Jon Vislie

• Michael Hoel, Tor Iversen, Tore Nilssen, and Jon Vislie, "Genetic testing in competitive insurance markets with repulsion from chance: A welfare analysis," Journal of Health Economics 25, 2006, 847-860
• Jon Vislie, "Efficiency and equilibria in complementary teams," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 23,1994, 83-91
• Jon Vislie and Christian Riis, "On game theory and how to use it for understanding the functioning of organizations", in Economic Approaches to Organizations: An Introduction, Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1994
• Jon Vislie, "Bargaining, vertical control and (de-)regulation in the european gas market," pp. 67 – 85 in Olav Bjerkholt, Øystein Olsen and Jon vislie (eds.), Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy Economics, Chapman and Hall, London, 1990
• Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy Economics, eds. Olav Bjerkholt, Øystein Olsen and Jon Vislie, Chapman and Hall, London, 1990
• Natural Gas Markets and Contracts, eds. Rolf Golombek, Michael Hoel and Jon Vislie, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. North Holland, 1987
• Jon Vislie, "On the optimal management of transboundary renewable resources: A comment on Munro’s paper," Canadian Journal of Economics 20, 1987, 870-875
• Michael Hoel and Jon Vislie, "Supply functions for outputs and demand functions for inputs in the short run and the long run under uncertainty," Scandinavian Journal of Economics 85, 1983, 53-60

• Nævdal, Eric & Vislie, Jon (2019). Climate Change, Catastrophic Risk and the Role of the Pure Rate of Time Preference. I Olaussen, Jon Olaf (Red.), Contributions in natural resource economics. Festschrift to Anders Skonhoft. Fagbokforlaget. ISSN 9788245024715. s. 199–219. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Førsund, Finn R & Vislie, Jon (2016). Leif Johansen on intra-industry structural change. Journal of Policy Modeling. ISSN 0161-8938. 38(3), s. 515–527. doi: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2016.02.005. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Anundsen, Andre Kallåk; Krogh, Tord S.; Nymoen, Ragnar & Vislie, Jon (2014). Overdeterminacy and endogenous cycles: Trygve haavelmo's business cycle model. Metroeconomica. ISSN 0026-1386. 65(3), s. 460–486. doi: 10.1111/meca.12049. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon; Anundsen, Andre Kallåk; Krogh, Tord Sigurd Holmsen & Nymoen, Ragnar (2012). The Macroeconomics of Trygve Haavelmo. Nordic Journal of Political Economy (NOPEC). ISSN 0805-7508. 37, s. 1–26. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Anundsen, Andre Kallåk; Krogh, Tord Sigurd Holmsen; Nymoen, Ragnar & Vislie, Jon (2011). Overdeterminacy and endogenous cycles: Trygve Haavelmo’s business cycle model and its implications for monetary policy. Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo. ISSN 0809-8786. doi: 10.1111/meca.12049. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Anundsen, Andre Kallåk; Krogh, Tord Sigurd Holmsen; Nymoen, Ragnar & Vislie, Jon (2011). Haavelmos makromodeller: Endogene konjunkturer og inflasjonsteori. Samfunnsøkonomen. ISSN 1890-5250. 125(9), s. 32–43. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hoel, Michael Olaf; Iversen, Tor; Nilssen, Tore & Vislie, Jon (2006). Genetic testing in competitive insurance markets with repulsion from chance: A welfare analysis. Journal of Health Economics. ISSN 0167-6296. 25, s. 847–860. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2005). Økonomiundervisningen - uten fagkritikk og faghistorie? I Astad, Ragnhild Savina Berg; Lie, Geir Sølve Sande & Stensnes, Kyrre (Red.), RØST:Økonomisk teori og politisk praksis 2005-01. Radikalt Økonominettverk. ISSN 9788299684514. s. 69–72. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1994). Efficiency and Equilibria in Complementary Teams. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. ISSN 0167-2681. 23(1), s. 83–91. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The paper considers a team or a partnership where the partners' effort levels enter as strict complements in the production function. The existence of a linear (budget-balancing) sharing mechanism is demonstrated which implements the team's efficient outcome as a Nash equilibrium. This result is in contrast to a result derived in Holmstrom (1982).

• Vislie, Jon & Riis, Christian (1994). On game theory and how to use it for understanding the functioning of organizations: An Introduction. I Foss, Pål (Red.), Economic Approaches to Organizations: An Introduction. Dartmouth Publishing Company. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hoel, Michael Olaf; Vislie, Jon & Holtsmark, Bjart (1990). The European gas market as a bargaining game. I Olsen, Ø. & Vislie, Jon (Red.), Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy. Chapman and Hall. s. 49–65. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1990). Bargaining, Vertical Control and (De)-Regulation in the European Gas Market. I Bjerkholt, Olav; Olsen, Øystein & Vislie, Jon (Red.), Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy Economics. Chapman and Hall. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1990). The Management of Jointly Produced Exhaustible Resources. I Bjerkholt, Olav; Olsen, Øystein & Vislie, Jon (Red.), Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy Economics. Chapman and Hall. s. 207–217. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1988). Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining and Random Outside Options. Economics Letters. ISSN 0165-1765. 26, s. 325–328. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1987). On the Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources: A Comment on Munro's paper. Canadian Journal of Economics. ISSN 0008-4085. 20(4), s. 870–875. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1987). Long-Term Bilateral Contracts for Natural Gas. I Vislie, Jon; Hoel, Michael Olaf & Golombek, Rolf (Red.), Natural Gas Markets and Contracts. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. North-Holland. ISSN 9780444702067. s. 267–277. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon; Hoel, Michael Olaf & Golombek, Rolf (1987). Natural gas markets and contracts:An introduction. I Vislie, Jon; Hoel, Michael Olaf & Golombek, Rolf (Red.), Natural Gas Markets and Contracts. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. North-Holland. ISSN 9780444702067. s. 1–6. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Hoel, Michael Olaf (1987). Bargaining, Bilateral Monopoly and Exhaustible Resources. I Vislie, Jon; Hoel, Michael Olaf & Golombek, Rolf (Red.), Natural Gas Markets and Contracts. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. North-Holland. ISSN 9780444702067. s. 253–265. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1986). Joint Production and Market Structure: The Case of Oil and Natural Gas. Journal of Economics. ISSN 0931-8658. 46, s. 163–173. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Hoel, Michael Olaf (1983). Supply Functions for Outputs and Demand Functions for Inputs in the Short Run and the Long Run under Uncertainty. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. ISSN 0347-0520. 85, s. 53–60. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1983). On the Dynamics of Production under Cost Uncertainty. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. ISSN 0347-0520. 85(2), s. 249–266. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1982). A Note on an Intertemporal Cost Function for a Class of Dynamic Problems. Economics Letters. ISSN 0165-1765. 9, s. 215–219. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1982). A Production Model for a Large Project. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. ISSN 0347-0520. 84(1), s. 13–25. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1979). Division of Labour - Simon Revisited. Regional Science and Urban Economics. ISSN 0166-0462. 9(1), s. 61–70. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

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• Vislie, Jon; Christiansen, Vidar; Holtsmark, Katinka Kristine & Strøm, Steinar (2015). Effektivitet, fordeling og økonomisk politikk. 2 utgv. Universitetsforlaget. ISBN 9788215023588. 400 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Skattepolitikk, knapphet på offentlige goder og private eller offentlige leverandører av tjenester. Alt dette er saker som står på politikernes agenda hver eneste dag, og som engasjerer mange.Hvordan bør knappe ressurser forvaltes i en blandingsøkonomi som den norske? I denne boken fremstilles sentrale tema som allokeringsproblemer, optimalitetskriterier og samfunnsøkonomisk effektivitet.

• Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar (2008). Økonomisk atferd, beslutninger og likevekt en innføring i analytisk mikroøkonomi. Universitetsforlaget. ISBN 9788215013572. 314 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar (2007). Effektivitet, fordeling og økonomisk politikk. Universitetsforlaget. ISBN 9788215010816. 313 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Bjerkholt, Olav; Vislie, Jon & Olsen, Ø. (1990). Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy Economics. Chapman and Hall, London. -1 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Olsen, Ø. & Vislie, Jon (1990). Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy. Chapman and Hall. -1 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Bjerkholt, Olav; Olsen, Øystein & Vislie, Jon (1990). Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy Economics. Chapman and Hall. -1 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Bjerkholt, Olav; Olsen, Øystein & Vislie, Jon (1990). Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy Economics. Chapman and Hall. -1 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Bjerkholt, Olav; Olsen, Øystein & Vislie, Jon (1990). Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy Economics. Chapman and Hall. -1 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon; Hoel, Michael Olaf & Golombek, Rolf (1987). Natural Gas Markets and Contracts. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. North-Holland. ISBN 9780444702067. 313 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

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• Vislie, Jon (2015). Norges Banks makropris til Andre Kallåk Anundsen. Samfunnsøkonomen. ISSN 1890-5250. 129(2), s. 84–85. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2015). Norges Banks makropris til André Kallåk Anundsen. Samfunnsøkonomen. ISSN 1890-5250. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Sibbern, Kai & Vislie, Jon (2014). Om OL i Oslo 2022. [Radio]. Verdibørsen NRK P2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar (2014). Renten som virkemiddel. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar (2013). EU i krise. Dagens næringsliv. ISSN 0803-9372. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2013). Innledning til "månedens klassiker": "Akademikersamfunnet" av Steinar Strøm. Samfunnsøkonomen. ISSN 1890-5250. 127(5). Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar (2013). Krav og Risiko. Dagens næringsliv. ISSN 0803-9372. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Storesletten, Kjetil & Vislie, Jon (2013). Slå Hellas konkurs! [Radio]. Verdibørsen - NRK(P2). Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2013). Effektiv forvaltning - en forutsetning for økonomisk vekst og velstand? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Krogh, Tord Sigurd Holmsen; Anundsen, Andre Kallåk; Nymoen, Ragnar & Vislie, Jon (2011). Overdeterminacy and endogenous cycles: Trygve Haavelmo's business cycle model. Presentasjon på forskningsseminar i Statistisk Sentralbyrå. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Førsund, Finn Ragnar (2011). From Macro Growth to Disaggregated Production Studies. Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo. ISSN 0809-8786. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar (2011). Skadelig eurosorti. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2010). Comments to David Zilberman: "The Legacy of Leif Johansen in Resources and Environmental Economics". Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2010). Insentiver i offentlig sektor. RØST: Radikalt økonominettverks skriftserie. ISSN 1503-9595. s. 22–28. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Førsund, Finn Ragnar (2010). Survey of the research of Leif Johansen. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar (2010). "EU's drømmeprosjekt". Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Strøm, Steinar & Vislie, Jon (2010). "Får ikke i pose og sekk". Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2010). Minnetale over Per Meinich. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2010). Optimal saving when productivity shocks are triggered by stochastic threshold caused by stock pollution. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar (2009). Vi trenger en verdidebatt. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2009). Samrøre og eierskap. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar (2008). Sentralbankene laget krisen. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2005). Effektivitet, fordeling og økonomisk politikk. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Bævre, Kåre (2005). Næringsstruktur, internasjonal handel og vekst. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2004). Privatisering og konkurranseutsetting i effektivitetens navn: Overser vi noe? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2002). Anmeldelse av "Økonomisk politikk og samfunnsøkonomisk lønnsomhet", av Kåre Petter Hagen. Økonomisk forum. ISSN 1502-6108. 56(3), s. 32–35. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2000). Fortrinn og solidaritet. Klassekampen. ISSN 0805-3839. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2000). Grenser for offentlig virksomhet? Klassekampen. ISSN 0805-3839. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2000). Myter og tvangstrøyer. Klassekampen. ISSN 0805-3839. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2000). Privatisering av omsorg. Klassekampen. ISSN 0805-3839. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1995). "Economics" av J.E.Stiglitz. Norsk Økonomisk Tidsskrift. ISSN 0801-9568. s. 303–308. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1994). Strategisk handling - Innføring i bruk av rasjonalitetsmodeller og spillteori; av Jon Hovi og Bjørn Erik Rasch. Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning (TfS). ISSN 0040-716X. s. 295–298. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1987). Spillteori anvendt på teorier for bransjestruktur og markedsformer. Sosialøkonomen. ISSN 0038-1624. 41, s. 14–19. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1986). Langsiktige gasskontrakter. Sosialøkonomen. ISSN 0038-1624. 40, s. 28–33. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1985). Om beslutningskriterier for trinnvise investeringsprosjekter. Sosialøkonomen. ISSN 0038-1624. 39, s. 29–33. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1985). Om bilaterale kontrakter for naturgass. Norsk Økonomisk Tidsskrift. ISSN 0801-9568. 99, s. 1–34. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Brunborg, Helge (1982). Økonomiske modeller og fruktbarhet. Sosialøkonomen. ISSN 0038-1624. 36, s. 12–17. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1979). Kan belutningen om å få barn belyses ved hjelp av økonomisk teori? Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning (TfS). ISSN 0040-716X. 20, s. 435–446. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Bramness, Gunnar (1978). Om konflikten mellom økonomi og økologi. Samtiden. ISSN 0036-3928. 86, s. 620–624. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1978). Begrepet "konkurranseevnen overfor utlandet". Sosialøkonomen. ISSN 0038-1624. 32, s. 13–18. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Kostøl, Fredrik Bakkemo; Gran, Bjørn; Evjenth, Anders & Vislie, Jon (2018). Finansiering av offentlig infrastruktur i utbyggingsområder. Samfunnsøkonomisk analyse AS. ISSN 9788283950274. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2017). Resource Extraction and Uncertain Tipping Points. Universitetet i Oslo. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Nævdal, Eric (2013). Resource Depletion and Capital Accumulation under Catastrophic Risk: Policy Actions against Stochastic Thresholds and Stock Pollution. Økonomisk institutt. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar (2009). Mål og virkemidler for bredere bredbånd. Fornyings-, Administrasjons-, og Kirkedepartementet - Rapport fra interdepartemental arbeidsgruppe. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Strøm, Steinar & Vislie, Jon (2008). A Discrete Choice-Model Approach to Optimal Congestion Charge. Økonomisk institutt. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Nævdal, Eric & Vislie, Jon (2008). Climate Change, Catastrophic Risk and the Relative Unimportance of Discounting. Økonomisk institutt. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar (2006). Effektivitet, Fordeling og Økonomisk Politikk. Unipub forlag. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2004). Samfunnsøkonomisk lønnsomhet og økonomisk politikk. Emneside - elektronisk. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hoel, Michael Olaf; Iversen, Tor; Nilssen, Tore & Vislie, Jon (2003). Genetic testing and repulsion from chance. Universitetet i Oslo. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  A central theme in the international debate on genetic testing concerns the extent to which insurance companies should be allowed to use genetic information in their design of insurance contracts. We analyze this issue within a model with the following important feature: A person�s well-being depends on the perceived probability of becoming ill in the future in a way that varies among individuals. We show that both tested high-risks and untested individuals are equally well off whether or not test results can be used by insurers. Individuals who test for being low-risks, on the other hand, are made worse off by not being able to verify this to insurers. This implies that verifiability dominates nonverifiability in an ex-ante sense.

• Vislie, Jon (2003). Domestic Environmental Policy under Asymmetric Information. Universitetet i Oslo. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (2001). Environmental regulation, asymmetric information and foreign ownership. Universitetet i Oslo. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Regulating an export firm with private information about emission technology is analysed, when the firm, owned partly by foreigners, has an option to bypass domestic regulation through costly relocation. If the firm chooses to relocate, a new plant will be set up in a region practicing environmental dumping, at a cost that is correlated with emission efficiency. The reservation utility then becomes type-dependent. We characterise the set of optimal contracts offered by the uninformed, domestic government under different ownership structures, when domestic taxation is distortive abd when welfare is the sum of consumers' surplus and the share of rent accruing to domestic residents. As ownership has no real effects under complete information, we show that under incomplete information ownership matters, because rent extraction becomes more important when ownership rights are shifted towards foreigners. Rent extraction is now accomplished by offering contracts with lower output and higher emissions to a subset of the efficient types, whereas a subset of the inefficient types are induced to relocate. When barriers towards foreign ownership are lowered, and then shifting the distribution of ownership rights in favour of foreigners, more pollution will be generated for types of the firm that do not exit, whereas a larger fraction of types should be induced to relocate.

• Vislie, Jon (2001). Incentive Contracts for Public Health Care Provision under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard. Universitetet i Oslo. ISSN 9788277560687. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Many payment reforms are based on a (high-powered) DRG-price system. We analyse the design of an optimal compensation scheme for public hospitals, when each hospital is privately informed about any patient's true disease, while cost control cannot be verified, and treatment offered has a stochastic outcome. We analyse the contracting issue both when treatment can and cannot be verified. In both cases we show that in order to reduce rent to the hospital, treatment should be less intensive than under complete information, when cost of treatment is disease-dependent. When treatment can be verified, rent extraction is accomplished not only by a demanding a less aggressive treatment, which has a negative impact on the likelihood for recovery, but also by offering a cost-reimbursement scheme, but no bonus. With non-verifiable treatment, we show that the optimal payment contract is a combination of a recovery-contingent bonus (being declining in severity) and cost sharing, with the fraction of cost reimbursed by the government increases in severity.

• Vislie, Jon (2000). Environmental Regulation under Asymmetric Information with Type-dependent outside Option. Department of Economics. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We consider how a benevolent regulator should regulate a polluting export industry when the industry, having private information about its abatement efficiency, has an option to move its operations abroad, with a type-dependent outside option rent. The paper focuses on the case where outside option is negatively correlated with abatement efficiency, implying unilateral incentives for overstating abatement efficiency. Because lump-sum taxation is ruled out, rent will have a social cost which is also affected by foreign ownership to the industry. It is demonstrated that optimal regulation calls for excessive pollution among the participating types (relative to complete information), for the purpose of rent extraction, while types being excluded are the ones with the higher outside option (the least efficient types). We also demonstrate that with a higher foreign ownership share, the larger is the set of excluded types, while overpollution should be reduced.

• Vislie, Jon (2000). Environmental regulation under asymmetric information with type-dependent outside option. Department of Economics. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1999). The role of foreign ownership in domestic environmental regulation under asymmetric information. Department of Economics. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon & Dalen, Dag Morten (1997). "Konkurranseforhold, etablering og distribusjon i markedet for legemidler". SNF. ISSN 9788272967481. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Vislie, Jon (1995). Designing optimal environmental incentive schemes under moral hazard and private information. Department of Economics. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

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