Abstract
This paper analyzes a cheap talk model with one receiver and multiple senders. Each sender observes a noisy signal regarding the unknown state. Existing literature (e.g., Levit and Malenko, 2011; Battaglini, 2017) focuses on scenarios where the receiver and the senders have aligned preferences in each state. We further explore situations with disagreement states where the receiver and the senders have misaligned preferences. We first show that, when the number of senders grows large, each sender’s message must convey almost no information to the receiver. Furthermore, we identify a discontinuity in information transmission: with moderate conflict between the receiver and the senders, introducing an arbitrarily small probability of disagreement states leads to complete unraveling, in contrast to complete information transmission predicted by the literature. Finally, we demonstrate that the receiver cannot fully learn the state even when receiving messages from arbitrarily many senders.
The seminar will be held in room 1249 (12th floor) at Eilert Sundts Hus. The address is Moltke Moes vei 31.