Karine Nyborg

• Grossman, Z., T. Hua, J.T. Lind, K. Nyborg (2026): Unwillingly informed: the prosocial impact of third-party informers, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 138, 103330.
• Hoven, N.Z., and K. Nyborg (2025): The Mixed Effects of Making Contribution Behaviors Observable, Environmental and Resource Economics 88 (10), 2645-2661.
• Segerson, Kathleen, Stephen Polasky, Marten Scheffer, U. Rashid Sumaila, Juan Camilo Cárdenas, Karine Nyborg, Eli P. Fenichel, John M. Anderies, Scott Barrett, Elena M. Bennett, Stephen R. Carpenter, Beatrice Crona, Gretchen Daily, Aart de Zeeuw, Joern Fischer, Carl Folke, Nils Kautsky, Claire Kremen, Simon A. Levin, Therese Lindahl, Malin L. Pinsky, Alessandro Tavoni, Brian Walker, and Elke U. Weber (2024): A cautious approach to subsidies for environmental sustainability, Science 386, 28-30.
• Nyborg, K. (2020): Økonomien i pandemien: penga eller livet? I H. P. Graver, Ø. Hov, Tone Tønjum (Red.): Tillit i koronaens tid, Oslo: Dreyer.
• Carlsen, B., J.T. Lind, K. Nyborg (2020): Why physicians are lousy gatekeepers: Sicklisting decisions when patients have private information on symptoms, Health Economics 29(7), 778-789.
• Nyborg, K. (2020): No Man is an Island: Social Coordination and the Environment, Environmental and Resource Economics 76(1), 177-193.
• Asheim, G.B., T. Fæhn, K. Nyborg, M. Greaker, C. Hagem, B. Harstad, M.O. Hoel, D. Lund, K.E. Rosendahl (2019): The Case for a Supply-Side Climate Treaty, Science 365 (6451), 325-327.
• Hauge, K.E., K.A. Brekke, K. Nyborg, J.T. Lind (2019): Sustaining cooperation through self-sorting: The good, the bad, and the conditional, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 116 (12), 5299-5304.
• Nyborg, K. (2018): Reciprocal Climate Negotiators. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 92, 707-725.
• Nyborg, K. (2018): Social Norms and the Environment, Annual Review of Resource Economics 10, 405-423.
• Brekke, K.A., J. Konow, K. Nyborg (2017): Framing in a Threshold Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneous Endowments, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 138, 99-110.
• Nyborg, K., J.M. Anderies, A. Dannenberg, T. Lindahl, C. Schill, M. Schlüter, W. N. Adger, K.J. Arrow, S. Barrett, S. Carpenter, F. S. Chapin III, A.S. Crépin, G. Daily, P. Ehrlich, C. Folke, W. Jager, N. Kautsky, S.A. Levin, O.J. Madsen, S. Polasky, M. Scheffer, B. Walker, E.U. Weber, J. Wilen, A. Xepapadeas, A. de Zeeuw (2016): Social Norms as Solutions, Science 07 Oct 2016, Vol. 354, Issue 6308, 42-43 (DOI: 10.1126/science.aaf8317).
• Nyborg, K. and T. Zhang (2013): Is Corporate Social Responsibility Associated with Lower Wages?. Environmental and Resource Economics 55, 107-117.
• Nyborg, K. (2012): The Ethics and Politics of Environmental Cost-Benefit Analysis. Routledge Explorations in Environmental Economics. London/NewYork: Routledge.
• Jacobsen, K.J., K.H. Eika, L. Helland, J.T. Lind, K. Nyborg (2011): Are nurses more altruistic than real estate brokers? Journal of Economic Psychology 32, 818–831.
• Brekke, K.A., K.E. Hauge, J.T. Lind, and K. Nyborg (2011): Playing with the Good Guys: A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation, Journal of Public Economics 95, 1111-1118.
• Nyborg, K. (2011): I Don’t Want to Hear About it: Rational Ignorance among Duty-Oriented Consumers, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (79), 263-274.
• Brekke, K.A., and K. Nyborg (2010): Selfish Bakers, Caring Nurses? A Model of Work Motivation, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 75, 377-394.
• Brekke, K.A., G. Kipperberg, and K. Nyborg (2010): Social Interaction in Responsibility Ascription: the Case of Household Recycling, Land Economics 86(4), 766-784.
• Brekke, K. A., and K. Nyborg (2008): Attracting Responsible Employees: Green Production as Labor Market Screening, Resource and Energy Economics 39, 509-526.
• Brekke, K. A., K. Nyborg, and M. Rege (2007): The Fear of Exclusion: Individual Effort when Group Formation is Endogenous, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 109 (3),531-550.
• Nyborg, K., R. B. Howarth, and K. A. Brekke (2006): Green Consumers and Public Policy: On Socially Contingent Moral Motivation, Resource and Energy Economics 28 (4), 351-366
• Bruvoll, A. and K. Nyborg (2004): The Cold Shiver of Not Giving Enough: On the Social Cost of Recycling Campaigns, Land Economics 80 (4), 539-549.
• Nyborg, K. and K. Telle (2004): The Role of Warnings in Regulation: Keeping Control with Less Punishment, Journal of Public Economics 88 (12), 2801-2816.
• Brekke, K. A., S. Kverndokk, and K. Nyborg (2003): An Economic Model of Moral Motivation, Journal of Public Economics 87 (9-10), 1967-1983.
• Nyborg, K., and M. Rege (2003): Does Public Policy Crowd Out Private Contributions to Public Goods? , Public Choice, 115 (3), 397-418.
• Nyborg, K. and M. Rege (2003): On Social Norms: The Evolution of Considerate Smoking Behavior , Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 52 (3), 323-340.

• Nyborg, Karine (2026). Adam in the Perfectly Competitive Market. Revista de Economía Institucional. ISSN 0124-5996. 28(54), s. 179–196. doi: 10.18601/01245996.V28N54.08. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Grossman, Zachary; Hua, Tony; Lind, Jo Thori & Nyborg, Karine (2026). Unwillingly informed: the prosocial impact of third-party informers. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. ISSN 0095-0696. s. 103330–103330. doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2026.103330. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Since ignorance can serve as an excuse for selfish behavior, people sometimes avoid learning about possible negative externalities of their actions. In social situations, however, others might provide the information anyway. How do potential informers affect willful ignorance and the resulting social outcomes? We introduce a third-party potential informer into the moral wiggle-room game. Almost half of the dictators avoided information only to have it imposed upon them by the informer. Most of these unwillingly-informed dictators revised their behavior to benefit the recipient, even at a cost to themselves. While knowledge of the informer’s presence did not change dictators’ propensity to seek information, a subtle change in the experimental choice interface did: The share of dictators choosing ignorance was more than halved when dictator’s ignorance and allocation choices were made in two separate decision screens rather than a single one.

• Grossman, Zachary; Hua, Tony; Lind, Jo Thori & Nyborg, Karine (2025). Unwillingly Informed: the Prosocial Impact of Third-Party Informers. Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo. ISSN 0809-8786. 02(2025). Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Zachary Grossman, Tony Hua, Jo Thori Lind og Karine Nyborg Memo 02/2025

• Hoven, Noel Zigrand & Nyborg, Karine (2025). The Mixed Effects of Making Contribution Behaviors Observable. Environmental and Resource Economics. ISSN 0924-6460. 88, s. 2645–2661. doi: 10.1007/s10640-025-01032-7. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Voluntary contributions to public goods have been shown to increase when contribution behaviors become observable by peers. We examine the effect of social pressure on moral behavior, using a framework distinguishing explicitly between observable and non-observable forms of contribution. We show that even with moral motivation and social pressure, there is underprovision of the public good. Making some contribution behaviors observable does increase effort, but also causes misallocation of effort between observable and non-observable effort types. The latter negative effect can possibly outweigh the positive effect of increased effort on public good provision.

• Segerson, Kathleen; Polasky, Stephen; Scheffer, Marten; Sumaila, U. Rashid; Cardenas, Juan Camilo & Nyborg, Karine [Vis alle 24 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2024). A cautious approach to subsidies for environmental sustainability. Science. ISSN 0036-8075. 386(6717), s. 28–30. doi: 10.1126/science.ado2615. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Walker, Brian; Crépin, Anne-Sophie; nyström, magnus; Anderies, John M.; Andersson, Erik & Elmqvist, Thomas [Vis alle 26 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2023). Response diversity as a sustainability strategy. Nature Sustainability. 6, s. 621–629. doi: 10.1038/s41893-022-01048-7. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Financial advisers recommend a diverse portfolio to respond to market fluctuations across sectors. Similarly, nature has evolved a diverse portfolio of species to maintain ecosystem function amid environmental fluctuations. In urban planning, public health, transport and communications, food production, and other domains, however, this feature often seems ignored. As we enter an era of unprecedented turbulence at the planetary level, we argue that ample responses to this new reality — that is, response diversity — can no longer be taken for granted and must be actively designed and managed. We describe here what response diversity is, how it is expressed and how it can be enhanced and lost.

• Levin, Simon; Anderies, John M.; Adger, Neil; Barrett, Scott; Bennett, Elena M. & Cárdenas, Juan Camilo [Vis alle 22 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2021). Governance in the Face of Extreme Events: Lessons from Evolutionary Processes for Structuring Interventions, and the Need to Go Beyond. Ecosystems. ISSN 1432-9840. doi: 10.1007/s10021-021-00680-2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Barrett, Scott; Dasgupta, Aisha; Dasgupta, Partha; Adger, William Neil; Anderies, John M. & Bergh, Jeroen van den [Vis alle 26 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2020). Social dimensions of fertility behavior and consumption patterns in the Anthropocene. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS). ISSN 0027-8424. 117(12), s. 6300–6307. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1909857117. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Carlsen, Benedicte; Lind, Jo Thori & Nyborg, Karine (2020). Why physicians are lousy gatekeepers: Sicklisting decisions when patients have private information on symptoms. Health Economics. ISSN 1057-9230. 29(7), s. 778–789. doi: 10.1002/hec.4019. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  In social insurance systems that grant workers paid sick leave, physicians act as gatekeepers, supposedly granting sickness certificates to the sick and not to shirkers. Previous research has emphasized the physician's superior ability to judge patients' need of treatment and potential collusion with the patient vis‐á‐vis an insurer. What is less well understood is the role of patients' private information. We explore the case where patients have private information about the presence of nonverifiable symptoms. Anyone can then claim to experience such symptoms, reducing physicians' ability to distinguish between sick patients and shirkers. Doubting a patients' reported symptoms may prevent good medical treatment of the truly sick. We show that for all parameter values, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is that some physicians trust all claims of nonverifiable symptoms, sicklisting shirkers as well as sick; for many values, every physician is trusting. In particular, if physician strategies are observable by patients, extremely strong gatekeeping preferences are required to make physicians mistrust. To limit unwarranted sicklisting, policies reducing the benefits of shirking for healthy workers may be better suited than attempts to convince physicians to be strict.

• Nyborg, Karine (2020). No man is an island: Social coordination and the environment. Environmental and Resource Economics. ISSN 0924-6460. 76, s. 177–193. doi: 10.1007/s10640-020-00415-2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Humans are fundamentally social. Social activities require coordination, possibly leading to multiple equilibria in the form of self-reinforcing patterns of herd behavior. When alternative equilibria differ substantially with respect to environmental damage, they represent virtuous and vicious cycles from an environmental perspective. Such cycles can be sustained by network effects, social pressure to conform, or other mechanisms directly or indirectly yielding coordination benefits. Breaking the vicious cycles can be an important task for environmental policies. I present a stylized model of social coordination with environmental externalities, using it to discuss how environmental policies may help agents coordinate in more environment-friendly ways.

• Herrero, Mario; Thornton, Philip K.; Mason-D’Croz, Daniel; Palmer, Jeda; Benton, Tim G. & Bodirsky, Benjamin L. [Vis alle 48 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2020). Innovation can accelerate the transition towards a sustainable food system. Nature Food. 1, s. 266–272. doi: 10.1038/s43016-020-0074-1. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Lind, Jo Thori; Nyborg, Karine & Pauls, Anna (2019). Save the planet or close your eyes? Testing strategic ignorance in a charity context. Ecological Economics. ISSN 0921-8009. 161, s. 9–19. doi: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.02.010. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Do people try to avoid unpleasant information about the environmental consequences of their actions? If so, do they react with hostility towards others who provide the unwanted information? Fearing such hostility, do others abstain from providing the information? These are the questions we set out to explore by means of lab experiments presented here. To our surprise, and in stark contrast to related previous literature, we found few indications of willful ignorance. In a binary dictator game with an environmental charity as the recipient, an option to stay uninformed about the effects of one's actions for the charity was infrequently chosen, and did not significantly affect generosity. When another subject might choose to impose information on the dictator, almost all dictators asked for information themselves – but this was not associated with increased dictator generosity. We argue that the phenomenon of strategic ignorance is likely to be less robust and more context-dependent than one might expect based on previous research, and that this result may be important from an environmental policy perspective.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Fæhn, Taran; Nyborg, Karine; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine & Harstad, Bård Gjul [Vis alle 9 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2019). The case for a supply-side climate treaty. Science. ISSN 0036-8075. 365(6451), s. 325–327. doi: 10.1126/science.aax5011. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  During decades of international climate policy negotiations, aiming to limit demand for fossil fuels, the stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased considerably, and even the flow of emissions to the atmosphere continues to grow (1). To reach the Paris Agreement's goal of keeping global warming well below 2°C, substantial parts of the world's fossil fuels simply cannot be combusted and must be left in the ground (1, 2). Recent work thus suggests redirecting climate policies toward fossil fuel producers directly (3–5) by capping the flows of extraction and restricting the stocks of resources available for exploration. We synthesize key economic mechanisms that support this approach, arguing that an international treaty among fossil fuel–producing countries could (i) enhance the impact of the Paris Agreement in the presence of free riders; (ii) stimulate investment in low-carbon technology research and development (R&D); (iii) provide insurance against a failed Paris Agreement; and (iv) make carbon policies more acceptable to fossil fuel producers, thus increasing their support. None of these effects depend on universal producer participation. Moreover, such a treaty need not be costly and could in fact help reduce the costs of the required transition to a low-carbon economy.

• Nyborg, Karine; Harstad, Bård Gjul; Holden, Steinar; Nilssen, Tore & Storesletten, Kjetil (2019). Plan S and the Economics of Scientific Journal Publishing. Journal of Peer Production. ISSN 2213-5316. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Securing open access to research will not remove the fundamental problem that commercial publishers have substantial market power. Thus, even if Plan S is successful, large commercial publishers are likely to put financial pressure on universities and funders in the future. One underlying source of publishers’ market power is the hierarchical ordering of journals’ quality. Whether one likes it or not, such rankings are likely to arise as a response to asymmetric information. Plan S does not, and probably cannot, address the substantial information problems in research publishing. In the absence of journal hierarchies, other and more malign responses may easily arise, including discrimination along dimensions such as gender, age, personal networks, and the prestige of institutional affiliations. Paywalls and subscription requirements are currently tools publishers use to exercise their market power. However, the underlying reason for publishers’ market power is not this tool, but rather the fact that journals provide services that cannot, at least from the point of view of individual researchers, be easily replaced by the services of other journals. This will prevail even with open access. Rather than imposing very strict requirements on journals’ business models, we would encourage funders to collaborate with academies and professional organizations. These organizations have the professional credibility to establish new but still highly regarded journals if needed. Funders can fully finance such journals, presumably at a reasonable cost, making subscription fees as well as publication fees redundant. It is well-established in economics that, if so-called market failures are present, unregulated markets will not function efficiently. In scientific publishing, market failures abound. Below, we discuss some of them and their interplay, before concluding with respect to implications for the scientific publishing market, for the potential success of Plan S, and alternative approaches.

• Fæhn, Taran; Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine; Harstad, Bård Gjul & hoel, michael [Vis alle 10 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2018). Parisavtalen og oljeeksporten. Samfunnsøkonomen. ISSN 1890-5250. 3, s. 39–50. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Bør Norge begrense sin oljeutvinning for å motvirke global oppvarming? Hvilke politiske virkemidler bør i så fall brukes? Vi oppsummerer sentrale fagøkonomiske argumenter i denne debatten i lys av de seneste årenes endringer i internasjonale klimapolitiske rammebetingelser, derunder Parisavtalen. Om Norge ønsker å bidra mer til å begrense oppvarmingen enn internasjonale avtaler forplikter oss til, kan redusert oljeutvinning være en kostnadseffektiv måte å gjøre det på. De mest nærliggende virkemidlene vil da være begrenset lisenstildeling og/eller en avgift per utvunnet enhet. Ved å initiere en internasjonal avtale om tilbudsbegrensning blant produsentland, vil norske myndigheter kunne bidra til at Parisavtalens målsettinger realiseres, selv om avtalen i seg selv skulle bli ineffektiv. En produsentlandavtale kan med andre ord virke som en forsikring.

• Hauge, Karen Evelyn; Brekke, Kjell Arne; Nyborg, Karine & Lind, Jo Thori (2018). Sustaining cooperation through self-sorting: The good, the bad, and the conditional. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS). ISSN 0027-8424. 116(12), s. 5299–5304. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1802875115. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

Se alle arbeider i NVA

• Nyborg, Karine (2026). Why morally motivated public good provision can lead to polarization and minimal contributions. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2026). Balancing research with teaching & administrative tasks. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2026). Economic Behavioral Economics of Climate Change. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2026). Unwillingly Informed: the Prosocial Impact of Third-Party Informers. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2026). Unwillingly informed: the prosocial impact of third-party informers. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2026). Why Morally Motivated Public Good Provision can Lead to Polarization and Minimal Contributions. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2025). Fordeling og nytte-kostnadsanalyse. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2025). Unwillingly Informed: the Prosocial Impact of Third-Party Informers. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2025). Unwillingly Informed: the Prosocial Impact of Third-Party Informers. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2025). The Desire for Respect can Drive Polarization. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2025). Unwillingly Informed: the Prosocial Impact of Third-Party Informers. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2025). Image Preferences can Drive Polarization. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2025). Image Preferences as a Driver of Polarization. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2024). Bør vi verdsette alt? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2024). Fordeling og nytte-kostnadsanalyse. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2024). Image Preferences as a Driver of Polarization. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2024). Image preferences as a driver of normative polarization. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2024). Om bedrifter, miljø og samfunnsøkonomi. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2024). Information Avoidance in the Presence of a Potential Informer. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2024). Jakten på realistiske løsninger: koordinering eller dilemma? I Mjaaland, Marius Timmann; Eriksen, Thomas Hylland & Hessen, Dag Olav (Red.), Antropocen - menneskets tidsalder. Res Publica. ISSN 9788282263016. s. 63–82. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2024). Moral Responsibility as a Driver of Polarization. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2024). The Pitfalls of Relying on Moral Motivation for Public Good Provision. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2024). Moral motivation as a driver of polarization. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2024). Jakten på realistiske løsninger: Koordinering eller dilemma? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2024). Public Good Provision: The Pitfalls of Relying on Moral Norms. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2024). Moral Motivation as a Driver of Polarization. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2024). Image Preferences as a Driver of Normative Polarization. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine & Brekke, Kjell Arne (2023). Moral responsibility as a driver of polarization. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2023). Moral motivation as a driver of polarization. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2023). Moral Motivation as a Driver of Responsibility. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2022). Moral Motivation as a Driver of Polarization. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2022). Om bedrifter, miljø og samfunnsøkonomi. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2022). Grunnrenteskatt tar ikke jobben fra folk. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2022). Reconciling formal and informal narratives: Humans in the perfectly competitive economy. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2022). On Decency. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2022). Humans in the Perfectly Competitive Economy: Reconciling Formal and Informal Narratives. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2022). The interactions between social and moral norms and climate policies: theoretical perspectives. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2021). Nåtidsskjevhet, viljestyrke og alkoholkonsum. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2021). Det hemmelige litteraturmangfoldet. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2021). Økonomi og vippepunkter. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2021). Økonomi og vippepunkter. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2021). «Retorikk og følelser i klimadebatten». Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2021). The First Welfare Theorem Precludes Economically Relevant Endogenous Learning. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2021). Atferdsøkonomi: et krasjkurs. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2021). «Om klimarelevant forskning ved Økonomisk institutt, Universitetet i Oslo.». Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2021). A Perfectly Competitive Economy is an Economy without Endogenous Learning. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2021). A Perfectly Competitive Economy is an Economy without Welfare Relevant Endogenous Learning. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir B.; Fæhn, Taran; Golombek, Rolf; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine & Harstad, Bård [Vis alle 12 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2021). Norsk olje-politikk kan bidra for klimaet. s. 28–29. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2020). The Case for Internationally Coordinated Supply-Side Climate Policies. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Einevoll, Gaute & Nyborg, Karine (2020). Om klimaøkonomi. [Internet]. Podcast: Vett og vitenskap med Gaute Einevoll. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2020). The Case for Coordinated Supply-Side Climate Policies. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2020). Økonomien i pandemien: Penga eller livet? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Fæhn, Taran; Nyborg, Karine; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine & Harstad, Bård Gjul [Vis alle 9 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2020). Arguments for a new supply-side climate treaty. EAERE Magazine. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2020). Pitch on the distributional aspects of supply-side climate policies. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Fæhn, Taran; Nyborg, Karine; Greaker, Mads; Harstad, Bård Gjul & Hagem, Cathrine [Vis alle 9 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2020). Strengthening the Paris Agreement by supply-side climate policies. Atlas of Science. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2020). The Third Theorem of Welfare Economics. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2020). The Third Theorem of Welfare Economics. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2020). Økonomien i pandemien: penga eller livet? Tillit i koronaens tid. Dreyer Forlag A/S. ISSN 9788282655569. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Christiansen, Vidar; Hoel, Michael; Lund, Diderik; Mehlum, Halvor & Nyborg, Karine [Vis alle 8 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2020). Subsidier til oljenæringen gir ikke omstilling. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2020). The Third Theorem of Welfare Economics: Report from a Fictional Field Study. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2020). Economic policy, climate and nature: economics – the solution or the problem? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Hoel, Michael & Nyborg, Karine (2020). Krisetiltak for oljebransjen bør ikke fremme ulønnsomme investeringer. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2019). Humans in the Perfectly Competitive Market: Report from a Fictional Field Study. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine; Nilssen, Tore; Holden, Steinar; Storesletten, Kjetil & Harstad, Bård Gjul (2019). Åpen tilgang fjerner ikke forlagenes makt. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2019). The Third Theorem of Welfare Economics. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Lund, Diderik & Nyborg, Karine (2019). Hvordan begrenses oljeutvinningen best? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Fæhn, Taran; Nyborg, Karine; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine & Harstad, Bård Gjul [Vis alle 9 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2019). En ny, internasjonal klimaavtale bør på plass. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2019). Om fordelingsvirkninger i nytte-kostnadsanalyser. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2019). The fine line between wanted and unwanted information: an experiment on strategic ignorance. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2019). Om risikojustering av kalkulasjonsrenten og arbeidet med NOU 2012:16. Kommentar til presentasjon av Diderik Lund og Frikk Nesje. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2019). Bør norsk oljeutvinning reduserast av omsyn til klimaet? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2019). The Case for a Supply-Side Climate Treaty. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2019). Hvordan forene olje- og klimapolitikken? En mulig pådriverrolle for Norge. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2019). The Third Theorem of Welfare Economics. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2019). The Third Theorem of Welfare Economics. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine; Brekke, Kjell Arne; Lind, Jo Thori & Hauge, Karen Evelyn (2018). The Good, the Bad and the Conditional: Sustaining Cooperation through Self-Sorting. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine; Brekke, Kjell Arne; Hauge, Karen Evelyn & Lind, Jo Thori (2018). The Good, the Bad and the Conditional: Sustaining Cooperation through Self-Sorting. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Wiborg, Vegard Sjurseike; Brekke, Kjell Arne & Nyborg, Karine (2020). Collaboration, Alphabetical Order and Gender Discrimination – Evidence from the Lab. Institute of Labor Economics (IZA). Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2019). No Man is an Island - Social coordination and the Environment. Universitetet i Oslo. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Wiborg, Vegard Sjurseike; Brekke, Kjell Arne & Nyborg, Karine (2019). Collaboration, Alphabetical Order and Gender Discrimination. Evidence from the Lab. Universitetet i Oslo. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2019). Humans in the Perfectly Competitive Market: Report from a Fictional Field Study. Universitetet i Oslo. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2019). The Third Theorem of Welfare Economics: Report from a Fictional Field Study. IZA Institute of Labor Economics. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2019). Skriftlige kommentarer fra særskilt sakkyndig til Økonomi og Miljø 2019, formannskapets diskusjonsopplegg til Danmarks Miljøøkonomiske Råds møte 30.04.19. De Økonomiske Råd København. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nyborg, Karine (2018). Skriftlig kommentar til Danmarks Miljøøkonomiske Råd: Vismandsrapporten Økonomi og miljø 2018. De Økonomiske Råd. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

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