Abstract
This paper explores if an increase in transparency can have unintended consequences, namely shifting the location of deliberations to more opaque venues rather than leading to an overall reduction in informality. This argument is based on the simple fact that there is often more than one way to cooperate. Once certain institutional avenues are foreclosed, governments may therefore avail themselves of institutional substitutes to achieve the same purpose. In other words, governments with an incentive to evade public scrutiny will seek and find alternative ways of doing so. I probe this argument using negotiations in the Council of the EU. More specifically, I investigate if stricter transparency regulations in the Council, including requirements about the publicity of negotiations and meeting outcomes, have led to an increase in informal negotiation breaks among ministers where no minutes are being taken.
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