Academic Interests
Microeconomics, environmental economics, incentives, public economics
Courses taught
Background
- Professor of economics, University of Oslo, 1993-
- Professor of economics, Norwegian School of Management, 1988-1992
- Research Director, Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, 1986-1987
- Associate professor of economics, University of Oslo, 1984-1985
- Visiting scholar, Department of Economics, Northwestern University, 1983
- Research fellow, Department of economics, University of Oslo, 1980-1983
- Cand. oecon., University of Oslo, 1976
- Research assistent, Department of economics, University of Oslo, 1975-1979
Positions held
- Scientific advisor, Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, 2009-
- Member of the board, CICERO, 1999-2003
- Member of the board, Sosialøkonomen, 1994-2000
- Editor, Norsk Økonomisk Tidsskrift, 1994-2000
- Scientific advisor, Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, 1994-2000
Tags:
Economics,
Economic Policy
Publications
- Michael Hoel, Tor Iversen, Tore Nilssen, and Jon Vislie, "Genetic testing in competitive insurance markets with repulsion from chance: A welfare analysis," Journal of Health Economics 25, 2006, 847-860
- Jon Vislie, "Efficiency and equilibria in complementary teams," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 23,1994, 83-91
- Jon Vislie and Christian Riis, "On game theory and how to use it for understanding the functioning of organizations", in Economic Approaches to Organizations: An Introduction, Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1994
- Jon Vislie, "Bargaining, vertical control and (de-)regulation in the european gas market," pp. 67 – 85 in Olav Bjerkholt, Øystein Olsen and Jon vislie (eds.), Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy Economics, Chapman and Hall, London, 1990
- Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy Economics, eds. Olav Bjerkholt, Øystein Olsen and Jon Vislie, Chapman and Hall, London, 1990
- Natural Gas Markets and Contracts, eds. Rolf Golombek, Michael Hoel and Jon Vislie, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. North Holland, 1987
- Jon Vislie, "On the optimal management of transboundary renewable resources: A comment on Munro’s paper," Canadian Journal of Economics 20, 1987, 870-875
- Michael Hoel and Jon Vislie, "Supply functions for outputs and demand functions for inputs in the short run and the long run under uncertainty," Scandinavian Journal of Economics 85, 1983, 53-60
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Nævdal, Eric & Vislie, Jon
(2019).
Climate Change, Catastrophic Risk and the Role of the Pure Rate of Time Preference.
In Olaussen, Jon Olaf (Eds.),
Contributions in natural resource economics. Festschrift to Anders Skonhoft.
Fagbokforlaget.
ISSN 9788245024715.
p. 199–219.
Full text in Research Archive
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Anundsen, Andre Kallåk; Krogh, Tord S.; Nymoen, Ragnar & Vislie, Jon
(2014).
Overdeterminacy and endogenous cycles: Trygve haavelmo's business cycle model.
Metroeconomica.
ISSN 0026-1386.
65(3),
p. 460–486.
doi:
10.1111/meca.12049.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon; Anundsen, Andre Kallåk; Krogh, Tord Sigurd Holmsen & Nymoen, Ragnar
(2012).
The Macroeconomics of Trygve Haavelmo.
Nordic Journal of Political Economy (NOPEC).
ISSN 0805-7508.
37,
p. 1–26.
Full text in Research Archive
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Anundsen, Andre Kallåk; Krogh, Tord Sigurd Holmsen; Nymoen, Ragnar & Vislie, Jon
(2011).
Overdeterminacy and endogenous cycles: Trygve Haavelmo’s business cycle model and its implications for monetary policy.
Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo.
ISSN 0809-8786.
doi:
10.1111/meca.12049.
Full text in Research Archive
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Anundsen, Andre Kallåk; Krogh, Tord Sigurd Holmsen; Nymoen, Ragnar & Vislie, Jon
(2011).
Haavelmos makromodeller: Endogene konjunkturer og inflasjonsteori.
Samfunnsøkonomen.
ISSN 1890-5250.
125(9),
p. 32–43.
Full text in Research Archive
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Hoel, Michael Olaf; Iversen, Tor; Nilssen, Tore & Vislie, Jon
(2006).
Genetic testing in competitive insurance markets with repulsion from chance: A welfare analysis.
Journal of Health Economics.
ISSN 0167-6296.
25,
p. 847–860.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(2005).
Økonomiundervisningen - uten fagkritikk og faghistorie?
In Astad, Ragnhild Savina Berg; Lie, Geir Sølve Sande & Stensnes, Kyrre (Ed.),
RØST:Økonomisk teori og politisk praksis 2005-01.
Radikalt Økonominettverk.
ISSN 9788299684514.
p. 69–72.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(1994).
Efficiency and Equilibria in Complementary Teams.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
ISSN 0167-2681.
23(1),
p. 83–91.
Full text in Research Archive
Show summary
The paper considers a team or a partnership where the partners' effort levels enter as strict complements in the production function. The existence of a linear (budget-balancing) sharing mechanism is demonstrated which implements the team's efficient outcome as a Nash equilibrium. This result is in contrast to a result derived in Holmstrom (1982).
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Vislie, Jon & Riis, Christian
(1994).
On game theory and how to use it for understanding the functioning of organizations: An Introduction.
In Foss, Pål (Eds.),
Economic Approaches to Organizations: An Introduction.
Dartmouth Publishing Company.
Full text in Research Archive
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Hoel, Michael Olaf; Vislie, Jon & Holtsmark, Bjart
(1990).
The European gas market as a bargaining game.
In Olsen, Ø. & Vislie, Jon (Ed.),
Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy.
Chapman and Hall.
p. 49–65.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(1990).
Bargaining, Vertical Control and (De)-Regulation in the European Gas Market.
In Bjerkholt, Olav; Olsen, Øystein & Vislie, Jon (Ed.),
Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy Economics.
Chapman and Hall.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(1990).
The Management of Jointly Produced Exhaustible Resources.
In Bjerkholt, Olav; Olsen, Øystein & Vislie, Jon (Ed.),
Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy Economics.
Chapman and Hall.
p. 207–217.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(1988).
Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining and Random Outside Options.
Economics Letters.
ISSN 0165-1765.
26,
p. 325–328.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(1987).
On the Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources: A Comment on Munro's paper.
Canadian Journal of Economics.
ISSN 0008-4085.
20(4),
p. 870–875.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(1987).
Long-Term Bilateral Contracts for Natural Gas.
In Vislie, Jon; Hoel, Michael Olaf & Golombek, Rolf (Ed.),
Natural Gas Markets and Contracts.
Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. North-Holland.
ISSN 9780444702067.
p. 267–277.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon; Hoel, Michael Olaf & Golombek, Rolf
(1987).
Natural gas markets and contracts:An introduction.
In Vislie, Jon; Hoel, Michael Olaf & Golombek, Rolf (Ed.),
Natural Gas Markets and Contracts.
Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. North-Holland.
ISSN 9780444702067.
p. 1–6.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon & Hoel, Michael Olaf
(1987).
Bargaining, Bilateral Monopoly and Exhaustible Resources.
In Vislie, Jon; Hoel, Michael Olaf & Golombek, Rolf (Ed.),
Natural Gas Markets and Contracts.
Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. North-Holland.
ISSN 9780444702067.
p. 253–265.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(1986).
Joint Production and Market Structure: The Case of Oil and Natural Gas.
Journal of Economics.
ISSN 0931-8658.
46,
p. 163–173.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon & Hoel, Michael Olaf
(1983).
Supply Functions for Outputs and Demand Functions for Inputs in the Short Run and the Long Run under Uncertainty.
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
ISSN 0347-0520.
85,
p. 53–60.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(1983).
On the Dynamics of Production under Cost Uncertainty.
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
ISSN 0347-0520.
85(2),
p. 249–266.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(1982).
A Note on an Intertemporal Cost Function for a Class of Dynamic Problems.
Economics Letters.
ISSN 0165-1765.
9,
p. 215–219.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(1982).
A Production Model for a Large Project.
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
ISSN 0347-0520.
84(1),
p. 13–25.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(1979).
Division of Labour - Simon Revisited.
Regional Science and Urban Economics.
ISSN 0166-0462.
9(1),
p. 61–70.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon; Christiansen, Vidar; Holtsmark, Katinka Kristine & Strøm, Steinar
(2015).
Effektivitet, fordeling og økonomisk politikk. 2 utgv.
Universitetsforlaget.
ISBN 9788215023588.
400 p.
Full text in Research Archive
Show summary
Skattepolitikk, knapphet på offentlige goder og private eller offentlige leverandører av tjenester. Alt dette er saker som står på politikernes agenda hver eneste dag, og som engasjerer mange.Hvordan bør knappe ressurser forvaltes i en blandingsøkonomi som den norske? I denne boken fremstilles sentrale tema som allokeringsproblemer, optimalitetskriterier og samfunnsøkonomisk effektivitet.
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Bjerkholt, Olav; Vislie, Jon & Olsen, Ø.
(1990).
Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy Economics.
Chapman and Hall, London.
-1 p.
Full text in Research Archive
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Bjerkholt, Olav; Olsen, Øystein & Vislie, Jon
(1990).
Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy Economics.
Chapman and Hall.
-1 p.
Full text in Research Archive
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Bjerkholt, Olav; Olsen, Øystein & Vislie, Jon
(1990).
Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy Economics.
Chapman and Hall.
-1 p.
Full text in Research Archive
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Bjerkholt, Olav; Olsen, Øystein & Vislie, Jon
(1990).
Recent Modelling Approaches in Applied Energy Economics.
Chapman and Hall.
-1 p.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon; Hoel, Michael Olaf & Golombek, Rolf
(1987).
Natural Gas Markets and Contracts.
Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. North-Holland.
ISBN 9780444702067.
313 p.
Full text in Research Archive
View all works in NVA
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Vislie, Jon
(2015).
Norges Banks makropris til Andre Kallåk Anundsen.
Samfunnsøkonomen.
ISSN 1890-5250.
129(2),
p. 84–85.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(2013).
Innledning til "månedens klassiker": "Akademikersamfunnet" av Steinar Strøm.
Samfunnsøkonomen.
ISSN 1890-5250.
127(5).
Full text in Research Archive
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Krogh, Tord Sigurd Holmsen; Anundsen, Andre Kallåk; Nymoen, Ragnar & Vislie, Jon
(2011).
Overdeterminacy and endogenous cycles: Trygve Haavelmo's business cycle model. Presentasjon på forskningsseminar i Statistisk Sentralbyrå.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon & Førsund, Finn Ragnar
(2011).
From Macro Growth to Disaggregated Production Studies.
Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo.
ISSN 0809-8786.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(2010).
Comments to David Zilberman: "The Legacy of Leif Johansen in Resources and Environmental Economics".
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(2010).
Insentiver i offentlig sektor.
RØST: Radikalt økonominettverks skriftserie.
ISSN 1503-9595.
p. 22–28.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(2010).
Optimal saving when productivity shocks are triggered by stochastic threshold caused by stock pollution.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(2002).
Anmeldelse av "Økonomisk politikk og samfunnsøkonomisk lønnsomhet", av Kåre Petter Hagen.
Økonomisk forum.
ISSN 1502-6108.
56(3),
p. 32–35.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(1994).
Strategisk handling - Innføring i bruk av rasjonalitetsmodeller og spillteori; av Jon Hovi og Bjørn Erik Rasch.
Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning (TfS).
ISSN 0040-716X.
p. 295–298.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(1987).
Spillteori anvendt på teorier for bransjestruktur og markedsformer.
Sosialøkonomen.
ISSN 0038-1624.
41,
p. 14–19.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(1985).
Om beslutningskriterier for trinnvise investeringsprosjekter.
Sosialøkonomen.
ISSN 0038-1624.
39,
p. 29–33.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(1985).
Om bilaterale kontrakter for naturgass.
Norsk Økonomisk Tidsskrift.
ISSN 0801-9568.
99,
p. 1–34.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon & Brunborg, Helge
(1982).
Økonomiske modeller og fruktbarhet.
Sosialøkonomen.
ISSN 0038-1624.
36,
p. 12–17.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(1979).
Kan belutningen om å få barn belyses ved hjelp av økonomisk teori?
Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning (TfS).
ISSN 0040-716X.
20,
p. 435–446.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon & Bramness, Gunnar
(1978).
Om konflikten mellom økonomi og økologi.
Samtiden.
ISSN 0036-3928.
86,
p. 620–624.
Full text in Research Archive
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Kostøl, Fredrik Bakkemo; Gran, Bjørn; Evjenth, Anders & Vislie, Jon
(2018).
Finansiering av offentlig infrastruktur i utbyggingsområder.
Samfunnsøkonomisk analyse AS.
ISSN 9788283950274.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon & Nævdal, Eric
(2013).
Resource Depletion and Capital Accumulation under Catastrophic Risk: Policy Actions against Stochastic Thresholds and Stock Pollution.
Økonomisk institutt.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar
(2009).
Mål og virkemidler for bredere bredbånd.
Fornyings-, Administrasjons-, og Kirkedepartementet - Rapport fra interdepartemental arbeidsgruppe.
Full text in Research Archive
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Strøm, Steinar & Vislie, Jon
(2008).
A Discrete Choice-Model Approach to Optimal Congestion Charge.
Økonomisk institutt.
Full text in Research Archive
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Nævdal, Eric & Vislie, Jon
(2008).
Climate Change, Catastrophic Risk and the Relative Unimportance of Discounting.
Økonomisk institutt.
Full text in Research Archive
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Hoel, Michael Olaf; Iversen, Tor; Nilssen, Tore & Vislie, Jon
(2003).
Genetic testing and repulsion from chance.
Universitetet i Oslo.
Full text in Research Archive
Show summary
A central theme in the international debate on genetic testing concerns the extent to
which insurance companies should be allowed to use genetic information in their design
of insurance contracts. We analyze this issue within a model with the following important
feature: A person�s well-being depends on the perceived probability of becoming ill in
the future in a way that varies among individuals. We show that both tested high-risks
and untested individuals are equally well off whether or not test results can be used by
insurers. Individuals who test for being low-risks, on the other hand, are made worse off
by not being able to verify this to insurers. This implies that verifiability dominates nonverifiability
in an ex-ante sense.
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Vislie, Jon
(2001).
Environmental regulation, asymmetric information and foreign ownership.
Universitetet i Oslo.
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Regulating an export firm with private information about emission technology is analysed, when the firm, owned partly by foreigners, has an option to bypass domestic regulation through costly relocation. If the firm chooses to relocate, a new plant will be set up in a region practicing environmental dumping, at a cost that is correlated with emission efficiency. The reservation utility then becomes type-dependent. We characterise the set of optimal contracts offered by the uninformed, domestic government under different ownership structures, when domestic taxation is distortive abd when welfare is the sum of consumers' surplus and the share of rent accruing to domestic residents. As ownership has no real effects under complete information, we show that under incomplete information ownership matters, because rent extraction becomes more important when ownership rights are shifted towards foreigners. Rent extraction is now accomplished by offering contracts with lower output and higher emissions to a subset of the efficient types, whereas a subset of the inefficient types are induced to relocate. When barriers towards foreign ownership are lowered, and then shifting the distribution of ownership rights in favour of foreigners, more pollution will be generated for types of the firm that do not exit, whereas a larger fraction of types should be induced to relocate.
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Vislie, Jon
(2001).
Incentive Contracts for Public Health Care Provision under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.
Universitetet i Oslo.
ISSN 9788277560687.
Full text in Research Archive
Show summary
Many payment reforms are based on a (high-powered) DRG-price system. We analyse the design of an optimal compensation scheme for public hospitals, when each hospital is privately informed about any patient's true disease, while cost control cannot be verified, and treatment offered has a stochastic outcome.
We analyse the contracting issue both when treatment can and cannot be verified. In both cases we show that in order to reduce rent to the hospital, treatment should be less intensive than under complete information, when cost of treatment is disease-dependent. When treatment can be verified, rent extraction is accomplished not only by a demanding a less aggressive treatment, which has a negative impact on the likelihood for recovery, but also by offering a cost-reimbursement scheme, but no bonus. With non-verifiable treatment, we show that the optimal payment contract is a combination of a recovery-contingent bonus (being declining in severity) and cost sharing, with the fraction of cost reimbursed by the government increases in severity.
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Vislie, Jon
(2000).
Environmental Regulation under Asymmetric Information with Type-dependent outside Option.
Department of Economics.
Full text in Research Archive
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We consider how a benevolent regulator should regulate a polluting export industry when the industry, having private information about its abatement efficiency, has an option to move its operations abroad, with a type-dependent outside option rent. The paper focuses on the case where outside option is negatively correlated with abatement efficiency, implying unilateral incentives for overstating abatement efficiency. Because lump-sum taxation is ruled out, rent will have a social cost which is also affected by foreign ownership to the industry. It is demonstrated that optimal regulation calls for excessive pollution among the participating types (relative to complete information), for the purpose of rent extraction, while types being excluded are the ones with the higher outside option (the least efficient types). We also demonstrate that with a higher foreign ownership share, the larger is the set of excluded types, while overpollution should be reduced.
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Vislie, Jon
(2000).
Environmental regulation under asymmetric information with type-dependent outside option.
Department of Economics.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(1999).
The role of foreign ownership in domestic environmental regulation under asymmetric information.
Department of Economics.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon & Dalen, Dag Morten
(1997).
"Konkurranseforhold, etablering og distribusjon i markedet for legemidler".
SNF.
ISSN 9788272967481.
Full text in Research Archive
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Vislie, Jon
(1995).
Designing optimal environmental incentive schemes under moral hazard and private information.
Department of Economics.
Full text in Research Archive
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Published
Oct. 1, 2010 4:02 PM
- Last modified
Jan. 6, 2020 12:58 PM