Geir B. Asheim

• Comprehensive National Accounting for CO₂ Emissions (coauthor: R. Yamaguchi) Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 13 (2026) 609–648 (Appendices)
• Exploring infinite population utilitarianism under strong anonymity (coauthors: K. Kamaga, S. Zuber) Economic Theory 80 (2025) 39–85
• Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox (coauthor: T. Brunnschweiler) Games and Economic Behavior 141 (2023) 503-514
• How stationarity contradicts intergenerational equity (coauthors: K. Banerjee, T. Mitra) Economic Theory 72 (2021) 423-444
• Characterizing sustainability in discrete time (coauthor: T. Mitra) Economic Theory 71 (2021) 461-481
• The measurement of resilience (coauthors: W. Bossert, C. D’Ambrosio, C. Vögele) Journal of Economic Theory https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105104
• The case for a supply-side climate treaty (coauthors: T. Fæhn, K. Nyborg, M. Greaker, C. Hagem, B. Harstad, M.O. Hoel, D. Lund, K.E. Rosendahl) Science 365 (2019) 6451:325-327
• Destructive intergenerational altruism (coauthor: F. Nesje) Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 3 (2016) 957-984
• Resource conservation across generations in a Ramsey-Chichilnisky model (coauthor: I. Ekeland) Economic Theory 61 (2016) 611-639
• Escaping the repugnant conclusion: rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population (coauthor: S. Zuber) Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 629-650
• Characterizing the sustainability problem in an exhaustible resource model (coauthors: T. Mitra, W. Buchholz, C. Withagen) Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 2164-2182 (Supplementary material)
• Justifying social discounting: the rank-discounted utilitarian approach (coauthor: S. Zuber) Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 1572-1601
• Climate policy under sustainable discounted utilitarianism (coauthor: S. Dietz) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 63 (2012) 321-335
• Sustainable recursive social welfare functions (coauthors: T. Mitra, B. Tungodden) Economic Theory 49 (2012) 267-292 (Supplement)
• Intergenerational equity Annual Review of Economics 2 (2010) 197-222
• Infinite-horizon choice functions (coauthors: W. Bossert, Y. Sprumont, K. Suzumura) Economic Theory 43 (2010) 1-21
• Justifying, Characterizing and Indicating Sustainability. Springer (2007)
• Constant savings rates and quasi-arithmetic population growth under exhaustible resource constraints (coauthors: W. Buchholz, J.M. Hartwick, T. Mitra, C. Withagen) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 53 (2007) 213-229
• Regional versus global cooperation for climate control (coauthors: Camilla Bretteville Froyn, Jon Hovi, Fredric C. Menz) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 51 (2006) 93-109
• The Consistent Preferences Approach to Deductive Reasoning in Games. Springer (2006)
• Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games (coauthor: A. Perea) Games and Economic Behavior 53 (2005) 15-42
• Green national accounting with a changing population Economic Theory 23 (2004) 601-619
• Deductive reasoning in extensive games (coauthor: M. Dufwenberg) Economic Journal 113 (2003) 305-325 (Awarded the Royal Economic Society Prize for the best paper published in the Economic Journal in 2003)
• Admissibility and common belief (coauthor: M. Dufwenberg) Games and Economic Behavior 42 (2003) 208-234
• Justifying sustainability (coauthors: W. Buchholz & B. Tungodden) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 41 (2001) 252-268
• Does NNP growth indicate welfare improvement? (coauthor: M.L. Weitzman) Economics Letters 73 (2001) 233-239
• Individual and collective time-consistency Review of Economic Studies 64 (1997) 427-443
• Net national product as an indicator of sustainability Scandinavian Journal of Economics 96 (1994) 257-265
• Unjust intergenerational allocations Journal of Economic Theory 54 (1991) 350-371
• Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games Games and Economic Behavior 3 (1991) 278-294
• Rawlsian intergenerational justice as a Markov-perfect equilibrium in a resource technology Review of Economic Studies 55 (1988) 469-483

• Asheim, Geir B. & Cato, Susumu (2026). The dilemma between repugnancy and sadism extends beyond critical-level utilitarianism. Economics and Philosophy. ISSN 0266-2671. s. 1–25. doi: 10.1017/S0266267126100807. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We consider axioms under which population principles face an unavoidable choice between accepting the Repugnant Conclusion or the Very Sadistic Conclusion. Our analysis reveals that this dilemma persists even without imposing the axiom of Anonymity. This significantly broadens the ethical implications when considering populations that differ in temporal, spatial or probabilistic dimensions or when including non-human populations. Imposing Existence Independence, combined with an Archimedean axiom that we term the Strict Limit Property, is sufficient for the dilemma to arise. These findings substantially generalize previous impossibility results in population ethics and highlight the inescapable trade-offs faced by any coherent population principle.

• Asheim, Geir B. & Yamaguchi, Rintaro (2025). Comprehensive national accounting for CO2 emissions. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. ISSN 2333-5955. doi: 10.1086/739401. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We use the vulnerability approach tointegrate CO2 emissions in comprehensive national accounts to indicate whether countries’ development is sustainable. Our sustainability indicator accounts for future mitigation costs and future climate damage of expected changes in national and global emissions, in addition to the value of current changes in capital stocks and the national social cost of carbon (NSCC) of current global emissions. We apply our theoretical results to recent data using the Greenhouse Gas Impact Value Estimator (GIVE) under the RFF Socioeconomic Projections. We show that the NSCC of current global emissions is important almost everywhere, although its effect on sustainability is partly offset by future damage decrease under decarbonization prospects. Our indicator is negative for some developing countries where the adjustment for current and future CO2 emissions exceeds the value of net investments in other assets. The responsibility and vulnerability approaches produce divergent empirical assessments of sustainability

• Asheim, Geir B. (2025). Hartwick's rule. I Lundgren, Tommy; Bostian, Moriah & Managi, Shunsuke (Red.), Encyclopedia of Energy, Natural Resource, and Environmental Economics. Elsevier. ISSN 9780323910132. s. 196–203. doi: 10.1016/b978-0-323-91013-2.00010-1. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Hartwick’s rule for sustainability prescribes reinvesting resource rents, thus keeping the value of net investments equal to zero. It is a robust result that Hartwick’s rule characterizes efficient and egalitarian paths: If along an efficient path Hartwick’s rule is followed forever, then an egalitarian path is implemented, and conversely, if an efficient and egalitarian path is implemented, then Hartwick’s rule is followed forever. It is a less reliable prescriptive rule for sustainability, as it has proven to be an elusive goal to exactly indicate sustainability by the value of net investments as a genuine savings indicator.

• Asheim, Geir B.; Kamaga, Kohei & Zuber, Stéphane (2024). Exploring infinite population utilitarianism under strong anonymity. Economic Theory. ISSN 0938-2259. doi: 10.1007/s00199-024-01620-6. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir B. & Brunnschweiler, Thomas (2023). Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox. Games and Economic Behavior. ISSN 0899-8256. 141, s. 503–514. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.007. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  After having observed a deviation from backward induction, a player might deem the opponent prone to deviate from backward induction again, making it worthwhile to deviate themself. Such reaction might make the deviation by the opponent worthwhile in the first place—which is the backward induction paradox. This argument against backward induction cannot be made in games where all players choose only once on each path. While strategic-form perfect equilibrium yields backward induction in games where players choose only once on each path but not necessarily otherwise, no existing non-equilibrium concept captures the backward induction paradox by having these properties. To provide such a concept, we define and epistemically characterize the concept of independently permissible strategies. Since beliefs are modeled by non-Archimedean probabilities, meaning that some opponent choices might be assigned subjective probability zero without being deemed subjectively impossible, special attention is paid to the formalization of stochastically independent beliefs.

• Asheim, Geir B.; Hartwick, John M. & Yamaguchi, Rintaro (2023). Sustainable per capita consumption under population growth. Resource and Energy Economics. ISSN 0928-7655. 73. doi: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2023.101363. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We establish two investment rules for maximal constant per capita consumption under exogenous population growth, one in terms of total capital stocks and the other in terms of per capita capital stocks. Both rules show the importance of the development of future population growth. The investment rules are illustrated in the one-sector model of capital accumulation, the DHSS model of capital accumulation and resource depletion, and the Stollery–d’Autume–Schubert model in which natural capital provides amenities. Application to recent empirical evidence indicates that actual genuine savings might be insufficient to sustain per capita consumption, when future population growth is combined with a large per capita consumption-wage gap.

• Asheim, Geir B.; Kamaga, Kohei & Zuber, Stéphane (2022). Maximal sensitivity under Strong Anonymity. Journal of Mathematical Economics. ISSN 0304-4068. 103. doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102768. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  This paper re-examines the incompatibility of Strong Pareto, as an axiom of sensitivity, and Strong Anonymity, as an axiom of impartiality, when comparing well-being profiles with a countably infinite number of components. We ask how far the Paretian principle can be extended without contradicting Strong Anonymity. We show that Strong Anonymity combined with four auxiliary axioms has two consequences: (i) There is sensitivity for an increase in one well-being component if and only if a co-finite set of other well-being components are at least ε (> 0) higher, and (ii) adding people to an infinite population cannot have positive social value.

• Asheim, Geir B. & Zuber, Stéphane (2022). Rank-discounting as a resolution to a dilemma in population ethics. I Arrhenius, Gustaf (Red.), The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics. Oxford University Press. ISSN 9780190907686. s. 86–86. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190907686.013.15. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  When evaluating well‐being streams in an anonymous manner, one faces a dilemma between, on the one hand, assigning dictatorship to a single worst‐off individual and thus succumbing to a tyranny of non‐aggregation and, on the other hand, assigning dictatorship to (unboundedly) many better‐off individuals and thus succumbing to a tyranny of aggregation. This can be shown to correspond to a population‐ethical dilemma in the variable population setting between, on the one hand, a reverse repugnant conclusion by preferring a very small population with high well‐being and, on the other hand, a repugnant or very sadistic conclusion. The repugnant conclusion is to prefer a sufficiently large population with lives barely worth living to a population with good lives. The very sadistic conclusion is not to prefer a sufficiently large population with lives worth living to a population with terrible lives. The dilemma can be resolved by relaxing replication invariance and thus allowing that evaluation in the fixed population setting might change with population size even though the relative distribution of well‐being over individuals remains unchanged. Rank‐dependent criteria, for example the rank‐discounted critical‐level generalized utilitarian (RDCLU) social welfare order, are evaluation criteria that resolve this dilemma but fail replication invariance. In this chapter, we recall the normative basis for the RDCLU social welfare order and provide conditions under which rank‐dependent criteria are the only way out of the dilemma. Furthermore, we discuss properties of such criteria, including the following interesting perspective of the relaxation of replication‐invariance: it becomes important to associate with the notion of total population not the people that are alive at any one time, but the people that will ever live. This perspective might have important implications for the conclusions that follow from population ethics.

• Zuber, Stéphane; Venkatesh, Nikhil; Tännsjö, Torbjörn; Tarsney, Christian; Stefánsson, H. Orri & Steele, Katie [Vis alle 29 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2021). What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion? Utilitas. ISSN 0953-8208. 33(4), s. 379–383. doi: 10.1017/S095382082100011X. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Banerjee, Kuntal & Mitra, Tapan (2020). How stationarity contradicts intergenerational equity. Economic Theory. ISSN 0938-2259. 72, s. 423–444. doi: 10.1007/s00199-020-01296-8. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We show how the condition of stationarity may contradict intergenerational equity. By formalizing the intuition that less sensitivity remains for the continuation of the stream if sensitivity for the interests of the present is combined with stationarity, we point out conflicts (a) between stationarity and the requirement of not letting the present be dictatorial, and (b) between stationarity and equal treatment of generations. We use the results to interpret the non-stationarity of the Chichilnisky and Rank-discounted utilitarian social welfare functions. Non-stationarity combined with time invariance leads to time inconsistency. We illustrate how such non-stationary social welfare functions can be applied in the Ramsey model if time invariance is imposed.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Hartwick, John M. & Mitra, Tapan (2020). Investment rules and time invariance under population growth. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. ISSN 0165-1889. 123. doi: 10.1016/j.jedc.2020.104048. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We propose an adaptation of Hartwick’s investment rule to models with population growth and show that following Hartwick’s rule is equivalent to a time-invariant real per capita net national product. In the so-called DHSS model of capital accumulation and resource depletion the proposed Hartwick’s rule equates the accumulation of per capita capital, net of the capital dilution effect of population growth, to the value of the depletion of the resource, gross of the capital dilution effect. We investigate why this asymmetry arises by analyzing a general model with multiple capital goods, in which we obtain a formulation of Hartwick’s investment rule where capital gains play a role if population growth is positive. Since capital gains accrue only to the resource but not to capital, we get the apparent asymmetry in the DHSS model. In both models we obtain as a corollary that keeping the value of net investments equal to zero leads to constant consumption if population is constant.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Mitra, Tapan (2020). Characterizing sustainability in discrete time. Economic Theory. ISSN 0938-2259. 71, s. 461–481. doi: 10.1007/s00199-020-01250-8. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We examine the investment rule that must be satisfied by an efficient and egalitarian path in a discrete-time version of the Dasgupta–Heal–Solow model of capital accumulation and resource depletion. In the discrete-time model, competitive valuation of net investments in terms of early and late pricing differs. We redefine Hartwick’s rule to require zero value of net investments at a valuation rule intermediate between these two. Using this definition, we show that along an efficient and egalitarian path, Hartwick’s rule is followed in all time periods. We thereby establish the converse of Hartwick’s result in discrete time, and we do so under weaker assumptions than those in the existing literature on how output varies as a function of capital and resource use. Our redefinition of Hartwick’s rule follows naturally if discrete time is viewed as providing information at discrete points in time of an underlying continuous-time process.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Bossert, Walter; D’Ambrosio, Conchita & Vögele, Claus (2020). The measurement of resilience. Journal of Economic Theory. ISSN 0022-0531. 189. doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105104. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Resilience has become an important topic in many social sciences. Numerous individual choices and economic and demographic outcomes are likely to be influenced by people's resilience. School performance, work absenteeism and burnout, longevity, the quality of sleep and health-risk behaviors such as substance abuse are some examples. Similarly, it is of high policy relevance to understand the determinants of both individual resilience (such as educational, marital and occupational status) and ecological resilience (such as climate change). Empirical work designed to uncover such relationships suffers from the absence of a resilience measure applicable in the context of large data sets. We fill this gap by proposing a specific measure that is characterized by a set of natural properties. After an introduction to the notion of resilience and its attributes, we argue why these conditions have intuitive appeal. Finally, we provide illustrating examples and derive our main characterization result.

• Nesje, Frikk & Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2020). Intergenerational altruism: A solution to the climate problem? I Chichilnisky, Graciela & Rezai, Armon (Red.), Handbook on the Economics of Climate Change. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISSN 9780857939067. s. 310–325. doi: 10.4337/9780857939067.00023. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Perea, Andres (2019). Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games. International Journal of Game Theory. ISSN 0020-7276. 48, s. 1241–1275. doi: 10.1007/s00182-019-00680-6. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We provide comparable algorithms for the Dekel–Fudenberg procedure, iterated admissibility, proper rationalizability and full permissibility by means of the notions of likelihood orderings and preference restrictions. The algorithms model reasoning processes whereby each player’s preferences over his own strategies are completed by eliminating likelihood orderings. We apply the algorithms for comparing iterated admissibility, proper rationalizability and full permissibility, and provide a sufficient condition under which iterated admissibility does not rule out properly rationalizable strategies. We also use the algorithms to examine an economically relevant strategic situation, namely a bilateral commitment bargaining game. Finally, we discuss the relevance of our algorithms for epistemic analysis.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Fæhn, Taran; Nyborg, Karine; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine & Harstad, Bård Gjul [Vis alle 9 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2019). The case for a supply-side climate treaty. Science. ISSN 0036-8075. 365(6451), s. 325–327. doi: 10.1126/science.aax5011. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  During decades of international climate policy negotiations, aiming to limit demand for fossil fuels, the stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased considerably, and even the flow of emissions to the atmosphere continues to grow (1). To reach the Paris Agreement's goal of keeping global warming well below 2°C, substantial parts of the world's fossil fuels simply cannot be combusted and must be left in the ground (1, 2). Recent work thus suggests redirecting climate policies toward fossil fuel producers directly (3–5) by capping the flows of extraction and restricting the stocks of resources available for exploration. We synthesize key economic mechanisms that support this approach, arguing that an international treaty among fossil fuel–producing countries could (i) enhance the impact of the Paris Agreement in the presence of free riders; (ii) stimulate investment in low-carbon technology research and development (R&D); (iii) provide insurance against a failed Paris Agreement; and (iv) make carbon policies more acceptable to fossil fuel producers, thus increasing their support. None of these effects depend on universal producer participation. Moreover, such a treaty need not be costly and could in fact help reduce the costs of the required transition to a low-carbon economy.

• Fæhn, Taran; Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine; Harstad, Bård Gjul & hoel, michael [Vis alle 10 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2018). Parisavtalen og oljeeksporten. Samfunnsøkonomen. ISSN 1890-5250. 3, s. 39–50. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Bør Norge begrense sin oljeutvinning for å motvirke global oppvarming? Hvilke politiske virkemidler bør i så fall brukes? Vi oppsummerer sentrale fagøkonomiske argumenter i denne debatten i lys av de seneste årenes endringer i internasjonale klimapolitiske rammebetingelser, derunder Parisavtalen. Om Norge ønsker å bidra mer til å begrense oppvarmingen enn internasjonale avtaler forplikter oss til, kan redusert oljeutvinning være en kostnadseffektiv måte å gjøre det på. De mest nærliggende virkemidlene vil da være begrenset lisenstildeling og/eller en avgift per utvunnet enhet. Ved å initiere en internasjonal avtale om tilbudsbegrensning blant produsentland, vil norske myndigheter kunne bidra til at Parisavtalens målsettinger realiseres, selv om avtalen i seg selv skulle bli ineffektiv. En produsentlandavtale kan med andre ord virke som en forsikring.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Ekeland, Ivar (2016). Resource conservation across generations in a Ramsey–Chichilnisky model. Economic Theory. ISSN 0938-2259. 61(4), s. 611–639. doi: 10.1007/s00199-016-0965-4. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The Chichilnisky criterion is an explicit social welfare function that satisfies compelling conditions of intergenerational equity. However, it is time inconsistent and has no optimal solution in the Ramsey model. By investigating stationary Markov equilibria in the game that generations with Chichilnisky preferences play, this paper shows how, nevertheless, this criterion can be practically implemented in the Ramsey model, leading to attractive consequences. The time-discounted utilitarian optimum is the unique equilibrium path with a high-productive initial stock, implying that the weight on the infinite future in the Chichilnisky criterion plays no role. However, this part of the Chichilnisky criterion may lead to more stock conservation than the time-discounted utilitarian optimum with a low-productive initial stock. Based on the notion of von Neumann–Morgenstern abstract stability, we obtain uniqueness by assuming that each generation coordinates on an almost best equilibrium and takes into account that future generations will do as well. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0965-4

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Voorneveld, Mark & Weibull, Jörgen W. (2016). Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets. Games. 7(4). doi: 10.3390/g7040037. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure-strategy subsets is epistemically robust if there is a Cartesian product Y of player type subsets with X as the associated set of best reply profiles such that the set Yi contains all player types that believe with sufficient probability that the others are of types in Y−i and play best replies. This robustness concept provides epistemic foundations for set-valued generalizations of strict Nash equilibrium, applicable also to games without strict Nash equilibria. We relate our concept to closedness under rational behavior and thus to strategic stability and to the best reply property and thus to rationalizability.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). Sustainable growth. Social Choice and Welfare. ISSN 0176-1714. 49, s. 825–848. doi: 10.1007/s00355-016-0977-9. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  This paper explores the view that a criterion of intergenerational equity serves to make choices according to ethical intuitions on a domain of relevant technological environments. In line with this view I first calibrate different criteria of intergenerational equity in the AK model of economic growth, with a given productivity parameter A, and then evaluate their performance by mapping the consequences of the criteria in various technological environments. The evaluation is based on the extent to which they yield social choice mappings satisfying four desirable properties. The Calvo criterion as well as sustainable discounted utilitarianism and rank-discounted utilitarianism yield sustainable growth in the AK model, the Ramsey technology and the Dasgupta–Heal–Solow–Stiglitz technology for any specifications of these technological environments. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0977-9

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Nesje, Frikk (2016). Destructive Intergenerational Altruism. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. ISSN 2333-5955. 3(4), s. 957–984. doi: 10.1086/688584. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Are the probable future negative effects of climate change an argument for decreasing the discount rate to promote the interests of future generations? The analysis of the present paper suggests that such stronger intergenerational altruism might undermine future well-being if not complemented by collective climate action. In the standard one-sector model of economic growth normatively attractive outcomes will be implemented if each generation has sufficient altruism for its descendants. This conclusion is radically changed in a two-sector model where one form of capital is more productive than the other but leads to negative atmospheric externalities. In fact, the model shows that, if each dynasty is trying to get ahead in a world threatened by climate change by increasing its intergenerational altruism, then long-term well-being will be seriously undermined.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Zuber, Stéphane (2016). Evaluating intergenerational risks. Journal of Mathematical Economics. ISSN 0304-4068. 65, s. 104–117. doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.05.005. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Climate policies have stochastic consequences that involve a great number of generations. This calls for evaluating social risk (what kind of societies will future people be born into) rather than individual risk (what will happen to people during their own lifetimes). We respond to this call by proposing and axiomatizing probability adjusted rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarianism (PARDCLU) through a key axiom ensuring that the social welfare order both is ethical and satisfies first-order stochastic dominance. PARDCLU yields a new useful perspective on intergenerational risks, is ethical in contrast to discounted utilitarianism, and avoids objections that have been raised against other ethical criteria. We show that PARDCLU handles situations with positive probability of human extinction and is linked to decision theory by yielding rank-dependent expected utilitarianism—but with additional structure—in a special case.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Zuber, Stéphane (2014). Escaping the repugnant conclusion: Rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population. Theoretical Economics. ISSN 1933-6837. 9(3), s. 629–650. doi: 10.3982/TE1338. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We contribute to population ethics by proposing and axiomatizing rankdiscounted Critical-level generalized utilitarianism (RDCLU). Population ethics is needed for evaluation of policies, e.g., concerning climate change, where population size depends on the chosen policy. We show that critical-level generalized utilitarianism and (a version of) Critical-level leximin are the limits of RDCLU for extreme values of the rank utility discount factor. Moreover, we establish how RDCLU avoids serious objections raised against other variable population criteria. In particular, it escapes both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Very Sadistic Conclusion (one of which Critical-level generalized utilitarianism fails for any critical level).

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Equitable intergenerational preferences and sustainability. I Atkinson, Giles; Dietz, Simon; Neumayer, Eric & Agarwala, Matthew (Red.), Handbook of Sustainable Development. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISSN 9781782544692. s. 125–139. doi: 10.4337/9781782544708.00017. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Hartwick's Rule. I Shogren, Jason (Red.), Encyclopedia of Energy, Natural Resource, and Environmental Economics. Elsevier. ISSN 9780123750679. s. 314–320. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-12-375067-9.00149-2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Zuber, Stéphane (2013). A complete and strongly anonymous leximin relation on infinite streams. Social Choice and Welfare. ISSN 0176-1714. 41(4), s. 819–834. doi: 10.1007/s00355-012-0705-z. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Various extensions of the leximin order to the infinite dimensional setting have been suggested. They relax completeness and strong anonymity. Instead, by removing sensitivity to generations at infinite rank this paper defines a complete and strongly anonymous leximin relation on infinite streams. The order is axiomatized, and it is shown to be the limit of extended rank-discounted utilitarianism for any utility function, as the discount factor approaches zero.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). A Distributional Argument for Supply-Side Climate Policies. Environmental and Resource Economics. ISSN 0924-6460. 56(2), s. 239–254. doi: 10.1007/s10640-012-9590-2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  This paper presents a distributional argument for the use of supply-side climate policies whereby carbon emissions are controlled through (i) depletion quotas or (ii) permanent confiscation of a fraction of the in situ carbon stocks. The modeling considers intertemporal competitive equilibria in the Cobb-Douglas version of the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz model of capital accumulation and costless resource extraction. It is shown how policies (i) and (ii) preserve the functional distribution of income between capital owners and resource owners, compared to the case where no climate policy is needed, while suggested demand-side policies do not. Such observations are of interest as avoiding functional redistribution may facilitate climate change negotiations. The paper discusses policy implications of the analysis outside the simplified setting of the stylized model.

• Mitra, Tapan; Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Buchholz, Wolfgang & Withagen, Cees (2013). Characterizing the sustainability problem in an exhaustible resource model. Journal of Economic Theory. ISSN 0022-0531. 148(5), s. 2164–2182. doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.019. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We provide a general condition under which consumption can be sustained indefinitely bounded away from zero in the continuous time Dasgupta–Heal–Solow–Stiglitz model, by letting augmentable capital substitute for a non-renewable resource. The assumptions made on the production function are mild, thus generalizing previous work. By showing that Hartwick’s rule minimizes the required resource input per unit of capital accumulation, and integrating the required resource input with respect to capital, we obtain a complete technological characterization without reference to the time path.We also use the characterization result to establish general existence of a maximin path.

• Dietz, Simon & Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Climate policy under sustainable discounted utilitarianism. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. ISSN 0095-0696. 63(3), s. 321–335. doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2012.01.003. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Empirical evaluation of policies to mitigate climate change has been largely confined to the application of discounted utilitarianism (DU). DU is controversial, both due to the conditions through which it is justified and due to its consequences for climate policies, where the discounting of future utility gains from present abatement efforts makes it harder for such measures to justify their present costs. In this paper, we propose sustainable discounted utilitarianism (SDU) as an alternative principle for evaluation of climate policy. Unlike undiscounted utilitarianism, which always assigns zero relative weight to present utility, SDU is an axiomatically based criterion, which departs from DU by assigning zero weight to present utility if and only if the present is better off than the future. Using the DICE integrated assessment model to run risk analysis, we show that it is possible for the future to be worse off than the present along a 'business as usual' development path. Consequently SDU and DU differ, and willingness to pay for emissions reductions is (sometimes significantly) higher under SDU than under DU. Under SDU, stringent schedules of emissions reductions increase social welfare, even for a relatively high utility discount rate.

• Zuber, Stéphane & Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Justifying social discounting: The rank-discounted utilitarian approach. Journal of Economic Theory. ISSN 0022-0531. 147(4), s. 1572–1601. doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.08.001. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The discounted utilitarian criterion for infinite horizon social choice has been criticized for treating generations unequally. We propose an extended rank-discounted utilitarian (ERDU) criterion instead. The criterion amounts to discounted utilitarianism on non-decreasing streams, but it treats all generations impartially: discounting becomes the mere expression of intergenerational inequality aversion. We show that more inequality averse ERDU societies have higher social discount rates when future generations are better off. We apply the ERDU approach in two benchmark economic growth models and prove that it promotes sustainable policies that maximize discounted utilitarian welfare.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Discounting While Treating Generations Equally. I Hahn, Robert W. & Ulph, Alastair (Red.), Climate Change and Common Sense Essays in Honour of Tom Schelling. Oxford University Press. ISSN 9780199692873. s. 131–146. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780199692873.003.0008. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  This chapter asks whether equal treatment of generations is compatible with social discounting. It presents the rank-discounted utilitarian criterion, proposed by Stephane Zuber and analyzed in Zuber and Asheim (2010), which combines equal treatment with social discounting by giving priority for the worse off not only due to their absolute level of well-being but also their relative rank in well-being. If the future is better off than the present, then this criterion is behaviorally indistinguishable from discounted utilitarianism, which is the criterion usually employed by economists. However, if e.g. climate change breaks the correlation between time and well-being, then rank-discounted utilitarianism more than discounted utilitarianism calls for present action to protect the interests of future generations.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Mitra, Tapan & Tungodden, Bertil (2012). Sustainable recursive social welfare functions. Economic Theory. ISSN 0938-2259. 49(2), s. 267–292. doi: 10.1007/s00199-010-0573-7. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  What ethical criterion for intergenerational justice should be adopted, e.g., when faced with the task of managing the global environment? Koopmans’ axiomatization of discounted utilitarianism is based on seemingly compelling conditions, yet this criterion leads to hard-to-justify outcomes. The present analysis considers a class of sustainable recursive social welfare functions within Koopmans’ general framework. This class is axiomatized by means of a weak equity condition (“Hammond Equity for the Future”) and general existence is established. Any member of the class satisfies the key axioms of Chichilnisky’s “sustainable preferences”. The analysis singles out one of Koopmans’ original separability conditions (his Postulate 3'a), here called “Independent Present”, as particularly questionable from an ethical perspective.

Se alle arbeider i NVA

• Asheim, Geir B. (2025). Complementary climate policies for supply and demand. doi: https:/www.conftool.pro/eaere2025/index.php?page=browseSessions&search=Asheim. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir B. (2025). The dilemma between repugnancy and sadism extends beyond Critical-Level Utilitarianism. doi: https:/www.mcgill.ca/valuetheory/events/axiology-2025. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir B. (2024). Complementary climate policies for supply and demand. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir B. (2024). Complementary climate policies for supply and demand. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir B. (2023). Comprehensive national accounting for carbon emissions. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir B. (2023). Comprehensive national accounting for carbon emissions. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir B. (2022). Sustainable per capita consumption under population growth. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir B. (2022). Sustainable per capita consumption under population growth. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir B. (2022). Sustainable per capita consumption under population growth. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir B. (2021). Evaluating climate policies by the Pareto principle: Efficiency when future identities are unobservable. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir B. (2021). Evaluating climate policies by the Pareto principle: Efficiency when future identities are unobservable. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir B.; Fæhn, Taran; Golombek, Rolf; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine & Harstad, Bård [Vis alle 12 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2021). Norsk olje-politikk kan bidra for klimaet. s. 28–29. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Fæhn, Taran; Nyborg, Karine; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine & Harstad, Bård Gjul [Vis alle 9 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2020). Arguments for a new supply-side climate treaty. EAERE Magazine. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Fæhn, Taran; Nyborg, Karine; Greaker, Mads; Harstad, Bård Gjul & Hagem, Cathrine [Vis alle 9 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2020). Strengthening the Paris Agreement by supply-side climate policies. Atlas of Science. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Christiansen, Vidar; Hoel, Michael; Lund, Diderik; Mehlum, Halvor & Nyborg, Karine [Vis alle 8 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2020). Subsidier til oljenæringen gir ikke omstilling. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Hoel, Michael & Nyborg, Karine (2020). Krisetiltak for oljebransjen bør ikke fremme ulønnsomme investeringer. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2020). How stationarity contradicts intergenerational equity. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2019). Characterizing sustainability in discrete time. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2019). The measurement of resilience. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Fæhn, Taran; Nyborg, Karine; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine & Harstad, Bård Gjul [Vis alle 9 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2019). En ny, internasjonal klimaavtale bør på plass. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2018). Rank-discounting as a resolution to a dilemma in population ethics. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2018). Characterizing sustainability in discrete time. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2018). Behavioral welfare economics with time inconsistent preferences. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2018). Characterizing sustainability in discrete time. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2018). Coping with climate change when dynasties are responsible for their own descendants. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). The necessity of time inconsistency for intergenerational equity. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). Rank-discounting as a resolution to a dilemma in population ethics. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). Hartwick's rule. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). Adapting the concept of Pareto improvement to evaluate climate policies. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). Behavioral welfare economics with time inconsistent preferences. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2017). Forming coalitions against climate change. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). Book review of "Green Capital — A New Perspective on Growth", by Christian de Perthuis and Pierre-Andre Jouvet. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). Pp. vii, 274. ISBN 978-0-231-17140-3. Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy. ISSN 2160-5882. 5, s. 142–143. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). Sustainable growth. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). Destructive intergenerational altruism. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). Sustainable growth. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). The necessity of time inconsistency for intergenerational equity. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2016). Destructive intergenerational altruism. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Evaluating intergenerational risks: Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Intergenerational risks, social context, and sustainability. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Resource conservation across generations in a Ramsey-Chichilnisky model. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Resource conservation across generations in a Ramsey-Chichilnisky model. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Competitive intergenerational altruism. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Evaluating intergenerational risks: Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Intergenerational equity: The necessity of time inconsistency. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2015). Intergenerational risks, social context, and sustainability. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Beyond GDP: Measuring Welfare and Assessing Sustainability. By Marc Fleurbaey and Didier Blanchet. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. xvi, 306. ISBN 978–0–19–976719–9. Journal of Economic Literature. ISSN 0022-0515. 52(4), s. 1168–1170. doi: 10.1257/jel.52.4.1160. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Evaluating intergenerational risks: Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Generations playing a Chichilnisky game. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Two questions on sustainability. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Forming coalitions against climate change. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2014). Generations playing a Chichilnisky game. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Normative analysis of climate change. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Competitive intergenerational altruism. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Competitive intergenerational altruism. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population and uncertainty. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2013). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Probability adjusted rank-discounted utilitarianism. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Epistemic stability. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Characterizing the sustainability problem in an exhaustible resource model. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne (2012). Discounting and intergenerational equity. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Andersen, Markus Lund; Grimsrud, Kristine & Asheim, Geir B. (2023). Vindkraftverks påvirkning på boligprisene for nærliggende boliger - En Hedonisk Prisstudie i Norge. Universitetet i Oslo. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Vindkraft på land er i dag den nest største energiformen i Norge, og har størst potensiale til å dekke fremtidige kraftunderskudd. Dette er fordi denne energiteknologien er den mest kostnadseffektive per kWh og raskest realiserbare i Norge (NOU 2023: 3). Vindkraft er fullstendig fornybar og representerer en faktor i kampen mot klimaendringene, men energiformen forårsaker også betydelige negative lokale virkninger, og er et klassisk eksempel på at klimahensyn og miljøhensyn kan komme i konflikt med hverandre. Oppføring av vindkraftverk kan føre til negative eksternaliteter som miljøproblemer gjennom tap av naturområder og økosystemtjenester, i tillegg til at naboer av kraftverket kan påføres visuell forurensning og støy (Heintzelman & Tuttle, 2012; Jensen et al., 2014; NVE, 2022b). I denne analysen anvendes en hedonisk prismodell for å undersøke om boligprisene er lavere i nærheten av vindkraftverk, og for å estimere den implisitte marginale betalingsvilligheten for å bo i nærheten av et vindkraftverk. For å kontrollere for at vindkraftverk ofte bygges i usentrale områder og andre romlige prosesser, så utvides den hedoniske prismodellen med geografisk faste effekter og differanse i forskjeller. Analysen er et bidrag til den stadig voksende litteraturen om effekten av vindkraftverk på boligpriser, ved at den er den første empiriske analysen som undersøker denne problemstillingen i Norge. For å estimere den hedoniske prisfunksjonen og relasjonen mellom boligpriser og nærhet til vindkraftverk, så er det benyttet informasjon inklusivt koordinater for over 225 000 boligtransaksjoner og 61 vindkraftverk i Norge fra 2010 til 2022. Resultatene varierer noe mellom ulike modeller og tilhørende forutsetninger, men er konsistente i å rapportere signifikant og betydelig negativ effekt på boligprisen av plassering i nærheten av vindkraftverk. Jevnt over er den estimerte marginale betalingsvilligheten for å bo under 1 km fra et vindkraftverk omkring -15% av boligprisen. Den negative effekten på boligprisen avtar med avstanden og konvergerer mot null mellom 5 og 7 km fra vindkraftverket. Videre drøftes fordelingseffekter og implikasjoner for økonomisk politikk basert på resultatene i analysen. Det anbefales at det utredes og innføres en naturavgift på bruk av naturområder som leverer naturressurser og økosystemtjenester. En slik avgift vil føre til at utbygger internaliserer de totale samfunnsøkonomiske kostnadene ved oppføring av vindkraftverk i sine kostnader, for å korrigere for markedssvikt forårsaket av blant annet negative eksternaliteter. På denne måten vil i større grad bare de vindkraftprosjektene som lønner seg for samfunnet realiseres.

Se alle arbeider i NVA