Geir B. Asheim

• Resource conservation across generations in a Ramsey-Chichilnisky model (coauthor: Ivar Ekeland) Economic Theory 61 (2016) 611-639
• Escaping the repugnant conclusion: rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population (coauthor: S. Zuber) Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 629-650
• Characterizing the sustainability problem in an exhaustible resource model (coauthors: T. Mitra, W. Buchholz, C. Withagen) Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 2164-2182 (Supplementary material)
• Justifying social discounting: the rank-discounted utilitarian approach (coauthor: S. Zuber) Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 1572-1601
• Climate policy under sustainable discounted utilitarianism (coauthor: S. Dietz) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 63 (2012) 321-335
• Sustainable recursive social welfare functions (coauthors: T. Mitra, B. Tungodden) Economic Theory 49 (2012) 267-292 (Supplement)
• Global welfare comparisons Canadian Journal of Economics 43 (2010) 1412-1432
• Intergenerational equity Annual Review of Economics 2 (2010) 197-222
• Infinite-horizon choice functions (coauthors: W. Bossert, Y. Sprumont, K. Suzumura) Economic Theory 43 (2010) 1-21
• Paradoxical consumption behavior when economic activity has environmental effects Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 65 (2008) 529–546 (Mathematical appendix)
• Justifying, Characterizing and Indicating Sustainability. Springer (2007)
• Constant savings rates and quasi-arithmetic population growth under exhaustible resource constraints (coauthors: W. Buchholz, J.M. Hartwick, T. Mitra, C. Withagen) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 53 (2007) 213-229
• Regional versus global cooperation for climate control (coauthors: Camilla Bretteville Froyn, Jon Hovi, Fredric C. Menz) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 51 (2006) 93-109
• The Consistent Preferences Approach to Deductive Reasoning in Games. Springer (2006)
• Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games (coauthor: A. Perea) Games and Economic Behavior 53 (2005) 15-42
• Green national accounting with a changing population Economic Theory 23 (2004) 601-619
• Deductive reasoning in extensive games (coauthor: M. Dufwenberg) Economic Journal 113 (2003) 305-325 (Awarded the Royal Economic Society Prize for the best paper published in the Economic Journal in 2003)
• Admissibility and common belief (coauthor: M. Dufwenberg) Games and Economic Behavior 42 (2003) 208-234
• Justifying sustainability (coauthors: W. Buchholz & B. Tungodden) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 41 (2001) 252-268
• Does NNP growth indicate welfare improvement? (coauthor: M.L. Weitzman) Economics Letters 73 (2001) 233-239
• Individual and collective time-consistency Review of Economic Studies 64 (1997) 427-443
• Net national product as an indicator of sustainability Scandinavian Journal of Economics 96 (1994) 257-265
• Unjust intergenerational allocations Journal of Economic Theory 54 (1991) 350-371
• Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games Games and Economic Behavior 3 (1991) 278-294
• Rawlsian intergenerational justice as a Markov-perfect equilibrium in a resource technology Review of Economic Studies 55 (1988) 469-483

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). Sustainable growth. Social Choice and Welfare.  ISSN 0176-1714.  49, s 825- 848 . doi: 10.1007/s00355-016-0977-9 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Ekeland, Ivar (2016). Resource conservation across generations in a Ramsey–Chichilnisky model. Economic Theory.  ISSN 0938-2259.  61(4), s 611- 639 . doi: 10.1007/s00199-016-0965-4 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Nesje, Frikk (2016). Destructive Intergenerational Altruism. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.  ISSN 2333-5955.  3(4), s 957- 984 . doi: 10.1086/688584 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Voorneveld, Mark & Weibull, Jörgen W. (2016). Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets. Games.  ISSN 2073-4336.  7(4) . doi: 10.3390/g7040037 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Zuber, Stéphane (2016). Evaluating intergenerational risks. Journal of Mathematical Economics.  ISSN 0304-4068.  65, s 104- 117 . doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.05.005 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Equitable intergenerational preferences and sustainability, In Giles Atkinson; Simon Dietz; Eric Neumayer & Matthew Agarwala (ed.),  Handbook of Sustainable Development.  Edward Elgar Publishing.  ISBN 978 1 78254 469 2.  8.  s 125 - 139
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Zuber, Stéphane (2014). Escaping the repugnant conclusion: Rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population. Theoretical Economics.  ISSN 1555-7561.  9(3), s 629- 650 . doi: 10.3982/TE1338 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  We contribute to population ethics by proposing and axiomatizing rankdiscounted Critical-level generalized utilitarianism (RDCLU). Population ethics is needed for evaluation of policies, e.g., concerning climate change, where population size depends on the chosen policy. We show that critical-level generalized utilitarianism and (a version of) Critical-level leximin are the limits of RDCLU for extreme values of the rank utility discount factor. Moreover, we establish how RDCLU avoids serious objections raised against other variable population criteria. In particular, it escapes both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Very Sadistic Conclusion (one of which Critical-level generalized utilitarianism fails for any critical level).

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). A Distributional Argument for Supply-Side Climate Policies. Environmental and Resource Economics.  ISSN 0924-6460.  56(2), s 239- 254 . doi: 10.1007/s10640-012-9590-2 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  This paper presents a distributional argument for the use of supply-side climate policies whereby carbon emissions are controlled through (i) depletion quotas or (ii) permanent confiscation of a fraction of the in situ carbon stocks. The modeling considers intertemporal competitive equilibria in the Cobb-Douglas version of the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz model of capital accumulation and costless resource extraction. It is shown how policies (i) and (ii) preserve the functional distribution of income between capital owners and resource owners, compared to the case where no climate policy is needed, while suggested demand-side policies do not. Such observations are of interest as avoiding functional redistribution may facilitate climate change negotiations. The paper discusses policy implications of the analysis outside the simplified setting of the stylized model.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Hartwick's Rule, In Jason Shogren (ed.),  Encyclopedia of Energy, Natural Resource, and Environmental Economics.  Elsevier.  ISBN 9780123750679.  Volume 2: RESOURCES.  s 314 - 320
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Zuber, Stéphane (2013). A complete and strongly anonymous leximin relation on infinite streams. Social Choice and Welfare.  ISSN 0176-1714.  41(4), s 819- 834 . doi: 10.1007/s00355-012-0705-z Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  Various extensions of the leximin order to the infinite dimensional setting have been suggested. They relax completeness and strong anonymity. Instead, by removing sensitivity to generations at infinite rank this paper defines a complete and strongly anonymous leximin relation on infinite streams. The order is axiomatized, and it is shown to be the limit of extended rank-discounted utilitarianism for any utility function, as the discount factor approaches zero.

• Mitra, Tapan; Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Buchholz, Wolfgang & Withagen, Cees (2013). Characterizing the sustainability problem in an exhaustible resource model. Journal of Economic Theory.  ISSN 0022-0531.  148(5), s 2164- 2182 . doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.019 Vis sammendrag

  We provide a general condition under which consumption can be sustained indefinitely bounded away from zero in the continuous time Dasgupta–Heal–Solow–Stiglitz model, by letting augmentable capital substitute for a non-renewable resource. The assumptions made on the production function are mild, thus generalizing previous work. By showing that Hartwick’s rule minimizes the required resource input per unit of capital accumulation, and integrating the required resource input with respect to capital, we obtain a complete technological characterization without reference to the time path.We also use the characterization result to establish general existence of a maximin path.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Discounting While Treating Generations Equally, In Robert W. Hahn & Alastair Ulph (ed.),  Climate Change and Common Sense Essays in Honour of Tom Schelling.  Oxford University Press.  ISBN 978-0-19-969287-3.  Kapittel 8.  s 131 - 146 Vis sammendrag

  This chapter asks whether equal treatment of generations is compatible with social discounting. It presents the rank-discounted utilitarian criterion, proposed by Stephane Zuber and analyzed in Zuber and Asheim (2010), which combines equal treatment with social discounting by giving priority for the worse off not only due to their absolute level of well-being but also their relative rank in well-being. If the future is better off than the present, then this criterion is behaviorally indistinguishable from discounted utilitarianism, which is the criterion usually employed by economists. However, if e.g. climate change breaks the correlation between time and well-being, then rank-discounted utilitarianism more than discounted utilitarianism calls for present action to protect the interests of future generations.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Mitra, Tapan & Tungodden, Bertil (2012). Sustainable recursive social welfare functions. Economic Theory.  ISSN 0938-2259.  49(2), s 267- 292 . doi: 10.1007/s00199-010-0573-7 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  What ethical criterion for intergenerational justice should be adopted, e.g., when faced with the task of managing the global environment? Koopmans’ axiomatization of discounted utilitarianism is based on seemingly compelling conditions, yet this criterion leads to hard-to-justify outcomes. The present analysis considers a class of sustainable recursive social welfare functions within Koopmans’ general framework. This class is axiomatized by means of a weak equity condition (“Hammond Equity for the Future”) and general existence is established. Any member of the class satisfies the key axioms of Chichilnisky’s “sustainable preferences”. The analysis singles out one of Koopmans’ original separability conditions (his Postulate 3'a), here called “Independent Present”, as particularly questionable from an ethical perspective.

• Dietz, Simon & Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Climate policy under sustainable discounted utilitarianism. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.  ISSN 0095-0696.  63(3), s 321- 335 . doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2012.01.003 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  Empirical evaluation of policies to mitigate climate change has been largely confined to the application of discounted utilitarianism (DU). DU is controversial, both due to the conditions through which it is justified and due to its consequences for climate policies, where the discounting of future utility gains from present abatement efforts makes it harder for such measures to justify their present costs. In this paper, we propose sustainable discounted utilitarianism (SDU) as an alternative principle for evaluation of climate policy. Unlike undiscounted utilitarianism, which always assigns zero relative weight to present utility, SDU is an axiomatically based criterion, which departs from DU by assigning zero weight to present utility if and only if the present is better off than the future. Using the DICE integrated assessment model to run risk analysis, we show that it is possible for the future to be worse off than the present along a 'business as usual' development path. Consequently SDU and DU differ, and willingness to pay for emissions reductions is (sometimes significantly) higher under SDU than under DU. Under SDU, stringent schedules of emissions reductions increase social welfare, even for a relatively high utility discount rate.

• Zuber, Stéphane & Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Justifying social discounting: The rank-discounted utilitarian approach. Journal of Economic Theory.  ISSN 0022-0531.  147(4), s 1572- 1601 . doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.08.001 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  The discounted utilitarian criterion for infinite horizon social choice has been criticized for treating generations unequally. We propose an extended rank-discounted utilitarian (ERDU) criterion instead. The criterion amounts to discounted utilitarianism on non-decreasing streams, but it treats all generations impartially: discounting becomes the mere expression of intergenerational inequality aversion. We show that more inequality averse ERDU societies have higher social discount rates when future generations are better off. We apply the ERDU approach in two benchmark economic growth models and prove that it promotes sustainable policies that maximize discounted utilitarian welfare.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2011). Comparing the welfare of growing economies. Revue d' Economie politique.  ISSN 0373-2630.  121(1), s 59- 72 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  Economies that currently have the same productive capacity may implement different growth rates. This entails that it is insufficient to base international comparisons of welfare solely on current well-being, or introducing the potential for future growth in an arbitrary manner. NNP-based measures trade off current well-being and the potential for future growth in a consistent manner. This paper shows that it matters for nnp-based measures whether different growth rates in different economies are due to different technological opportunities or different social preferences for development. The analysis illustrates the similarity between international comparisons of welfare and interpersonal comparisons of well-being.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Hartwick, John M. (2011). Anomalies in green national accounting. Ecological Economics.  ISSN 0921-8009.  70(12), s 2303- 2307 . doi: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.06.020 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  We "extend" standard arguments for greening the product side of the national accounts to the income side of the accounts and turn up an anomaly. For an economy with oil use, no entry for oil income, a supposed primary factor, appears in the income side of the national accounts when the depletion of natural capital is accounted for on the product side of the accounts. We resolve this issue by applying an income definition developed in the theory of national accounting. This, however, leads to another anomaly on the income side of the national accounts.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2010). Global welfare comparisons. Canadian Journal of Economics.  ISSN 0008-4085.  43(4), s 1412- 1432 . doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2010.01619.x Vis sammendrag

  To provide a normative foundation for transfers between different economies, one needs information on their ‘per capita welfare.’ This paper considers various methods for doing this and reaches the following conclusions: (i) Such global welfare comparisons are more demanding than usually thought. (ii) The ranking of methods differs from that of local (over-time) comparisons, with real comprehensive per capita NNP being the least impractical method. The lesson is that global welfare comparisons should be performed with great care. The comparisonsmust be made in local real prices calculated according to ‘purchasing-power-parity,’ where non-traded environmental amenities play an important role.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2010). Intergenerational Equity. Annual Review of Economics.  ISSN 1941-1383.  2, s 197- 222 . doi: 10.1146/annurev.economics.102308.124440 Vis sammendrag

  Axiomatic analysis of intergenerational social preferences over infinite streams of well-being faces the following dilemma. Equal treatment of generations combined with sensitivity for the interests of each generation rules out explicitly defined preferences that can rank any pair of infinite well-being streams. Hence, either intergenerational social preferences must be incomplete or equal treatment and sensitivity must be compromised. This critical review of axiomatic analyses of preferences over infinite streams evaluates different kinds of intergenerational social preferences by comparing their axiomatic basis as well as their performance in simple present-future conflicts. The scope for application is discussed, using real-world intergenerational conflicts (such as global warming) as a backdrop.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2010). Strategic Use of Environmental Information. Environmental and Resource Economics.  ISSN 0924-6460.  46(2), s 207- 216 . doi: 10.1007/s10640-010-9353-x Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  Strategic use of environmental information may have as consequence that a benevolent environmental agency will choose not to disclose information leading to reduced moral motivation. Thus, decision makers will not have access to such information, implying that they will not be able to adjust their decisions to available information on the state of the environment. In contrast, if the benevolent environmental agency instead bases its regulation on standard economic instruments, these instruments will incorporate all available information.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2010). The relationship between welfare measures and indicators of sustainable development, In T Aronsson & Karl Löfgren (ed.),  Handbook of Environmental Accounting.  Edward Elgar Publishing.  ISBN 9781847203847.  Chapter 10.  s 237 - 256 Vis sammendrag

  This chapter investigates whether measures of welfare improvement indicates sustainability. First it shows how the value of net investments and real NNP growth (appropriately extended if population growth is positive) can be used to measure welfare improvement, before turning to following two questions: (1) Does non-negative value of net investments imply sustainable development? (2) Does sustainable development imply non-negative value of net investments? The main conclusion is that welfare improvement is not a sufficient condition for sustainability, but under special conditions it is a necessary condition for sustainability.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Banerjee, Kuntal (2010). Fixed-step anonymous overtaking and catching-up. International Journal of Economic Theory.  ISSN 1742-7355.  6, s 147- 163 . doi: 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2009.00127.x Vis sammendrag

  We investigate criteria for evaluating infinite utility streams that satisfy Fixed-step anonymity and include some notion of overtaking or catching-up. We do so in a generalized setting which do not require us to specify the underlying finite-dimensional criterion (e.g., utilitarianism or leximin). We present axiomatizations that rely on weaker axioms than those in the literature, and which in one case is new. We also provide a complete analysis of the relationships between the symmetric parts of these criteria and likewise for the asymmetric parts.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Bossert, W.; Sprumont, Y. & Suzumura, Kotaro (2010). Infinite-horizon choice functions. Economic Theory.  ISSN 0938-2259.  43(1), s 1- 21 . doi: 10.1007/s00199-008-0423-z Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  We analyze infinite-horizon choice functions within the setting of a simple technology. Efficiency and time consistency are characterized by stationary consumption and inheritance functions, as well as a transversality condition. In addition, we consider the equity axioms Suppes-Sen, Pigou-Dalton, and resource monotonicity. We show that Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton imply that the consumption and inheritance functions are monotone with respect to time — thus justifying sustainability — while resource monotonicity implies that the consumption and inheritance functions are monotone with respect to the resource. Examples illustrate the characterization results.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; d'Aspremont, C & Banerjee, Kuntal (2010). Generalized time-invariant overtaking. Journal of Mathematical Economics.  ISSN 0304-4068.  46(4), s 519- 533 . doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.03.005 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  We present a new version of the overtaking criterion, which we call generalized timeinvariant overtaking. The generalized time-invariant overtaking criterion (on the space of infinite utility streams) is defined by extending proliferating sequences of complete and transitive binary relations defined on finite dimensional spaces. The paper presents a general approach that can be specialized to at least two, extensively researched examples, the utilitarian and the leximin orderings on a finite dimensional Euclidean space.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Emblem, Anne Wenche & Nilssen, Tore (2010). Health insurance: medical treatment vs. disability payment. Research in Economics.  ISSN 1090-9443.  64, s 137- 145 . doi: 10.1016/j.rie.2010.02.004 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  We present arguments for treating health insurance and disability insurance in an integrated manner in economic analysis, based on a model where each individual's utility depends on both consumption and health and her income depends on her earning ability. When purchasing insurance, she may choose a contract that offers less than full medical treatment. We find that high-ability individuals demand full recovery and equalize utility across states, while low-ability individuals demand partial treatment and cash compensation and suffer a loss in utility if ill. Our results carry over to the case where health states are not observable.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Mitra, Tapan (2010). Sustainability and discounted utilitarianism in models of economic growth. Mathematical Social Sciences.  ISSN 0165-4896.  59(2), s 148- 169 . doi: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.08.003 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  Discounted utilitarianism treats generations unequally and leads to seemingly unappealing consequences in some models of economic growth. Instead, this paper presents and applies sustainable discounted utilitarianism (SDU). SDU respects the interests of future generations and resolves intergenerational conflicts by imposing on discounted utilitarianism that the evaluation be insensitive to the interests of the present generation if the present is better off than the future. An SDU social welfare function always exists. We provide a convenient sufficient condition to identify SDU optima and apply SDU to two well-known models of economic growth.

Se alle arbeider i Cristin

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). Adapting the concept of Pareto improvement to evaluate climate policies.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). Behavioral welfare economics with time inconsistent preferences.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). Forming coalitions against climate change.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). Hartwick's rule.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). Rank-discounting as a resolution to a dilemma in population ethics.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). The necessity of time inconsistency for intergenerational equity.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). Book review of "Green Capital — A New Perspective on Growth", by Christian de Perthuis and Pierre-Andre Jouvet. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). Pp. vii, 274. ISBN 978-0-231-17140-3.. Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy.  ISSN 2160-5882.  5, s 142- 143
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). Destructive intergenerational altruism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). Destructive intergenerational altruism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). Sustainable growth.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). Sustainable growth.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). The necessity of time inconsistency for intergenerational equity.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Competitive intergenerational altruism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Evaluating intergenerational risks: Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Evaluating intergenerational risks: Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Intergenerational equity: The necessity of time inconsistency.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Intergenerational risks, social context, and sustainability.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Intergenerational risks, social context, and sustainability.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Resource conservation across generations in a Ramsey-Chichilnisky model.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Resource conservation across generations in a Ramsey-Chichilnisky model.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Beyond GDP: Measuring Welfare and Assessing Sustainability. By Marc Fleurbaey and Didier Blanchet. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. xvi, 306. ISBN 978–0–19–976719–9.. Journal of Economic Literature.  ISSN 0022-0515.  52(4), s 1168- 1170 . doi: 10.1257/jel.52.4.1160
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Evaluating intergenerational risks: Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Forming coalitions against climate change.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Generations playing a Chichilnisky game.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Generations playing a Chichilnisky game.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Two questions on sustainability.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Competitive intergenerational altruism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Competitive intergenerational altruism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Normative analysis of climate change.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population and uncertainty.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). A distributional argument for supply-side climate policies.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). A distributional argument for supply-side climate policies.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Aging and sustainability.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Characterizing the sustainability problem in an exhaustible resource model.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Characterizing the sustainability problem in an exhaustible resource model.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Characterizing the sustainability problem in an exhaustible resource model.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Discounting and intergenerational equity.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Epistemic stability.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Epistemic stability.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Extending analysis of intergenerational equity to variable population and uncertainty.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). The case for combining absolute and relative priority.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Three questions on sustainability.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2011). A Complete and Strongly Anonymous Leximin Relation on Infinite Streams.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2011). A Complete and Strongly Anonymous Leximin Relation on Infinite Streams.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2011). A distributional argument for supply-side climate policies.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2011). Can generations be treated equally?.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2011). Climate policy under sustainable discounted utilitarianism.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2011). Combining sensitivity to the interests of the present with respect for the interests of the future.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2011). Discounting While Treating Generations Equally.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2011). Discounting while treating generations equally.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2011). Justifying social discounting: the rank-discounted utilitarian approach.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2010). Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2010). Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2010). Climate change and intergenerational equity.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2010). Climate change and intergenerational equity.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2010). Epistemically stable strategy sets.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2010). Global welfare comparisons.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2010). Strategic use of environmental information.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2009). Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2009). Generalized time-invariant overtaking.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2009). Intergenerational Equity - Combining sensitivity for the interests of the present with respect for the interests of the future.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2009). Procrastination, partial naivete, and behavioral welfare analysis.
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2009). Strategic use of environmental information.

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