GInE General Institutional Equilibrium: Theory and Policy Implications

Status
Completed

European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grant 283236.

Contact

About the project  

Theory: The GInE project aims at developing a coherent theory of the organizational design of political and economic institutions with an emphasis on how they interact. In a partial equilibrium setting, contract theory must be extended to permit the agent to be an institution, perhaps endogenously choosing its organizational design. In a general equilibrium setting, several institutions must be permitted to be endogenous at the same time.

Applications:The theory is necessary to better understand how environmental agreements should be designed, how federal policies should be implemented given local institutions, and what development aid should be conditional on. Thus, the theory will be built on and for several applications in political economics, public economics, environmental economics, and international/development economics.

The theoretical as well as the applied part consist of three stages:

Stage 1: How must existing contract theory be modified when the “agent” is an organization or an institution?

(a) Development aid contracts as functions of the local governance structure
(b) Federal incentives for local governments generating externalities on others

Stage 2: What is the optimal institutional design given its tasks and the environment?  

(c) The optimal climate agreement depends on the design of local institutions 
(d) Local governance structures depend on the international political environment

Stage 3: What is the general institutional equilibrium when multiple institutions are endogenous simultaneously?

(e) Environmental agreement designs and local governance structures interact
(f) One country’s privatization of public utilities triggers privatization abroad

Read more about the project:

Project description

The principal investigator

Bård Harstad is a professor at the University of Oslo. Until 2013, he held the Max McGraw Chair in Management & Environment at Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University.

Events

Theory and Environment Workshop

Time and place: Mar. 3, 2016 12:00 PM – Mar. 4, 2016 3:00 PM, Eilert Sundts hus

The GINE project at the Department of Economics, University of Oslo, is organizing a workshop on Theory and Environment 3-4 March 2016.

Workshop Goals

The goals of the workshop are to:

  1. motivate environmental economists to employ the best and most recent methods available in economic theory;
  2. motivate economic theorists to develop models that provide insight on environmental problems.

To achieve these two goals, five papers will be presented by environmental economists and discussed by theorists, and five papers will be presented by economic theorists and discussed by environmental economists.

Programme

Thursday March 3rd, 12:00-18:00
  • 12:00-13:00 Welfare Division in the Commons
    • Presenter: Stefan Ambec (Toulouse)
    • Discussant: Francis Bloch (Paris)
  • 13:00-14:00 Green Technology and Bandits
    • Presenter: Katinka Holtsmark (Oslo)
    • Discussant: Juuso Valimaki (Aalto)
  • 14:15-15:15 Group Decision Making 
    • Presenter: Philippe Jehiel (Paris) with Olivier Compte
    • Discussant: Jean-Marc Bourgeon (INRA and Ecole Polytechnique)
  • 15:30-16:30 Cake Eating with Private Information
    • Presenter: Reyer Gerlagh (Tilburg) with Matti Liski
    • Discussant: Steven Matthews (Pennsylvania)
  • 16:45-17:45 Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation
    • Presenter: Johannes Horner (Yale) with Alessandro Bonatti
    • Discussant: Matti Liski (Aalto)
Friday March 4th. 9:00-15:00
  • 09:00-10:00 Dynamic Conservation Contracts
    • Presenter: Bård Harstad (Oslo) with Nils Chr. Framstad
    • Discussant: Dilip Abreu (Princeton)
  • 10:15-11:15 Reputation Building under Uncertain Monitoring
    • Presenter: Joyee Deb (Yale) with Yuhta Ishii 
    • Discussant: Mirabelle Muuls (IC London/ LSE)
  • 11:15-12:15 Collective Intertemporal Choice: Time Consistency vs. Time Invariance
    • Presenter: Antony Millner (LSE) with Geoffrey Heal
    • Discussant: Francis Dennig (Yale-NUS College)
  • 12:45-13:45 The Optimal Structure of Conservation Agreements and Monitoring
    • Presenter: Ted Groves (UC San Diego) et al.
    • Discussant: Peter N Sørensen (Copenhagen)
  • 14:00-15:00 Dynamic Oligopoly with Incomplete Information
    • Presenter: Juuso Toikka (MIT) with Alessandro Bonatti and Gonzalo Cisternas
    • Discussant: Till Requate (Kiel)
  • 15:15-16:30 General discussion

Participants

  • Dilip Abreu (Princeton)
  • Arne Rogde Gramstad (Oslo)
  • Fransesco Nava (LSE)
  • Stefan Ambec (Toulouse)
  • Mads Greaker (SSB)
  • Frikk Nesje (Oslo)
  • Arild Angelsen (NMBU)
  • Ted Groves (San Diego)
  • Tore Nilssen (Oslo)
  • Malin Arve (NHH)
  • Bård Harstad (Oslo)
  • Karine Nyborg (Oslo)
  • Geir B. Asheim (Oslo)
  • Ingrid Hjort (Oslo)
  • Trond Olsen (NHH)
  • Olvar Bergland (NMBU)
  • Michael Olaf Hoel (Oslo)
  • Anna Pauls (Oslo)
  • Geir H Bjertnæs (SSB)
  • Katinka Holtsmark (Oslo)
  • Till Requate (Kiel)
  • Francis Bloch (Paris)
  • Johannes Horner (Yale)
  • Eirik Romstad (NMBU)
  • Jean-Marc Bourgeon (INRA)
  • Aanund Hylland (Oslo)
  • Knut Einar Rosendahl (NMBU)
  • Kjell Arne Brekke (Oslo)
  • Philippe Jehiel (Paris)
  • Wilfried Sand-Zantman (Toulouse)
  • Joyee Deb (NYU Stern)
  • Svenn Jensen (NMBU)
  • Robert Schmidt (Humboldt)
  • Francis Dennig (Yale NUS)
  • Snorre Kverndokk (Frisch)
  • Peter N. Sørensen (Copenhagen)
  • Florian Klaus Diekert (Oslo)
  • Francesco Lancia (Vienna)
  • Daniel Spiro (Oslo)
  • Gunnar Eskeland (Oslo)
  • Matti Liski (Aalto)
  • Aurore Staes (Zürich)
  • Nils Christian Framstad (Oslo)
  • Steven Matthews (Pennsylvania)
  • Alessandro Tavoni (LSE)
  • Finn Førsund (Oslo)
  • Torben Mideksa (Oslo)
  • Juuso Toikka (MIT)
  • Reyer Gerlagh (Tilburg)
  • Antony Millner (LSE)
  • Juuso Valimaki (Aalto)
  • Isla Globus-Harris (San Diego)
  • Kalle Moene (Oslo)
  • Jon Vislie (Oslo)
  • Rolf Golombek (Frisch)
  • Mirabelle Muuls (IC London)
  • Nils-Henrik von der Fehr (Oslo)

Participants

Publications

  • Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements. Marco Battaglini and Bård Harstad. Published in: Journal of Political Economics 2015
  • Experimentation in federal systems. Bård Harstad and Steven Callander. Published in: Quarterly Journal of Economics 2015 130 (2) pp. 951-1002. DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjv008
  • Intergenerational Egalitarianism. Paolo Piacquadio. Published in Journal of Economic Theory (2014, vol. 153: 117-127).
  • Announcements as an Equilibrium Selection Device. Paolo Piacquadio with N. Acocella, G. Di Bartolomeo and A. Hughes-Hallett. Published in Oxford Economic Papers (2014, vol. 66: 325-347).
  • Games and Resources. Bård Harstad and Matti Liski. Book chapter, published in Encyclopedia of Energy, Natural Resource, and Environmental Economics (2013, vol. 2: 299-308).
  • Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements. Bård Harstad and Marco Battaglini. Journal of Political Economy. DOI: 10.3386/w18585

Funding

European Research Counsil

Funded by the European Union (ERC, GInE, 283236). Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Council Executive Agency. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 283236.

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Published Aug. 7, 2025 10:10 AM - Last modified Aug. 7, 2025 12:39 PM