Tobias Bach

Askim, J., Bach, T., & Christensen, J.G. (2024). Political change and administrative turnover in meritocratic systems. West European Politics, 47(2), 329-355. (published version and authors' post-print version)

Verlinden, S., Bach, T., Wynen, J., Kleizen, B., & Verhoest, K. (2023). Does Organizational Change Trigger Civil Servant Proactivity? The Impact of Individual Change History. Public Management Review. (article on journal website)

Bach, T.. & Hustedt, T. (2023). Policy-making in the executive triangle: a comparative perspective on ministers, advisers, and civil servants. In R. Shaw (ed.) Handbook on Ministerial and Political Advisers (pp. 338-351). Edward Elgar.

Bach, T., Jugl, M., Köhler, D., & Wegrich, K. (2022). Regulatory agencies, reputational threats, and communicative responses. Regulation & Governance 16(4), 1042-1057. (open access, video summary)

Bach, T., & Wegrich, K. (2022). Politician-Bureaucrat Relations. In K. Schedler (Ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Management (pp. 150-154). Edward Elgar.

Bach, T. (2022). Bureaucratic Politics. In P. Graziano & J. Tosun (Eds.), Elgar Encyclopedia of European Union Public Policy (pp. 11-20). Edward Elgar. (working paper version available here).

Bach, T., Verhoest, K., & Wynen, J. (2022). The interaction of administrative tradition and organisational characteristics: the case of agency personnel management autonomy. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 88(1), 95-113. (article on journal website, authors' post-print version)

Bach, T. (2021). Bureaucracies and Policy Ideas. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Oxford University Press. (version on publisher's website, author's postprint version)

Bach, T. (2020). Top Officials’ Careers and the Relationship between Politics and Administration. The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, 13(2), 35-48. 

Bach, T., Hammerschmid, G., & Löffler, L. (2020). More Delegation, More Political Control? Politicization of Senior Level Appointments in 18 European Countries. Public Policy and Administration, 35(1), 3-23. 

Bach, T., & Wegrich, K. (2020). Politicians and Bureaucrats in Executive Government. In R. B. Andeweg, R. Elgie, L. Helms, J. Kaarbo, & F. Müller-Rommel (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Executives (pp. 525-546). Oxford University Press.

Bach, T., & Wegrich, K. (2019). The politics of blame avoidance in complex delegation structures: the public transport crisis in Berlin. European Political Science Review, 11(4), 415-431.

Bach, T., & Wegrich, K. (Eds.). (2019). The blind spots of public bureaucracy and the politics of non-coordination. Palgrave Macmillan.

Bach, T., & Veit, S. (2018). The Determinants of Promotion to High Public Office in Germany: Partisan Loyalty, Political Craft, or Managerial Competencies? Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 28(2), 254-269.
 

• Bach, Tobias & Hustedt, Thurid (2023). Policy-making in the executive triangle: a comparative perspective on ministers, advisers, and civil servants. In Shaw, Richard (Eds.), Handbook on Ministerial and Political Advisers. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISSN 9781800886575 . p. 338–351. doi: 10.4337/9781800886582.00034. Show summary

  This chapter seeks to bridge existing research on the politicisation of top civil servants and the roles of ministerial advisers by proposing a new conceptual approach for the comparative analysis of executive policy-making. We conceive of the executive triangle as a set of interdependent relationships between ministers, civil servants, and advisers. Those relationships may take different forms, depending on the distinct tasks performed by each actor and their roles in policy-making, which define mutual expectations. Thus understood, the executive triangle is an institution performing particular functions in policy-making (such as assessing policy alternatives, anticipating political support, and coordinating with other actors both inside and outside government). Those functions are performed by actors within the triangle and reflected in their roles and their direct and indirect relationships. The chapter conceptually explores such a system-perspective on the executive triangle; sketches analytical dimensions for understanding similarities and differences of executive triangles across contexts; provides empirical illustrations of variations of the executive triangle in Europe; and develops a research agenda using this concept to better understand the roles of ministers, ministerial advisers, and top civil servants in executive policy-making in a comparative perspective.

• Verlinden, Stéphanie; Bach, Tobias; Wynen, Jan; Kleizen, Bjorn & Verhoest, Koen (2023). Does organizational change trigger civil servant proactivity? The impact of past changes experienced. Public Management Review. ISSN 1471-9037. doi: 10.1080/14719037.2023.2284225. Show summary

  Civil servants are increasingly expected to behave proactively at work, being confronted with workplace changes that require increased autonomy and responsibility. However, proactivity is a resource-intense behaviour that may become increasingly difficult in a demanding work context characterized by frequent change. We examine the impact of organizational change on civil servant proactivity, taking into account civil servants’ past change experiences. Analysis of two survey waves in a Belgian government agency reveal that civil servants who experienced many changes in the past behave less proactively in response to new changes compared to their colleagues who only experienced few past changes.

• Bach, Tobias; Trondal, Jarle; Aars, Jacob; Lindén, Tord Skogedal; Martinussen, Pål Erling & Winsvold, Marte Slagsvold (2022). Hvorfor trenger vi en ny infrastruktur for norsk forvaltningsforskning? Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift. ISSN 0801-1745. 38(4), p. 137–157. doi: 10.18261/nst.38.4.2. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Artikkelen presenterer etableringen, organiseringen og gjennomføring av ny forskningsinfrastruktur for norsk forvaltningsforskning. Norsk Forvaltningspanel (NFP) er en forskningsinfrastruktur etablert for å gjennomføre jevnlige spørreundersøkelser blant forvaltningsansatte i staten (departementer, direktorater og tilsyn). NFP er en del av en større forskningsinfrastruktur som både muliggjør panelundersøkelser blant byråkrater over tid og koordinert datainnsamling mellom byråkrater, politikere, journalister og medborgere. Artikkelen skisserer bakgrunnen for etableringen av NFP, noen grunnprinsipper for organisering av infrastrukturen, samt en gjennomgang av fordeler og utfordringer ved etableringen av en slik infrastruktur. Deretter analyserer vi panelets representativitet og presenterer utvalgte resultater fra første runde med datainnsamling i NFP, som vi sammenligner med eksisterende survey-data. Avslutningsvis diskuterer vi kritiske steg i videreutviklingen av forskningsinfrastrukturen.

• Askim, Jostein Rosfjord; Bach, Tobias & Christensen, Jørgen Grønnegård (2022). Political change and administrative turnover in meritocratic systems. West European Politics. ISSN 0140-2382. 47(2), p. 329–355. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2022.2148195. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  A change of government or minister constitutes a stress test for the relationship between ministers and bureaucrats. The new political masters may question the loyalty of incumbent bureaucrats and seek to replace them. However, the relationship between political changes and administrative turnover is poorly understood in meritocratic systems. This article analyses how changes of either government or minister affect the turnover of permanent secretaries in Denmark and Norway (1970–2020). Whereas ministers are completely reliant on career bureaucrats in pure meritocratic systems, they are supported by political appointees in hybrid meritocratic systems. The article investigates whether the effect of political changes on administrative turnover is mediated by the presence or absence of political appointees. Changes of government increase the risk of administrative turnover in Norway (hybrid system), but there are no such effects in Denmark (pure system), suggesting that political appointees potentially undermine the permanence of career bureaucrats.

• Zahra, Abiha & Bach, Tobias (2021). The Intensity of Organizational Transitions in Government: Comparing Patterns in Developed and Developing Countries. Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration. ISSN 2327-6665. 44(2), p. 152–171. doi: 10.1080/23276665.2021.1980069. Full text in Research Archive
• Bach, Tobias; Jugl, Marlene; Wegrich, Kai & Köhler, Dustin (2021). Reputational threats and democratic responsiveness of regulatory agencies. In Eriksen, Erik Oddvar (Eds.), The Accountability of Expertise: Making the Un-Elected Safe for Democracy. Routledge. ISSN 9781003175490. p. 81–98. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  This chapter studies decision-making behaviour of independent regulatory agencies. Theoretical accounts of delegation to regulatory agencies emphasise that losses of political accountability of regulators are traded off against potential gains in regulatory efficiency. The theory of credible commitment suggests that independent (non-majoritarian) regulatory agencies are more effective in regulating markets than organisations under direct political control. However, independent regulatory agencies operate in a political context and need to demonstrate their benefit to a diverse set of stakeholders, including elected politicians. We are hence confronted with a ‘paradox of autonomisation’ according to which more autonomous public organisations have to take into consideration external demands to a greater degree than less autonomous organisations. Independent regulatory agencies will thus be subjected to high accountability demands. We use the analytical lens of bureaucratic reputation theory to analyse how different types of external demands affect regulatory agencies’ attention to stakeholders. The chapter argues that reputation-sensitive regulatory agencies will exhibit differential response patterns to negative public judgements, depending on the kind of negative judgements and the type of actor criticising the regulator. In this chapter we use data from a systematic media analysis of public judgements and regulators’ communicative response, with the financial regulator and the utility regulator (electricity, railways, etc.) in Germany as empirical cases . We find that regulatory agencies respond differently to negative public judgements yet are not more (or less) responsive to political actors’ criticism compared to other types of actors. This finding questions independent regulatory agencies’ democratic accountability, yet the chapter also suggests that public criticism and debate is only one channel, among many others, through which regulators are held democratically accountable.

• Askim, Jostein & Bach, Tobias (2021). Mellom meritokrati og politisering? En kompetansestudie av etatsledere med og uten politikerbakgrunn, 1980–2020. Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift. ISSN 0801-1745. 37(4), p. 171–190. doi: 10.18261/issn.1504-2936-2021-04-02. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Artikkelen studerer tilsetting av norske toppbyråkrater i et politiseringsperspektiv og ser på sammenhengen mellom politisk bakgrunn og kompetanse. Forskningsspørsmålene er (1) om toppbyråkrater med politisk bakgrunn er bedre eller dårligere kvalifisert enn andre toppbyråkrater når det gjelder fagkunnskap og ledererfaring og (2) om de som er tilknyttet regjeringspartiene, er bedre eller dårligere kvalifisert enn de som er tilknyttet opposisjonen. Artikkelen studerer 120 etatsledertilsettinger i 48 virksomheter på fire departementsområder fra 1980 til 2020. I 14 % av tilfellene ble det tilsatt en etatsleder som hadde erfaring fra toppolitikken. Resultatene viser at etatsledere med politisk erfaring har lavere fagkunnskap enn etatsledere uten politisk erfaring, men at denne forskjellen drives av de som er regjeringstilknyttet. De opposisjonstilknyttede har ikke statistisk signifikant dårligere fagkunnskap enn de upolitiske etatsledere. Tre teoretiske perspektiver brukes til å tolke funnene. At det er få regjeringstilknyttede blant etatslederne støtter meritokratiperspektivet, men at de som er regjeringstilknyttet er relativt dårlig kvalifisert, støtter politiseringsperspektivet. At de de opposisjonstilknyttede scorer noe lavere, dog ikke statistisk signifikant lavere enn de upolitiske, når det gjelder fagkunnskap, lar seg best forklare med politikkforståelsesperspektivet.

• Bach, Tobias; Jugl, Marlene; Köhler, Dustin & Wegrich, Kai (2021). Regulatory agencies, reputational threats, and communicative responses. Regulation & Governance. ISSN 1748-5983. 16(4), p. 1042–1057. doi: 10.1111/rego.12421. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  A key claim in bureaucratic reputation literature is that reputation has several dimensions. This presents agencies with a difficult choice concerning which dimension(s) they should emphasize in the management of their reputation. This paper analyzes how regulatory agencies manage their reputation through communicative responses to public judgments, based on a single-case study of the German financial regulator BaFin. Our theoretical argument underscores the importance of different reputational dimensions for regulatory agencies that simultaneously considers their distinct reputation reserves. Our main finding was that BaFin prioritizes responses to public judgments targeting reputational dimensions that are central to its mission and for which the agency has a weak reputation, as opposed to judgments targeting dimensions that are central to its mission and for which it has a strong reputation, or judgments targeting peripheral dimensions. The paper demonstrates the importance of agency missions for reputation management and suggests directions for further research.

• Bach, Tobias (2021). Bureaucracies and Policy Ideas. In Thompson, William R. (Eds.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Oxford University Press. ISSN 9780190228637. doi: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1421. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  The idea of a clear separation between policymaking and implementation is difficult to sustain for policy bureaucracies in which public officials have “policy work” as their main activity. A diverse body of scholarship indicates that bureaucrats may enjoy substantial levels of discretion in defining the nature of policy problems and elaborating on policy alternatives. This observation raises questions about the conditions under which bureaucratic policy ideas make their way into authoritative policy decisions, the nature of those policy ideas, and how bureaucratic policymaking has evolved. A main point is that bureaucratic policy ideas are developed in a political context, meaning that bureaucrats have to anticipate that political decision makers will eventually have to endorse a policy proposal. The power relations between politicians and bureaucrats may, however, vary, and bureaucrats may gain the upper hand, which is likely if a bureaucracy is professionally homogenous and able to develop a coherent policy idea. Another perspective concerns the origins of policy ideas. There is limited evidence for individual-level explanations of policy ideas, according to which bureaucrats pursue exogenously defined preferences to maximize their own utility. A competing organizational perspective, which considers policy preferences as the result of organizational specialization, the development of local rationalities, and the defense of organizational turf, stands out as a more plausible explanation for the origins of bureaucratic policy ideas. The policymaking role, and thereby the importance of bureaucratic policy ideas, is being challenged by the rise of ministerial advisors, agencification, and better regulation reforms. Those developments have the potential to change the substance of bureaucratic policy ideas, but they may also generate strategic behavior, which should be of interest to scholars of the politics of bureaucracy.

• Bach, Tobias (2020). Top Officials’ Careers and the Relationship between Politics and Administration. NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy. ISSN 1337-9038. 13(2), p. 35–48. doi: 10.2478/nispa-2020-0013. Show summary

  This essay elaborates how the analysis of administrative careers – both as dependent and independent variables – can be leveraged to gain a more systematic understanding of the relationship between politics and administration. It highlights how the analysis of administrative careers can provide answers to pertinent questions about the relationship between politics and administration, including civil service politicization, politicians’ motivations in patronage decisions, the interplay of organizational characteristics and top officials’ careers, and performance effects of administrative careers. It also includes suggestions on how to move forward in terms of research methods and how the systematic analysis of administrative careers can strengthen the comparative analysis of the relationship between politics and administration.

• Bach, Tobias & Wegrich, Kai (2020). Politicians and Bureaucrats in Executive Government. In Andeweg, Rudy B.; Elgie, Robert; Helms, Ludger; Kaarbo, Juliet & Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Executives. Oxford University Press. ISSN 9780198809296. p. 525–546. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198809296.013.21. Show summary

  Political executives depend on bureaucrats in the formulation and implementation of public policy. This raises fundamental questions about the balancing of bureaucratic autonomy and political control. The chapter primarily focuses on the relationship between political executives and public officials tasked with policy development (‘policy bureaucrats’). It provides an overview of the main scholarly debates: the recruitment and replacement of public officials; sources of bureaucratic power; and interactions between policy bureaucrats and political executives. We also provide an overview of the main theories on politico-administrative relations, including political economy and Public Service Bargain (PSB) perspectives. The chapter then highlights key developments in current research, including comparative analyses, the study of ministerial advisers, and the politicization of regulatory agencies. We conclude with a research agenda on the impact of increasingly complex problems and political polarization on role understandings and patterns of decision-making, as well as on the motivations and effects of politicization.

• Lichtmannegger, Christina & Bach, Tobias (2020). The interaction of multiple drivers of intra-organizational change in ministerial administrations: A study of three decades of structural reforms in the Austrian Ministry of Agriculture. Public Policy and Administration. ISSN 0952-0767. 38(3), p. 287–308. doi: 10.1177/0952076720904439. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Administrative reform policies cutting across several sectors are commonplace in the public sector. However, reform policies do not necessarily result in organizational change. This article examines intra-organizational change within the Austrian Ministry of Agriculture in a longitudinal case study covering a period of three decades, which allows us to study short-term and long term-effects of administrative reforms. Whereas existing research mainly uses single-factor explanations for inter- and intra-organizational change, this article emphasizes the interplay of various drivers of organizational change within government organizations. In analytical terms, we draw on the multiple streams framework to study intra-organizational decision-making which is embedded in government-wide administrative reform policies. We find that reform leads to intra-organizational change when a political entrepreneur is able to couple solutions and problems in a decision window, which may happen decades after the initial reform attempts, underscoring that short-term reform failure may turn into success in a long-term perspective.

• Bach, Tobias; Verhoest, Koen & Wynen, Jan (2020). The interaction of administrative tradition and organisational characteristics: the case of agency personnel management autonomy. International Review of Administrative Sciences. ISSN 0020-8523. 88(1), p. 95–113. doi: 10.1177/0020852319889674. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Comparative scholars emphasise that public administration should be understood in terms of context-bound patterns of organising and decision-making. Agencies in the same context will display more commonalities than those in another. At the same time, there is good empirical evidence for organisational-level variation in decision-making. For instance, not all agencies in one country are delegated similar levels of personnel management autonomy. This article develops a theoretical argument about how administrative tradition moderates the effect of organisational drivers of personnel management autonomy. We identify the degree of uniformity embedded in administrative tradition as a key explanatory factor for this relationship. In empirical terms, the article compares the perceived personnel management autonomy of agencies in 10 European countries nested in three country clusters (Scandinavian, Latin-Napoleonic and Continental). The analysis confirms theoretical expectations about the context-specific effects of organisational characteristics on personnel management autonomy in agencies.

• Bach, Tobias & Wegrich, Kai (2019). The politics of blame avoidance in complex delegation structures: the public transport crisis in Berlin. European Political Science Review. ISSN 1755-7739. 11(4), p. 415–431. doi: 10.1017/S1755773919000213. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  The article analyses the public attribution of blame and the use of presentational strategies of blame avoidance in complex delegation structures. We theorize and empirically demonstrate that complex delegation structures result in the diffusion of blame to multiple actors so that a clear allocation of responsibility becomes more difficult. The article shows that public attribution of blame follows a distinct temporal pattern in which politicians only gradually move into the centre of the blame storm. We also find that blame-takers deploy sequential patterns of presentational management and use blame shifting to other actors as a dominant strategy. However, the analysis suggests that complex delegation structures impose limitations on blame-takers’ use of blame avoidance strategies, and that sequential presentational management becomes less useful over time. The article uses media content analysis to study blame games during a major crisis of the public transport system in Berlin, Germany.

• Bach, Tobias; Boon, Jan; Boye, Stefan; Salomonsen, Heidi Houlberg; Verhoest, Koen & Wegrich, Kai (2019). In the Line of Fire: European Financial Regulators before, during, and after the Crisis. Der moderne Staat. ISSN 1865-7192. 12(1), p. 5–29. doi: 10.3224/dms.v12i1.03. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  A key argument in recent theorizing on the drivers of bureaucratic behaviour is that agencies seek to establish and maintain a unique reputation. While recent years have witnessed substantial empirical support for this claim, the field lacks comparative examinations of the dynamics of reputation and its management throughout crisis periods. This article draws on a systematic media content analysis to explore the exposure and communication responses of the German, Belgian and Danish financial regulators to reputational threats before, during, and after the financial crisis. Our results point at the dynamic and context-sensitive nature of reputation management.

• Bach, Tobias & Wegrich, Kai (2019). Das Verhältnis von Regierung und Verwaltung aus internationaler Perspektive. In Ritz, Adrian; Haldemann, Theo & Sager, Fritz (Ed.), Blackbox Exekutive. NZZ Libro. ISSN 978-3-03810-401-8. p. 65–87.
• Bach, Tobias & Wegrich, Kai (2019). How to Deal with the Blind Spots of Public Bureaucracies. In Bach, Tobias & Wegrich, Kai (Ed.), The Blind Spots of Public Bureaucracy and the Politics of Non‐Coordination. Palgrave Macmillan. ISSN 978-3-319-76671-3. p. 241–261. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-76672-0_12. Show summary

  This concluding chapter addresses two ‘so what?’ questions raised throughout the volume. First, if attention biases are a pertinent factor in organizational life in political contexts, what can be done about them? Bach and Wegrich discuss three public sector reform approaches (joined-up government, impact assessment, and behavioural insights) in terms of how, and how successfully, they address different attention biases. Second, how can research on organizational attention biases take the role of institutional context systematically into account and explore particular different institutions’ vulnerabilities to organizational attention biases? Two ideal-type institutional modes of coordination—hierarchical and negotiated coordination—are discussed in terms of their susceptibility to attention biases. Taken together, the discussion of these two questions outlines an agenda for future research the volume seeks to stimulate.

• Bach, Tobias & Wegrich, Kai (2019). Blind Spots, Biased Attention, and the Politics of Non-coordination. In Bach, Tobias & Wegrich, Kai (Ed.), The Blind Spots of Public Bureaucracy and the Politics of Non‐Coordination. Palgrave Macmillan. ISSN 978-3-319-76671-3. p. 3–28. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-76672-0_1. Show summary

  Bach and Wegrich introduce the key theme of the volume, which revolves around understanding how routine processes of decision-making in public sector organizations potentially lead to problematic outcomes in terms of coordination and problem solving. Instead of viewing those outcomes as the result of organizational or individual pathologies, the chapter traces the origins of non-coordination within and between organizations to intentionally rational organizational behaviour. Conceptualizing blind spots as part of a larger universe of biases in organizational attention, based on established theoretical notions of bounded rationality and institutionalized organizations, the authors show how different types of attention biases provide novel insights into seemingly irrational or uncoordinated administrative behaviour.

• Bach, Tobias; Hammerschmid, Gerhard & Löffler, Lorenz (2018). More delegation, more political control? Politicization of senior-level appointments in 18 European countries. Public Policy and Administration. ISSN 0952-0767. 35(1), p. 3–23. doi: 10.1177/0952076718776356. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  This article contributes to the literature on the politicization of appointments to increase political control over public bureaucracies with often substantial managerial and policy autonomy. Using data from a large-scale executive survey from central government ministries and agencies in 18 European countries, the article provides a comprehensive cross-national and cross-organizational analysis of the autonomy-politicization conundrum and the drivers of the politicization of senior-level appointments. We find that national patterns of politicization correspond fairly well to country families as defined by administrative traditions, with some traditions being more coherent than others. At the organizational level, we find no evidence of efforts by politicians to compensate for extended autonomy by politicizing senior-level appointments, yet we provide evidence of differential effects of both formal and informal organizational characteristics on patterns of politicization. Our analyses show that politicization of senior appointments is lower in organizations with agency status, higher organizational social capital, higher financial autonomy and more extensive use of management tools. The article thereby not only offers comprehensive evidence of cross-country differences in politicization; it also adds to the literature on sub-national variation, by fleshing out an organizational perspective to the study of politicized appointments in the European context.

• Bach, Tobias & Veit, Sylvia (2018). The determinants of promotion to high public office in Germany: Partisan loyalty, political craft, or managerial competencies? Journal of public administration research and theory. ISSN 1053-1858. 28(2), p. 254–269. doi: 10.1093/jopart/mux041. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  The politicization of bureaucracy is a widespread strategy to increase the political control of ministerial departments in parliamentary democracies. It is, however, largely unknown why executive politicians promote some officials rather than others to high public office. Based on a unique dataset of all senior officials in German federal ministries and agencies that held office in the period 1997–2015, this article investigates whether partisan loyalty, political craft, and managerial competencies influence the chance of promotion to the highest civil service position in Germany (state secretary). We apply event history modeling to draw inferences on the relative importance of different selection criteria used by ministers when recruiting state secretaries from a candidate pool of senior officials. A key finding is that ministers consistently prefer politically loyal to nonloyal candidates. Although ministers also consider candidates’ political craft and selected managerial competencies, they are likely to trade-off partisan loyalty against those qualifications. The article contributes to the literature on politicization in the public sector by comparing potential and actual office holders and by including a broad set of selection criteria, moving beyond the literature’s dominating focus on partisan loyalty. The methodological approach developed in this article may well be transferred to other institutional contexts and used for comparative studies in this area.

• Bach, Tobias & Ruffing, Eva (2017). The Transformative Effects of Transnational Administrative Coordination in the European Multi-level System. In Ongaro, Edoardo & van Thiel, Sandra (Ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Public Administration and Management in Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. ISSN 978-1-137-55268-6. p. 747–763. doi: https:/doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55269-3_39.
• Veit, Sylvia; Hustedt, Thurid & Bach, Tobias (2017). Dynamics of Change in Internal Policy Advisory Systems: The Hybridization of Advisory Capacities in Germany . Policy sciences. ISSN 0032-2687. 50(1), p. 85–103. doi: 10.1007/s11077-016-9266-9. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Recent scholarship on advisory systems has focussed on the externalization of advisory capacities and sectoral dynamics of change, whereas changes of internal policy advisory systems have not yet been approached systematically. This article proposes an analytical concept for exploring change dynamics in internal policy advisory systems by means of three logics for assessing policy advice (political salience, credibility and representativeness). The approach is illustrated by analysing changes within the internal policy advisory system of the German federal government (1990–2015). The analysis relies on three original datasets on ministerial departments, research agencies and governmental advisory bodies. We find that the internal advisory system of the German federal government is characterized by a differentiated hybridization of advisory logics, which has changed the nature of policy advice.

• Bach, Tobias; van Thiel, Sandra; Hammerschmid, Gerhard & Steiner, Reto (2017). Administrative Tradition and Management Reforms: A Comparison of Agency Chief Executive Accountability in Four Continental Rechtsstaat Countries. Public Management Review. ISSN 1471-9037. 19(6), p. 765–784. doi: 10.1080/14719037.2016.1210205. Full text in Research Archive
• Bach, Tobias & Wegrich, Kai (2016). Regulatory Reform, Accountability and Blame in Public Service Delivery: The Public Transport Crisis in Berlin. In Christensen, Tom & Lægreid, Per (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook to Accountability and Welfare State Reforms in Europe. Routledge. ISSN 978-1-472-47059-1. p. 223–235.
• Bach, Tobias (2016). Administrative Autonomy of Public Organizations. In Farazmand, Ali (Eds.), Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance 2016. Springer. ISSN 978-3-319-31816-5. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_143-1. Show summary

  Administrative autonomy refers to public organizations’ ability to determine their own preferences and to translate those preferences into authoritative actions. The concept describes a relationship between an organization and a set of actors outside the organization, most importantly elected officials and executive politicians.

• Bach, Tobias; de Francesco, Fabrizio; Maggetti, Martino & Ruffing, Eva (2016). Transnational Bureaucratic Politics: An Institutional Rivalry Perspective on EU Network Governance. Public Administration. ISSN 0033-3298. 94(1), p. 9–24. doi: 10.1111/padm.12252.
• Bach, Tobias (2015). Brunsson, Nils/Olsen, Johan P. (1993): The Reforming Organization. In Kühl, Stefan (Eds.), Schlüsselwerke der Organisationsforschung. Springer. ISSN 978-3658090678. p. 133–136.
• Bach, Tobias (2015). Wie "tickt" die öffentliche Verwaltung? Autonomie, Reputation und Responsivität von Regulierungsbehörden am Beispiel des Bundesinstituts für Risikobewertung. In Dohler, Marian; Franzke, Jochen & Wegrich, Kai (Ed.), Der gut organisierte Staat. Nomos. ISSN 9783848720620. p. 161–179. doi: 10.5771/9783845262703-162.
• Bach, Tobias; Ruffing, Eva & Yesilkagit, Kutsal (2015). The Differential Empowering Effects of Europeanization on the Autonomy of National Agencies. Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions. ISSN 0952-1895. 28(3), p. 285–304. doi: 10.1111/gove.12087.
• Bach, Tobias & Ruffing, Eva (2014). The transformative effects of Europeanization on national administrations. Public. ESADE's Institute of Public Governance & Management (IGDP) e-bulletin. ISSN 2013-2530.
• Wegrich, Kai & Bach, Tobias (2014). Unter Stress: Regierung und Verwaltung in stürmischen Zeiten. In Anheier, Helmut & Hurrelmann, Klaus (Ed.), Die Hauptstädter - Berlin 25 Jahre nach dem Mauerfall: Die Hertie Berlin Studie 2014. HOFFMANN UND CAMPE VERLAG. ISSN 978-3455503395. p. 203–253.
• Bach, Tobias & Ruffing, Eva (2014). Bürokratische Koordination im europäischen Mehrebenensystem: Die Einbindung nationaler Regulierungsbehörden in europäische Verwaltungsnetzwerke. Der moderne Staat. ISSN 1865-7192. 7(1), p. 75–94. doi: 10.3224/dms.v7i1.16237.
• Bach, Tobias (2014). The autonomy of government agencies in Germany and Norway: explaining variation in management autonomy across countries and agencies. International Review of Administrative Sciences. ISSN 0020-8523. 80(2), p. 341–361. doi: 10.1177/0020852313514527.
• Bach, Tobias & Ruffing, Eva (2013). Networking for autonomy? National agencies in European networks. Public Administration. ISSN 0033-3298. 91(3), p. 712–726. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2012.02093.x.
• Bach, Tobias & Fleischer, Julia (2012). The parliamentary accountability of European Union and national agencies. In Trondal, Jarle (Eds.), The agency phenomenon in the European Union. Manchester University Press. ISSN 978-0-7190-8554-3. p. 152–171.
• Bach, Tobias & Verhoest, Koen (2012). The Influence of Agencies on Policy-Making. NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy. ISSN 1337-9038. 5(2), p. 143–151.
• Bach, Tobias & Verschuere, Bram (2012). Executive agencies, ministers and departments: Can policy and management ever be separated? Administration & Society. ISSN 0095-3997. 44(2), p. 183–206. doi: 10.1177/0095399711412918.
• Bach, Tobias (2012). Autonomie und Steuerung verselbständigter Behörden: Management, Regulierung und die Bedeutung formaler Strukturen. Politische Vierteljahresschrift. ISSN 0032-3470. 53(1), p. 79–97. doi: 10.5771/0032-3470-2012-1-79.
• Bach, Tobias; Niklasson, Birgitta & Painter, Martin (2012). The role of agencies in policy-making. Policy and Society: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Policy Research. ISSN 1449-4035. 31(3), p. 183–193. doi: 10.1016/j.polsoc.2012.07.001.
• Bach, Tobias (2012). The involvement of agencies in policy formulation: explaining variation in policy autonomy of federal agencies in Germany. Policy and Society: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Policy Research. ISSN 1449-4035. 31(3), p. 211–222. doi: 10.1016/j.polsoc.2012.07.003.
• Bach, Tobias (2010). Policy and Management Autonomy of Federal Agencies in Germany. In Lægreid, Per & Verhoest, Koen (Ed.), Governance of public sector organizations : proliferation, autonomy and performance. Palgrave Macmillan. ISSN 978-0230-23820-6. p. 89–110.
• Bach, Tobias & Jann, Werner (2010). Animals in the administrative zoo: organizational change and agency autonomy in Germany. International Review of Administrative Sciences. ISSN 0020-8523. 76(3), p. 443–468. doi: 10.1177/0020852310372448.

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• Bach, Tobias & Wegrich, Kai (2019). The Blind Spots of Public Bureaucracy and the Politics of Non‐Coordination. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-3-319-76671-3. 269 p.
• Bach, Tobias (2014). Autonomie und Steuerung verselbständigter Behörden. Eine empirische Analyse am Beispiel Deutschlands und Norwegens. Springer. ISBN 978-3-658-04298-1. 338 p.
• Bach, Tobias; Fleischer, Julia & Hustedt, Thurid (2010). Organisation und Steuerung zentralstaatlicher Behörden. Agenturen im westeuropäischen Vergleich. Edition Sigma. ISBN 978-3836072342. 95 p.

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• Parsons, Craig Alexander; Smith, Andy; Andrejuk, Katarzyna; Trondal, Jarle & Bach, Tobias (2023). Single Markets in Services in the United States and the European Union: The Case of Construction.
• Squevin, Pierre Louis Daniel & Bach, Tobias (2023). Loyalty and Competence in Administrative Appointments: Designing and building a dataset for comparing Administrative Leaders’ Backgrounds and Career Profiles in Europe.
• Squevin, Pierre Louis Daniel & Bach, Tobias (2023). The consequences of sector-switching for public administrators’ values.
• Bach, Tobias (2022). Regulatory Agencies and Networks in Europe. ARENA Working Paper. ISSN 1890-7741. p. 1–17. Show summary

  The emergence of regulatory agencies is widely considered as the institutional hallmark of the regulatory state and has attracted considerable academic attention. Moreover, research shows that national regulatory agencies are increasingly integrated into transnational regulatory networks. This paper argues that research on regulatory agencies and networks is based on an implicit assumption that regulatory agencies are a distinct ‘species’ of organisations that can be studied without considering other types of agencies. A key insight is that comparative perspectives including regulatory and executive agencies are important to put regulatory scholarship into context and to flesh out the contribution of regulatory scholarship to advance general knowledge on public administration. The paper illustrates such comparative perspectives by reviewing literature on the formal and actual autonomy of agencies, the effect of transnational networks on national agencies, and multilevel coordination in administrative networks.

• Bach, Tobias & Squevin, Pierre Louis Daniel (2022). Public leadership, organizational performance, and trust in government.
• Askim, Jostein Rosfjord; Bach, Tobias & Kolltveit, Kristoffer (2022). Bureaucratic appointments, competence, and administrative dilemmas: a paired experiment with bureaucrats, politicians, citizens, and journalists.
• Bach, Tobias (2022). Public leadership, organizational performance, and trust in government.
• Bach, Tobias & Wegrich, Kai (2022). Politician–Bureaucrat Relations. In Schedler, Kuno (Eds.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Management. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISSN 9781800375482. p. 150–154. doi: 10.4337/9781800375499.politician.bureaucrat.relations. Show summary

  This chapter explores the relation between politicians and bureaucrats and introduces the fundamental tensions that result from the delegation of policymaking and implementation functions from politicians to bureaucrats. After introducing this basic tension between permanent career bureaucrats and temporary executive politicians, we introduce the fundamental normative model of the separation between politics and administration as starting point for understanding the distinct roles of politicians and bureaucrats and their relationship. The notion of separating politics and administration includes two key dimensions: the separation of political and administrative careers and the distinct contributions of politicians and bureaucrats in the policy-making process. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of changing relations and different types of challenges to politician-bureaucrat relations.

• Bach, Tobias; Trondal, Jarle & Aars, Jacob (2022). Hele livet i staten. Stat og styring. ISSN 0803-0103. 32(1), p. 46–48. doi: 10.18261/stat.32.1.15.
• Askim, Jostein Rosfjord & Bach, Tobias (2022). Hvem er tjent med at Stoltenberg blir sentralbanksjef? Aftenposten (morgenutg. : trykt utg.). ISSN 0804-3116. 163(14), p. 30–31.
• Bach, Tobias (2021). Politics and administrative turnover in highly meritocratic systems.
• Askim, Jostein Rosfjord; Bach, Tobias & Kolltveit, Kristoffer (2021). Politisering av embetsverket: Introduksjon til et temanummer. Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift. ISSN 0801-1745. 37(4), p. 165–170. doi: 10.18261/issn.1504-2936-2021-04-01.
• Bach, Tobias (2021). Hvordan kan blindsoner i forvaltningen forebygges? Stat og styring. ISSN 0803-0103.
• Bach, Tobias (2021). Hvordan oppstår blindsoner i forvaltningen? Stat og styring. ISSN 0803-0103.
• Bach, Tobias; Trondal, Jarle & Aars, Jacob (2021). Tilfreds med jobben. Stat og styring. ISSN 0803-0103.
• Bach, Tobias; Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Hinrik & Staroňová, Katarína (2020). Top officials in Turbulent Times: Converging Research Agendas in Europe East and West. NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy. ISSN 1337-9038. 13(2), p. 25–34. doi: 10.2478/nispa-2020-0012.
• Bach, Tobias; Trondal, Jarle & Aars, Jacob (2020). Kampen mot surveymonsteret begynner. Stat og styring. ISSN 0803-0103. p. 56–59. Show summary

  Norsk forvaltningspanel representerer en ny tilnærming til innsamling av forskningsdata om forvaltningens virkemåte. Panelet vil gi mer aktuell og relevant kunnskap og dermed også gi et mer solid grunnlag for beslutningstaking i politikk og forvaltning.

• Bach, Tobias (2019). Siefken, Sven (2018). Parlamentarische Kontrolle im Wandel. Theorie und Praxis des Deutschen Bundestages. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 461 Seiten. ISBN: 978-3-8487-4966-9. Der moderne Staat. ISSN 1865-7192. 12(1), p. 232–235.
• Bach, Tobias; Wegrich, Kai & Lodge, Martin (2018). De-biasing administrative behaviour? Risk and Regulation. ISSN 1473-6004. p. 31–32.
• Bach, Tobias & Veit, Sylvia (2018). Verwaltungspolitik und Verwaltungsreform. In Veit, Sylvia; Reichard, Christoph & Wewer, Göttrik (Ed.), Handbuch zur Verwaltungsreform. Springer. ISSN 978-3-658-21571-2. doi: 10.1007/978-3-658-21571-2_8-1.
• Bach, Tobias (2018). Agencies. In Veit, Sylvia; Reichard, Christoph & Wewer, Göttrik (Ed.), Handbuch zur Verwaltungsreform. Springer. ISSN 978-3-658-21571-2. doi: 10.1007/978-3-658-21571-2_26-1.
• Bach, Tobias (2018). Organizing Leviathan: Politicians, bureaucrats, and the making of good government (Carl Dahlström, Victor Lapuente. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, 270 pp., £22.99 (hb), ISBN: 9781316630655). Public Administration. ISSN 0033-3298. 96(3), p. 626–627. doi: 10.1111/padm.12519.
• Bach, Tobias; Philipps, Axel; Barlösius, Eva & Dohler, Marian (2013). Governance von Ressortforschungseinrichtungen. In Grande, Edgar; Jarren, Otfried; Rip, Arie; Schimank, Uwe & Weingart, Peter (Ed.), Neue Governance der Wissenschaft. Reorganisation – externe Anforderungen – Medialisierung. Transcript Verlag. ISSN 978-3837622720. p. 139–162.
• Bach, Tobias & Huber, Etienne (2012). Comparing agencification in continental countries. In Verhoest, Koen; van Thiel, Sandra; Bouckaert, Geert & Lægreid, Per (Ed.), Government agencies: Practices and Lessons from 30 Countries. Palgrave Macmillan. ISSN 9780230354364. p. 203–210.
• Bach, Tobias (2012). Germany. In Verhoest, Koen; van Thiel, Sandra; Bouckaert, Geert & Lægreid, Per (Ed.), Government agencies: Practices and Lessons from 30 Countries. Palgrave Macmillan. ISSN 9780230354364. p. 166–178.
• Bach, Tobias; Jantz, Bastian & Veit, Sylvia (2011). Verwaltungspolitik als Politikfeld. In Blanke, Bernhard; Nullmeier, Frank; Reichard, Christoph & Wewer, Göttrik (Ed.), Handbuch zur Verwaltungsreform. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. ISSN 978-3-531-17546-1. p. 527–536.
• Bach, Tobias; Jantz, Bastian & Veit, Sylvia (2010). Verwaltungspolitik auf Bundesebene: Eine Bilanz der großen Koalition. In Egle, Christoph & Zohlnhöfer, Reimut (Ed.), Die zweite Große Koalition. Bilanz der Regierung Merkel. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. ISSN 978-3-531-16796-1. p. 463–486.
• Bach, Tobias & Jann, Werner (2009). Structure and governance of agencies in Germany: A lot of continuity and little change. In Roness, Paul G. & Sætren, Harald (Ed.), Change and Continuity in Public Sector Organizations. Essays in Honour of Per Lægreid. Fagbokforlaget. ISSN 978-82-450-0754-1. p. 127–147.
• Bach, Tobias (2007). Agencies in Norwegen. Steuerung und Organisation zentralstaatlicher Behörden. In Jann, Werner & Dohler, Marian (Ed.), Agencies in Westeuropa. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. ISSN 978-3-531-15422-0. p. 172–211.
• Hagen, Kåre & Bach, Tobias (2022). Norway Report. Sustainable Governance Indicators 2022. Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung.
• Bach, Tobias (2021). Methodological report on the TiGRE project expert survey. ARENA Senter for Europastudier. ISSN 0807-3139. 4(21). Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  This report outlines the steps taken to design and implement a stakeholder survey on trust and distrust in European regulatory governance and ultimately create a large, multi-actor, multi-level, multi-sector, and cross-country dataset. Specifically, the report provides information about the mapping, ethical considerations, survey question and scale design, the questionnaire structure, translation and piloting, fielding and reminders, the creation of the dataset, response rates, and the sample. A list of important actors and the questionnaire itself are included in the annexes. This report should be of interest to everyone working with the survey data, readers of project publications who would like to know more about the survey methodology, and everyone seeking to implement similar large-scale surveys

• Bach, Tobias (2021). Bureaucratic Politics. ARENA Senter for Europaforskning. ISSN 1890-7741. Show summary

  The bureaucratic politics approach seeks to understand public policy as the result of decision-making processes, characterized by conflict, bargaining, and compromise, inside and between government organizations. A core assumption is that government organizations pursue distinct interests, including the preservation of their unique sphere of authority (“turf”) as well as the pursuit of distinct views on policy problems and solutions. Hence, while appearing as unitary actors with consistent preferences from the outside, the bureaucratic politics approach suggests that decisions of national governments, supranational organizations, such as the European Commission, and other bodies, such as regulatory and executive agencies, should be better understood as the result of political processes involving multiple organizations and organizational units. The bureaucratic politics perspective therefore partly overlaps with the literature on coordination inside and between government organizations, which for instance highlights the importance of “organizational silos” as impediments to successful coordination. The paper introduces classic contributions to this literature (as well as more recent theorizing), focusing on the political nature of public organizations, including reputation management and blame avoidance. The paper also elaborates on different types of decisions – reforms/institutional choice vs. regular policy-making – and the relevance of the bureaucratic politics approach for analyzing such decisions. The paper reviews selected empirical contributions to this literature, specially focusing on the European Commission as well as EU agencies and their interactions with national level agencies.

• Bach, Tobias & Ruffing, Eva (2016). The Multi-Level Administration of the EU: Transnational Coordination Through National and Supranational Bureaucracies . ARENA Centre for European Studies. ISSN 2464-3270.

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