supply-side climate treaty, by Asheim, Fæhn, Nyborg, Greaker, Hagem, Harstad, Hoel, Lund, Rosendahl, Science Policy Forum 365(6451): 325-27, 2019.
• Gridlock and Inefficient Policy Instruments, by Austen-Smith, Dziuda, Harstad, and Loeper, Theoretical Economics 14(4), 2019: 1483–1534.
• Compliance Technology and Self-enforcing Agreements, by Harstad, Lancia, and Russo, Journal of the European Economic Association 17(1), 2019: 1-30.
• Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes, by Harstad and Mideksa, Review of Economic Studies 84(4), 2017: 1708-34.
• The Market for Conservation and Other Hostages, by Harstad. Journal of Economic Theory 166(November), 2016: 124-151.
• Buy Coal! A Case for Supply-Side Environmental Policy, by Harstad. Journal of Political Economy 120(1), 2012: 77-115. 

More on the objectives

The project develops and applies game theory and political economy methods to address a number of important questions:

1. Strategic conservation. How can the time profile of oil extraction, for example, influence the time profile of more harmful fossil fuels, such as coal, but also the development of renewable energy sources and other types of green technology?
2. International agreements. Climate treaties have so far focused on the demand side. How will emission quotas determine the various countries’ choice of resource extraction, when they take into account that the resource stock they have left at the next bargaining round will influence their bargaining power and the bargaining outcome? One hypothesis is that since resource extraction will be strategic when such concerns are taken into account, it may be more efficient to (also) negotiate extraction rates.
3. Deforestation contracts. For some types of resources, such as tropical forests, it is necessary with explicit compensations to succeed with conservation. While some such agreements are being established, we do not yet know much about how conservation contracts ought to be designed in order to be effective, neither from an economic, nor from a political point of view.
4. Political concerns. To address the questions above in a realistic manner, the analysis will also take into account political economy forces: the resource stock that is conserved will be inherited by the political challenger when the opposition wins the election; political decisions are not made by isolated politicians, but typically through legislative bargaining and coalition formation; international treaties will tie the hands of the next policy maker, and may thus also influence the election. These concerns will influence the answer to the questions raised above, such as how deforestation contracts ought to be designed when political economy forces are taken into account. 

Principal investigator

This is the second ERC project led by principal investigator Bård Harstad. The first project, a European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grant called "General Institutional Equilibrium: Theory and Policy Implications", was operational from 2012 to 2016.

Events

2018: Political Economy of the Environment (workshop)

Time and place: Apr. 26, 2018 12:00 PM – Apr. 27, 2018 4:30 PM, Eilert Sundts hus, rom 1047

Goal

For environmental economics to be relevant for practitioners, economists' analyses and advise must take into account political economy constraints. This workshop brings together leading scholars from both fields in order to (i) add political economy considerations to environmental economics analyses and (ii) to discuss the relevance of political economy analyses for environmental policy. 

Programme

Thursday April 26th

• 11:30-12:00 Lunch before the first presentations
• 12:00-13:00 The Political Economy and Governance of Rural Electrification
  • Presenter: Catherine Wolfram (Berkeley) with Berkouwer, Hsu, Lee, Miguel
  • Discussant: Karine van der Straeten (Toulouse)
• 13:00-14:00 Democratic Values and Institutions
  • Presenter: Torsten Persson (IIES) with Besley
  • Discussant: Cameron Hepburn (Oxford)
• 14:15-15:15 Resource Discoveries and Duration of Autocratic Leadership
  • Presenter: Elise Grieg (ETH) with Vinogradova
  • Discussant: Bob Powell (Berkeley)
• 15:45-16:45 Property Rights vs. Cooperative Agreements on the Global Ocean Commons
  • Presenter: Scott Barrett (Columbia)
  • Discussant: Tore Ellingsen (SSE, Stockholm)
• 16:45-17:45 Integrated Assessment in a Multi-region World with Multiple Energy Sources and Endogenous Technical Change
  • Presenter: John Hassler (IIES) with Krusell, Olovsson, Reiter
  • Discussant: Georgy Egorov (Kellogg)
• 19:00 Dinner

Friday April 27th

• 09:00-10:00 Pledge-and-Review Bargaining
  • Presenter: Bård Harstad (Economics dep., UiO)
  • Discussant: Jon Hovi (Political science dep., UiO)
• 10:15-11:15 Equity Effects in Energy Regulation
  • Presenter: Carolyn Fischer (Vrije, Amsterdam) with Pizer
  • Discussant: Antoine Loeper (Carlos III)
• 11:15-12:15 Trading Votes for Votes: A Dynamic Theory
  • Presenter: Alessandra Casella (Columbia) with Palfrey
  • Discussant: Reyer Gerlagh (Tilburg)
• 12:45-13:45 Mirage on the Horizon: Geoengineering and Carbon Taxation Without Commitment
  • Presenter: Will Rafey (MIT) with Acemoglu
  • Discussant: Anne-Sophie Crepin (Beijer, Stockholm)
• 14:00-15:00 Policy Advice in a Complicated World
  • Presenter: Steve Callander (Stanford GSB) with Lambert and Matouschek
  • Discussant: Antony Millner (Grantham, LSE)
• 15:15-16:30 General discussion: Political Environmental Economics
• 17:00 Dinner

Participants

• Johannes H. Alsvik (UiO)
• Torfinn Harding (NHH)
• Frikk Nesje (UiO)
• Geir B. Asheim (UiO)
• John Hassler (IIES)
• Tore Nilsen (UiO)
• Scott Barrett (Columbia)
• Cameron Hepburn (Oxford)
• Torsten Persson (IIES)
• Jacopo Bizzotto (UiO)
• Michael Hoel (UiO)
• Paolo G. Piacquadio (UiO)
• Geir Bjertnæs (SSB)
• Katinka K. Holtsmark (UiO)
• Robert L. Powell (Berkeley)
• Steven Callander (Stanford)
• Jon Hovi (UiO)
• Will Rafey (MIT)
• Alessandra Casella (Columbia)
• Svenn Jensen (OsloMet)
• Mathias Reynaert (TSE)
• Anne-Sophie Crepin (KVA)
• Steffen Kallbekken (CICERO)
• Knut Einar Rosendahl (NMBU)
• Georgy Egorov (Kellogg)
• Marie H. Karlsen (UiO)
• Tore Schweder (UiO)
• Tore Ellingsen (HHS)
• Snorre Kverndokk (Frisch)
• Kjetil Storesletten (UiO)
• Carolyn Fischer (RFF)
• Tuomas Laiho (UiO)
• Håkon Sælen (CICERO)
• Nils C. Framstad (UiO)
• Andreas Lange (Hamburg)
• Christian Traeger (UiO)
• Cloe Garnache (MSU)
• Matti Liski (Aalto)
• Karine Van der Straeten (TSE)
• Reyer Gerlagh (Tilburg)
• Antoine Loeper (UC3M)
• Sareh Vosooghi (Oxford)
• Rolf Golombek (Frisch)
• Tyre Merker (UiO)
• Carl Magnus Woldstad (UiO)
• Elise Grieg (ETHZ)
• Antony Millner (LSE)
• Catherine Wolfram (Berkeley)
• Bård Harstad (UiO)
• Kalle Moene (UiO)
• Gry T. Østenstad (USN