EXPLOIT Environmental Exploitation of Political Economics

A photograph of an assembly at the Security Council.

Photo: United Nations Photo.

Duration
01.01.2023–30.11.2029

European Research Council (ERC) Call: ERC-2021-ADG

Contact

  • Bård Harstad
    Bård Harstad Stanford GSB and University of Oslo Principal Investigator

About the project

Why has our society been unsuccessful in addressing deforestation, climate change, and other environmental problems? After all, we have been able to deal with many other challenges, and we have today better technologies and economic means than any time before. 

In this project, we seek to shed light on two questions:

  1. What political economics forces explain the failure to deal with environmental problems?
  2. How can environmental agreements and contracts exploit domestic political forces?

The first, positive, part seeks to develop dynamic political economics models that can be combined with models of climate change and other environmental problems. The goal is to learn more about what political economics forces or constraints are best able to explain the observed inefficiencies in environmental policies. This knowledge is necessary before we can analyse which policies are best - subject to the relevant constraints.

The second, normative, part is more groundbreaking because it investigates how international environmental policies can exploit the political forces that are important at the domestic level.

Intuitively, when desirable policies are hindered by political forces, such as present bias and time inconsistency, an incumbent may value a treaty that offers pre-commitments or credibility. This value implies that the incumbent can be persuaded to contribute more (to emission cuts, for example) if the agreement is designed so that it helps the incumbent overcome domestic political constraints. By drawing on contract theory and organizational economics, we will investigate how international policies can exploit time-inconsistent incumbents' demands for commitment, how status-quo biases offer credibility, and how inattention permits persuasion.

The project will contribute methodologically to political economics and contract theory.

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Principal investigator

Bård Harstad is a professor in political economy, and of business and sustainability, at Stanford GSB. He is also affiliated with the University of Oslo, and this is the third ERC grants that he is leading. 

For more on his research, please consult with his homepage at Stanford.

Participants

Funding

European Research Counsil

Funded by the European Union (ERC, EXPLOIT, 101055353). Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Council Executive Agency. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

This project received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under grant agreement No [101055353 — EXPLOIT — ERC-2021-ADG]. The project application had a budget of 1,9 million Euro (approximately 19 million NOK) and it runs until December 2029.

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Published Nov. 18, 2024 12:44 PM - Last modified Aug. 28, 2026 7:23 AM