Abstract:
We study the effect of communication on deterrence and costly punishment. We show that a theoretical model of belief-dependent anger captures the relationship between messages, beliefs, and behavior and implies that threats can generate credible commitments. We test our model in a between-subjects experiment with belief elicitation where one-sided communication is available as a treatment. The design allows us to record not only subjects’ choices but also many of their beliefs, allowing us to explore whether communicated threats change beliefs and payoff expectations and then drive greater rates of costly punishment and whether threats successfully deter co-players from exploiting the strategic environment to their advantage. (The “+” in the title is an indicator that the presentation will feature a general introduction to the framework of psychological game theory, which the threats-exercise is formulated within.)
The seminar will be held in room 1249 (12th floor) at Eilert Sundts Hus. The address is Moltke Moes vei 31.