Kristoffer Berg

The Equal-Sacrifice Social Welfare Function with an Application to Optimal Income Taxation, CESifo WP (2020)

Problematic Response Margins in the Estimation of the Elasticity of Taxable Income, International Tax and Public Finance (2019)

• Berg, Kristoffer; Henriksen, Espen; Næss, Ole-Andreas Elvik & Vestad, Ola L. (2026). Eierbeskatning: to forslag for å redusere politisk risiko. Samfunnsøkonomen. ISSN 1890-5250. 140(4), p. 99–118. doi: 10.18261/sam.140.4.1. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer; Håvarstein, Morten & Piacquadio, Paolo Giovanni (2026). Equity and efficiency when needs differ. Journal of Public Economics. ISSN 0047-2727. 260. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2026.105704. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  There is no consensus on how to measure social welfare and inequality when households have different needs. As we show, a dilemma emerges between holding households responsible for their needs or compensating them. This dilemma is of first-order importance for social welfare, but generally plays a minor role in the measurement of inequality. To address this impasse, we introduce partial compensation. Our axiomatic characterizations reveal novel families of welfare criteria and, with the extension to multidimensional commodity spaces, provide ready-to-use criteria for the analysis of redistributive policies.

• Berg, Kristoffer (2025). Revealing inequality aversion from tax policy and the role of non‐discrimination. Economica. ISSN 0013-0427. 92(366), p. 483–506. doi: 10.1111/ecca.12567. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Governments have increasing access to individual information, but they exploit little of it when setting taxes. This paper shows how to reveal inequality aversion from observed tax policy choices of such governments. First, I map governments' priorities into concerns for vertical and horizontal equity. While vertical equity underlies inequality aversion, horizontal equity introduces a restriction against tax discrimination. This restriction affects the measurement of inequality aversion. Second, I apply the model to a hypothetical gender tax using Norwegian tax return data. The main result is that inequality aversion is overestimated when horizontal equity is ignored.

• Berg, Kristoffer & Hebous, Shafik (2025). The effect of parental wealth on labor income: Evidence from the Norwegian wealth tax. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. ISSN 0167-2681. 240. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107284. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Does parental wealth affect labor income and inequality in the next generation? We address this question using intergenerational data and institutional variation from the Norwegian wealth tax. Our findings indicate that a 10 percent increase in parental wealth raises annual labor income of children by 0.15 percent. The causal effect of parental wealth accounts for 18 percent of the rank-rank correlation between parental wealth and labor income. While education remains a key determinant of earnings, higher parental wealth is also associated with greater labor market risk-taking. These results suggest that taxing parental wealth potentially alters the distribution of labor income across generations.

• Berg, Kristoffer; Håvarstein, Morten & Piacquadio, Paolo Giovanni (2024). Equity and Efficiency when Needs differ. CESifo Working Papers. ISSN 1617-9595. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer & Hebous, Shafik (2021). Does a Wealth Tax Improve Equality of Opportunity? Evidence from Norway. IMF Working Paper. ISSN 1018-5941. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer & Thoresen, Thor Olav (2019). Problematic response margins in the estimation of the elasticity of taxable income. International Tax and Public Finance. ISSN 0927-5940. p. 721–752. doi: 10.1007/s10797-019-09576-3. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  The elasticity of taxable income (ETI) holds the promise of representing a summary measure of tax efciency costs, which means that further information about the behavioral components of the ETI is not required for its use in tax policy design. However, since there are response margins that can cause biases in the estimation of the elasticity, this paper warns against neglecting information about the composition of the behavior summarized by the ETI. When using responses of the Norwegian self-employed to the tax reform of 2006 for illustration, we discuss how three diferent response margins relate to the overall ETI: working hours, tax evasion and shifts in organizational form. We provide empirical illustrations of efects of each of these margins and argue that the standard procedure for estimating the ETI produces a biased estimate due to the organizational shift margin.

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• Berg, Kristoffer (2026). Capital Gains Tax Deferral: Norwegian Evidence and Reform Simulations. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2026). Taxing Deferred and Mobile Capital Gains. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer; Håvarstein, Morten & Stubhaug, Magnus Eliasson (2023). Meritocratic Labor Income Taxation. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer; Håvarstein, Morten & Stubhaug, Magnus Eliasson (2023). Meritocratic Labor Income Taxation. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer & Hebous, Shafik (2023). Does a Wealth Tax Improve Equality of Opportunity? Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2023). Taxing Corporate or Shareholder Income. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2023). Kutt heller selskapsskatten. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2023). EU Wealth Tax Debate Heats Up As Governments Search for Revenue. [Internet]. Bloomberg Tax. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer & Vamsæter, Kristen (2023). Skattesatser på grunnrente – tenk på et tall? Dagens næringsliv. ISSN 0803-9372. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer & Piacquadio, Paolo Giovanni (2023). Fairness and Paretian Social Welfare Functions. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer & Hebous, Shafik (2023). Does a Wealth Tax Improve Equality of Opportunity? Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer & Hebous, Shafik (2023). Does a Wealth Tax Improve Equality of Opportunity? Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer & Piacquadio, Paolo Giovanni (2023). Fairness and Paretian Social Welfare Functions. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2023). Civita forteller ikke hele sannheten om eierskatt. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2023). Et glimrende argument for robust aksjonærbeskatning. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2023). Sollen Reiche mehr abgeben? | Geht auch anders. [Internet]. ENTR de by Deutsche Welle. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer & Piacquadio, Paolo Giovanni (2023). Fairness and Paretian Social Welfare Functions. CESifo Working Papers. ISSN 1617-9595. doi: 10.13140/RG.2.2.17538.96962. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2022). Listhaug: – Vi har mulighet til å betale tilbake noen av de ekstreme inntektene staten har fått. [Internet]. Altinget. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer & Piacquadio, Paolo Giovanni (2022). The equal-sacrifice social welfare function. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2021). Ulikheten øker, men ikke slik Arbei­der­par­tiet sa. [Internet]. faktisk.no. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2021). Skatteøkonomer mener nytt grep kan gjøre offentlige investeringer betydelig billigere. [Journal]. E24. Full text in Research Archive
• Piacquadio, Paolo Giovanni & Berg, Kristoffer (2021). The equal-sacrifice social welfare function. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer & Piacquadio, Paolo Giovanni (2021). The equal-sacrifice social welfare function. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer & Piacquadio, Paolo Giovanni (2021). The equal-sacrifice social welfare function. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2021). Revealing Inequality Aversion from Tax Policy. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2021). Does a Wealth Tax Improve Equality of Opportunity? Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2021). Revealing Inequality Aversion from Tax Policy. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2021). Hva skal vi med selskapsskatten? Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2021). Skattlegg de rike gamle og gi til de unge. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2021). Revealing Inequality Aversion from Tax Policy. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2021). Formuesskatten bidrar til likere muligheter. Dagens næringsliv. ISSN 0803-9372. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2021). Does a Wealth Tax Improve Equality of Opportunity? Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer & Hebous, Shafik (2021). Wealth Inequality, Wealth Taxation, and the Wage Distribution of the Next Generation. Austaxpolicy. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2020). Trickle down-teorien. [Radio]. P2. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2020). Når sprekker den norske boligboblen? [Internet]. UiO/Agenda. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2020). Norges mest undervurderte skatt. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2020). Revealing Inequality Aversion from Tax Policy. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2020). Revealing Inequality Aversion from Tax Policy. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2020). Revealing Inequality Aversion from Tax Policy. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2020). Revealing Inequality Aversion from Tax Policy. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer & Piacquadio, Paolo Giovanni (2020). The equal sacrifice social welfare function with an application to optimal income taxation. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer & Piacquadio, Paolo Giovanni (2020). The equal sacrifice social welfare function with an application to optimal income taxation. CESifo Working Papers. ISSN 1617-9595. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer & Piacquadio, Paolo Giovanni (2020). The equal sacrifice social welfare function with an application to optimal income taxation. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer & Piacquadio, Paolo Giovanni (2020). The equal sacrifice social welfare function with an application to optimal income taxation. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer & Piacquadio, Paolo Giovanni (2020). The equal sacrifice social welfare function with an application to optimal income taxation. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2019). Er ekstremt rike folk skadelig for demokratiet? Agenda Magasin. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2019). Revealing Equity Principles from the Tax System. Full text in Research Archive
• Thoresen, Thor Olav & Berg, Kristoffer (2015). On the Multiple Behavioral Margins of Self-Employment. Full text in Research Archive
• Berg, Kristoffer (2021). Fair and Efficient Taxation. Universitetet i Oslo. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Due to increasing inequality and government debt, taxation is at the forefront of both academic and policy debates. With this in mind, the criteria economists use to evaluate tax policies are crucial. Typically, the criterion has been utilitarianism. However, utilitarianism has problematic tax policy implications. This dissertation considers other fairness views, such as horizontal equity, equal sacrifice and intergenerational mobility. The main contribution is therefore to expand the fairness views considered in designing tax policy. The first chapter shows how to reveal inequality aversion from observed tax policy when governments restrict the information they exploit. Governments have increasing access to information about individuals, but they exploit little of it in setting taxes. I build on the inverse optimal tax problem, which considers the observed tax system, combined with information about the income distribution and how individuals react to taxes, to reveal the weight society assigns to each individual’s consumption. The first contribution is to map these weights into the concerns for vertical and horizontal equity. While vertical equity provides the standard inequality aversion rationale for redistributive taxation, horizontal equity introduces a restriction against tax discrimination. Here, I develop a theory and optimal tax algorithm to reveal the priority on each concern. The second contribution is to apply the model to gender-specific taxation in Norway. My result is that inequality aversion is overestimated if horizontal equity is ignored. The second chapter (joint with Paolo G. Piacquadio) proposes and axiomatically characterize a family of welfare criteria that prioritize individuals making larger sacrifices. By combining efficiency with a concern for equality of sacrifice, our criteria avoid serious shortcomings of utilitarianism. We illustrate our results within the Mirrleesian optimal taxation framework. Our simulated equal-sacrifice optimal tax schedule rationalizes the Californian tax system at higher incomes when sacrifice is proportional, and suggests marginal tax rates that are about 20 percentage points lower than the utilitarian recommendation. In the third chapter (joint with Shafik Hebous), we ask the questions: Does parental wealth inequality impact next generation labour income inequality, and if so, does a tax on parental wealth affect the labour income distribution of the next generation? We tackle both questions empirically using detailed intergenerational data from Norway, focusing on effects on wages rather than capital income. Our results suggest that a net wealth of NOK 1 Million increases the yearly wages of the children by NOK 14,000. Children of wealthy parents also have a higher labour income mobility. The estimated hypothetical wage distribution without the wealth tax is more unequal. In addition, suggestive evidence indicates parental wealth is associated with higher labour risk taking. In the fourth chapter (joint with Thor O. Thoresen), we study the elasticity of taxable income and the self-employed. The elasticity of taxable income summarizes the welfare effects of behavioural responses to taxes. We show how behavioural responses may create bias in the measurement of the elasticity of taxable income. Using register data on the self-employed in Norway, we find that their taxable income response stems from responses in working hours, tax evasion and organizational shifts. In particular, organizational shifts create a selection problem and, in this chapter, we show how to correct the measurement bias due to this response.

• Berg, Kristoffer & Thoresen, Thor Olav (2016). Problematic Response Margins in the Estimation of the Elasticity of Taxable Income. Statistisk sentralbyrå (SSB). Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  The elasticity of taxable income (ETI) is known to represent a summary measure of tax efficiency costs, which means that further information about the behavioral components of the ETI is not required for its use in tax policy design. However, as there are response margins that may cause biases in the estimation of the elasticity, we advise against neglecting information about the composition of the behavior seized by the ETI. When using responses of the Norwegian self-employed to the tax reform of 2006 for illustration, we discuss how four different responses relate to the overall ETI, given characteristics of the reform. Effects on working hours, on tax evasion, and from shifts in organizational form and across tax bases are discussed in terms of to what extent they represent sources to estimation bias, or enter into the ETI in a decompositional way. We provide empirical illustrations of the effects of each of these margins.

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