Geir B. Asheim

• How stationarity contradicts intergenerational equity (coauthors: K. Banerjee, T. Mitra) Economic Theory 72 (2021) 423-444
• Characterizing sustainability in discrete time (coauthor: T. Mitra) Economic Theory 71 (2021) 461-481
• The measurement of resilience (coauthors: W. Bossert, C. D’Ambrosio, C. Vögele) Journal of Economic Theory https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105104
• The case for a supply-side climate treaty (coauthors: T. Fæhn, K. Nyborg, M. Greaker, C. Hagem, B. Harstad, M.O. Hoel, D. Lund, K.E. Rosendahl) Science 365 (2019) 6451:325-327
• Resource conservation across generations in a Ramsey-Chichilnisky model (coauthor: I. Ekeland) Economic Theory 61 (2016) 611-639
• Escaping the repugnant conclusion: rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population (coauthor: S. Zuber) Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 629-650
• Characterizing the sustainability problem in an exhaustible resource model (coauthors: T. Mitra, W. Buchholz, C. Withagen) Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 2164-2182 (Supplementary material)
• Justifying social discounting: the rank-discounted utilitarian approach (coauthor: S. Zuber) Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 1572-1601
• Climate policy under sustainable discounted utilitarianism (coauthor: S. Dietz) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 63 (2012) 321-335
• Sustainable recursive social welfare functions (coauthors: T. Mitra, B. Tungodden) Economic Theory 49 (2012) 267-292 (Supplement)
• Intergenerational equity Annual Review of Economics 2 (2010) 197-222
• Infinite-horizon choice functions (coauthors: W. Bossert, Y. Sprumont, K. Suzumura) Economic Theory 43 (2010) 1-21
• Justifying, Characterizing and Indicating Sustainability. Springer (2007)
• Constant savings rates and quasi-arithmetic population growth under exhaustible resource constraints (coauthors: W. Buchholz, J.M. Hartwick, T. Mitra, C. Withagen) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 53 (2007) 213-229
• Regional versus global cooperation for climate control (coauthors: Camilla Bretteville Froyn, Jon Hovi, Fredric C. Menz) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 51 (2006) 93-109
• The Consistent Preferences Approach to Deductive Reasoning in Games. Springer (2006)
• Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games (coauthor: A. Perea) Games and Economic Behavior 53 (2005) 15-42
• Green national accounting with a changing population Economic Theory 23 (2004) 601-619
• Deductive reasoning in extensive games (coauthor: M. Dufwenberg) Economic Journal 113 (2003) 305-325 (Awarded the Royal Economic Society Prize for the best paper published in the Economic Journal in 2003)
• Admissibility and common belief (coauthor: M. Dufwenberg) Games and Economic Behavior 42 (2003) 208-234
• Justifying sustainability (coauthors: W. Buchholz & B. Tungodden) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 41 (2001) 252-268
• Does NNP growth indicate welfare improvement? (coauthor: M.L. Weitzman) Economics Letters 73 (2001) 233-239
• Individual and collective time-consistency Review of Economic Studies 64 (1997) 427-443
• Net national product as an indicator of sustainability Scandinavian Journal of Economics 96 (1994) 257-265
• Unjust intergenerational allocations Journal of Economic Theory 54 (1991) 350-371
• Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games Games and Economic Behavior 3 (1991) 278-294
• Rawlsian intergenerational justice as a Markov-perfect equilibrium in a resource technology Review of Economic Studies 55 (1988) 469-483

• Asheim, Geir B. & Brunnschweiler, Thomas (2023). Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox. Games and Economic Behavior. ISSN 0899-8256. 141, s. 503–514. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.007. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  After having observed a deviation from backward induction, a player might deem the opponent prone to deviate from backward induction again, making it worthwhile to deviate themself. Such reaction might make the deviation by the opponent worthwhile in the first place—which is the backward induction paradox. This argument against backward induction cannot be made in games where all players choose only once on each path. While strategic-form perfect equilibrium yields backward induction in games where players choose only once on each path but not necessarily otherwise, no existing non-equilibrium concept captures the backward induction paradox by having these properties. To provide such a concept, we define and epistemically characterize the concept of independently permissible strategies. Since beliefs are modeled by non-Archimedean probabilities, meaning that some opponent choices might be assigned subjective probability zero without being deemed subjectively impossible, special attention is paid to the formalization of stochastically independent beliefs.

• Asheim, Geir B.; Hartwick, John M. & Yamaguchi, Rintaro (2023). Sustainable per capita consumption under population growth. Resource and Energy Economics. ISSN 0928-7655. 73. doi: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2023.101363. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir B. & Zuber, Stéphane (2022). Rank-discounting as a resolution to a dilemma in population ethics. I Arrhenius, Gustaf (Red.), The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics. Oxford University Press. ISSN 9780190907686. doi: https:/doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190907686.013.15. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  When evaluating well‐being streams in an anonymous manner, one faces a dilemma between, on the one hand, assigning dictatorship to a single worst‐off individual and thus succumbing to a tyranny of non‐aggregation and, on the other hand, assigning dictatorship to (unboundedly) many better‐off individuals and thus succumbing to a tyranny of aggregation. This can be shown to correspond to a population‐ethical dilemma in the variable population setting between, on the one hand, a reverse repugnant conclusion by preferring a very small population with high well‐being and, on the other hand, a repugnant or very sadistic conclusion. The repugnant conclusion is to prefer a sufficiently large population with lives barely worth living to a population with good lives. The very sadistic conclusion is not to prefer a sufficiently large population with lives worth living to a population with terrible lives. The dilemma can be resolved by relaxing replication invariance and thus allowing that evaluation in the fixed population setting might change with population size even though the relative distribution of well‐being over individuals remains unchanged. Rank‐dependent criteria, for example the rank‐discounted critical‐level generalized utilitarian (RDCLU) social welfare order, are evaluation criteria that resolve this dilemma but fail replication invariance. In this chapter, we recall the normative basis for the RDCLU social welfare order and provide conditions under which rank‐dependent criteria are the only way out of the dilemma. Furthermore, we discuss properties of such criteria, including the following interesting perspective of the relaxation of replication‐invariance: it becomes important to associate with the notion of total population not the people that are alive at any one time, but the people that will ever live. This perspective might have important implications for the conclusions that follow from population ethics.

• Asheim, Geir B.; Kamaga, Kohei & Zuber, Stéphane (2022). Maximal sensitivity under Strong Anonymity. Journal of Mathematical Economics. ISSN 0304-4068. 103. doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102768. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Zuber, Stéphane; Venkatesh, Nikhil; Tännsjö, Torbjörn; Tarsney, Christian; Stefánsson, H. Orri & Steele, Katie [Vis alle 29 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2021). What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion? Utilitas. ISSN 0953-8208. 33(4), s. 379–383. doi: 10.1017/S095382082100011X. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Hartwick, John M. & Mitra, Tapan (2020). Investment rules and time invariance under population growth. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. ISSN 0165-1889. 123. doi: 10.1016/j.jedc.2020.104048. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Banerjee, Kuntal & Mitra, Tapan (2020). How stationarity contradicts intergenerational equity. Economic Theory. ISSN 0938-2259. 72, s. 423–444. doi: 10.1007/s00199-020-01296-8. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nesje, Frikk & Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2020). Intergenerational altruism: A solution to the climate problem? I Chichilnisky, Graciela & Rezai, Armon (Red.), Handbook on the Economics of Climate Change. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISSN 9780857939067. s. 310–325. doi: https:/doi.org/10.4337/9780857939067.00023.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Bossert, Walter; D’Ambrosio, Conchita & Vögele, Claus (2020). The measurement of resilience. Journal of Economic Theory. ISSN 0022-0531. 189. doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105104. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Mitra, Tapan (2020). Characterizing sustainability in discrete time. Economic Theory. ISSN 0938-2259. 71, s. 461–481. doi: 10.1007/s00199-020-01250-8. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Fæhn, Taran; Nyborg, Karine; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine & Harstad, Bård Gjul [Vis alle 9 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2019). The case for a supply-side climate treaty. Science. ISSN 0036-8075. 365(6451), s. 325–327. doi: 10.1126/science.aax5011. Vis sammendrag

  During decades of international climate policy negotiations, aiming to limit demand for fossil fuels, the stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased considerably, and even the flow of emissions to the atmosphere continues to grow (1). To reach the Paris Agreement's goal of keeping global warming well below 2°C, substantial parts of the world's fossil fuels simply cannot be combusted and must be left in the ground (1, 2). Recent work thus suggests redirecting climate policies toward fossil fuel producers directly (3–5) by capping the flows of extraction and restricting the stocks of resources available for exploration. We synthesize key economic mechanisms that support this approach, arguing that an international treaty among fossil fuel–producing countries could (i) enhance the impact of the Paris Agreement in the presence of free riders; (ii) stimulate investment in low-carbon technology research and development (R&D); (iii) provide insurance against a failed Paris Agreement; and (iv) make carbon policies more acceptable to fossil fuel producers, thus increasing their support. None of these effects depend on universal producer participation. Moreover, such a treaty need not be costly and could in fact help reduce the costs of the required transition to a low-carbon economy.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Perea, Andres (2019). Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games. International Journal of Game Theory. ISSN 0020-7276. 48, s. 1241–1275. doi: 10.1007/s00182-019-00680-6. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Fæhn, Taran; Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine; Harstad, Bård Gjul & hoel, michael [Vis alle 10 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2018). Parisavtalen og oljeeksporten. Samfunnsøkonomen. ISSN 1890-5250. 3, s. 39–50. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Voorneveld, Mark & Weibull, Jörgen W. (2016). Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets. Games. ISSN 2073-4336. 7(4). doi: 10.3390/g7040037. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Nesje, Frikk (2016). Destructive Intergenerational Altruism. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. ISSN 2333-5955. 3(4), s. 957–984. doi: 10.1086/688584. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Zuber, Stéphane (2016). Evaluating intergenerational risks. Journal of Mathematical Economics. ISSN 0304-4068. 65, s. 104–117. doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.05.005. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). Sustainable growth. Social Choice and Welfare. ISSN 0176-1714. 49, s. 825–848. doi: 10.1007/s00355-016-0977-9. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Ekeland, Ivar (2016). Resource conservation across generations in a Ramsey–Chichilnisky model. Economic Theory. ISSN 0938-2259. 61(4), s. 611–639. doi: 10.1007/s00199-016-0965-4. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Equitable intergenerational preferences and sustainability. I Atkinson, Giles; Dietz, Simon; Neumayer, Eric & Agarwala, Matthew (Red.), Handbook of Sustainable Development. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISSN 978 1 78254 469 2. s. 125–139. doi: 10.4337/9781782544708.00017.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Zuber, Stéphane (2014). Escaping the repugnant conclusion: Rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population. Theoretical Economics. ISSN 1933-6837. 9(3), s. 629–650. doi: 10.3982/TE1338. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We contribute to population ethics by proposing and axiomatizing rankdiscounted Critical-level generalized utilitarianism (RDCLU). Population ethics is needed for evaluation of policies, e.g., concerning climate change, where population size depends on the chosen policy. We show that critical-level generalized utilitarianism and (a version of) Critical-level leximin are the limits of RDCLU for extreme values of the rank utility discount factor. Moreover, we establish how RDCLU avoids serious objections raised against other variable population criteria. In particular, it escapes both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Very Sadistic Conclusion (one of which Critical-level generalized utilitarianism fails for any critical level).

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Zuber, Stéphane (2013). A complete and strongly anonymous leximin relation on infinite streams. Social Choice and Welfare. ISSN 0176-1714. 41(4), s. 819–834. doi: 10.1007/s00355-012-0705-z. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Various extensions of the leximin order to the infinite dimensional setting have been suggested. They relax completeness and strong anonymity. Instead, by removing sensitivity to generations at infinite rank this paper defines a complete and strongly anonymous leximin relation on infinite streams. The order is axiomatized, and it is shown to be the limit of extended rank-discounted utilitarianism for any utility function, as the discount factor approaches zero.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). A Distributional Argument for Supply-Side Climate Policies. Environmental and Resource Economics. ISSN 0924-6460. 56(2), s. 239–254. doi: 10.1007/s10640-012-9590-2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  This paper presents a distributional argument for the use of supply-side climate policies whereby carbon emissions are controlled through (i) depletion quotas or (ii) permanent confiscation of a fraction of the in situ carbon stocks. The modeling considers intertemporal competitive equilibria in the Cobb-Douglas version of the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz model of capital accumulation and costless resource extraction. It is shown how policies (i) and (ii) preserve the functional distribution of income between capital owners and resource owners, compared to the case where no climate policy is needed, while suggested demand-side policies do not. Such observations are of interest as avoiding functional redistribution may facilitate climate change negotiations. The paper discusses policy implications of the analysis outside the simplified setting of the stylized model.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Hartwick's Rule. I Shogren, Jason (Red.), Encyclopedia of Energy, Natural Resource, and Environmental Economics. Elsevier. ISSN 9780123750679. s. 314–320. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-12-375067-9.00149-2.
• Mitra, Tapan; Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Buchholz, Wolfgang & Withagen, Cees (2013). Characterizing the sustainability problem in an exhaustible resource model. Journal of Economic Theory. ISSN 0022-0531. 148(5), s. 2164–2182. doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.019. Vis sammendrag

  We provide a general condition under which consumption can be sustained indefinitely bounded away from zero in the continuous time Dasgupta–Heal–Solow–Stiglitz model, by letting augmentable capital substitute for a non-renewable resource. The assumptions made on the production function are mild, thus generalizing previous work. By showing that Hartwick’s rule minimizes the required resource input per unit of capital accumulation, and integrating the required resource input with respect to capital, we obtain a complete technological characterization without reference to the time path.We also use the characterization result to establish general existence of a maximin path.

• Dietz, Simon & Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Climate policy under sustainable discounted utilitarianism. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. ISSN 0095-0696. 63(3), s. 321–335. doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2012.01.003. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Empirical evaluation of policies to mitigate climate change has been largely confined to the application of discounted utilitarianism (DU). DU is controversial, both due to the conditions through which it is justified and due to its consequences for climate policies, where the discounting of future utility gains from present abatement efforts makes it harder for such measures to justify their present costs. In this paper, we propose sustainable discounted utilitarianism (SDU) as an alternative principle for evaluation of climate policy. Unlike undiscounted utilitarianism, which always assigns zero relative weight to present utility, SDU is an axiomatically based criterion, which departs from DU by assigning zero weight to present utility if and only if the present is better off than the future. Using the DICE integrated assessment model to run risk analysis, we show that it is possible for the future to be worse off than the present along a 'business as usual' development path. Consequently SDU and DU differ, and willingness to pay for emissions reductions is (sometimes significantly) higher under SDU than under DU. Under SDU, stringent schedules of emissions reductions increase social welfare, even for a relatively high utility discount rate.

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• Asheim, Geir B. (2023). Comprehensive national accounting for carbon emissions.
• Asheim, Geir B. (2023). Comprehensive national accounting for carbon emissions.
• Asheim, Geir B. (2022). Sustainable per capita consumption under population growth.
• Asheim, Geir B. (2022). Sustainable per capita consumption under population growth.
• Asheim, Geir B. (2022). Sustainable per capita consumption under population growth.
• Asheim, Geir B. (2021). Evaluating climate policies by the Pareto principle: Efficiency when future identities are unobservable.
• Asheim, Geir B. (2021). Evaluating climate policies by the Pareto principle: Efficiency when future identities are unobservable.
• Asheim, Geir B.; Fæhn, Taran; Golombek, Rolf; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine & Harstad, Bård [Vis alle 12 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2021). Norsk olje-politikk kan bidra for klimaet. Aftenposten (morgenutg. : trykt utg.). ISSN 0804-3116. s. 28–29.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Fæhn, Taran; Nyborg, Karine; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine & Harstad, Bård Gjul [Vis alle 9 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2020). Arguments for a new supply-side climate treaty. EAERE Magazine.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Fæhn, Taran; Nyborg, Karine; Greaker, Mads; Harstad, Bård Gjul & Hagem, Cathrine [Vis alle 9 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2020). Strengthening the Paris Agreement by supply-side climate policies. Atlas of Science.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2020). How stationarity contradicts intergenerational equity.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Christiansen, Vidar; Hoel, Michael; Lund, Diderik; Mehlum, Halvor & Nyborg, Karine [Vis alle 8 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2020). Subsidier til oljenæringen gir ikke omstilling. Aftenposten (morgenutg. : trykt utg.). ISSN 0804-3116.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Hoel, Michael & Nyborg, Karine (2020). Krisetiltak for oljebransjen bør ikke fremme ulønnsomme investeringer. Aftenposten (morgenutg. : trykt utg.). ISSN 0804-3116.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2019). Characterizing sustainability in discrete time.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2019). The measurement of resilience.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Fæhn, Taran; Nyborg, Karine; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine & Harstad, Bård Gjul [Vis alle 9 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2019). En ny, internasjonal klimaavtale bør på plass. Aftenposten (morgenutg. : trykt utg.). ISSN 0804-3116.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2018). Coping with climate change when dynasties are responsible for their own descendants.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2018). Characterizing sustainability in discrete time.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2018). Behavioral welfare economics with time inconsistent preferences.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2018). Rank-discounting as a resolution to a dilemma in population ethics.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2018). Characterizing sustainability in discrete time.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). Hartwick's rule.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). Behavioral welfare economics with time inconsistent preferences.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). Adapting the concept of Pareto improvement to evaluate climate policies.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). Forming coalitions against climate change.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). Rank-discounting as a resolution to a dilemma in population ethics.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). The necessity of time inconsistency for intergenerational equity.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). Sustainable growth.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). The necessity of time inconsistency for intergenerational equity.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). Destructive intergenerational altruism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). Sustainable growth.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). Destructive intergenerational altruism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). Book review of "Green Capital — A New Perspective on Growth", by Christian de Perthuis and Pierre-Andre Jouvet. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). Pp. vii, 274. ISBN 978-0-231-17140-3. Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy. ISSN 2160-5882. 5, s. 142–143.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Intergenerational risks, social context, and sustainability.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Resource conservation across generations in a Ramsey-Chichilnisky model.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Resource conservation across generations in a Ramsey-Chichilnisky model.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Evaluating intergenerational risks: Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Intergenerational risks, social context, and sustainability.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Evaluating intergenerational risks: Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Intergenerational equity: The necessity of time inconsistency.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Competitive intergenerational altruism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Beyond GDP: Measuring Welfare and Assessing Sustainability. By Marc Fleurbaey and Didier Blanchet. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. xvi, 306. ISBN 978–0–19–976719–9. Journal of Economic Literature. ISSN 0022-0515. 52(4), s. 1168–1170. doi: 10.1257/jel.52.4.1160.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Forming coalitions against climate change.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Generations playing a Chichilnisky game.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Generations playing a Chichilnisky game.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Two questions on sustainability.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Evaluating intergenerational risks: Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Competitive intergenerational altruism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Competitive intergenerational altruism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population and uncertainty.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Normative analysis of climate change.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Epistemic stability.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Characterizing the sustainability problem in an exhaustible resource model.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Three questions on sustainability.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). A distributional argument for supply-side climate policies.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Characterizing the sustainability problem in an exhaustible resource model.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Discounting and intergenerational equity.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Aging and sustainability.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). A distributional argument for supply-side climate policies.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). The case for combining absolute and relative priority.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Epistemic stability.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Extending analysis of intergenerational equity to variable population and uncertainty.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Characterizing the sustainability problem in an exhaustible resource model.
• Andersen, Markus Lund; Grimsrud, Kristine & Asheim, Geir B. (2023). Vindkraftverks påvirkning på boligprisene for nærliggende boliger – En hedonisk prisstudie i Norge . Universitetet i Oslo. Vis sammendrag

  Vindkraft på land er i dag den nest største energiformen i Norge, og har størst potensiale til å dekke fremtidige kraftunderskudd. Dette er fordi denne energiteknologien er den mest kostnadseffektive per kWh og raskest realiserbare i Norge (NOU 2023: 3). Vindkraft er fullstendig fornybar og representerer en faktor i kampen mot klimaendringene, men energiformen forårsaker også betydelige negative lokale virkninger, og er et klassisk eksempel på at klimahensyn og miljøhensyn kan komme i konflikt med hverandre. Oppføring av vindkraftverk kan føre til negative eksternaliteter som miljøproblemer gjennom tap av naturområder og økosystemtjenester, i tillegg til at naboer av kraftverket kan påføres visuell forurensning og støy (Heintzelman & Tuttle, 2012; Jensen et al., 2014; NVE, 2022b). I denne analysen anvendes en hedonisk prismodell for å undersøke om boligprisene er lavere i nærheten av vindkraftverk, og for å estimere den implisitte marginale betalingsvilligheten for å bo i nærheten av et vindkraftverk. For å kontrollere for at vindkraftverk ofte bygges i usentrale områder og andre romlige prosesser, så utvides den hedoniske prismodellen med geografisk faste effekter og differanse i forskjeller. Analysen er et bidrag til den stadig voksende litteraturen om effekten av vindkraftverk på boligpriser, ved at den er den første empiriske analysen som undersøker denne problemstillingen i Norge. For å estimere den hedoniske prisfunksjonen og relasjonen mellom boligpriser og nærhet til vindkraftverk, så er det benyttet informasjon inklusivt koordinater for over 225 000 boligtransaksjoner og 61 vindkraftverk i Norge fra 2010 til 2022. Resultatene varierer noe mellom ulike modeller og tilhørende forutsetninger, men er konsistente i å rapportere signifikant og betydelig negativ effekt på boligprisen av plassering i nærheten av vindkraftverk. Jevnt over er den estimerte marginale betalingsvilligheten for å bo under 1 km fra et vindkraftverk omkring -15% av boligprisen. Den negative effekten på boligprisen avtar med avstanden og konvergerer mot null mellom 5 og 7 km fra vindkraftverket. Videre drøftes fordelingseffekter og implikasjoner for økonomisk politikk basert på resultatene i analysen. Det anbefales at det utredes og innføres en naturavgift på bruk av naturområder som leverer naturressurser og økosystemtjenester. En slik avgift vil føre til at utbygger internaliserer de totale samfunnsøkonomiske kostnadene ved oppføring av vindkraftverk i sine kostnader, for å korrigere for markedssvikt forårsaket av blant annet negative eksternaliteter. På denne måten vil i større grad bare de vindkraftprosjektene som lønner seg for samfunnet realiseres.

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