Karl Halvor Teigen

• Teigen, Karl-Halvor (2022). Dimensions of uncertainty communication: What is conveyed by verbal terms and numeric ranges. Current Psychology. ISSN 1046-1310. doi: 10.1007/s12144-022-03985-0. Vis sammendrag

  The paper reviews two strands of research on communication of uncertainty that usually have been investigated separately: (1) Probabilities attached to specific outcomes, and (2) Range judgments. Probabilities are sometimes expressed by verbal phrases (“rain is likely”) and at other times in a numeric format (“70% chance of rain”), whereas range judgments describe the potential amounts expected (“1–4 mm of rain”). Examination of previous research shows that both descriptions convey, in addition to the strength of expectations, pragmatic information about the communicative situation. For instance, so-called verbal probability expressions (VPE), as likely, unlikely, a chance, or not certain give some, albeit vague, probabilistic information, but carry in addition an implicit message about the sources of uncertainty, the outcome’s valence and severity, along with information about the speakers’ attitudes and their communicative intentions. VPEs are directional by drawing attention either to an outcome’s occurrence (“it is possible”) or to its non-occurrence (“it is doubtful”). In this sense they may be more informative than numbers. Uncertainties about outcomes in a distribution (continuous quantities) are alternatively expressed as interval estimates. The width of such intervals can function as a cue to credibility and expertise. Incomplete, one-sided intervals, where only one boundary is stated, imply directionality. “More than 100 people” suggests a crowd, while “less than 200” implies a shortfall. As with VPEs, directionally positive intervals are more frequent, and perhaps more neutral than negative ones. To convey expectancies and uncertainty in a balanced way, communicators may have to alternate between complementary frames.

• Teigen, Karl-Halvor; Juanchich, Marie & Løhre, Erik (2022). Combining verbal forecasts: The role of directionality and the reinforcement effect. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. ISSN 0894-3257. s. 1–13. doi: 10.1002/bdm.2298. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Recent research has shown that when people combine verbal probabilistic forecasts from two sources, they are not simply averaged but can reinforce each other; so when two advisors both said an event was “rather likely,” some listeners concluded that the event was “quite likely”. Conversely, when both said the event was “rather unlikely,” people concluded that it was “quite unlikely.” The present studies demonstrate that the direction of this effect is not evoked by high versus low probabilities, but by the directionality of verbal probability expressions. Some phrases are affirmative, directed towards occurrences (“there is a chance”), whereas others are negations, pointing to the possibility that the event might not occur (“it is not certain”). Two positive phrases are perceived to reinforce each other, even when they convey low probabilities, resulting in a higher combined probability estimate, whereas two negative phrases do the opposite, regardless of the probabilities they convey. We show that this effect occurs both for equal and unequal verbal phrases, regardless of the probability equivalents of the expressions. We also found a positive, but weaker, reinforcement effect of numerical probabilities

• Teigen, Karl-Halvor; Juanchich, Marie & Løhre, Erik (2022). What is a “likely” amount? Representative (modal) values are considered likely even when their probabilities are low. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. ISSN 0749-5978. 171. doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2022.104166. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Research on verbal probabilities and standard scales issued by national and international authorities suggest that only events with probabilities above 60% should be labelled “likely”. We find, however, that when people apply this term to continuous variables, like expected costs, it describes the most likely (modal) outcome or interval, regardless of actual probabilities, which may be quite small. This was demonstrated in six studies in which lay participants (N = 2,228) were shown probability distributions from various domains and asked to generate or to select “likely” outcome intervals. Despite having numeric and graphically displayed information available, participants judged central, low-probability segments as “likely” (as opposed to equal or larger segments in the tails) and subsequently overestimated the chances of these outcomes. We conclude that high-probability interpretations of “likely” are only valid for binary outcomes but not for distributions of graded variables or multiple outcomes.

• Teigen, Karl Halvor & Kanten, Alf Børre (2022). Out of the blue: on the suddenness of perceived chance events. Thinking and Reasoning. ISSN 1354-6783. doi: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2047105. Vis sammendrag

  People commonly use terms like ‘random’, ‘by chance’, or ‘accidentally’ when they describe occurrences that sidestep the normal course of events, with no apparent causal link to ongoing activities. Such intrusive events are typically perceived as happening all of a sudden. This was demonstrated in seven experiments (N=1299) by asking people to identify statements they believed belonged to stories about chanc events, and by comparing chance vs. nonchance events from their own life and from the lives of others. Suddenness also appeared to be more strongly associated with beginnings than with endings of an episode. Thus, statements about sudden beginnings of a career or a relationship were more readily believed to happen ‘by chance’ than ‘not by chance’. But life-changing events did not become more accidental simply by being placed in the beginning of a ‘life chapter’. These studies highlight a central but neglected feature of perceived randomness.

• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2022). Judgments by representativeness. I Pohl, Rüdiger F. (Red.), Cognitive illusions, 3rd ed.. Routledge. ISSN 9780367724245.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2021). Luck, Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research. Springer Nature. ISSN 978-3-319-69909-7. doi: https%3A/doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69909-7_1712-2.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2020). ‘The concept of correlation in adults’ comes of age. I Lindstad, Tobias; Stänicke, Erik & Valsiner, Jaan (Red.), Respect for Thought: Jan Smedslund’s Legacy for Psychology. Springer. ISSN 978-3-030-43065-8. s. 55–68. doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-43066-5_4. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2020). Historien om svensk eksperimentalpsykologi: En nabos betraktninger. I Johansson, Gunn (Red.), Historien om svensk psykologisk forskning. Utvecklingen från perception och psykofysik. Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien. ISSN 9789188763167. s. 163–173.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor & Keren, Gideon (2020). Are random events perceived as rare? On the relationship between perceived randomness and outcome probability. Memory & Cognition. ISSN 0090-502X. 48(2), s. 299–313. doi: 10.3758/s13421-019-01011-6. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Many daily life events, from lotteries to coincidental encounters, occur partly or entirely randomly or “by chance.” Six experiments,in two different languages, explored how perceptions of randomness are related to the perceived probability of the same events—specifically, whether low-probability events were viewed as more random than similar events that were judged (rightly or wrongly) to be more likely. The experiments suggest that low-probability outcomes of stochastic events are indeed considered as being more random than medium and highly likely outcomes, even when all are produced by a “blind” (hence random) process. Degree of randomness involved in catching a bus was inversely related to the subjective probability estimates of the same event, both for correct and incorrect estimates. Unlikely coincidences were perceived to be more random than the same events presented in a more likely frame. The outcome of a match between two soccer teams was deemed to be more random when the weaker team wins than when the stronger team wins. Only extremely deviant outcomes—for instance, a top student who fails on two successive exams—made some people reject the randomness account, presumably believing that such extreme events must have a causal explanation. We conclude that people generally associate randomness with low-probability events,indicating outcomes that “cannot be predicted.”

• Magnussen, Svein & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2020). Kognitive snarveier og slagsider i vurdering av bevis. Lov og Rett. ISSN 0024-6980. 59(1), s. 19–42. doi: 10.18261/issn.1504-3061-2020-01-03.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor & Kanten, Alf Børre (2019). Are random events expected to be small? . Psychological Research. ISSN 0340-0727. doi: 10.1007/s00426-019-01252-9. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  People’s intuitions about mathematical and statistical concepts often include features that are not a part of the formal definitions. We argue that randomness and related concepts (events happening “accidentally”, “coincidentally” or “by chance”) are typically assumed to occur in a context of small rather than large events. Five experiments were designed to test the hypothesis of an association between perceived randomness and size. In Experiment 1 and 2 statements describing small outcomes as due to chance were judged to be more natural and to make better sense than corresponding statements about large outcomes (or about small outcomes not due to chance). Experiment 3 showed that people imagine that stories about randomness in daily life should preferably start with small events, even when they eventually turn out to be consequential (e.g., stories about an apparently random meeting ending with marriage). Experiment 4 demonstrated that small changes in a graph of a random walk were seen as random, whereas large changes were perceived as potentially nonrandom. Finally, Experiment 5 showed that small animals are believed to display more random behavior than larger ones. This applied also to fictional creatures with nonsense names, where size was implicitly suggested by the names’ phonetic qualities. Analogical instances can be found in the history of science, all the way back to Lucretius’ doctrine of the tiny “swerves” of atoms. The pervasive association between smallness and randomness might be partly due to real world observations and partly to cognitive and motivational constraints.

• Teigen, Karl Halvor; Andersen, Bjørn Sørskot; Alnes, Sigurd Lerkerød & Hesselberg, Jan Ole (2019). Entirely possible overruns: How people think and talk about probabilistic cost estimates. International Journal of Managing Projects in Business. ISSN 1753-8378. 13(2), s. 293–311. doi: 10.1108/IJMPB-06-2018-0114. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Løhre, Erik; Juanchich, Marie; Sirota, Miroslav; Teigen, Karl Halvor & Shepherd, Theodore G. (2019). Climate scientists' wide prediction intervals may be more likely but are perceived to be less certain. Weather, Climate, and Society. ISSN 1948-8327. 11(3), s. 565–575. doi: 10.1175/WCAS-D-18-0136.1. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Løhre, Erik; Sobkow, Agata; Hohle, Sigrid Møyner & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2019). Framing experts' (dis)agreements about uncertain environmental events. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. ISSN 0894-3257. 32, s. 564–578. doi: 10.1002/bdm.2132. Vis sammendrag

  Agreements and disagreements between expert statements influence lay people's beliefs. But few studies have examined what is perceived as a disagreement. We report six experiments where people rated agreement between pairs of probabilistic statements about environmental events, attributed to two different experts or to the same expert at two different points in time. The statements differed in frame, by focusing on complementary outcomes (45% probability that smog will have negative health effects vs. 55% probability that it will not have such effects), in probability level (45% vs. 55% probability of negative effects), or in both respects. Opposite frames strengthened disagreement when combined with different probability levels. Approximate probabilities can be “framed” in yet another way by indicating reference values they are “over” or “under”. Statements that use different directional verbal terms (over vs. under 50%) indicated greater disagreement than statements with the same directional term but different probability levels (over 50% vs. over 70%). Framing and directional terms similarly affected consistency judgments when both statements were issued by the same expert at different occasions. The effect of framing on perceived agreement was significant for medium (10 and 20 percentage points) differences between probabilities, whereas the effect of directional term was stable for numerical differences up to 40 percentage points. To emphasize agreement between different estimates, they should be framed in the same way. To accentuate disagreements or changes of opinion, opposite framings should be used.

• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2019). Luck and risk. I Church, Ian & Hartman, Robert (Red.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. Taylor & Francis. ISSN 9780815366591. s. 345–355. doi: 10.4324/9781351258760-31. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Manolchev, Constantine & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2018). Counterfactual theory as an under-utilised analytical framework for studying precarious work experiences. Personnel Review. ISSN 0048-3486. 48(1), s. 288–302. doi: 10.1108/PR-11-2017-0367. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Teigen, Karl Halvor; Løhre, Erik & Hohle, Sigrid Møyner (2018). The boundary effect: Perceived post hoc accuracy of prediction intervals. Judgment and decision making. ISSN 1930-2975. 13(4), s. 309–321. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Predictions of magnitudes (costs, durations, environmental events) are often given as uncertainty intervals (ranges). When are such forecasts judged to be correct? We report results of four experiments showing that forecasted ranges of expected natural events (floods and volcanic eruptions) are perceived as accurate when an observed magnitude falls inside or at the boundary of the range, with little regard to its position relative to the “most likely” (central) estimate. All outcomes that fell inside a wide interval were perceived as equally well captured by the forecast, whereas identical outcomes falling outside a narrow range were deemed to be incorrectly predicted, in proportion to the magnitude of deviation. In these studies, ranges function as categories, with boundaries distinguishing between right or wrong predictions, even for outcome distributions that are acknowledged as continuous, and for boundaries that are arbitrarily defined (for instance, when the narrow prediction interval is defined as capturing 50 percent and the wide 90 percent of all potential outcomes). However, the boundary effect is affected by label. When the upper limit of a range is described as a value that “can” occur (Experiment 5), outcomes both below and beyond this value were regarded as consistent with the forecast.

• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2018). Vurdering: lite sannsynlig. Verbale (u)sannsynligheter gjennom 30 år. Psykologisk tidsskrift. ISSN 1501-7508. 22(2), s. 58–65.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2018). The unbearable lightness of finger movements: Commentary to Dolinski. Psychologia Społeczna. ISSN 1896-1800. 13(2). doi: 10.5964/spb.v113i2.26110. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  In the target article, Doliński showed that empirical studies of “real” behaviour are an almost extinct species of research, judged from articles published in the most recent volume of JPSP (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology). This finding continues a trend identified by Baumeister and colleagues ten years ago. The reliance on self-reports and rating scales can hardly be explained as an aftermath of the cognitive revolution in psychology, or a preoccupation with measurements and advanced statistical analyses, as Doliński suggests, but is more compatible with the ease of collecting questionnaire data, combined with the pressure to publish large multi-study papers and to obtain approval from ethical review boards. This development is further strengthened by the accessibility of online participant pools. An informal count showed that students participating for course credit were in 2006 involved more than 90% of empirical JPSP studies, as against 22.5% in 2017. In contrast, Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, non-existent in 2006, participated in 55.3% of the empirical studies published in the most recent volume. Parallel to this development the number of participants per study and the number of studies per article have vastly increased.

• Nilsen, Connie Villemo; Friborg, Oddgeir; Teigen, Karl Halvor & Svartdal, Frode (2018). Textual health warning labels on snus (Swedish moist snuff): do they affect risk perception? BMC Public Health. ISSN 1471-2458. 18(564). doi: 10.1186/s12889-018-5461-2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hohle, Sigrid Møyner & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2018). When probabilities change: Perceptions and implications of trends in uncertain climate forecasts. Journal of Risk Research. ISSN 1366-9877. 22(5), s. 595–569. doi: 10.1080/13669877.2018.1459801. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Past research has revealed a trend effect when people are faced with a revised probabilistic forecast: A forecasted event that has become more (vs. less) certain is taken to signal a trend towards even stronger (weaker) certainty in future revisions of the forecast. The present paper expands this finding by exploring the boundary conditions of the trend effect and how it affects judgments of the forecaster. In Study 1, the trend effect was shown to persist when receivers process the forecast more deliberately, by considering reasons for the revision. In Study 2, trend continuation was predicted even when the two forecasts were made by different experts at different points in time. Study 3 demonstrated that the effect disappears when receivers are given an earlier forecast disrupting the linearity of the trend (e.g., a 60%-70% sequence preceded by a 70% forecast). In Study 4, two forecasters were perceived as more in agreement when revising divergent probabilities in the same rather than in opposite directions. If the event occurs, a forecast with downgraded probability (e.g. from 50% to 40%) was judged to be less accurate than an equally uncertain single forecast (40%). These results demonstrate the robustness of the trend effect based on two forecasts, affecting not only receivers' expectations of what comes next, but also their perceptions of the forecaster and of forecast accuracy. The findings have implications for how people communicate and understand risks and other uncertain events in areas such as climate science, weather prediction, political science and medicine.

• Teigen, Karl Halvor; Filkukova, Petra & Hohle, Sigrid Møyner (2018). It can become 5 °C warmer: The extremity effect in climate forecasts. Journal of experimental psychology. Applied. ISSN 1076-898X. 24(1), s. 3–17. doi: 10.1037/xap0000149. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Climate projections and other predictions are often described as outcomes that can happen, indicating possibilities that are imaginable, but uncertain. Whereas the meanings of other uncertainty terms have been extensively studied, the uses of modal verbs like can and will have rarely been examined. Participants in five experiments were shown graphs and verbal statements showing projections of future global warming, sea level rise, and other climate-related issues. All studies gave support for the extremity hypothesis, which states that people use can-statements to describe the topmost values in a distribution of outcomes, regardless of their actual probabilities. Despite their extremity, outcomes that can happen are believed to have a substantial likelihood of occurrence. The extremity effect was replicated in two languages (Norwegian and English), and with several related terms (can, possible, could, may). The combination of extremity and exaggerated likelihood conveyed by such statements could lead to serious miscommunications.

• Hohle, Sigrid Møyner & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2018). More than 50% or Less than 70% Chance: Pragmatic Implications of Single-Bound Probability Estimates. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. ISSN 0894-3257. 31(1), s. 138–150. doi: 10.1002/bdm.2052. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Probability estimates can be given as ranges or uncertainty intervals, where often only one of the interval bounds (lower or upper) is specified. For instance, a weather forecaster can describe La Niña as having “more than 70% chance” or “less than 90% chance” of occurring. In three experiments, we studied how research participants perceived climate related forecasts expressed with lower-bound (“over X% chance”) or upper-bound (“under Y% chance”) probability statements. Results indicate that such single-bound statements give pragmatic information in addition to the numeric probabilities they convey. First, the studies show that these statements are directional, leading the listeners’ attention in opposite directions. “Over” statements guide attention towards the possible occurrence of the event, and are explained by reasons for why it might happen, while “under” statements direct attention to its possible non-occurrence, and are more often explained by reasons for why the target event might not appear, corresponding to positive (it is possible) vs. negative (it is uncertain) verbal probabilities. Second, boundaries were found to reveal the forecaster’s beliefs, and could be perceived as indicative of an increasing or a decreasing trend. Single-bound probability estimates are therefore not neutral communications of probability level, but might “leak” information about the speaker’s expectations, and about past and future developments of the forecast.

• Nordbye, Gro Hege Haraldsen; Riege, Anine H. & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2018). Better safe than sorry: Risking irresponsibility by seeking uncertainty. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. ISSN 0894-3257. 31(1), s. 87–99. doi: 10.1002/bdm.2049. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Bruckmüller, Susanne; Hegarty, Peter; Teigen, Karl Halvor; Böhm, Gisela & Luminet, Olivier (2017). When do past events require explanation? Insights from social psychology. Memory Studies. ISSN 1750-6980. 10(3), s. 261–273. doi: 10.1177/1750698017701607. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Teigen, Karl Halvor & Løhre, Erik (2017). Expressing (un)certainty in no uncertain terms: Reply to Fox and Ülkümen. Thinking and Reasoning. ISSN 1354-6783. 23(4), s. 492–496. doi: 10.1080/13546783.2017.1314965. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Løhre, Erik & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2017). Probabilities associated with precise and vague forecasts. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. ISSN 0894-3257. 30(5), s. 1014–1026. doi: 10.1002/bdm.2021. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Forecasts of future outcomes, such as the consequences of climate change, are given with different degrees of precision. Logically, more precise forecasts (e.g., a temperature increase of 3–4°) have a smaller probability of capturing the actual outcome than less precise forecasts (e.g., a temperature increase of 2–6°). Nevertheless, people often trust precise forecasts more than vague forecasts, perhaps because precision is associated with knowledge and expertise. In five experiments, we ask whether people expect highly confident forecasts to be associated with wider or narrower outcome ranges than less confident forecasts (Experiments 1, 2, and 5), and, conversely, whether they expect precise forecasts to be issued with higher or lower confidence than vague forecasts (Experiments 3 and 4). The results revealed two distinct ways of thinking about confidence intervals, labeled distributional (wide intervals seen as more probable than narrow intervals) and associative (wide intervals seen as more uncertain than narrow intervals). Distributional responses occurred somewhat more often in within-subjects designs, where wide and narrow prediction intervals and high and low probability estimates can be directly compared, whereas separate evaluations (in between-subjects design) suggested associative responses to be slightly more frequent. These findings are relevant for experts communicating forecasts through confidence intervals.

• Hohle, Sigrid Møyner & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2017). The trend effect: When a forecast is revised, people believe it will continue changing. I Römpke, A.-K. (Red.), Outlooks on Applying Environmental Psychology Research. Bundesamt für Naturschutz. ISSN 978-3-89624-197-9. s. 35–41. doi: 10.19217/skr460.
• Magnussen, Svein; Eilertsen, Dag-Erik; Stridbeck, Ulf; Teigen, Karl Halvor & Wessel, Ellen Margrethe (2017). Misforstått kritikk. Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap. ISSN 0040-7143. 130, s. 109–111. doi: 10.18261/issn.1504-3096-2017-01-06.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor; Böhm, Gisela; Bruckmüller, Susanne; Hegarty, Peter & Luminet, Olivier (2017). Long live the king! Beginnings loom larger than endings of past and recurrent events. Cognition. ISSN 0010-0277. 163, s. 26–41. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.02.013. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Events are temporal “figures”, which can be defined as identifiable segments in time, bounded by beginnings and endings. But the functions and importance of these two boundaries differ. We argue that beginnings loom larger than endings by attracting more attention, being judged as more important and interesting, warranting more explanation, and having more causal power. This difference follows from a lay notion that additions (the introduction of something new) imply more change and demand more effort than do subtractions (returning to a previous state of affairs). This “beginning advantage” is demonstrated in eight studies of people’s representations of epochs and events on a historical timeline as well as in cyclical change in the annual seasons. People think it is more important to know when wars and reigns started than when they ended, and are more interested in reading about beginnings than endings of historical movements. Transitional events (such as elections and passages from one season to the next) claim more interest and grow in importance when framed as beginnings of what follows than as conclusions of what came before. As beginnings are often identified in retrospect, the beginning advantage may distort and exaggerate their actual historical importance.

• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2017). Judgments by representativeness. I Pohl, Rüdiger F. (Red.), Cognitive illusions: Intriguing phenomena in thinking, judgment and memory. Routledge. ISSN 978-1-138-90342-5. s. 204–222.
• Riege, Anine Cecilie & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2017). Everybody Will Win, and All Must Be Hired: Comparing Additivity Neglect with the Nonselective Superiority Bias. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. ISSN 0894-3257. 30(1), s. 95–106. doi: 10.1002/bdm.1924. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Magnussen, Svein; Eilertsen, Dag-Erik; Teigen, Karl Halvor; Stridbeck, Ulf & Wessel, Ellen Margrethe (2016). Urimelig tvil: et tilsvar. Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap. ISSN 0040-7143. 129, s. 300–305.
• Løhre, Erik & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2016). There is a 60% probability, but I am 70% certain: Communicative consequences of external and internal expressions of uncertainty. Thinking and Reasoning. ISSN 1354-6783. 22(4), s. 369–396. doi: 10.1080/13546783.2015.1069758. Vis sammendrag

  Current theories of probability recognize a distinction between external (un)certainty (frequentistic probabilities) and internal (un)certainty (degrees of belief). The present studies investigated this distinction in lay people’s judgments of probability statements formulated to suggest either an internal (“I am X% certain”) or an external (“It is X% certain” or “There is a X% probability”) interpretation. These subtle differences in wording influenced participants’ perceptions and endorsements of such statements, and their impressions of the speaker. External expressions were seen to signal more reliable task duration estimates, and a lower degree of external than internal certainty was deemed necessary to advise a course of action. In conversations about football, internal expressions were perceived as signaling more personal interest, and were expected to be on the average 10% higher than corresponding external probabilities. Finally, people who reported their outcome expectations for two major sports events let their degree of interest in these events influence their internal but not their external certainty. These results have implications for the communication of uncertainty and probability.

• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2015). Framing of numerical quantities. I Keren, Gideon & Wu, George (Red.), The Wiley Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making. Wiley-Blackwell. ISSN 978-1-118-46839-5. s. 568–589. doi: 10.1002/9781118468333.ch20.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor; Løhre, Erik & Hohle, Sigrid Møyner (2015). Det (u)sikre og det (u)sannsynlige: Hva forskerne sier og hva de (kanskje) mener. Impuls : Tidsskrift for psykologi. ISSN 0801-2911. 68(1), s. 33–42.
• Hohle, Sigrid Møyner & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2015). Forecasting forecasts: The trend effect. Judgment and decision making. ISSN 1930-2975. 10(5), s. 416–428. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  People often make predictions about the future based on trends they have observed in the past. Revised probabilistic forecasts can be perceived by the public as indicative of such a trend. In five studies, we describe experts who make probabilistic forecasts of various natural events (effects of climate changes, landslide and earthquake risks) at two points in time. Prognoses that have been upgraded or downgraded from T1 to T2 were in all studies expected to be updated further, in the same direction, later on (at T3). Thus, two prognoses were in these studies enough to define a trend, forming the basis for future projections. This “trend effect” implies that non-experts interpret recent forecast in light of what the expert said in the past, and think, for instance, that a “moderate” landslide risk will cause more worry if it has previously been low than if it has been high. By transcending the experts’ most recent forecasts the receivers are far from conservative, and appear to know more about the experts’ next prognoses than the experts themselves.

• Kanten, Alf Børre & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2015). A Magnitude Effect in Judgments of Subjective Closeness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. ISSN 0146-1672. 41(12), s. 1712–1722. doi: 10.1177/0146167215609894. Vis sammendrag

  Events can be far away from or near an observer in several respects: they can be distant or close in a spatial, temporal, social, or hypothetical sense. They can also vary in magnitude, physically or in terms of impact and importance. We examine the existence of a general effect of perceived magnitude on judgments of subjective closeness. Studies 1-4 show that proximity judgments, of any type, are affected by the severity of an event so that a highly severe event will be described as closer than a less severe one. Study 5 demonstrates the Magnitude Effect for positive events. Finally, Study 6 shows that the effect can be extended to distances between comparable events, in addition to the distance from an observer to an event. We see the Magnitude Effect as a spillover from the scales used to describe events to the scales used to describe distances.

• Larsen, Kim Sverre & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2015). Hvorfor misforstås forskning om selvmord? Tidsskrift for Norsk Psykologforening. ISSN 0332-6470. 52(7), s. 607–612.
• Magnussen, Svein; Eilertsen, Dag-Erik; Stridbeck, Ulf; Teigen, Karl Halvor & Wessel, Ellen Margrethe (2014). «UTOVER RIMELIG TVIL»? En kvantitativ studie av sikkerhet i bevisvurdering i straffesaker hos norske fagdommere og lekdommere. Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap. ISSN 0040-7143. 127, s. 384–396.
• Nordbye, Gro Hege Haraldsen & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2014). Responsibility judgments of wins and losses in the 2013 Chess Championship. Judgment and decision making. ISSN 1930-2975. 9(4), s. 335–348. doi: 10.1037/e573552014-082. Vis sammendrag

  We report two studies on the perceived responsibility of opponents competing for a goal that can be attained by only one of them. Responsibility judgments were collected in seven samples of lay people and experts before, during, and after the World Chess Championship in 2013. Participants assessed the responsibility of the two players, their supporting teams,local conditions, and chance factors for four hypothetical outcomes (large and small loss/win for each player), along With probabilities for these outcomes, demonstrating subadditivity (sums exceeding 100%) in all samples, even among chess experts. The winner was consistently perceived to be more responsible than the loser, and more for outcomes with large than small margins. There was also an effect of focal player, as Carlsen was given more responsibility both for losses and wins than Anand, by the present (Norwegian) pro-Carlsen samples. However, this effect could be modified by describing the outcomes as Anand’s (rather than Carlsen’s) wins and losses. Thus the study adds to the valence framing literature by showing how responsibility judgments are affected by the way outcomes are framed.

• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2014). When very likely is not so likely. Nature Climate Change. ISSN 1758-678X. 4, s. 421–422. doi: 10.1038/nclimate2256. Vis sammendrag

  The International Panel of Climate Change has issued guidelines for communicating probabilities with words. But readers all over the world think the words mean something different.

• Riege, Anine Cecilie; Sulutvedt, Unni & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2014). Format dependent probabilities: An eye-tracking analysis of additivity neglect. Polish Psychological Bulletin. ISSN 0079-2993. 45(1), s. 12–20. doi: 10.2478/ppb-2014-0003. Vis sammendrag

  When people are asked to estimate the probabilities of uncertain events, they often neglect the additivity principle, which requires that the probabilities assigned to an exhaustive set of outcomes should add up to 100%. Previous studies indicate that additivity neglect is dependent on response format, self-generated probability estimates being more coherent than estimates on rating scales. The present study made use of eye-tracking methodology, recording the movement, frequency and duration of fixations during the solution of ten additivity problems and two control tasks. Participants produced more non-additive estimates in the Scale format than in the Self-generated format. Self-generated estimates also led to longer decision time and a higher number of repeated inspections, suggesting a deliberate comparison process. In contrast, the Scale format seemed to encourage a case-based approach where each outcome is evaluated in isolation.

• Nordbye, Gro Hege Haraldsen & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2014). Being responsible versus acting responsibly: Effects of agency and risk taking on responsibility judgments. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology. ISSN 0036-5564. 55(2), s. 102–114. doi: 10.1111/sjop.12111. Vis sammendrag

  In three experimental studies, with managers and students as participants, we explore in this article the relation between two kinds of responsibility judgments, called Responsibility 1 (R1) and Responsibility 2 (R2). Decision makers can be viewed as being more or less responsible for their choice and its consequences (R1). Their actions can also be evaluated, from a normative point of view, as instances of more or less responsible behavior (R2). Experiment 1 showed that managers who depart from the default or “normal” course of action, by choosing a new (versus familiar) alternative, changing (versus sticking to) an initial decision, or going against (versus following) the advice of a management team, are rated as more responsible (R1) for the outcomes of their decision. At the same time, they are perceived to act in a less responsible way (R2). Experiment 2 compared decision makers choosing between more or less risky options. High risk takers were held more responsible (R1) for their choice and for its consequences, but were again viewed as behaving in a less responsible way (R2) than low risk takers. In Experiment 3, participants judged decision makers who followed or opposed others’ advice by choosing either a high or a low risk option. Opposing others’ advice led to higher R1 and lower R2 scores, especially when choosing the high risk option, moderated by outcome (successful decisions appearing more responsible than those that went wrong). Thus R1 and R2 judgments should be distinguished as having different and sometimes even opposite determinants.

• Løhre, Erik & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2014). How fast can you (possibly) do it, or how long will it (certainly) take? Communicating uncertain estimates of performance time. Acta Psychologica. ISSN 0001-6918. 148, s. 63–73. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2014.01.005.
• Magnussen, Svein; Eilertsen, Dag-Erik; Teigen, Karl Halvor & Wessel, Ellen Margrethe (2014). The Probability of Guilt in Criminal Cases: Are People Aware of Being 'Beyond Reasonable Doubt'? Applied Cognitive Psychology. ISSN 0888-4080. 28(2), s. 196–203. doi: 10.1002/acp.2978.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor; Juanchich, Marie & Filkukova, Petra (2014). Verbal probabilities: An alternative approach. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology (QJEP). ISSN 1747-0218. 67(1), s. 124–146. doi: 10.1080/17470218.2013.793731. Vis sammendrag

  Previous studies of verbal probabilities have tried to place expressions like a chance, possible, and certain on 0-1 numerical probability scales. We ask instead, out of a range of outcomes which outcome does a verbal probability suggest. When, for instance, a sample of laptop batteries lasts from 1.5 to 3.5 hours, what is a certain and what is a possible duration? Study 1 showed that speakers associate certain with low values and possible with (unlikely) high or maximal values. In Study 2 this methodology was applied to several positive and negative verbal probability phrases, showing a preference for high rather than low or middle values in a distribution. Study 3 showed that such maxima are not universally described by large numbers. For instance, maximum speed is often described in terms of a small number of time units. What can (possibly) happen is accordingly sometimes described with very low and sometimes with very high values, depending upon focus of interest. Finally, participants in Study 4 were given the role of hearers rather than speakers, and asked to infer outcome ranges from verbal probabilities. Hearers appeared to be partly aware of speakers’ tendencies to describe outcomes at the top of the range.

• Kirkebøen, Geir; Vasaasen, Erik & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2013). Revisions and Regret: The Cost of Changing your Mind. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. ISSN 0894-3257. 26(1), s. 1–12. doi: 10.1002/bdm.756. Vis sammendrag

  Decision reversals often imply improved decisions. Yet, people show a strong resistance against changing their minds. These are well established findings, which suggest that changed decisions carry a subjective cost, perhaps by being more strongly regretted. Three studies were conducted to explore participants’ regret when making reversible decisions, and to test the hypothesis that changing one’s mind will increase post-outcome regret. The first two studies employed the Ultimatum game and the Trust game. The third study used a variant of the Monty Hall problem. All games were conducted by individual participants playing interactively against a computer. The outcomes were designed to capture a common characteristic of real life decisions: they varied from rather negative to fairly positive, and for every outcome it was possible to imagine both more and less profitable outcomes. In all experiments, those who changed their minds reported much stronger post-outcome regret than those who did not change, even if the final outcomes were equally good (Experiments 2 and 3) or better (Experiment 1).This finding was not due to individual differences with respect to gender, tendency to regret, or tendency to maximize. Previous studies have found that those who change from a correct to wrong option regret more than those who select a wrong option directly. This study indicates that this finding is a special case of a more general phenomenon: Changing one’s mind seems to come with a cost, even when one ends up with favourable outcomes.

• Teigen, Karl Halvor & Filkukova, Petra (2013). Can > will: Predictions of what "can" happen are extreme, but believed to be probable. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. ISSN 0894-3257. 26(1), s. 68–78. doi: 10.1002/bdm.761. Vis sammendrag

  Predictions of uncertain events are often described in terms of what can or what will happen. How are such statements used by speakers, and what are they perceived to mean? Participants in four experiments were presented with distributions of variable product characteristics, and asked to generate natural, meaningful sentences containing either will or can. Will was typically associated with either low or intermediate numeric values, whereas can consistently suggested high (maximum) values. For instance, laptop batteries lasting from 1.5 to 3.5 hours “will” last for 1.5 hours or for 2.5 hours, but they “can” last for 3.5 hours. The same response patterns were found for positive and negative events. In will-statements, the most frequent scalar modifiers were “at least” and “about”, whereas can-statements included “up to” as the most frequent modifier. A fifth experiment showed that will indicates an outcome that may be “certain”, but more often simply “probable”. Can means “possible”, but even can-statements are perceived to imply “probable” outcomes. This could create a communication paradox since most speakers use “can” to describe outcomes that because of their extremity are at the same time quite unlikely.

• Riege, Anine H. & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2013). Additivity neglect in probability estimates: Effects of numeracy and response format. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. ISSN 0749-5978. 121(1), s. 41–52. doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.11.004. Vis sammendrag

  When people are asked to estimate the probabilities for an exhaustive set of more than two events, they often produce probabilities that add up to more than 100%. Potential determinants for such additivity neglect are explored in four experiments. Additive responses vary between experimental conditions, mainly as a result of response format, with a scale format leading to fewer additive responses than a list format with self-generated, written probabilities. Participants with high numeracy scores produced more additive responses, especially after being primed with a numeracy scale. Additivity neglect for 100% sums appears to be unrelated to other subadditive judgments, like non-additive disjunctions. We conclude that additivity neglect is caused by a case-based approach, which comes natural in real-life situations where the full set of outcomes is not available.

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• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2017). Terningen er rund: Bedømmingspsykologi i tretten kapitler. Cappelen Damm Akademisk. ISBN 978-1-138-90342-5. 252 s.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2015). En psykologihistorie 2. utgave. Fagbokforlaget. ISBN 978-82-450-1704-5. 474 s.

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• Løhre, Erik & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2021). Effects of expressing external and internal uncertainty on perceived leadership competence and honesty.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor; Juanchich, Marie & Løhre, Erik (2021). A “likely” quantity is a “most likely” quantity, but not as likely as we like to think. Vis sammendrag

  Research on verbal probabilities and standard scales issued by IPCC, NATO and other authorities indicate that only probabilities above 60% should be described as “likely”. We find, in contrast, that when people apply this term to continuous quantities, like expected costs, it describes the most likely (modal) outcome or a central range, regardless of actual probabilities, which may be quite small. This was demonstrated in five studies in which lay participants were shown bell-shaped probability distributions from various domains and were asked to provide or to select “likely” outcome intervals. They also gave numeric estimates of probabilities of these intervals. Participants neglected numeric and graphically displayed information, and considered central, narrow but representative outcomes as “likely” (as opposed to much larger intervals in the tails) We conclude that the p > .6-interpretation of “likely” is only valid for binary outcomes but not for continuous quantities

• Løhre, Erik & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2020). How to admit uncertainty and still be trusted: External and internal uncertainty and the confidence heuristic.
• Larsen, Kim Sverre & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2020). Historien om den ungarske selvmordsangen Gloomy Sunday. Tidsskrift for Norsk Psykologforening. ISSN 0332-6470. 57(9), s. 690–692.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2019). Terningen er rund: Hvordan folk tenker om sannsynligheter og tilfeldigheter.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2019). Usikre prognoser: Folks tolkninger av hva eksperter sier om vær og klima.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor; Keren, Gideon & Kanten, Alf Børre (2019). Are random events rare and small? Intuitive connotations of perceived chance events.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor; Hohle, Sigrid Møyner & Løhre, Erik (2019). Uncertain statements about climate change: What do they tell the public?
• Teigen, Karl Halvor; Løhre, Erik & Hohle, Sigrid Møyner (2019). Hva ligger i et anslag? Folks tolkninger av hva klimaforskerne sier.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor & Keren, Gideon (2019). Do people think of random outcomes as unlikely? Vis sammendrag

  Most people agree that a blind draw of a marble from an urn will produce a random outcome. But is perceived randomness affected by the number of marbles? It appears that a winning draw will be considered more random with 10 than with 90 winning marbles (out of 100). We explored in six experiments how perceived degree of randomness of an event is related to the perceived likelihood of the same event, specifically whether low-probability events were viewed as more random than comparable events that were judged (rightly or wrongly) to be more likely. The events to be judged ranged from outcomes of lotteries to bus arrivals, coincidental encounters, unexpected exam grades and the outcome of football matches between strong and weak teams. Unlikely coincidences were perceived to be more random than the same events presented in a more likely frame. For instance, a drunk driver crashing with a sober driver is perceived as more likely and less random than a sober driver crashing with a driver that is drunk. Only extremely deviant outcomes happening for unclear reasons made some people reject the randomness account, presumably believing such extreme events must have a causal explanation (and thus not so unlikely, after all). We conclude that, under most circumstances, people associate randomness with low probability events, indicating outcomes that “could not be predicted”.

• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2019). Out of the blue: Lay perceptions of singular random events.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2019). Unlikely, small and sudden - Lay perceptions of singular random events.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2019). The taming of uncertainty: How we make sense of chance by words and numbers.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2018). When science turns against itself: A historical perspective on the replication crisis in social psychology.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2018). How are experts' uncertainty intervals perceived by non-experts? Vis sammendrag

  Estimated project costs can be described as an uncertainty interval where low (minimum), middle (expected or most likely) and high (maximum) values are specifically indicated (e.g., corresponding to P15, P50, and P85 in a cumulative probability distribution). We report the results of a questionnaire study where experts’ estimated costs for a road project, illustrated by a bell-shaped graph, were presented to several educated samples (including students, employees in a major construction company, and judges). In line with findings from other domains, they underestimated the span of the uncertainty interval, and yet they believed that actual outcomes outside of this interval, especially excess costs, would be likely. When asked to suggest outcomes corresponding to verbal phrases, like “entirely probable”, “not surprising” and “could cost”, they mostly selected extreme values (at the top of the uncertainty distribution). Outcomes inside, or at the boundaries of an uncertainty interval were regarded as accurately predicted, while outcomes outside indicated that the estimates were wrong. It is concluded that even well-defined probabilistic estimates cannot be assumed to be understood as intended, even by educated readers, due to lay notions of probabilities, categorical thinking and the colloquial meaning of verbal terms

• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2018). The language of uncertainty - after 30 years.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2017). Nobelpris til lirkemiddel-arkitekten. Tidsskrift for Norsk Psykologforening. ISSN 0332-6470. 54.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2017). A beginning bias in framing of season changes.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2017). En artikkel for alle årstider. Tidsskrift for Norsk Psykologforening. ISSN 0332-6470. 54(5), s. 472–477.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2016). Perception of chances – real and imaginary.
• Hohle, Sigrid Møyner & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2016). The Trend Effect: People's perceptions of revised expert forecasts.
• Løhre, Erik & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2016). Stronger forecasts are more certain.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2016). The probable, the uncertain, and the hypothetical: Problems of assessment and communication.
• Hohle, Sigrid Møyner & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2015). Trendeffekten: Hvordan tolkes reviderte klimaprognoser?
• Løhre, Erik; Teigen, Karl Halvor & Hohle, Sigrid Møyner (2015). Trusting an uncertain forecaster: Judgments of revised intervals in predictions of climate change.
• Hohle, Sigrid Møyner & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2015). Forecasting forecasts: The power of trends.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2015). Om å varsle fremtiden: Hvordan vi forstår og misforstår prognoser.
• Kanten, Alf Børre & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2015). A Magnitude Effect in Judgments of Subjective Closeness.
• Riege, Anine Cecilie & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2015). Everybody will win, and all must be hired:Comparing additivity neglect with the nonselective superiority bias .
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2015). Th. Tidsskrift for Norsk Psykologforening. ISSN 0332-6470. 52(9), s. 774–776.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2015). What can happen? Spontaneous verbal probabilities describe extreme events.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor; Hohle, Sigrid Møyner & Løhre, Erik (2015). Trends in forecasts: When past predictions change present risks.
• Riege, Anine Cecilie & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2014). The relationship between additivity neglect and the nonselective superiority bias.
• Riege, Anine Cecilie; Sulutvedt, Unni; Bjørgfinsdottir, Røskva & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2014). An eye-tracking analysis of the effect of answering format on additivity neglect.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2014). Hva skal barnet hete? Kommentar til debatten om psykologiens “hypotetiske konstrukter”. Norsk Tidsskrift for Atferdsanalyse (NTA). ISSN 0809-781X. 41(2), s. 181–184.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2014). Hvordan kom fedrene seg hjem fra Eidsvoll. Psykologisk.no.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2014). Issues in communication of uncertainty.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor & Nordbye, Gro Hege Haraldsen (2014). Is Carlsen more responsible than Anand? Responsibility judgments and outcome framing in the World Chess Championship. Vis sammendrag

  Lay people (students) and experts (chess players) were asked to predict the outcome of the World Chess Championship, which took place in India 9-20 November 2013 as a 10 rounds match between the reigning champion Vishy Anand and the Norwegian challenger Magnus Carlsen. Participants in seven samples also made causal responsibility judgments for four hypothetical outcomes, before, during, and (in hindsight) after the match. The winner was viewed as more responsible than the loser, especially for outcomes with large margins. An effect of focal player was also observed, with Carlsen perceived as more responsible for both losses and wins than Anand. However, when outcomes were framed as Anand’s (rather than Carlsen’s) wins and losses the effect was reduced or reversed, showing that responsibility judgments are affected by the way outcomes are framed.

• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2014). Om avstand, risiko og stabburstrapper. Scandinavian Psychologist. ISSN 1894-5570.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2014). Hva er en psykolog? Scandinavian Psychologist. ISSN 1894-5570.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2014). Luck. I Michalos, Alex C. (Red.), Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research. Springer. ISSN 978-94-007-0752-8. s. 3731–3733. doi: 10.1007/SpringerReference_413083.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2014). Historisk kognisjon - Kan sosial kognisjon bidra til å forstå lekfolks oppfatning av fortiden?
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2014). Framing of uncertainty: Interval estimates and verbal probabilities.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2014). Verbal probabilities: A pragmatic perspective.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2014). Something old, something new: What makes an experience interesting.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor (2013). P? Tidsskrift for Norsk Psykologforening. ISSN 0332-6470. 50(1), s. 34–35.
• Riege, Anine Cecilie; Sulutvedt, Unni & Teigen, Karl Halvor (2013). Additivity neglect of probability estimates: An eye-tracking analysis.
• Teigen, Karl Halvor; Andersen, Bjørn & Alnes, Sigurd Lerkerød (2018). Hvordan oppfattes og omtales usikre kostnadsestimater? Concept. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

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