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For over a decade, jihadi terrorism in Europe, and the recruitment of Europeans to fight for jihadi causes elsewhere have increasingly involved marginalised youths from a social context of street culture, illegal drug use and crime. Existing theoretical models of the crime-terrorism nexus and radicalisation, however, do not sufficiently explain the fluid and dynamic ways that street culture is intertwined in jihadi subcultures. In a recent article published in the European Journal of Criminology, we argue that a concept of street-jihadi spectrum is better placed to explain recent tendencies when ‘gangsters becomes jihadists’. On the street culture end, it includes subcultural play with provocative jihadi symbols, and on the jihadi end, it involves the terrorism of people previously engaged in street culture, drugs, and traditional crime.
Overlaps between street and jihadi subcultures
These recent empirical trends warrant a more extensive integration of sociological and criminological theory and perspectives in the studies of terrorism and political violence. We argue that some young men are first drawn towards street culture, and then towards violent jihadism, in a search for the recognition and status they feel they cannot achieve in mainstream society. In the same way as gangs and criminal groups, political and religious extremism also presents opportunities for experiencing excitement, meaning, enjoyment and group affiliation. In an early discussion of the many links between criminal and terrorist organisations, Schmid argues that despite the obvious differences, both kinds of organisation are rational actors using intimidation and violence, and producing victims. The different points on a ‘crime–terror continuum’ has similarly been described as including alliances, operational motivations and convergences.
When Basra and Neumann set out to suggest a new crime-terror nexus, they maintained this emphasis on rational actors and instrumental strategies, but focused on Europe and jihadism, and most importantly, expanded the focus from criminal and terrorist organisations to include the movements of particular individuals from criminal to extremist environments. Their starting point was how the crime-terror nexus for a long time had been used to understand the links that terrorist organisations shared with ‘conventional’ criminal activity: to generate money, to access weapons, to obtain information, to recruit personnel, and to develop expertise in violent conflict.
Such a ‘new crime-terror nexus’ however, requires more sociological theorising and understanding of the cultural, social and emotional dimensions of radicalisation, in addition to the more instrumental and organisational dimensions. More specificity is also needs in terms of what kind of ideologies or religions and what kinds of crime and criminal organisations are involved. It is difficult to generalise too much across very different phenomenon. What we develop as the street-jihadi spectrum speaks to a particular time in Europe, with some particular forms of jihadi extremism becoming intertwined in a general criminal and violent street subculture, not necessarily associated with organized crime. The overlaps, homologies and links between western street culture and violent jihadi subcultures are at the core of our interest.
Placing people, culture, and emotions at the core
The conceptualisation of a street-jihadi spectrum is inspired by the new crime-terror nexus, but differs in that people, culture and emotions are at the center, and not criminal organisations. We draw inspiration from Hegghammer's work on jihadi culture, but question his suggestion that culture is not ‘functionally essential to the military effort’. We argue that the cultural hybridity of the street-jihadi spectrum is crucial to understand military and terrorist recruitment, tactics and efforts. Importantly, the spectrum should not be conceptualised as unidirectional as individuals can move, drift and jump between main categories, but its utility in distinguishing youthful subcultural provocations from strategic and ideologically and religiously motivated political violence is important.
It is worth recognising that subcultural and extremist affiliations may be fluid, especially among marginalised, attention- and excitement-seeking youths. The spectrum has a street and jihadi end, and a multitude of positions and connections in between. Moreover, Islamic beliefs certainly play a part in jihadi radicalisation, but in general they are best conceived as an anti-criminogenic force. Similarly, while street culture can foster radicalisation, based on research on more general street populations (and not those ‘gangsters’ that turn ‘jihadi’), it seems as if it more often mobilises resistance and opposition to extremism.
The marginalising force of classification
So far, we have emphasised how the street-jihadi spectrum affects street youths and jihadi organisations, and their interaction. Importantly however, the street-jihadi spectrum also has impacts outside of these environments. Crime-terror spectrum studies should be attentive to the possibilities of cross-contamination between categories. For political or risk management reasons political violence can be classed as ‘merely criminal’ and criminal milieus can be represented as potential hot beds of terrorism. For marginalised populations who have traditionally experienced ‘over policing and under protection’ – which is in itself a marginalising force, there is the risk of exposure to ever more caustic forms of social control. Being suspected of terrorism does not only come with a much greater stigma, but also brings in a completely different array of police mandates, controls and technologies of surveillance. This has the potential to deepen and strengthen street cultures and to fortify the forces that both push and pull individuals with a background in poverty, marginality and crime into the hands of jihadi recruiters.
The street-jihadi spectrum can be a useful concept for unpicking the complexities of the relationship between marginality, street subcultures and jihadi extremism in contemporary Western societies. It explains the full gamut of phenomena from ‘harmless posturing’ and empty sloganeering, to embodying identity without consequential action and ultimately to the realisation of violent identities. The street-jihadi spectrum eschews simplistic, deterministic models and explanations in favor of a view that recognizes the potential for ideological and cultural fluidity amongst those who are committed to violent behavior more generally. It challenges the dominant emphasis on groups and rational strategies in the crime-terror nexus literature, and highlights instead how a hybrid street-jihadi culture draws street youths into extremism more circuitously.
Challenging the staircase model of radicalisation
The street jihadi spectrum contests staircase models of radicalisation by questioning its inherent unidirectionality, and puzzle metaphors by emphasising that radicalisation sometimes happens partially and in highly unexpected ways. Most importantly, and as opposed to nearly all theorising in this field, the street-jihadi spectrum starts from the many confluences of criminal and extremist networks and culture, instead of from individuals and groups that are radicalised or labelled extremists. Our theorisation incorporates how these confluences can lead to radicalisation, but also explores and includes in the analysis those many instances when they do not. While our study has emphasised jihadism, such insights can easily be transferred to right-wing or other forms of political or religious extremism, which also has an appeal to people in gangs and street environments.
The street-jihadi spectrum approach derives strength from integrating insights from criminology and sociology with disciplines more typically associated with the study of extremism and radicalisation, such as political science, psychology, history, and religious studies. It identifies symbolic playfulness and purposive subcultural provocations as such, and cultural hybrids that are more incidental, without diminishing analyses that can clarify the existence of security threats where they do exist. Including an insight that street-jihadi confluences have multiple outcomes, the street-jihadi spectrum concept also recognises the resistance towards extremism that emerges in marginal street environments.
The full paper can be read here. Read more about the project Radicalisation and Resistance.
