Tore Nilssen

• E. Fumagalli and T. Nilssen, “Sweetening the Pill: A Theory of Waiting To Merge," Journal of Industry, Competition & Trade 19 (2019), 351-388. 
• D.J. Clark and T. Nilssen, “Keep On Fighting: The Dynamics of Head Starts in All-Pay Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior 110 (2018), 258-272. 
• B.O. Johansen and T. Nilssen, “The Economics of Retailing Formats: Competition versus Bargaining," Journal of Industrial Economics 64 (2016), 109-134.
• H.J. Kind, T. Nilssen and L. Sørgard, “Inter-Firm Price Coordination in a Two-Sided Market," International Journal of Industrial Organization 44 (2016), 101-112. 
• P.P. Barros and S. Hoernig, T. Nilssen, “Transversal Agency and Crowding Out” (with P.P. Barros and S. Hoernig), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 171 (2015), 589-608
• D.J. Clark and T. Nilssen, "Learning by Doing in Contests", Public Choice 156, 2013, 329-343.
• H.J. Kind, T. Nilssen and L. Sørgard, "Business Models for Media Firms: Does Competition Matter for How They Raise Revenue?" Marketing Science 28, 2009, 1112-1128.
• H.J. Kind, T. Nilssen, and L. Sørgard, "Competition for Viewers and Advertisers in a TV Oligopoly," Journal of Media Economics 20, 2007, 211-233.
• M. Hoel, T. Iversen, T. Nilssen and J. Vislie, "Genetic testing in competitive insurance markets with repulsion from chance: A welfare analysis," Journal of Health Economics 25, 2006, 847-860.
• T. Nilssen: "Consumer lock-in with asymmetric information," International Journal of Industrial Organization 18, 2000, 641-666.
• G.B. Asheim and T. Nilssen, “Insurance Monopoly and Renegotiation," Economic Theory 9 (1997), 341-354. 
• T. Nilssen, “On the Consistency of Merger Policy”, Journal of Industrial Economics 45 (1997), 89-100.
• G.B. Asheim and T. Nilssen, "Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market," European Economic Review 40, 1996, 1717-1736.
• T. Nilssen, "Two kinds of consumer switching costs," RAND Journal of Economics 23, 1992, 579-589.

• Clark, Derek John; Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2025). Investing to get a head start in contests. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. ISSN 0167-2681. 241. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107364. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  In a contest, rivals compete for a prize by making irretrievable outlays. Commonly, researchers assume that contestants spontaneously start to compete at some designated time. In practice, however, preparation is an important part of the actual contest, where rivals may undertake actions in order to improve their chance of winning the prize. We model this as a two-player all-pay auction under complete information in which rivals can make an investment to try to get a head start before the contest is played. We provide conditions under which a pure-strategy equilibrium exists in which the player with the high prize valuation invests and the opponent does not. A pure-strategy equilibrium can also exist in which it is the player with the low prize valuation that makes the investment. The investment opportunity allows the rivals to move some of the competition to the investment stage, reducing the intensity of fighting in the contest. An important feature of our model is that investment does not necessarily preclude fighting in the contest. We show when investment leads to active participation in the contest, and when it leads a rival to simply capitulate. This is an important distinction, especially if the overall aim is to minimize contest effort, such as in armed conflicts.

• Clark, Derek John; Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2025). Investment and endogenous efficiency in a contest. Economics Letters. ISSN 0165-1765. 247. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112131. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Contests are ubiquitous but do not happen in a vacuum. Rivals can prepare themselves for the contest to improve their ultimate chance of victory. Two contestants with different prize values play an all-pay auction and can invest to improve the efficiency of their own effort in the contest. We show that at most one player will invest, and that two asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria exist depending upon the identity of the investor. If the high-value player invests, then investment reinforces the initial asymmetry; investment by the low-value player turns the tables on the initially advantaged rival. The investment opportunity moves competition away from the contest, resulting in less expected contest effort than would occur without investment.

• Haugen, Kjetil K.; Heen, Knut Peder; Smerdon, David C. & Nilssen, Tore (2023). A heuristic for finding cheating in chess. Mathematics for applications. ISSN 1805-3610. 12(2), p. 116–125. doi: 10.13164/ma.2023.120212. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  This article argues by casual empirics that a low draw percent in chess may work as a simplified cheating indicator. Data from a large number of historical chess games (53331) indicate that this extremely simple heuristic may be used as a first test if suspicion of cheating arises for professional chess players. This heuristic does not prove any cheating, but it may be applied as a quick primal indicator of potential cheating behaviour for a player suspected of cheating.

• Guerra, Alice & Nilssen, Tore (2022). Optimal sentencing with recurring crimes and adjudication errors. Journal of Economics. ISSN 0931-8658. doi: 10.1007/s00712-022-00813-8. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  We analyze optimal sentence length for recurring crimes in the face of adjudication errors. We develop an infinite-horizon model where offenders are habitual — they repeat crimes whenever free. If apprehended, criminals may be wrongfully acquitted. Similarly, innocent people may be apprehended and wrongfully convicted. The key result shows how the risks of wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals affect optimal sentencing. For reasonable ranges of parameter values, the two types of adjudication errors have the same qualitative effect on optimal sentencing: a greater risk of any of the two adjudication errors leads to a decrease in optimal sentencing.

• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2021). Delegating pollution permits. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. ISSN 0347-0520. 124(2), p. 457–487. doi: 10.1111/sjoe.12468. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  We discuss the decision to delegate the regulation of pollution through sales of permits to a biased expert in a situation where the polluting firm has private information about its technology. We consider, in particular, constrained delegation where the government puts restrictions on the amount of pollution that the expert can sell permits for. We find that, in general, delegation is more likely if the firm is low-cost. This is not in line with the so-called uncertainty principle, which states that there is more delegation the more uncertainty the government faces.

• Clark, Derek John & Nilssen, Tore (2021). Fatter or fitter? On rewarding and training in a contest. Economic Inquiry. ISSN 0095-2583. 60, p. 101–120. doi: 10.1111/ecin.13021. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Competition between heterogeneous participants leads to low-effort provision in contests. A principal can divide her fixed budget between skill-enhancing training and the contest prize. Training can reduce heterogeneity, increasing effort. It also reduces the contest prize, making effort fall. We set up an incomplete-information contest with heterogeneous players and show how this trade-off is related to the size of the budget of an effort-maximizing principal. A selection problem arises implying a cost associated with a win by the inferior player. The principal has a larger incentive to train the laggard, reducing the prize on offer.

• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2020). Delegation of regulation*. The Journal of Industrial Economics. ISSN 0022-1821. 68(3), p. 445–482. doi: 10.1111/joie.12238. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  We discuss a government’s incentives to delegate regulation to bureaucrats. The government faces a trade-off in its delegation decision: bureaucrats have knowledge of the firms in the industry that the government does not have, but at the same time, they have other preferences than the government. The preference bias and the private information interact to affect the incentives to delegate regulation. Allowing for constrained delegation, we introduce the concepts of weak and strict delegation. We find that bureaucratic discretion reduces with bureaucratic drift, while the effect of increased uncertainty about the firm’s technology depends on how that uncertainty changes.

• Clark, Derek John; Nilssen, Tore & Sand, Jan Yngve (2020). Gaining advantage by winning contests. Review of Economic Design. ISSN 1434-4742. 24, p. 23–38. doi: 10.1007/s10058-020-00229-0. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  We consider a principal who faces many identical competitors, and who can distribute a prize fund over two consecutive contests. The winner of contest one gains an advantage in contest two where his effort is more productive than all rivals. We identify a tipping point for the productivity parameter, below which it is optimal for an effort-maximizing principal to place the whole prize in the second contest. Above this level, a single symmetric contest is preferred. The institution chosen depends inextricably upon the number of competitors and their valuation of future gains and costs. We identify the optimal setting of the productivity parameter, showing that introducing asymmetry can increase total efforts by as much as one quarter compared to a single symmetric contest.

• Clark, Derek John & Nilssen, Tore (2020). Creating balance in dynamic competitions. International Journal of Industrial Organization. ISSN 0167-7187. 69. doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.102578. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  We consider incentives for organizing competitions in multiple rounds, focusing on situations where there is heterogeneity among the contestants ex ante, which discourages effort in a single contest. Heterogeneity evolves across rounds depending upon the outcomes of previous rounds. We present conditions under which balance in such a competition can be created, by determining the number of rounds and dividing the prize fund carefully across them, so that full rent dissipation entails. In the model, each round is an all-pay auction where contestants differ in their abilities to gain a momentum from winning. We also discuss the case when negative prizes are feasible, demonstrating that this strengthens the full dissipation result; and we consider a case where the size of the winner’s momentum is related to the size of the prize attained, showing that the stronger this linkage, the less of the prize is awarded early on.

• Clark, Derek John & Nilssen, Tore (2020). Competitive Balance When Winning Breeds Winners. Social Choice and Welfare. ISSN 0176-1714. doi: 10.1007/s00355-020-01281-z. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  In contest settings, heterogeneity between contestants generally leads to low effort provision, and many instruments have been suggested to restore competitive balance. We suggest that heterogeneity may evolve depending upon the outcome of previous contests. Restoring competitive balance in this setting is challenging, and we consider the choice faced by a principal who can distribute a prize fund over two consecutive all-pay auction contests. Contestants are heterogeneous in the sense that one of them has a head start in the first contest. The winner of contest one gains the stage prize and a net head start in contest two; the size of this net head start also varies between players. The head start of the early leader can be increased, neutralized or overturned. The principal aims to maximize total effort. We show how the potential head start that the initial underdog can gain is critical in determining expected efforts. When this parameter is small, the principal can do no better than running a single contest. When the initial underdog can catch up and surpass the first-contest favourite, there is scope to do better. Indeed, it is possible to completely neutralize the initial heterogeneity and capture all of the surplus from the players, inciting a level of expected effort equal to the prize value. Competitive balance is achieved by a judicious division of the prize budget.

• Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Moen, Espen Rasmus & Nilssen, Tore (2020). Prisdiskriminering i dagligvarebransjen. Samfunnsøkonomen. ISSN 1890-5250. 34(3), p. 21–30. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  INNLEDNING Det har foregått en intens diskusjon den siste tiden om hvorvidt det bør innføres et forbud mot prisdiskriminering på leverandørnivå i dagligvaremarkedet. Kjede har stått mot kjede, professor mot professor. Det er utarbeidet en rekke rapporter og innspill på oppdrag fra både bransjeaktører og myndigheter. Vi har fått i oppdrag av Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet å gjennomgå de innspill og rapporter som er kommet i saken, og vurdere argumentene som er fremsatt for og mot inngrep mot prisdiskriminering. Videre er vi bedt om å komme med vår anbefaling om slike inngrep. Blant de mange innspillene identifiserte vi tre viktige konstellasjoner som representative for ulike syn i debatten. Den første er Foros og Kind som har produsert en rekke innspill og rapporter på oppdrag fra advokatfirmaet BAHR og Rema 1000. Argumentene i disse rapportene oppfatter vi som i favør av å regulere – eller i alle fall gripe inn mot – ulike innkjøpspriser (Foros og Kind, 2018a, b; 2019a, b; Foros, Kind og Shaffer, 2018). De som tydeligst argumenterer mot å legge restriksjoner på innkjøpsprisene, er Oslo Economics (2019), skrevet på oppdrag fra NorgesGruppen; se også Bergh m. fl. (2020). Den tredje sentrale rapporten er Johansen og Straume (2019), skrevet på oppdrag fra Konkurransetilsynet. Denne rapporten framhever, i større grad enn de andre, usikkerheten rundt forventede effekter av å regulere eller gripe inn mot ulike innkjøpspriser. Den plasserer seg derfor et sted mellom Foros og Kind og Oslo Economics, men kanskje noe nærmere den siste.

• Nyborg, Karine; Harstad, Bård Gjul; Holden, Steinar; Nilssen, Tore & Storesletten, Kjetil (2019). Plan S and the Economics of Scientific Journal Publishing. Journal of Peer Production. ISSN 2213-5316. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Securing open access to research will not remove the fundamental problem that commercial publishers have substantial market power. Thus, even if Plan S is successful, large commercial publishers are likely to put financial pressure on universities and funders in the future. One underlying source of publishers’ market power is the hierarchical ordering of journals’ quality. Whether one likes it or not, such rankings are likely to arise as a response to asymmetric information. Plan S does not, and probably cannot, address the substantial information problems in research publishing. In the absence of journal hierarchies, other and more malign responses may easily arise, including discrimination along dimensions such as gender, age, personal networks, and the prestige of institutional affiliations. Paywalls and subscription requirements are currently tools publishers use to exercise their market power. However, the underlying reason for publishers’ market power is not this tool, but rather the fact that journals provide services that cannot, at least from the point of view of individual researchers, be easily replaced by the services of other journals. This will prevail even with open access. Rather than imposing very strict requirements on journals’ business models, we would encourage funders to collaborate with academies and professional organizations. These organizations have the professional credibility to establish new but still highly regarded journals if needed. Funders can fully finance such journals, presumably at a reasonable cost, making subscription fees as well as publication fees redundant. It is well-established in economics that, if so-called market failures are present, unregulated markets will not function efficiently. In scientific publishing, market failures abound. Below, we discuss some of them and their interplay, before concluding with respect to implications for the scientific publishing market, for the potential success of Plan S, and alternative approaches.

• Fumagalli, Eileen & Nilssen, Tore (2019). Sweetening the Pill: a Theory of Waiting to Merge. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade. ISSN 1566-1679. 19(3), p. 351–388. doi: 10.1007/s10842-019-00309-0. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Merger policy is a permission-granting activity by government in which there may be disincentives to seek permission because of the benefit from having other firms merge. We set up a sequential merger game with endogenized antitrust policy to study one aspect of these disincentives. In particular, we delineate a pill-sweetening motive for waiting to merge: a small firm may choose to let other bigger firms move first, in order to get more mergers approved by government. We report the prevalence of pill sweetening to occur in equilibrium and find it to hinge on efficiency gains from a merger, differently sized firms, firms’ production technology, the presence of an antitrust authority, the alignment of interests between antitrust authorities and firms, and the number of firms in the industry.

• Clark, Derek John & Nilssen, Tore (2018). Keep on fighting: The dynamics of head starts in all-pay auctions. Games and Economic Behavior. ISSN 0899-8256. 110, p. 258–272. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.005. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  We investigate a model of a series of contests in which a contestant's past and present success gives a head start over a rival in the future. How this advantage from winning affects contestants' efforts, whether the laggard gives up or keeps on fighting, and how the head start develops over time, are key issues. We find that the expected effort of the laggard will always be higher than the rival at some stage in the series of contests, and this is most likely to happen when at a large disadvantage or at a late stage in the series.

• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2017). Delegation of Regulation. Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo. ISSN 0809-8786. 2017(12 ). Full text in Research Archive
• Johansen, Bjørn Olav & Nilssen, Tore (2016). The economics of retailing formats: Competition versus bargaining. The Journal of Industrial Economics. ISSN 0022-1821. 64(1), p. 109–134. doi: 10.1111/joie.12096. Full text in Research Archive
• Kind, Hans Jarle; Nilssen, Tore & Sørgard, Lars (2016). Inter-firm price coordination in a two-sided market. International Journal of Industrial Organization. ISSN 0167-7187. 44, p. 101–112. doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.010. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  In many two-sidedmarkets we observe that there is a common distributor on one side of the market. One example is the TV industry,where TV channels choose advertising prices to maximize own profit and typically delegate determination of viewer prices to independent distributors.We showthat in such amarket structure the stronger the competition between the TV channels, the greater will joint profits in the TV industry be. We also show that joint profits may be higher if the wholesale contract between each TV channel and the distributor consists of a simple fixed fee rather than a two-part tariff.

• Brekke, Kjell Arne & Nilssen, Tore (2015). Media competition enhances new-product entry: On the market for fake observations. Information Economics and Policy. ISSN 0167-6245. 31, p. 59–66. doi: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2015.03.001. Full text in Research Archive
• Barros, Pedro P.; Hoernig, Steffen & Nilssen, Tore (2015). Transversal Agency and Crowding Out. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. ISSN 0932-4569. 171(4), p. 589–608. doi: 10.1628/093245615X14302136524798. Full text in Research Archive
• Clark, Derek John & Nilssen, Tore (2013). Learning by doing in contests. Public Choice. ISSN 0048-5829. 156(1-2), p. 329–343. doi: 10.1007/s11127-011-9905-9. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore; Sand, Jan Yngve & Clark, Derek John (2012). Motivating over Time: Dynamic Win Effects in Sequential Contests. Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo. ISSN 0809-8786. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3155251. Full text in Research Archive
• Clark, Derek John & Nilssen, Tore (2011). Learning by doing in contests. Public Choice. ISSN 0048-5829. doi: 10.1007/s11127-011-9905-9. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2011). Risk externalities in a payments oligopoly. Portuguese Economic Journal. ISSN 1617-982X. 10(3), p. 211–234. doi: 10.1007/s10258-010-0064-6. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2010). The television industry as a market of attention. Nordicom Review. ISSN 1403-1108. 31(1), p. 115–123. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  In this article, I present an economist’s perspective on the TV industry and view it as a so-called two-sided market, with advertisers on the one side benefiting from the presence of TV viewers and TV viewers on the other side having a dislike for advertising on TV. I use this framework to discuss the likely future development of pay TV, in particular how a future increase in competition in the TV industry will affect the prevalence of pay TV over advertising-financed TV.

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• Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Moen, Espen Rasmus & Nilssen, Tore (2022). Bjerkholt og enkle svar om dagligvareprisene. Full text in Research Archive
• Boasson, Elin Lerum & Nilssen, Tore (2021). Vi trenger mer kunnskap om klimaløsningene, ikke om klimaproblemet. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2021). Joda, vi trenger tidsskriftene. Full text in Research Archive
• Knutsen, Carl Henrik; Nilssen, Tore & Wig, Tore (2020). Skal snøballen rulle, må det være riktig snøball. Full text in Research Archive
• Johansen, Bjørn Olav & Nilssen, Tore (2020). Merger Remedies, Incomplete Information, and Commitment. Full text in Research Archive
• Knutsen, Carl Henrik; Nilssen, Tore & Wig, Tore (2020). Plan S: snøballen som stopper opp. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2020). Samtalen: Konkurransen som forsvann. [Journal]. Dag og Tid. Full text in Research Archive
• Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Moen, Espen Rasmus & Nilssen, Tore (2020). Påbud om like innkjøpspriser kan gi dyrere dagligvarer. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2019). Merger remedies, incomplete information, and commitment. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2019). Creating Balance in Dynamic Competitions. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2019). Merger remedies, incomplete information, and commitment. Full text in Research Archive
• Nyborg, Karine; Nilssen, Tore; Holden, Steinar; Storesletten, Kjetil & Harstad, Bård Gjul (2019). Åpen tilgang fjerner ikke forlagenes makt. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2019). Hvordan skal vi publisere? Samfunnsøkonomen. ISSN 1890-5250. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2018). Beating the Matthew Effect: Head Starts and Catching Up in a Dynamic All-Pay Auction. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2018). Barnevern og medhold. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2018). Beating the Matthew Effect: Head Starts and Catching Up in a Dynamic All-Pay Auction. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2017). Delegation of Regulation. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2017). Delegation of Regulation. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2016). Delegation of Regulation. Full text in Research Archive
• Fumagalli, Eileen & Nilssen, Tore (2016). Sweetening the pill: a theory of waiting to merge. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2016). Delegation of regulation. Full text in Research Archive
• Fumagalli, Eileen & Nilssen, Tore (2016). Sweetening the pill: a theory of waiting to merge. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2016). Delegation of Regulation. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2016). Delegation of Regulation. Full text in Research Archive
• Fumagalli, Eileen & Nilssen, Tore (2016). Sweetening the pill: a theory of waiting to merge. Full text in Research Archive
• Clark, Derek John; Nilssen, Tore & Sand, Jan Yngve (2016). Keep On Fighting: The Dynamics of Head Starts in All-Pay Auctions. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2016). Delegation of Regulation. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2016). Delegation of Regulation. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2016). Delegation of regulation. Full text in Research Archive
• Clark, Derek John; Nilssen, Tore & Sand, Jan Yngve (2015). Keep on fighting: dynamic win effects in an all-pay auction. Full text in Research Archive
• Clark, Derek John; Nilssen, Tore & Sand, Jan Yngve (2015). Keep on fighting: dynamic win effects in an all-pay auction. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2015). Skattefinansiering av kringkasting. Samfunnsøkonomen. ISSN 1890-5250. 129(6), p. 4–6. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2015). Delegation in Regulation. Full text in Research Archive
• Clark, Derek John; Nilssen, Tore & Sand, Jan Yngve (2015). Keep On Fighting: Dynamic Win Effects in an All-Pay Auction. Full text in Research Archive
• Kind, Hans Jarle; Nilssen, Tore & Sørgard, Lars (2015). Inter-Firm Price Coordination in a Two-Sided Market. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2015). Delegation in Regulation. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2015). Delegation in Regulation. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2015). Delegation in Regulation. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2015). Delegation in Regulation. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2014). Procurement versus permits in rent seeking bureaucracies. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2014). Procurement versus permits in rent seeking bureaucracies. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2014). Intervju om lederavlønning. [TV]. NRK Lørdagsrevyen. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2014). Procurement versus permits in rent seeking bureaucracies. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2014). Nobel Prize in Economics 2014 - Jean Tirole: Market Power and Regulation. Full text in Research Archive
• Kind, Hans Jarle; Nilssen, Tore & Sørgard, Lars (2014). Inter-Firm Price Coordination in a Two-Sided Market. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2014). Procurement versus permits in rent-seeking bureaucracies. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2014). - Det statlige eierskapet er en torn i øyet for Høyre. [Journal]. Dagsavisen. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2013). Skyhøye bonuser. [Journal]. Vårt Land. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2013). Motivating over time: dynamic win effects in sequential contests. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore & Tjelflaat, Irmelin Sangolt (2013). Barna blir taperne - igjen. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2013). Intervju om Statens eierskap i Statoil. [Radio]. Her og Nå, NRK P1. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2013). Debatt om Statens eierskap i Statoil. [Radio]. Dagsnytt 18, NRK P2 (radio) og NRK2 (TV). Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2013). Barn på anbud - samfunnsøkonomiske perspektiver. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2013). Das Kapital. [Radio]. Radio Nova. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Intervju om medienes fremtid i Radio Novas magasin "Das Kapital"

• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2013). The Economics of Independent Regulatory Agencies. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2013). - Staten bør selge seg ut av Statoil. [Journal]. Stavanger Aftenblad. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2013). Økonomene ser rødt. [Journal]. Fontene. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2013). Barn på anbud: noen samfunnsøkonomiske perspektiver. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2013). Intervju om søndagsåpne butikker. [TV]. TV2 Nyhetene. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2013). The Economics of Retailing Formats: Competition versus Bargaining. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2013). The Economics of Retailing Formats: Competition versus Bargaining. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2013). The Economics of Independent Regulatory Agencies: Commitment and Information. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2012). Endogenous hypermarkets. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2012). Motivating over time: dynamic win effects in sequential contests. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2012). Dynamic win effects in sequential contests. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2012). - Kan være smidig. [Journal]. Klassekampen. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2012). Endogenous hypermarkets. Full text in Research Archive
• Sørgard, Lars; Kind, Hans Jarle & Nilssen, Tore (2011). Price coordination in two-sided markets: Competition in the TV industry. Full text in Research Archive
• Jansen, Eilev S.; Nilssen, Tore & Strandenes, Siri P. (2011). "Animal Spirits: Fargerik tomhet" vant Artikkelprisen for 2010. Samfunnsøkonomen. ISSN 1890-5250. 65(1), p. 48–50. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2011). - Ungdommen betaler brillekampanje. [Internet]. e24.no. Full text in Research Archive
• Nilssen, Tore (2010). Business models for media firms. Full text in Research Archive
• Jansen, Eilev; Nilssen, Tore & Strandenes, Siri Pettersen (2010). Artikkelprisen 2009 til Telemark. Samfunnsøkonomen. ISSN 1890-5250. 64(1), p. 35–36. Full text in Research Archive
• Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore (2017). Delegation of Regulation. CESifo. Full text in Research Archive
• Kind, Hans Jarle; Nilssen, Tore & Sørgard, Lars (2014). Inter-Firm Price Coordination in a Two-Sided Market. Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi, Norges Handelshøyskole. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  In many two-sided markets we observe that there is a common distributor on one side of the market. One example is the TV industry, where TV channels choose advertising prices to maximize own pro…t and typically delegate determination of viewer prices to independent distributors. We show that in such a market structure the stronger the competition between the TV channels, the greater will joint pro…ts in the TV industry be. We also show that joint pro…ts might be higher if the wholesale contract between each TV channel and the distributor consists of a simple …fixed fee rather than a two-part tariff.

• Clark, Derek John; Nilssen, Tore & Sand, Jan Yngve (2014). Keep on Fighting: Dynamic Win Effects in an All-Pay Auction. Department of Economics, University of Oslo. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  We investigate a multi-period contest model in which a contestant’s' present success gives an advantage over a rival in the future. How this win advantage affects contestants' efforts, and whether the laggard gives up or keep on fighting are key issues. We find that the expected effort of the laggard will always be higher than the rival at some stage in the series of contests, and this is most likely to happen when at a large disadvantage or at a late stage in the series.

• Kind, Hans Jarle; Nilssen, Tore & Sørgard, Lars (2010). Price Coordination in Two-Sided Markets: Competition in the TV Industry. Samfunns- og næringslivsforskning (SNF). Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  The TV industry is a two-sided market where both advertisers and viewers buy access to the programs offered by competing TV channels. Under the current market structure advertising prices are typically set by TV channels while viewer prices are set by distributors (e.g. cable operators). The latter implies that the distributors partly internalize the competition between the TV channels, since they take into account the fact that a lower viewer price at one channel will harm rival channels. We nonetheless find that a shift to a market structure where both advertising prices and viewer prices are set competitively by the TV channels might increase joint industry profits. The reason is that this market structure, in contrast to the one we observe today, directly addresses the two-sidedness of the market. We also show that this is to the benefit of the viewers.

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