Kotsadam, Andreas; Rasmussen, Magnus Bergli; Moene, Karl Ove; Kjelsrud, Anders & Gjerløw, Haakon
(2026).
Strikes and Machines: Investments in the Norwegian Inter-War-Period.
Journal of Economic History.
ISSN 0022-0507.
86(2),
p. 427–459.
doi: 10.1017/S0022050725101095.
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We suggest a new mechanism to explain political and economic inequality in resource rich countries. The mechanism is based on the premise that migrants are treated less generously in autocracies than in democracies. As a consequence, democracies want fewer migrants than autocracies. After democratization a new government may therefore start out with (potentially many) more migrants than their preferred level. These excess migrants, inherited from the autocracy, represent a costly legacy that makes democracy less attractive to citizens. With democracy less attractive, it is cheaper to compensate citizens for not challenging the autocratic regime. Not only that — by adding even more migrants, democratization becomes even less attractive, enabling the ruler to keep even more of the resource rents for himself without a threat of losing power.
Kjelsrud, Anders; Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle) & Vandewalle, Lore
(2024).
Political Competition Over Life and Death Social Provision and Infant Mortality in India.
The Journal of human resources.
ISSN 0022-166X.
60(1).
doi: 10.3368/jhr.0723-13002R2.
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We argue that economic inequality harms social provision to the poor, but that higher political competition can mitigate this effect. We test this hypothesis using a large redistricting of electoral boundaries in India. Higher economic inequality leads to more post-neonatal infant deaths, but only when political competition is weak. We assert that the effect on mortality operates via changes in social provision at the local level and confirm this for two different programs: Inequality leads to worse performance of public healthcare and weaker provision of the workfare program MGNREGA, but only in situations with little political competition.
Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle) & Søreide, Tina
(2024).
Scope and precision in the laws against corporate bribery.
In Rose-Ackerman, Susan (Eds.),
Public Sector Performance, Corruption and State Capture in a Globalized World.
Routledge.
ISSN 9781003416234.Full text in Research Archive
De engelske kornlovene 1815–1846 ble initiert for å beskytte grunneiernes kommersielle inntekter; matkrisen i Frankrike i 1770 for å øke overskuddet på kongens jord; hungersnøden i Bengal i 1770 for å øke East India Companys profitt. Eksemplene indikerer hvordan fattigdom og sult i perioden 1750–1850 kunne skyldes kommersielt maktmisbruk som skadet allmennheten, samtidig som grunneiere og næringslivsinteresser tjente på det. Essayet understreker hvordan progressive økonomer på den tiden foreslo å bruke frihandel for å temme det kommersielle maktmisbruket. Venstresiden agiterte for marked heller enn monopol. Høyresiden agiterte for privilegier heller enn konkurranse. Abstract in English:Market, Power, and Countervailing Forces – in the Time of Adam Smith, Henry Hunt, and Henry GeorgeThe English Corn Laws, 1815–1846, were initiated to protect landowners’ commercial rents; the 1770 food crisis in France to raise the surplus on the King’s land; the 1770 famine in Bengal to raise the profits of the East India Company. These examples indicate how poverty and starvation in the period 1750–1850 could be caused by commercial power abuse, harming the public but benefiting landowners and commercial interests. The essay emphasizes how progressive economists at the time recommended free trade to tame the commercial abuse. The left agitated for markets rather than monopoly. The right agitated for privileges rather than competition.
Barth, Erling; Finseraas, Henning; Kjelsrud, Anders & Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle)
(2023).
Openness and the welfare state: risk and income effects in protection without protectionism.
European Journal of Political Economy.
ISSN 0176-2680.
79.
doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2023.102405.
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Have recent trends in globalization changed the positive link between trade openness and social insurance? The consensus view – that voters want better social insurance against income loss the more open the economy – is seemingly contested by the rise of new right-wing parties and the China shock. We present a theoretical framework of risk and income effects of globalization that captures the conventional view, but also shows when it will be modified: When the income effect is negative, the political support for social insurance can decline in spite of the risk effect. We construct an empirical measure of welfare state support across European regions and leverage the rapid integration of China into the world economy to show that higher import competition reduces the support for social insurance. Consistent with our framework, we use variations in employment losses between regions to decompose the overall effect of the shock into a (weak) positive risk effect and a (strong) negative income effect.
Bhuller, Manudeep Singh; Moene, Karl Ove; Mogstad, Magne & Vestad, Ola Lotherington
(2022).
Facts and Fantasies about Wage Setting and Collective Bargaining.
Journal of Economic Perspectives.
ISSN 0895-3309.
36(4),
p. 29–52.
doi: 10.1257/jep.36.4.29.
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In this article, we document and discuss salient features of collective bargaining systems in the OECD countries, with the goal of debunking some misconceptions and myths and revitalizing the general interest in wage setting and collective bargaining. We hope that such an interest may help close the gap between how economists tend to model wage setting and how wages are actually set. Canonical models of competitive labor markets, monopsony, and search and matching all assume a decentralized wage setting where individual firms and workers determine wages. In most advanced economies, however, it is common that firms or employer associations bargain with unions over wages, producing collective bargaining systems. We show that the characteristics of these systems vary in important ways across advanced economies, with regards to both the scope and the structure of collective bargaining.
Kjelsrud, Anders; Mitra, Shabana & Moene, Karl Ove
(2022).
Wheels of Power: Can Free Bicycles for Schoolgirls Free Their Mothers?
Economic development and cultural change.
ISSN 0013-0079.
72(2),
p. 423–457.
doi: 10.1086/722053.
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We study whether a social program to facilitate girls’ schooling in India increases theautonomy of mothers and other female family members. The program gives every girl inGrade 9 a cash amount to purchase a bicycle. This targeted in-kind provision has the effectof lowering the price of educating girls. It also signals the worth of young women. Wefind a strong empowerment effect on older female family members. The effect is strongestin areas where the program has the biggest impact on girls’ schooling, suggesting that itis an indirect outcome of targeting benefits towards schoolgirls.
Barth, Erling; Finseraas, Henning; Kjelsrud, Anders & Moene, Karl Ove
(2022).
Hit by the Silk Road: how wage coordination in Europe mitigates the China shock.
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
ISSN 0347-0520.
doi: 10.1111/sjoe.12489.
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Coordination in collective wage setting can constrain potential monopoly gains to unions in non-traded-goods industries. Countries with national wage coordination can thus stabilize overall employment against fluctuations and shocks in the world economy. We test this argument by exploring within-country variation in exposure to competition from China in 13 European countries. Our estimates demonstrate that in countries with uncoordinated wage setting, regions with higher import exposure from China experienced a marked fall in employment, while countries with wage-coordination experienced no such employment effects. We show that our findings are robust to alternative measures of wage coordination, industry classifications, and trade exposure.
Cappelen, Alexander Wright; Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle); Skjelbred, Siv-Elisabeth & Tungodden, Bertil
(2022).
The merit primacy effect.
The Economic Journal.
ISSN 0013-0133.
133(651),
p. 951–970.
doi: 10.1093/ej/ueac082.
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A long history in economics going back to Adam Smith has argued that people give primacy to merit – rather than luck – in distributive choices. We provide a theoretical framework formalizing the merit primacy effect, and study it in a novel experiment where third-party spectators redistribute from high-earners to low-earners in situations where both merit and luck determine earnings. We identify a strong and consistent merit primacy effect in the spectator behaviour. The results shed new light on inequality acceptance in society, by showing how just a little bit of merit can make people significantly more inequality accepting.
The chapter demonstrates that while the Nordic countries remain relatively affluent and egalitarian, inequality of disposable household income has been on the rise over the past 30 years. The increase in income inequality and relative income poverty has been strongest in Sweden and more modest in the three other countries. In Sweden, and, to a lesser extent, in Finland and Denmark, a reduced role for social transfers among the working age population has contributed to a decline in relative income levels enjoyed by the bottom quintile. Often in the wake of serious macro-economic downturns, politicians have reduced the generosity of social transfers to improve labour market incentives. Even if these reforms have had the intended effect on employment, the increase in earnings has not been sufficient to replace the loss of social transfers.
Grimalda, Gianluca; Trannoy, Alain; Filgueira, Fernandro & Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle)
(2020).
Egalitarian redistribution in the era of hyper-globalization.
Review of social economy.
ISSN 0034-6764.
78(2),
p. 151–184.
doi: 10.1080/00346764.2020.1714072.
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Two traditional theorems of welfare economics posit a trade-off between a government redistribution targets and efficiency. We propose a third ‘claim’ of welfare economics, stating that in closed economies the actual efficiency costs associated with redistribution are small. We then examine the claim in the current phase of ‘hyper-globalization’. On the one hand, a race-to-the-bottom in taxation restricts the capacity to tax high-earners and the associated brain drain may affect a country’s long-run growth. On the other hand, demand for social insurance should be particularly high in an open economy, especially with advancing digitalization. Xenophobic sentiments may, however, offset this demand. We also discuss the impact of globalization on wage equalization and productive efficiency. We conclude against the idea that the welfare state is intrinsically unable to carry out its redistributive function in an era of globalization. However, its strategies and tools of intervention must be rethought.
Around the world, journalists uncover corruption, abuse of power, and financial misdealing – often at the risk of serious consequences or under financial constraints. These are also important issues in economic research. Economists address similar problems from a different perspective, and offer logical explanations for the factors that enable a risk of corruption, its harmful impact on society, and why governments fail to enforce their anti-corruption laws. Below we discuss some of the problems of corruption and how investigative journalism contributes to controlling it. We are interested in what the disciplines of journalism and economics can learn from each other. The more authoritarian leaders weaken integrity standards in governance, the more financial secrecy providers facilitate grand scale crime; and the more barriers there are for journalists who seek to disclose misdealing, the more important it is to join forces across countries and across disciplines.
Barth, Erling & Moene, Karl Ove
(2017).
Reell eller Ideell Konkurranse.
Samfunnsøkonomen.
ISSN 1890-5250.
131(2),
p. 92–102.Full text in Research ArchiveShow summary
Konkurranse dreier seg ikke bare om priser og kostnader. Derfor kan ikke små åpne økonomier gjøre det bra ved bare å produsere det samme som andre land, på samme måte, men med
lavere kostnader. Den reelle konkurransen dreier seg om hva en skal gjøre og hvordan en skal gjøre det. Den dreier seg like mye om organisering, institusjoner og fordelingspolitikk som om nye metoder, nye teknologier og nye produkter. Troen på anbefalingene fra institusjonsfri
økonomisk teori kan stå i veien for den nødvendige institusjonelle oppfinnsomheten.
Moene, Karl Ove
(2016).
Social Equality as a Development Strategy.
In Törnquist, Olle & Harriss, John (Ed.),
Reinventing Social Democratic Development. Insights from Indian and Scandinavian Comparisons.
NIAS Press.
ISSN 9788776942007.p. 241–267.Full text in Research Archive
Prydz, Espen Beer; Lind, Jo Thori & Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle)
(2026).
Poverty Amidst Affluence. Measuring Miserliness in Rich and Poor Countries.
Full text in Research Archive
Mogstad, Magne; Moene, Karl Ove; Bhuller, Manudeep Singh & Vestad, Ola Lotherington
(2022).
Facts and Fantasies about Wage Setting and Collective Bargaining.
BFI Working Papers.
121.
Full text in Research Archive
Bhuller, Manudeep Singh; Moene, Karl Ove; Mogstad, Magne & Vestad, Ola
(2022).
Facts and Fantasies about Wage Setting and Collective Bargaining.
NBER Working Paper Series.
ISSN 0898-2937.
30437.
Full text in Research Archive
Aaberge, Rolf & Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle)
(2021).
Innlegg om ulikhet: Verdien av velferdstjenestene oppveier ikke forskjellene som skriver seg fra kapital- og boligmarkedene.
Dagens næringsliv.
ISSN 0803-9372.Full text in Research Archive
Aaberge, Rolf & Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle)
(2021).
Innlegg i ulikhetsdebatten: Fag møter ideologi.
Dagens næringsliv.
ISSN 0803-9372.Full text in Research Archive
Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle)
(2021).
Gjestearbeidere er gisler i Qatar og andre udemokratiske land.
Full text in Research Archive
Davies, Rob; Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle) & Torvik, Ragnar
(2020).
How the Zimbabweans pay for the war against covid-19.
EDI COVID-19 ESSAY SERIES.
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Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle)
(2020).
Kronikk: Det avgjørende skillet går ikke mellom offentlig og privat.
Full text in Research Archive
Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle)
(2020).
Kronikk: Privat sektor er ikke produktiv fordi den er privat.
Full text in Research Archive
Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle)
(2020).
Kronikk: Store forhåpninger ble til enorme skuffelser.
Full text in Research Archive
Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle)
(2020).
Arbeiderkapitalister – Økonomien kan fungere bedre når de ansatte eier og styrer sin egen virksomhet.
Full text in Research Archive
Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle)
(2020).
Ulikhetenes likevekt – merknader til Thomas Pikettys Capital and Ideology.
Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning (TfS).
ISSN 0040-716X.
61(4),
p. 403–407.
doi: 10.18261/ISSN.1504-291X-2020-04-07.
Full text in Research Archive
Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle)
(2020).
Innlegg: Ingen sektor har forrang.
Dagens næringsliv.
ISSN 0803-9372.Full text in Research Archive
Lind, Jo Thori & Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle)
(2018).
Trumps økonomirådgivere advarer mot nordisk «sosialisme». Rapporten er misvisende og polemisk.
Full text in Research Archive
Lind, Jo Thori; Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle) & Aaberge, Rolf
(2018).
The inequality of equal mating.
Full text in Research Archive
Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle)
(2018).
Kalle Moene: «Jeg lurer på hvordan toppledere kan få seg til å tro på de pene ordene og vakre bildene på selskapenes hjemmesider».
p. 34–34.Full text in Research Archive
Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle)
(2018).
Kanskje vi skal prise oss lykkelige over at økonomer ikke klarer å forutsi finansielle kriser, skriver Kalle Moene. Full text in Research Archive
Barth, Erling; Finseraas, Henning; Kjelsrud, Anders Grøn & Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle)
(2021).
Does the Rise of China Lead to the Fall of European Welfare States?
IZA Institute of Labor Economics.
Full text in Research ArchiveShow summary
Have recent trends in globalization changed the positive link between trade openness and social insurance? The consensus view - that voters want better social insurance against income loss the more open the economy - is seemingly contested by the rise of populism and the China shock. We present a theoretical framework of risk and income effects of globalization that captures the conventional view, but also shows when it will be modified:
When the income effect is negative, the political support for social insurance can decline in spite of the risk effect. We construct an empirical measure of welfare state support across European regions and leverage the rapid integration of China into the world economy to show that higher import competition reduces the support for social insurance. Consistent with our framework, we decompose the overall effect of the shock into a (weak) positive risk effect and a (strong) negative income effect
Barth, Erling; Finseraas, Henning; Kjelsrud, Anders Grøn & Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle)
(2020).
Hit by the Silk Road: How Wage Coordination in Europe Mitigates the China Shock.
IZA – Institute of Labor Economics.
Full text in Research Archive
Kjelsrud, Anders Grøn; Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle) & Vandewalle, Lore
(2020).
The political competition over life and death evidence from infant mortality in India.
Geneva, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, International Economics Department.
Full text in Research Archive
Do people give primacy to merit when luck partly determines earnings? This paper reports from a novel experiment where third-party spectators have to decide whether to redistribute from a high-earner to a low-earner in cases where earnings are determined by luck and merit. The experiment has four treatments that vary the relative importance of luck and merit, but where it is always possible to decompose the part of the earnings that originate from each of the two sources. We argue that any reasonable fairness view in such cases should satisfy two fairness conditions: Fairness Consistency and Fairness Symmetry. Our main finding is that the spectators assign strong primacy to merit in situations where inequalities are due to both luck and merit, and as a result violate both fairness conditions. The spectators allocate close to the same share to the high-earner when merit
only accounts for ten percent of the earnings as when merit accounts for all of the earnings, and paradoxically spectators allocate even more to the high-earner when luck determines a small part of the earnings. We believe that the results shed new light on inequality acceptance in society, in particular by showing how just a little bit of merit can make people significantly more inequality accepting.
