Jon Hovi

• Hovi, Jon; Tveit, Andreas Kokkvoll; Aamodt, Solveig; Andresen, Steinar E; Bang, Guri & Boasson, Elin Lerum [Vis alle 13 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2026). A Lifetime of Research on Environmental Politics: A Tribute to Arild Underdal (1946–2025). Global Environmental Politics. ISSN 1526-3800. s. 1–12. doi: 10.1162/glep.a.739. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Abstract The late Arild Underdal profoundly impacted how scholars and policymakers understand international and domestic environmental governance. We summarize his influence on studies of leadership in international negotiations, policy integration, treaty design, climate clubs, regime effectiveness, and the domestic politics of international environmental agreements. For each topic, we also offer brief suggestions for future research based on Arild’s academic legacy. Finally, we highlight Arild’s role in academic leadership and research organization.

• Tørstad, Vegard Heggelund; Hovi, Jon; Milkoreit, Manjana; Sælen, Håkon Grøn & Tveit, Andreas Kokkvoll (2025). The Ambition Trap: How Overpromising on Climate Action Could Undermine the Paris Agreement. Global Environmental Politics. ISSN 1526-3800. 25(2), s. 27–54. doi: 10.1162/glep_a_00777. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Under cross-pressure to pledge ambitious emission cuts and deliver concrete policy action, climate policymakers must navigate the tension between ambition and implementation prospects. Achieving the Paris Agreement’s long-term targets is possible only if countries make highly ambitious climate pledges. However, very ambitious pledges might engender widespread implementation failure. Devoid of enforcement mechanisms, the Paris Agreement risks an “ambition trap” whereby policymakers pledge ever more ambitious targets without the willingness or capability to ensure these targets’ implementation. Arguing that the difficulties of implementing highly ambitious pledges might threaten the long-term credibility of international climate cooperation, we report two main empirical findings. First, the ambitiousness of existing nationally determined contributions (NDCs) is inversely related to implementation likelihood, indicating a trade-off between pledges’ ambition and implementation prospects. Second, a conjoint experiment in five major democracies shows that the public is (far) more concerned with emission targets’ implementation likelihood than with their stringency (ambitiousness). Our findings suggest that maintaining the Paris Agreement’s long-term credibility requires aligning NDCs’ ambitiousness with feasible implementation. In short, emission targets must be ambitious, yet realistic.

• Tørstad, Vegard; Hovi, Jon & Sælen, Håkon Grøn (2025). Does Distributive Conflict Explain Variation in Green Stimulus Spending? Evidence From 40 Major Economies During the Global Financial Crisis and the Covid‐19 Recession. Regulation & Governance. ISSN 1748-5983. doi: 10.1111/rego.70071. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the 2020 Covid‐19 pandemic triggered large economic stimulus packages in most countries. While aimed primarily at saving the domestic economy from widespread bankruptcies and mass unemployment, these stimulus packages also offered governments windows of opportunity for pivoting toward decarbonization. Drawing on a new dataset covering 40 of the world's largest economies' stimulus spending during the two crises, this article addresses two questions: (1) Did the allocation toward green investments increase in government stimulus packages from the GFC to the Covid‐19 downturn? (2) What country characteristics are associated with green stimulus spending in each crisis? Grounded in distributive‐conflict theory, we hypothesize that the relative strength of green and fossil stakeholders in the economy is decisive in shaping climate policy outcomes. Consistent with this theory, our empirical analysis reveals (1) a (small) uptick in major economies' net green spending from 2008 to 2020 and (2) that robust green industrial interests strongly predict cross‐country variation in green stimulus spending. In contrast, countries' levels of fossil fuels production did not exert a proportional influence. Notably, our research also uncovers a pattern of path dependency, with countries leading in green stimulus spending during the GFC maintaining this position also through the Covid‐19 pandemic. Overall, this article contributes new insights to the comparative political economy literature on climate change by analyzing how economic recessions affect the energy transition and how economic structures drive cross‐country variation in investment‐based climate policy.

• Tørstad, Vegard Heggelund; Stankovic, Tatjana; Nahm, Jonas; Urpelainen, Johannes & Hovi, Jon (2025). Macroeconomic crises and green recovery spending: Introducing the CLIMREC dataset. npj Climate Action. doi: 10.1038/s44168-025-00226-5. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The CLIMREC Dataset on Green Economic Recovery Spending offers new insights into the emissions profiles of 40 major economies’ economic recovery packages during the Global Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. Analyses reveal that most governments have allocated modest recovery spending towards decarbonization objectives, with green spending patterns changing little over time. Overall, governments have prioritized emissions-neutral economic stabilization measures over advancing the clean energy transition in crisis-related fiscal spending.

• Stankovic, Tatjana & Hovi, Jon (2025). Economic crises and climate action: the enduring role of CBDR. Environmental Research Letters. 20(2). doi: 10.1088/1748-9326/ada45e. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Stankovic, Tatjana; Hovi, Jon; Skodvin, Tora & Øverland, Indra Nobl (2024). Regulating production rather than consumption? Comparing the challenges of supply-side and demand-side climate agreements. Energy Research & Social Science. ISSN 2214-6296. 114. doi: 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103601. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  A growing strand of climate policy literature explores the potential for a supply-side treaty—an international agreement among fossil-fuel-producing states to reduce their output. Proponents argue that such a treaty is cost-efficient; that it is easier to enforce than a demand-side treaty; that it encourages investment in low-carbon technology; and that it addresses concerns such as “the green paradox” and “carbon leakage.” We contribute to this literature by examining the conditions under which a supply-side climate treaty can be effective and by systematically comparing the prospects for each type of agreement to overcome two major impediments—collective-action problems and distributive conflict issues. Having noted that most large greenhouse gas emitters are also major fossil-fuel producers, we conclude that mitigating anthropogenic climate change would likely be no less challenging for a supply-side treaty than for a demand-side treaty. In particular, distributive conflict remains a significant obstacle to effective climate action regardless of whether it is pursued through a demand-side treaty or a supply-side treaty.

• Huseby, Robert; Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2024). Protecting Future Generations Through Minilateralism: Climate Clubs and Normative Legitimacy. Politics and Governance. 12. doi: 10.17645/pag.7674. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Despite three decades of global climate negotiations and high expectations for the 2015 Paris Agreement, global emissions continue to grow. To protect future generations from severe harm, scholars, environmentalists, and politicians alike explore potential supplements to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process. One potential supplement is climate clubs of a type where a small number of “enthusiastic” countries embark on ambitious mitigation efforts while encouraging other, more “reluctant” countries to join. Previous research has shown that this club type possesses a significant potential for expanding membership and eventually becoming highly effective in reducing global emissions. A common criticism of climate clubs, however, is that they lack legitimacy. Assessing this criticism, we argue that climate clubs of the type considered here can be normatively legitimate. The main challenge for normative legitimacy concerns climate clubs’ use of incentives, particularly negative incentives, to attract members. However, we argue that even negative incentives for participation can be legitimate, assuming they meet a set of relevant legitimacy criteria—including that the club respects human rights, provides a comparative benefit, maintains institutional integrity, implements only proportional incentives, and fulfills a requisite set of epistemic criteria. We also argue that the normative legitimacy of climate clubs’ use of incentives for compliance is less challenging than the normative legitimacy of their use of incentives for participation.

• Tørstad, Vegard Heggelund; Nahm, Jonas; Hovi, Jon; Skodvin, Tora & Dietrichson, Gard Olav (2023). Economic recessions and decarbonisation: analysing green stimulus spending in Canada and the US. New Political Economy. ISSN 1356-3467. s. 1–19. doi: 10.1080/13563467.2023.2294744. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Existing research has demonstrated that government policies often prioritise growth over climate during economic downturns. Yet government stimulus spending during economic downturns also offers an opportunity for decarbonisation through long-term investments in infrastructure, transportation electrification, building efficiency, and clean energy technologies able to reduce emissions and sustainably shift the economy away from fossil fuels. We study the size and distribution of green stimulus spending in response to two recent economic downturns – the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic. Focusing on Canada and the US – two major economies with strong incumbent fossil fuel interests – we explore the determinants of green stimulus spending. Counter to conventional wisdom, our findings provide little evidence to support the notion that institutional permeability to industry lobbying influenced the share of green stimulus spending. Instead, drawing on a novel dataset on green recovery spending and lobbying, we show that the strength of liberal parties in the legislatures shapes the distribution of stimulus funds. Our analysis suggests that liberal parties committed to decarbonisation can leverage economic crises to align economic and climate policy making, even in the face of strong lobbying efforts by the fossil fuel sector.

• Tveit, Andreas Kokkvoll; Hovi, Jon & Stiansen, Øyvind (2023). Screening or constraining? The relationship between participation and target achievement in transboundary air pollution treaties. Earth System Governance. 17(August 2023), s. 1–9. doi: 10.1016/j.esg.2023.100185. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Enforcement and management scholars alike expect that countries participating in an international agreement will more likely achieve predetermined targets than nonparticipating countries will. The management school ascribes this expected association to a constraining effect of the treaty; the enforcement school ascribes it to a screening effect. If the latter conjecture is correct, the association between participation and target achievement should significantly weaken (or even vanish) when controlling for targets' ambition level and other confounding factors. We test this hypothesis on a new dataset comprising three protocols under the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP). Our results suggest that the positive association between participation and target achievement is robust to controlling for confounding factors; hence, our data suggests that these CLRTAP protocols have indeed constrained participating states.

• Stankovic, Tatjana; Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2023). The Paris Agreement’s inherent tension between ambition and compliance. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. 10(550). doi: 10.1057/s41599-023-02054-6. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Parties to the Paris Agreement face mounting social pressure to raise their ambition, thereby reducing the gap between individual pledges and collective temperature goals. Although crucial for inciting positive change, especially given that the Paris Agreement lacks an enforcement mechanism, it is also important to consider social pressure’s potential negative unintended consequences. First, it might undermine the Paris Agreement’s celebrated flexibility, which allows countries to design their Nationally Determined Contributions according to domestic conditions and capabilities. Second, it might result in widespread noncompliance by inciting pledges that the countries concerned prove unwilling or even unable to fulfill. Should that happen, confidence in the Paris Agreement and its institutions might falter. Further research is therefore needed to identify the scope conditions for social pressure to work effectively in the domain of international climate policy.

• Sælen, Håkon; Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef & Underdal, Arild (2020). How US withdrawal might influence cooperation under the Paris climate agreement. Environmental Science and Policy. ISSN 1462-9011. 108, s. 121–132. doi: 10.1016/j.envsci.2020.03.011. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Using a novel agent-based model, we study how US withdrawal might influence the political process established by the Paris Agreement, and hence the prospects for reaching the collective goal to limit warming below 2°C. Our model enables us to analyze to what extent reaching this goal despite US withdrawal would place more stringent requirements on other core elements of the Paris cooperation process. We find, first, that the effect of a US withdrawal depends critically on the extent to which member countries reciprocate others’ promises and contributions. Second, while the 2°C goal will likely be reached only under a very small set of conditions in any event, even temporary US withdrawal will further narrow this set significantly. Reaching this goal will then require other countries to step up their ambition at the first opportunity and to comply nearly 100% with their pledges, while maintaining high confidence in the Paris Agreement's institutions. Third, although a US withdrawal will first primarily affect the United States' own emissions, it will eventually prove even more detrimental to other countries' emissions.

• Kverndokk, Snorre; Figenbaum, Erik & Hovi, Jon (2020). Would my driving pattern change if my neighbor were to buy an emissions-free car? Resource and Energy Economics. ISSN 0928-7655. 60(May), s. 1–25. doi: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2020.101153. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Aiming to reduce the number of brown (polluting) cars on the road, several countries currently promote the purchase and use of green (emission-free) cars through financial and non-financial incentives. We study how such incentives affect consumers who continue to drive brown cars. Using a simple model, we analyze the effects of policy instruments such as subsidizing green cars, taxing brown cars, and allowing green cars to drive in bus lanes. Car owners are influenced by price incentives as well as by external effects from traffic (such as congestion) both in regular lanes and in bus lanes. An extension of the model also considers how changes in local driving habits affect brown-car driving. We find that subsidizing green cars and allowing them to drive in bus lanes might increase brown-car driving. We also report the results of a recent survey containing questions specifically designed to tap the significance of the model’s core mechanisms. The results are partially consistent with propositions derived from the model. While most brown-car respondents report their driving was unchanged after the implementation of the policies to promote green cars, some – particularly in major cities – report that these policies caused them to reduce or increase their driving. We conclude that some mechanisms in our model are more important than others and that certain mechanisms appear to influence different brown-car drivers in different ways. Overall, it seems that Norwegian policies to promote the transition from brown to green cars have somewhat reduced brown-car driving.

• Dimitrov, Radoslav; Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef F.; Sælen, Håkon & Underdal, Arild (2019). Institutional and environmental effectiveness: Will the Paris Agreement work? Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change (WIRESs). ISSN 1757-7780. 10(4). doi: 10.1002/wcc.583. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The 2015 Paris Agreement (PA) has been widely hailed as a diplomatic triumph and a breakthrough in global climate cooperation. However, it is commonly accepted that the PA's collective goal—keeping global warming “well below” 2°C above preindustrial levels—remains ambitious. Making matters even more challenging, in 2017, global CO2 emissions resumed growth after 3 years of near standstill. In 2018, this growth accelerated. It is therefore extremely important that the PA's institutional architecture meet expectations concerning its ability to induce member countries to promise and deliver emissions reductions. This study offers a review of the rapidly growing literature on the PA, to assess its strengths and weaknesses, its significance, and its prospects. We focus on evaluations of its institutional structure and its ability to induce member countries to implement policies. We frame the issues as a trilemma: the challenge of simultaneously satisfying all three main conditions for effectiveness—broad participation, deep commitments, and satisfactory compliance rates. Based on our review, we conclude that the key challenge for the PA will likely be to facilitate sufficiently fast ratcheting-up of nationally determined contributions, while keeping compliance rates high.

• Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon & Sælen, Håkon (2018). Climate Leadership by Conditional Commitments. Oxford Economic Papers. ISSN 0030-7653. 70(2), s. 417–442. doi: 10.1093/oep/gpx045. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Under the 2015 Paris climate agreement, each Party sets its own mitigation target by submitting a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) every …five years. An important question is whether including conditional components in NDCs might enhance the agreement’s effectiveness. We report the results of a closely controlled laboratory experiment – based on a mixed sequential-simultaneous public good game with one leader and three followers –that helps answer this question. The experiment investigates how two factors infl‡uence the effectiveness of leadership based on intrinsically conditional commitments. Measuring e¤ectiveness in terms of followers’' and total contributions, we …find that it may help if the conditional promise is credible and if its implementation in‡fluences followers'’ welfare substantially. Importantly, however, for both factors we fi…nd a signi…cant effect only if the leader does not reap disproportionate gains from the group'’s efforts. These fi…ndings have important implications concerning the future success of the Paris agreement.

• Hovi, Jon & Underdal, Arild (2018). Implementation, Compliance, and Effectiveness of Policies and Institutions. I Luterbacher, Urs & Sprinz, Detlef (Red.), Global Climate Policy: Actors, Concepts, and Enduring Challenges. MIT Press. ISSN 9780262535342. s. 297–322. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Grundig, Frank; Hovi, Jon & Ward, Hugh (2018). Cooperation on Climate Change: Insights from Game Theory. I Luterbacher, Urs & Sprinz, Detlef (Red.), Global Climate Policy: Actors, Concepts, and Enduring Challenges. MIT Press. ISSN 9780262535342. s. 93–123. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Sprinz, Detlef; Sælen, Håkon; Underdal, Arild & Hovi, Jon (2018). The effectiveness of climate clubs under Donald Trump. Climate Policy. ISSN 1469-3062. 18(7), s. 828–838. doi: 10.1080/14693062.2017.1410090. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  On 1 June 2017, President Trump announced that the US intends to leave the Paris Agreement if no alternative terms acceptable to his administration can be agreed upon. In this article, an agent-based model of bottom-up climate mitigation clubs is used to derive the impact that lack of US participation may have on the membership of such clubs and their emissions coverage. We systematically analyse the prospects for climate mitigation clubs, depending on which of Three conceivable roles the US takes on: as a leader (for benchmarking), as a follower (i.e. willing to join climate mitigation clubs initiated by others if this is in its best interest) or as an outsider (i.e. staying outside of any climate mitigation club no matter what). We investigate these prospects for three types of incentives for becoming a member: club goods, conditional commitments and side-payments. Our results show that lack of US leadership significantly constrains climate clubs’ potential. Lack of US willingness to follow others’ lead is an additional, but smaller constraint. Only in a few cases will US withdrawal entail widespread departures by other countries. We conclude that climate mitigation clubs can function without the participation of an important GHG emitter, given that other major emitters show leadership, although these clubs will rarely cover more than 50% of global emissions.

• Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef; Sælen, Håkon & Underdal, Arild (2017). Climate Clubs: a Gateway to Effective Climate Cooperation? British Journal of Political Science. ISSN 0007-1234. 49(3), s. 1071–1096. doi: 10.1017/S0007123416000788. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Although the Paris Agreement arguably made some progress, interest in supplementary approaches to climate change co-operation persist. This article examines the conditions under which a climate club might emerge and grow. Using agent-based simulations, it shows that even with less than a handful of major actors as initial members, a club can eventually reduce global emissions effectively. To succeed, a club must be initiated by the ‘right’ constellation of enthusiastic actors, offer sufficiently large incentives for reluctant countries and be reasonably unconstrained by conflicts between members over issues beyond climate change. A climate club is particularly likely to persist and grow if initiated by the United States and the European Union. The combination of club-good benefits and conditional commitments can produce broad participation under many conditions.

• Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2017). Why the United States Supports International Enforcement for Some Treaties but Not for Others. Politics and Governance. 5(2), s. 79–92. doi: 10.17645/pag.v5i2.886. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Under what conditions should we expect the United States to support international enforcement of treaties? We hypothesize that U.S. support is most likely for treaties where international enforcement will cause considerable (desired) behavioral change by other countries but little (undesired) behavioral change by the United States. Similarly, U.S. support is least likely for treaties where international enforcement will generate the converse effects. In developing this hypothesis, we derive specific conditions under which we should expect U.S. benefits of international enforcement to outweigh U.S. costs (or vice versa). We also provide empirical examples. Finally, we consider three alternative explanations of U.S. views on international enforcement—concern for U.S. sovereignty, desire to prevent infringements on U.S. constitutional protection of individual rights, and the usefulness of international enforcement as a domestic commitment device. We discuss these alternative explanatory factors’ relationship to our own hypothesis.

• Aakre, Stine; Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon (2016). When Does Informal Enforcement Work? Journal of Conflict Resolution. ISSN 0022-0027. 60(7), s. 1312–1340. doi: 10.1177/0022002714560349. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We study experimentally how enforcement influences public goods provision when subjects face two free-rider options that roughly parallel the nonparticipation and noncompliance options available for countries in relation to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Our results add to the MEA literature in two ways. First, they suggest that compliance enforcement will fail to enhance compliance in the absence of participation enforcement. Second, they indicate that compliance enforcement will boost compliance significantly in the presence of participation enforcement. Our results also add to the experimental literature on public goods provision, again in two ways. First, they reveal that previous experimental findings of enforcement boosting cooperation are valid only in settings with forced (or enforced) participation. Second, they show that subjects’ willingness to allocate costly punishment points is significantly stronger when the enforcement system permits punishment of both types of free riding than when it permits punishment of only one type.

• Gullberg, Anne Therese & Hovi, Jon (2016). Regulating solar radiation management: The roles of public engagement and legislative procedures. European Journal of Risk Regulation. ISSN 1867-299X. 7(1), s. 75–86. doi: 10.1017/S1867299X00005419. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Climate engineering in general and solar radiation management (SRM) in particular raise profound and complex political, legal, social, and ethical questions that go well beyond technical-feasibility issues. We consider three such questions. First, can existing EU decision-making processes accommodate sufficient public engagement to ensure legitimate decisions on SRM? Second, does politics influence the choice of legislative procedure for SRM regulation? Third, does the choice of legislative procedure influence the likelihood of SRM implementation? Three main conclusions emerge from our analysis. First, existing EU decision-making processes can – given certain conditions – accommodate considerable public engagement and hence ensure legitimate decisions on SRM. Second, politics matters; indeed, the EU’s choice of legislative procedure concerning SRM may well become subject to political negotiations. Finally, the choice of legislative procedure may substantially influence the likelihood of SRM implementation.

• Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef; Sælen, Håkon & Underdal, Arild (2016). Climate Change Mitigation: A Role for Climate Clubs? Palgrave Communications. 2. doi: 10.1057/palcomms.2016.20. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The limited success of the UNFCCC negotiations has enticed scholars, environmentalists, and policymakers alike to propose alternative approaches to climate cooperation. This article reviews the scholarly literature concerning one such proposed alternative—climate clubs. According to the club approach, it would be promising to start with small groups of “enthusiastic” countries. These countries would outline what they are willing and able to do, conditional on what other enthusiastic countries offer and implement. Moreover, these enthusiastic countries would try to entice “reluctant” countries to join via “exclusive and contingent” measures. Focusing on the conditions for a climate club to effectively reduce global emissions, we organize our review around four main questions: first, what is a climate club’s potential for providing benefits that accrue exclusively to club members? Second, how might leadership influence a climate club’s ability to eventually become effective? Third, what insights can the formal modelling literature offer concerning the effectiveness of climate clubs? Finally, which is the empirical record of existing climate clubs? We conclude by providing several suggestions for future research.

• Hovi, Jon; Høyland, Bjørn & Rasch, Bjørn Erik (2016). Topptidsskrifter i statsvitenskap. Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift. ISSN 0801-1745. 32(3), s. 290–298. doi: 10.18261/issn.1504-2936-2016-03-04. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Bang, Guri; Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2016). The Paris Agreement: short-term and long-term effectiveness. Politics and Governance. 4(3), s. 209–218. doi: 10.17645/pag.v4i3.640. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The 2015 Paris Agreement was widely greeted with enthusiasm. We assess the short-term and long-term potential effectiveness of Paris. Concerning short-term effectiveness, we contend that while Paris scores high on participation, and reasonably high on the depth of the parties’ commitments (ambition), its Achilles’ heel will likely be compliance. Concerning long-term effectiveness, we argue that Paris does little to restructure states’ incentives so as to avoid free riding. At worst, it might end up as a failure, much like Kyoto did. On the other hand, domestic and international norms could continue to develop in a direction that makes it more and more difficult for individuals, firms, and states alike to ignore the plea to limit and reduce their carbon footprints. Technological progress that gradually reduces abatement costs, combined with leadership by major emitters such as the United States, might further strengthen climate cooperation and enhance other countries’ willingness to follow through. However, deep political polarization continues to represent a significant barrier to U.S. leadership on climate change.

• Hvidsten, Andreas H & Hovi, Jon (2015). Why no twin-track Europe? Unity, discontent, and differentiation in European integration. European Union Politics. ISSN 1465-1165. 16(1), s. 3–22. doi: 10.1177/1465116514557964. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon; Ward, Hugh & Grundig, Frank (2015). Hope or Despair? Formal Models of Climate Cooperation. Environmental and Resource Economics. ISSN 0924-6460. 62(4), s. 665–688. doi: 10.1007/s10640-014-9799-3. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We review formal (and some more informal) models of climate cooperation derived from economics and political science. These models convey two main messages. On one hand, they suggest that the prospects for effective climate cooperation are bleak: The standard view is that stable coalitions are small and that renegotiation-proof equilibria require that only a few countries participate. On the other hand, there might be light at the end of the tunnel after all. First, more recent work suggests that larger coalitions can be made stable. Second, other recent work suggests that it may be possible to design a renegotiation-proof climate agreement with broad or even full participation. Third, deposit-refund systems might help solve some of the obstacles for effective climate cooperation. Fourth, although the “law of the least ambitious program” pinpoints severe constraints on effective cooperation, this law has its limits. Fifth, countries may use cooperative probes to build trust. Sixth, cooperation might emerge in a completely decentralized fashion. Finally, experiments indicate that some of the conditions for effective cooperation that are taken for granted in most formal models might in fact be overly strict.

• Cherry, Todd L.; Hovi, Jon & McEvoy, David M. (2014). Introduction: Toward a New Climate Agreement. I Cherry, Todd L.; Hovi, Jon & McEvoy, David M. (Red.), Toward a New Climate Agreement. Conflict, Resolution and Governance. Routledge. ISSN 9780415643795. s. xix–xxix. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Climate change is one of the most pressing problems facing the global community. Although most states agree that climate change is occurring and is at least partly the result of humans’ reliance on fossil fuels, managing a changing global climate is a formidable challenge. Underlying this challenge is the fact that states are sovereign, governed by their own laws and regulations. Sovereignty requires that states address global problems such as climate change on a voluntary basis, by negotiating international agreements. Despite a consensus on the need for global action, many questions remain concerning how a meaningful international climate agreement can be realized. This book brings together leading experts to speak to such questions and to offer promising ideas for the path toward a new climate agreement. Organized in three main parts, it examines the potential for meaningful climate cooperation. Part 1 explores sources of conflict that lead to barriers to an effective climate agreement. Part 2 investigates how different processes influence states’ prospects of resolving their differences and of reaching a climate agreement that is more effective than the current Kyoto Protocol. Finally, part 3 focuses on governance issues, including lessons learned from existing institutional structures. The book is unique in that it brings together the voices of experts from many disciplines, such as economics, political science, international law, and natural science. The authors are academics, practitioners, consultants and advisors. Contributions draw on a variety of methods, and include both theoretical and empirical studies. The book should be of interest to scholars and graduate students in the fields of economics, political science, environmental law, natural resources, earth sciences, sustainability, and many others. It is directly relevant for policy makers, stakeholders and climate change negotiators, offering insights into the role of uncertainty, fairness, policy linkage, burden sharing and alternative institutional designs.

• Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef Friedrich & Underdal, Arild (2014). Bottom Up or Top Down? I Cherry, Todd L.; Hovi, Jon & McEvoy, David M. (Red.), Toward a New Climate Agreement. Conflict, Resolution and Governance. Routledge. ISSN 9780415643795. s. 167–180. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Climate change is one of the most pressing problems facing the global community. Although most states agree that climate change is occurring and is at least partly the result of humans’ reliance on fossil fuels, managing a changing global climate is a formidable challenge. Underlying this challenge is the fact that states are sovereign, governed by their own laws and regulations. Sovereignty requires that states address global problems such as climate change on a voluntary basis, by negotiating international agreements. Despite a consensus on the need for global action, many questions remain concerning how a meaningful international climate agreement can be realized. This book brings together leading experts to speak to such questions and to offer promising ideas for the path toward a new climate agreement. Organized in three main parts, it examines the potential for meaningful climate cooperation. Part 1 explores sources of conflict that lead to barriers to an effective climate agreement. Part 2 investigates how different processes influence states’ prospects of resolving their differences and of reaching a climate agreement that is more effective than the current Kyoto Protocol. Finally, part 3 focuses on governance issues, including lessons learned from existing institutional structures. The book is unique in that it brings together the voices of experts from many disciplines, such as economics, political science, international law, and natural science. The authors are academics, practitioners, consultants and advisors. Contributions draw on a variety of methods, and include both theoretical and empirical studies. The book should be of interest to scholars and graduate students in the fields of economics, political science, environmental law, natural resources, earth sciences, sustainability, and many others. It is directly relevant for policy makers, stakeholders and climate change negotiators, offering insights into the role of uncertainty, fairness, policy linkage, burden sharing and alternative institutional designs.

• Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine & Hovi, Jon (2013). Hvordan kan en internasjonal klimaavtale håndheves? Samfunnsøkonomen. ISSN 1890-5250. s. 28–35. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  En god internasjonal klimaavtale krever ikke bare bred deltagelse og dype forpliktelser, den må også sikre at medlemslandene overholder sine forpliktelser. Håndhevingssystemet i Kyotoprotokollen har en rekke svakheter. Bl.a. kan land som misligholder avtalen lett unngå sanksjoner, og eventuelle sanksjoner rammer også land som ikke bryter avtalen. Vi presenterer her et enkelt, fleksibelt og troverdig depositumsystem som vil løse mange av problemene knyttet til Kyotoprotokollens håndhevingssystem. Systemet vil også bidra til å hindre at land motivert av kortsiktig politisk gevinst slutter seg til en avtale de ikke har til hensikt å overholde.

• Hovi, Jon; Skodvin, Tora & Aakre, Stine (2013). Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed? Politics and Governance. 1(2), s. 138–150. doi: 10.12924/pag2013.01020138. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  More than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accords, but have nevertheless made very limited progress in curbing global emissions of greenhouse gases. This paper considers whether negotiations can succeed in reaching an agreement that effectively addresses the climate change problem. To be effective, a climate agreement must cause sub­stantial emissions reductions either directly (in the agreement's own lifetime) or indirectly (by paving the way for a future agreement that causes substantial emissions reductions directly). To reduce global emissions substantially, an agreement must satisfy three conditions. Firstly, participation must be both comprehensive and stable. Secondly, participating countries must accept deep commitments. Finally, the agreement must obtain high compliance rates. We argue that three types of enforcement will be crucial to fulfilling these three conditions: (1) incentives for countries to ratify with deep commitments, (2) incentives for countries that have ratified with deep commitments to abstain from withdrawal, and (3) incentives for countries having ratified with deep commitments to comply with them. Based on assessing the constraints that characterize the climate change negotiations, we contend that adopting such three-fold potent enforcement will likely be politically infeasible, not only within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but also in the framework of a more gradual approach. Therefore, one should not expect climate change negotiations to succeed in producing an effective future agreement—either directly or indirectly.

• Grundig, Frank; Hovi, Jon; Underdal, Arild & Aakre, Stine (2012). Self-enforcing Peace and Environmental Agreements. Toward Scholarly Cross-fertilization? International Studies Review. ISSN 1521-9488. 14(4), s. 522–540. doi: 10.1111/misr.12003. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Enforcement of agreements can be a major challenge in international politics. However, the interest in mechanisms of self-enforcement seems significantly lower among scholars studying international peace agreements (IPAs) than among scholars studying international environmental agreements (IEAs). Moreover, practically no exchange of ideas and findings about enforcement can be found between these two fields of research. We argue that a combination of similarities and differences between the two issue-areas provides fertile ground for mutual learning. To facilitate communication we develop a unifying but differentiated definition of self-enforcing agreements (SEAs). We then use this conceptual framework to explore lessons about IEA design that might be learned by studying IPAs and lessons about IPA design that might be learned by studying IEAs. We submit that this kind of compare-and-contrast analysis may provide important input for the development of a more refined and general theory of SEAs.

• Hovi, Jon (2012). Strategibegrepet i spillteorien. I Diesen, Sverre (Red.), Strategi: Mellom Vitenskap, Intuisjon og Etikk. Universitetsforlaget. ISSN 9788215019567. s. 32–48. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Underdal, Arild; Hovi, Jon; Kallbekken, Steffen & Skodvin, Tora (2012). Can conditional commitments break the climate change negotiations deadlock? International Political Science Review. ISSN 0192-5121. 33(4), s. 475–493. doi: 10.1177/0192512111432564. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Can a conditional commitment by a major actor (for example, the European Union) induce other major actors (such as the USA, China, India, or Japan) to do more to mitigate global climate change? We analyse this question by first estimating the impact of emission reductions by one of these actors on the mitigation costs of the others and, second, by exploring how domestic politics influence the willingness of the European Union and the USA to contribute. We find that an emission cut by any actor will reduce mitigation costs for all the others and thereby expand the settlement range. These cost reductions seem, however, insufficient to induce significant unilateral policy change. Emissions trading can cut aggregate costs further, but also redistribute wealth. Domestic politics tend to add weight to the concerns of powerful actors that stand to lose from more ambitious mitigation policies.

• Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon & Monkerud, Lars Christian (2012). Can exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence. European Journal of Government and Economics. 1(2), s. 106–125. doi: 10.17979/ejge.2012.1.2.4280. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Elected representatives serving their final period face only weak incentives to provide costly effort. However, overlapping generations (OLG) models suggest that exit prizes sustained by trigger strategies can induce representatives in their final period to provide such effort. We evaluate this hypothesis using a simple OLG public good experiment, the central treatment being whether exit prizes are permitted. We find that a significantly higher number of subjects in their final period contribute when exit prizes are permitted. However, this result does not originate from use of trigger strategies. More likely explanations include gift-exchange and focal-point effects.

• Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef F. & Bang, Guri (2012). Why the United States did not become a party to the Kyoto Protocol: German, Norwegian, and US perspectives. European Journal of International Relations. ISSN 1354-0661. 18(1), s. 129–150. doi: 10.1177/1354066110380964. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  According to two-level game theory, negotiators tailor agreements at the international level to be ratifiable at the domestic level. This did not happen in the Kyoto negotiations, however, in the US case. We interviewed 26 German, Norwegian, and US participants in and observers of the climate negotiations concerning their views on three explanations for why the United States did not become a party to Kyoto. Explanation 1 argues that Kyoto delegations mistakenly thought the Senate was bluffing when adopting Byrd–Hagel. Explanation 2 contends that Europeans preferred a more ambitious agreement without US participation to a less ambitious agreement with US participation. Finally, explanation 3 suggests that in Kyoto the Clinton–Gore administration gave up on Senate ratification, and essentially pushed for an agreement that would provide them a climate-friendly face. While all explanations received some support from interviewees, explanation 1 and (particularly) explanation 3 received considerably more support than explanation 2.

• Hovi, Jon; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine & Holtsmark, Bjart (2012). A credible compliance enforcement system for the climate regime. Climate Policy. ISSN 1469-3062. 12(6), s. 741–754. doi: 10.1080/14693062.2012.692206. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The compliance enforcement system of the Kyoto Protocol provides only weak incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments. For example, the penalties for non-compliant countries are not legally binding, and moreover, there is no second-order punishment for those countries that fail to implement them. Thus, a Party can simply refuse to comply without consequence. The alternative compliance enforcement systems that have been proposed in the literature also face substantial problems. A simple, flexible, potent, and credible compliance enforcement system for a post-Kyoto climate agreement, based on deposits, is proposed here: at ratification, each country deposits a significant amount of money, and continues to do so in the preparation stage each year until the start of the commitment period. At the end of this period, those countries that meet their emissions limitation targets receive a full refund of their deposit, while those that fail to do so forfeit part or all of it. A simplified two-country model of the deposit system and a numerical example of an agreement involving the US, Japan, Russia, and Europe is also provided. If each country’s deposit is no less than its abatement costs, there is a strong incentive for participating countries to avoid noncompliance.

• Bang, Guri; Hovi, Jon & Sprinz, Detlef F. (2012). US presidents and the failure to ratify multilateral environmental agreements. Climate Policy. ISSN 1469-3062. 12(6), s. 755–763. doi: 10.1080/14693062.2012.699788. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Whereas the US President signed the Kyoto Protocol, the failure of the US Congress to ratify it seriously hampered subsequent international climate cooperation. This recent US trend, of signing environmental treaties but failing to ratify them, could thwart attempts to come to a future climate agreement. Two complementary explanations of this trend are proposed. First, the political system of the US has distinct institutional features that make it difficult for presidents to predict whether the Senate will give its advice and consent to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and whether Congress will pass the required enabling legislation. Second, elected for a fixed term, US presidents might benefit politically from supporting MEAs even when knowing that legislative support is not forthcoming. Four policy implications are explored, concerning the scope for unilateral presidential action, the potential for bipartisan congressional support, the effectiveness of a treaty without the US, and the prospects for a deep, new climate treaty.

• Hovi, Jon; Underdal, Arild & Ward, Hugh (2011). Potential Contributions of Political Science to Environmental Economics. Environmental and Resource Economics. ISSN 0924-6460. 48(3), s. 391–411. doi: 10.1007/s10640-010-9453-7. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  While political science has much to offer, at least some of its contributions might be difficult to incorporate into economic models. Nevertheless, we argue that environmental economics might benefit from supplementing, combining, or sometimes even replacing the rational choice approach with other approaches commonly used in political science. We develop our argument by examining three core components of political science analysis: ideas, power, and institutions. For each component we review political science approaches and propositions with a view to determining “what’s in it” for environmental economics.

• Hovi, Jon (2011). Trusler i internasjonal politikk. I Hovi, Jon & Malnes, Raino Sverre (Red.), Anarki, makt og normer : Innføring i internasjonal politikk. Abstrakt forlag. ISSN 9788279353171. s. 67–86. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon (2010). Non-instrumental behavior in an environmental public goods game. Homo Oeconomicus (HOEC). ISSN 0943-0180. 27(3), s. 241–262. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  This paper reports a puzzling result from an experiment based on an indefinitely repeated N -player Prisoners’ Dilemma game carried out in a PC lab. The experiment used real monetary payoffs, and was conducted in the context of international cooperation to curb climate change. It was puzzling that after the experiment, a large majority of subjects reported they were at least partially motivated out of concern for the climate; however, nothing they did in the experiment could possibly have had an impact on the climate. We show that subjects acting out of concern for the climate incurred a real cost in monetary terms, and argue that many subjects’ behavior in the experiment deviated quite fundamentally from instrumental rationality. Although much recent research on public goods provision questions the traditional assumption that players are purely self-regarding, the assumption of instrumental rationality is typically preserved. The results reported in this paper go some way towards challenging the validity of this assumption.

• Aakre, Stine & Hovi, Jon (2010). Emission trading: Participation enforcement determines the need for compliance enforcement. European Union Politics. ISSN 1465-1165. 11(3), s. 427–445. doi: 10.1177/1465116510369265. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We identify and explain significant differences between the compliance enforcement systems of three cap-and-trade programmes: the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), the US SO2 emission trading programme and the Kyoto Protocol. Because EU-ETS’s compliance enforcement system is somewhat less potent than that of US SO2, but vastly more potent than Kyoto’s, it might be tempting to predict that EU-ETS will (1) not quite achieve the SO2 programme’s near-perfect compliance rates, yet (2) achieve significantly better compliance rates than Kyoto. However, we offer a novel theoretical framework suggesting that how compliance enforcement affects compliance will depend on how the emission trading programme addresses participation. We conclude that while (1) will likely prove correct, (2) will not; Kyoto may even outperform EU-ETS compliance-wise because whereas EU-ETS (and US SO2) specify mandatory participation, most Kyoto member countries participate voluntarily.

• Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon (2009). Renegotiation Proofness and Climate Agreements: Some Experimental Evidence. Nordic Journal of Political Economy (NOPEC). ISSN 0805-7508. 34( ), s. 1–26. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The notion of renegotiation-proof equilibrium has become a cornerstone in non-cooperative models of international environmental agreements. Applying this solution concept to the infinitely repeated N-person Prisoners' Dilemma generates predictions that contradict intuition as well as conventional wisdom about public goods provision. This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test two such predictions. The first is that the higher the cost of making a contribution, the more cooperation will materialize. The second is that the number of cooperators is independent of group size. Although the experiment was designed to replicate the assumptions of the model closely, our results lend very little support to the two predictions.

• Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef & Underdal, Arild (2009). Implementing Long-Term Climate Policy: Time Inconsistency, Domestic Politics, and International Anarchy. Global Environmental Politics. ISSN 1526-3800. 9(3), s. 20–39. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2009). Towards a Better Compliance System for the Climate Regime? I Vasser, Christophe P. (Red.), The Kyoto Protocol: Economic Assessments, Implementation Mechanisms, and Policy Implications. Nova Science Publishers. ISSN 9781604569834. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Froyn, Camilla Bretteville & Hovi, Jon (2008). A climate agreement with full participation. Economics Letters. ISSN 0165-1765. 99(2), s. 317–319. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.07.013. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon (2008). Renegotiation proofness and climate agreements some experimental evidence. Nordic Journal of Political Economy (NOPEC). ISSN 0805-7508. 34, s. 1–26. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2008). Which way to U.S. Climate Cooperation? Issue Linkage versus a U.S.-based Agreement. Review of Policy Research. ISSN 1541-132X. 25(2), s. 129–148. doi: 10.1111/j.1541-1338.2007.00315.x. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Several scholars have suggested that the United States can be compelled to reengage in the Kyoto process by linking cooperation on climate change to cooperation on trade or technology research and development. We argue that such issue linkage would likely fail and suggest that a more promising road to U.S. cooperation is to develop an alternative climate agreement based on federal U.S. climate policy. However, the question then becomes whether the Kyoto countries might be prepared to abandon the Kyoto process in favor of such a U.S.-based agreement. We argue that if a U.S.-based agreement were to be built on President Bush's current climate policy, the Kyoto countries (especially the European Union) would likely be reluctant to go along. However, if a U.S.-based agreement were to be built on the many Kyoto-like initiatives now emerging at state and local levels, the Kyoto countries might well be more favorably inclined.

• Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon (2008). Renegotiation-profness and Climate Agreements: Experimental Evidence. Nordic Journal of Political Economy (NOPEC). ISSN 0805-7508. 34(2), s. 1–26. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2007). Trusler i internasjonal politikk. I Hovi, Jon & Malnes, Raino Sverre (Red.), Anarki, makt og normer. Abstrakt forlag. ISSN 9788279352280. s. 66–85. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Bang, Guri; Froyn, Camilla Bretteville; Hovi, Jon & Menz, Fredric C. (2007). The United States and international climate cooperation: International "pull" versus domestic "push". Energy Policy. ISSN 0301-4215. 35(2), s. 1282–1291. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2006.03.015. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The U.S. government is being pressured by both international and domestic influences to re-engage in international climate control. This paper considers whether the international “pull” and the domestic “push” will be strong enough to accomplish this. First, we discuss whether changes in the architecture of the current climate regime might induce the United States to re-engage at the international level. We argue that the United States is unlikely to rejoin any global climate regime that is based on the Kyoto architecture, even if Kyoto were to be “reformed.” Second, we discuss whether domestic political developments might eventually cause the United States to re-engage. We conclude that U.S. re-engagement is likely to require the emergence of a new climate regime that basically extends U.S. regulation to other countries. However, the forging of a unified U.S. climate policy is still in the making. Furthermore, a new regime can gain widespread participation only if the Kyoto countries accept the idea of replacing Kyoto with some alternative architecture, which seems unlikely in the near future.

• Kallbekken, Steffen & Hovi, Jon (2007). The Price of Non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol: The Remarkable Case of Norway. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics. ISSN 1567-9764. 7(1), s. 1–15. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon; Froyn, Camilla Bretteville & Bang, Guri (2007). Enforcing the Kyoto Protocol: can punitive consequences restore compliance? Review of International Studies. ISSN 0260-2105. 33. doi: 10.1017/SO260210507007590. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon & Holtsmark, Bjart (2006). Cap-and-Trade or Carbon Taxes? The Feasibility of Enforcement and the Effects of Non-Compliance. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics. ISSN 1567-9764. 6(2), s. 137–155. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  One of the proposed alternatives to Kyoto’s cap-and-trade approach is a regime based on internationally harmonized carbon taxes. In this paper, we consider and compare the enforcement problems associated with a tax regime and a cap-and-trade regime, respectively. The paper tries to convey two main points. First, both types of regime require an effective enforcement mechanism. However, such a mechanism is unlikely to be adopted as part of a regime with full participation, because the political process tends to water down the enforcement mechanism to a point where it no longer has much bite. And if this is somehow avoided, countries expecting compliance to be difficult or costly will almost certainly decline to sign – not to mention ratify – the resulting agreement. Second, the implications of non-compliance in a tax regime differ in important ways from the corresponding implications in a cap-and-trade regime. In a cap-and-trade regime, emissions trading can make inaction legitimate for buyers of emission permits. In particular, overselling of permits by a few permit exporting countries might completely undermine the regime’s environmental effect. In a tax regime, by contrast, one country's non-compliance can not make inaction by other countries legitimate, meaning that an agreement based on harmonized carbon taxes will always have some effect, so long as at least one country complies. We thus conclude that enforcement is more important for a cap-and-trade regime than for a tax regime.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Froyn, Camilla Bretteville; Hovi, Jon & Menz, Fredric C. (2006). Regional versus global cooperation for climate control. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. ISSN 0095-0696. 51. doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2005.04.004. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  This paper considers whether international environmental public goods provision, such as mitigation of climate change, is better dealt with through regional cooperation than through a global treaty. Previous research suggests that, at best, a global environmental treaty will achieve very little. At worst, it will fail to enter into force. Using a simple dynamic game-theoretic model, with weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium as solution concept, we demonstrate that two agreements can sustain a larger number of cooperating parties than a single global treaty. The model provides upper and lower bounds on the number of parties under each type of regime. It is shown that a regime with two agreements can Pareto dominate a regime based on a single global treaty. We conclude that regional cooperation might be a good alternative–or supplement–to global environmental agreements.

• Halvorssen, Anita M. & Hovi, Jon (2006). The Nature, Origin and Impact of Legally Binding Consequences: The Case of the Climate Regime. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics. ISSN 1567-9764. 6(2), s. 157–171. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The Marrakesh Accords provide a detailed compliance system for the Kyoto Protocol. An innovative feature of this system is an Enforcement Branch authorized to apply punitive measures or ‘consequences’ in the second commitment period to Annex I Parties that have been found to be in non-compliance in the first commitment period. However, even after the latest Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), COP-11, and the first Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, COP/MOP-1, it is not yet clear whether these consequences will be legally binding. The purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, we examine the legal nature of the punitive consequences embedded in the Marrakesh Accords. Second, we discuss potential motives for making these consequences legally binding. We point out that one such motive is that their implementation requires cooperation by the Party that is in non-compliance. In this regard, Kyoto’s compliance system differs from other international compliance systems equipped with punitive consequences, such as those of the WTO and the UN. Finally, we consider whether making the punitive consequences legally binding is likely to make a difference. The conclusion, which should be of interest to both academic researchers and the policy community, is that the legal status of the consequences is likely to have only a modest effect on compliance levels. A country that deliberately fails to abide by other legally binding commitments under the Kyoto Protocol is also likely to resist the application of punitive consequences, regardless of whether these consequences are made legally binding or not.

• Gullberg, Anne Therese; Hovi, Jon & Vevatne, Jonas (2006). U-landsdeltakelse i klimaregimet - muligheter og barrierer. Internasjonal Politikk. ISSN 0020-577X. 64(2), s. 147–172. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  De aller fleste u-land har ratifisert Kyotoprotokollen. I motsetning til i-landene (utenom USA og Australia), er u-landene imidlertid ikke underlagt bindende forpliktelser om å begrense utslipp av klimagasser. Formålet med denne artikkelen er firedelt. Først redegjør vi for noen viktige politiske og institusjonelle barrierer for u-landsdeltakelse. Dernest diskuterer vi om det er mulig å stimulere til mer forpliktende u-landsdeltakelse innenfor rammen av det eksisterende klimaregimet. Så behandler vi spørsmålet om hvorvidt andre måter å organisere klimasamarbeidet på kan gjøre det mer attraktivt for u-landene å delta. Endelig analyserer vi enkelte tiltak som – i hvert fall i prinsippet – vil kunne øke u-landenes interesse for å delta i klimaregimet. Vår konklusjon er at bindende forpliktelser om utslippsreduksjoner for u-landene er lite sannsynlig i overskuelig fremtid. Dels gjør den tette koblingen mellom klimautslipp og økonomisk vekst det vanskelig å motivere mange u-land til å akseptere reelle utslippsbegrensninger. Dessuten tilsier rettferdighetsbetraktninger små eller ingen forpliktelser for u-landene. Og selv om det skulle være mulig å overkomme disse barrierene, kan det likevel bli politisk vanskelig å endre u-landenes posisjon i klimaforhandlingene som følge av de ekstremt konserverende beslutningsreglene som benyttes i G77 og i klimaregimet.

• Hovi, Jon & Sprinz, Detlef (2006). The limits of the law of the least ambitious program. Global Environmental Politics. ISSN 1526-3800. 6, s. 28–+. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Arild Underdal’s work on the Law of the Least Ambitious Program (LLAP) is a significant contribution to our understanding of the logic of international collaboration. The LLAP, however, applies only under particular conditions. After comparing the law to the joint decision trap and the veto player concept, we discuss four observations that tend to limit the law’s domain. First, while the LLAP is intended to apply to decision-making under unanimity, in a number of international bodies decisions are made by some kind of majority voting. Second, the LLAP assumes that the alternative to collective agreement is individual decision-making, yet in practice the relevant alternative (the “reversion rule”) is often the continuation of some pre-existing collaborative arrangement. Third, whereas the LLAP assumes that the unanimity rule invariably favors the least ambitious program, there are interesting cases where this assumption does not hold. Finally, the LLAP does not take into account that the outcome of international decision-making not only depends on the decision rule and the reversion rule, but also on the voting sequence.

• Hovi, Jon (2005). The Domino Theory. I Larsen, Stein Ugelvik (Red.), Theory and Methods in Poilitical Science. Columbia University Press. ISSN 9780880339988. s. 171–183. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2005). The Pros and Cons of External Enforcement. I Stokke, Olav Schram; Hovi, Jon & Ulfstein, Geir (Red.), Implementing the Climate Regime: International Compliance. Earthscan. ISSN 9781844071616. s. 129–145. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2005). The Future of Kyoto's Compliance System. I Stokke, Olav Schram; Hovi, Jon & Ulfstein, Geir (Red.), Implementing the Climate Regime: International Compliance. Earthscan. ISSN 9781844071616. s. 233–236. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon; Stokke, Olav Schram & Ulfstein, Geir (2005). Introduction and main findings. I Stokke, Olav Schram; Hovi, Jon & Ulfstein, Geir (Red.), Implementing the Climate Regime: International Compliance. Earthscan. ISSN 9781844071616. s. 1–14. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon; Huseby, Robert & Sprinz, Detlef (2005). When do (imposed) economic sanctions work? World Politics. ISSN 0043-8871. 57(4), s. 479–499. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Previous research has documented a modest success rate for imposed sanctions. By contrast, the success rate is higher in cases that are settled at the threat stage. In this article, we provide new insights about the circumstances under which sanctions cause behavioral change only after being imposed: First, the target must initially underestimate the impact of sanctions, miscalculate the sender’s determination to impose them, or wrongly believe that sanctions will be imposed and maintained whether it yields or not. Second, the target’s misperceptions must be corrected after sanctions are imposed. A game-theoretical model with incomplete information is used to develop and clarify our argument.

• Hovi, Jon (2004). Causal Mechanisms and the Study of International Environmental Regimes. I Underdal, Arild & Young, Oran R (Red.), Regime Consequences: Methodological Challenges and Research Strategies. Kluwer Academic Publishers. ISSN 9781402020704. s. 71–86. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon & Areklett, Ivar (2004). Enforcing the Climate Regime: Game Theory and the Marrakesh accords. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics. ISSN 1567-9764. 4(1), s. 1–26. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef & Underdal, Arild (2003). The Oslo-Potsdam Solution to Measuring Regime Effectiveness: Critique, Response, and the Road Ahead. Global Environmental Politics. ISSN 1526-3800. 3(3), s. 74–96. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef & Underdal, Arild (2003). Regime Effectiveness and the Oslo-Potsdam Solution: A Rejoinder to Oran Young. Global Environmental Politics. ISSN 1526-3800. 3(3), s. 105–107. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2003). Dominoteorien. I Larsen, Stein Ugelvik (Red.), Teori og metode i statsvitenskap. Fagbokforlaget. ISSN 9788276747225. s. 137–147. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Andresen, Steinar E; Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2003). The Persistence of the Kyoto Protocol: Why Other Annex I Countries Move on Without the United States. Global Environmental Politics. ISSN 1526-3800. 3(4), s. 1–23. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2002). Rationality, Microbehaviour and Macroevents: Notes on the Prospects for Prediction. Electronic Review of World Politics. ISSN 1471-325X. 1(2). Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2002). Etikk og klimapolitikk. I Axell, Pia Hverven (Red.), Med forskerblikk på verdier. Norges forskningsråd. ISSN 9788212016743. s. 173–187. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2001). Decentralized enforcement, sequential bargaining and the clean development mechanism. Nordic Journal of Political Economy (NOPEC). ISSN 0805-7508. 27(2), s. 135–152. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  While there is a vast literature both on international bargaining and on how international agreements can be enforced, very little work has been done on how bargaining and enforcement interact. An important exception is Fearon (1998), who models international cooperation as a two-stage process in which the bargaining process is constrained by a need for decentralized enforcement (meaning that the agreement must be enforced by the parties themselves rather than a third party, such as a court). Using the Clean Development Mechanism as an example, the present paper proposes a different model of this kind of interaction. The model follows Fearon’s in so far as we both use the infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma to capture the enforcement phase of the game. However, while Fearon depicts the bargaining stage as a War of Attrition, the present model sees that stage as a sequential bargaining game of the Ståhl-Rubinstein type. The implications of the present model are compared both to those of the Ståhl-Rubinstein model and to those of the Fearon model. A surprising conclusion is that a need for decentralized enforcement tends to make the bargaining outcome more symmetrical than otherwise. Thus, the impact of bargaining power is actually smaller when the resulting agreement must be enforced by the parties themselves than it is if enforcement is taken care of by a third party.

• Malnes, Raino Sverre & Hovi, Jon (2001). Modeller og teorier: en bruksanvisning, Normer og makt. Innføring i internasjonal politikk. Abstrakt forlag. ISSN 9788279350170. s. 339–354. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Artikkelen gjøre rede for bruken av teorier og modeller i forklaring og prediksjon av internasjonale begivenheter.

• Hovi, Jon (2001). Hvorfor økonomiske sanksjoner virker - tross alt. Internasjonal Politikk. ISSN 0020-577X. 59(4), s. 509–524. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon & Malnes, Raino Sverre (2001). Innledning, Normer og makt. Innføring i internasjonal politikk. Abstrakt forlag. ISSN 9788279350170. s. 7–10. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Boken inneholder artikler som behandler både teoretiske og empiriske problemstillinger i studiet av internasjonal politikk.

• Hovi, Jon (2001). Klimapolitiske strategier og etikk. Internasjonal Politikk. ISSN 0020-577X. 59(2), s. 179–199. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2001). Strategisk tenkning - 35 år etter. Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning (TfS). ISSN 0040-716X. 42(4), s. 591–608. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2001). Trusler i internasjonal politikk, Normer og makt. Innføring i internasjonal politikk. Abstrakt forlag. ISSN 9788279350170. s. 117–136. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Boken inneholder artikler som behandler både teoretiske og empiriske problemstillinger i studiet av internasjonal politikk.

• Hovi, Jon & Malnes, Raino Sverre (2001). Modeller og teorier: En bruksanvisning, Normer og makt. Innføring i internasjonal politikk. Abstrakt forlag. ISSN 9788279350170. s. 339–354. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Boken inneholder artikler som behandler både teoretiske og empiriske problemstillinger i studiet av internasjonal politikk.

• Hovi, Jon & Holtsmark, Bjart (1998). Betingete posisjoner i klimaforhandlingene. Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift. ISSN 0801-1745. 14(4), s. 153–174. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (1998). The Relevance of Unrealistic Models for Empirical Political Science. Homo Oeconomicus (HOEC). ISSN 0943-0180. XV(1), s. 45–59. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

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• Cherry, Todd L.; Hovi, Jon & McEvoy, David M. (2014). Toward a New Climate Agreement. Conflict, Resolution and Governance. Routledge. ISBN 9780415643795. 328 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Climate change is one of the most pressing problems facing the global community. Although most states agree that climate change is occurring and is at least partly the result of humans’ reliance on fossil fuels, managing a changing global climate is a formidable challenge. Underlying this challenge is the fact that states are sovereign, governed by their own laws and regulations. Sovereignty requires that states address global problems such as climate change on a voluntary basis, by negotiating international agreements. Despite a consensus on the need for global action, many questions remain concerning how a meaningful international climate agreement can be realized. This book brings together leading experts to speak to such questions and to offer promising ideas for the path toward a new climate agreement. Organized in three main parts, it examines the potential for meaningful climate cooperation. Part 1 explores sources of conflict that lead to barriers to an effective climate agreement. Part 2 investigates how different processes influence states’ prospects of resolving their differences and of reaching a climate agreement that is more effective than the current Kyoto Protocol. Finally, part 3 focuses on governance issues, including lessons learned from existing institutional structures. The book is unique in that it brings together the voices of experts from many disciplines, such as economics, political science, international law, and natural science. The authors are academics, practitioners, consultants and advisors. Contributions draw on a variety of methods, and include both theoretical and empirical studies. The book should be of interest to scholars and graduate students in the fields of economics, political science, environmental law, natural resources, earth sciences, sustainability, and many others. It is directly relevant for policy makers, stakeholders and climate change negotiators, offering insights into the role of uncertainty, fairness, policy linkage, burden sharing and alternative institutional designs.

• Hovi, Jon & Malnes, Raino Sverre (2011). Anarki, makt og normer : Innføring i internasjonal politikk. Abstrakt forlag. ISBN 9788279353171. 423 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon & Underdal, Arild (2008). Internasjonalt samarbeid og internasjonal organisasjon. Universitetsforlaget. ISBN 9788215012049. 254 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2008). Spillteori. En Innføring. Universitetsforlaget. ISBN 9788215012964. 125 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon & Malnes, Raino Sverre (2007). Anarki, makt og normer. Abstrakt forlag. ISBN 9788279352280. 407 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Stokke, Olav Schram; Hovi, Jon & Ulfstein, Geir (2005). Implementing the Climate Regime: International Compliance. Earthscan. ISBN 9781844071616. 240 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon & Underdal, Arild (2003). Internasjonalt samarbeid og internasjonal organisasjon. Universitetsforlaget. ISBN 9788215005164. 216 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Malnes, Raino Sverre & Hovi, Jon (2001). Normer og makt. Innføring i internasjonal politikk. Abstrakt forlag. ISBN 9788279350170. 361 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Boken inneholder artikler som behandler både teoretiske og empiriske problemstillinger i studiet av internasjonal politikk.

• Hovi, Jon & Rasch, Bjørn Erik (1998). Samhällsvetenskapliga analysprinciper. Studentlitteratur, Lund. ISBN 9789144004204. 150 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (1998). Games, Threats and Treaties. Understanding Commitments in International Relations. Pinter. ISBN 9781855674882. 152 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (1997). Metode og statistikk for samfunnsfag. Eksamensoppgaver med løsningsforslag. Fagbokforlaget. ISBN 9788276743166. 114 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon & Rasch, Bjørn Erik (1996). Samfunnsvitenskapelige analyseprinsipper. Fagbokforlaget. ISBN 9788276741858. 189 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon & Rasch, Bjørn Erik (1993). Strategisk handling. Universitetsforlaget. ISBN 9788200218913. 200 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

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• Hovi, Jon; Tørstad, Vegard Heggelund; Bang, Guri; Sælen, Håkon Grøn & Stankovic, Tatjana (2025). Hva skjer med klimapolitikken under kriser? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  2008 gikk vi gjennom en finanskrise, i 2020 en global pandemi, og siden Russlands invasjon av Ukraina har Europa rustet seg for krig. Har den påfølgende utviklingen innenfor finansmarkedene og innretningen av subsidier gjennom finans- og koronakrisen støttet den grønne omstillingen?

• Tørstad, Vegard Heggelund; Hovi, Jon & Sælen, Håkon (2025). Hva kjennetegner land med grønne krisepakker? Analyse av verdens 40 største økonomier under Finanskrisen og COVID−19. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Tørstad, Vegard Heggelund; Hovi, Jon & Sælen, Håkon (2025). The Global Finanacial Crisis and COVID-19: windows of opportunity for decarbonization? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Tørstad, Vegard Heggelund & Hovi, Jon (2024). Debatt: Trepartssamarbeidet bremser det grønne skiftet (+). Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Mange land brukte pandemien til å investere store beløp for å fremme det grønne skiftet. Men ikke Norge. Samarbeidet mellom arbeidstagere, arbeidsgivere og staten er en viktig forklaring.

• Tørstad, Vegard Heggelund & Hovi, Jon (2024). Kommer ingen vei om alle som taper får vetorett på klimatiltak. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Tørstad, Vegard H. & Hovi, Jon (2024). Trepartssamarbeidet bremser det grønne skiftet. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Kupzok, Nils; Park, RyuGyung; Tørstad, Vegard H.; Valenzuela, Jose Maria; Johannes, Urpelainen & Hovi, Jon (2024). On “Satellites” and “Standalones”: How International Economic Hierarchies Shape Green Industrial Policy Strategy. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Tørstad, Vegard H.; Hovi, Jon; Milkoreit, Manjana; Sælen, Håkon & Tveit, Andreas Kokkvoll (2024). The Ambition Trap: Why Overpromising on Climate Action Could Undermine Progress. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2023). Frigjøring av Ukraina fordrer angrep mot russisk territorium. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Tørstad, Vegard H.; Hovi, Jon & Sælen, Håkon (2023). The Political Economy of Green Stimulus Spending: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis and the Covid-19 Crisis. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Holtermann, Helge; Hovi, Jon & Huseby, Robert (2018). Syria: Tvilsom avskrekkingseffekt. Klassekampen. ISSN 0805-3839. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Kverndokk, Snorre; Hovi, Jon & Figenbaum, Erik (2018). Will I change by driving habits if a neighbor buys and emissions-free car? Unintended effects of environmental policies. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Holtermann, Helge & Hovi, Jon (2017). Det må strenge sanksjoner til mot Myanmars myndigheter: Fordømmelse er ikke nok. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2016). Når har internasjonale avtaler behov for håndheving? I Malnes, Raino Sverre (Red.), Velkommen til statsvitenskap. Gyldendal Akademisk. ISSN 9788205494718. s. 242–258. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Holtermann, Helge; Hansen, Vibeke Wøien; Hovi, Jon & Stankovic, Tatjana (2016). Bargaining, Enforcement, and Civil War. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2016). Editorial to the Issue on Climate Governance and the Paris Agreement. Politics and Governance. 4(3), s. 111–114. doi: 10.17645/pag.v4i3.721. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  This thematic issue of Politics and Governance serves as a Festschrift in honor of Professor Dr. Philos. Arild Underdal on his 70th birthday. In this editorial, the guest editors summarize a few of Professor Underdal’s many academic merits and achievements. They also provide a synopsis of each of the ten contributions to the Festschrift, which focuses on climate governance in general and the 2015 Paris Agreement in particular.

• Hovi, Jon (2016). Blir Paris-avtalen effektiv? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2016). Climate Clubs: A Gateway to Effective Climate Cooperation? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Skodvin, Tora & Hovi, Jon (2015). Kan de internasjonale klimaforhandlingene lykkes? 73(4), s. 529–537. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon; Sælen, Håkon; Sprinz, Detlef F. & Underdal, Arild (2014). The Club Approach: A Gateway to Effective Climate Cooperation? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Sælen, Håkon Grøn; Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef Friedrich & Underdal, Arild (2014). Climate Mitigation Clubs: An agent-based model. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2013). Norge og veien til lavutslippssamfunnet. Dagens næringsliv. ISSN 0803-9372. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon & Aakre, Stine (2013). Punishment under Anarchy. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mauritzen, Cecilie; Hovi, Jon; Torvanger, Asbjørn & Aaheim, Asbjørn (2013). Sats på regionale klimaavtaler. Aftenposten (morgenutg. : trykt utg.). ISSN 0804-3116. s. 6–6. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2012). Håndheving, deltakelse og etterlevelse i den neste klimaavtalen. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2012). Internasjonale klimaavtaler: Hvor viktig er håndheving? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2012). When Does Enforcement Matter? An Experimental Study. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2012). The Pros and Cons of Bottom Up Agreements. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2012). Kan klimaforhandlingene lykkes? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Voigt, Christina; Gullberg, Anne Therese; Hovi, Jon; Lahn, Bård & Ulfstein, Geir (2012). Can Law Save the Climate? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon & Monkerud, Lars Christian (2009). Can contingent prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon & Monkerud, Lars Christian (2009). Can contingent prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon & Monkerud, Lars Christian (2009). Can contingent prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon (2004). Non Instrumental Behavior in a Public Goods Game: Experimental Evidence. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2003). Gaute Torsvik: Menneskenatur og samfunnsstruktur. Økonomisk forum. ISSN 1502-6108. 57(6), s. 39–41. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2002). Bokmelding av C. Ragin, Fuzzy Set Social Science. Sosiologi i dag. ISSN 0332-6330. 32(3). Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2000). Etikk og klimapolitikk: Forebygging best - men ikke nok? Cicerone. ISSN 0804-0508. s. 19–21. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Sælen, Håkon & Hovi, Jon (2016). When can a small number of states drive effective global cooperation on climate change? Universitetet i Oslo. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon & Monkerud, Lars Christian (2009). Can exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence. Handelshøyskolen BI. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon (2008). Non-Instrumental Behavior in an Environmental Public Good Game. Handelshøyskolen BI. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Helland, Leif; Asheim, Geir; Hovi, Jon & Høyland, Bjørn (2008). Self-serving dictators. Department of economics, UiO. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon (2004). The Theory of Full International Cooperation: An Experimental Evaluation. CICERO Senter for Klimaforskning. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The concept of renegotiation-proof equilibrium has become a cornerstone in recent game theoretic reasoning about the stability of international environmental agreements. Applying this solution concept to a linear version of the infinitely repeated N-person Prisoners’ Dilemma, Scott Barrett has been able to derive a number of interesting (and sometimes provocative) predictions about international cooperation to curb climate change. This paper reports the results of a laboratory experiment designed to test two central predictions from Barrett’s model. The first prediction says that the higher the cost of making a contribution, the more cooperation will materialize. The second claims that the number of cooperators is independent of group size. The experiment was designed to replicate the assumptions of Barrett’s model closely. We find that the experimental confrontation lends very little support to the two predictions.

• Hovi, Jon (2002). Internasjonalt samarbeid. NUPI. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon (2002). Enforcing the climate regime: Game theory and the Marrakesh Accords. CICERO Senter for Klimaforskning. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  This article reviews basic insights about compliance and “hard” enforcement that can be derived from various non-cooperative equilibrium concepts, and evaluates the Marrakesh Accords in light of these insights. Five different notions of equilibrium are considered – the Nash equilibrium, the subgame perfect equilibrium, the renegotiation proof equilibrium, the coalition proof equilibrium, and the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. These various types of equilibrium have a number of implications for effective enforcement: (1) Consequences of non-compliance should be more than proportionate. (2) To be credible punishment needs to take place on the Pareto frontier, rather than by reversion to some suboptimal state. (3) An effective enforcement system must be able to curb collective as well as individual incentives to cheat. (4) A fully transparent enforcement regime could in fact turn out to be detrimental for compliance levels. It is concluded that constructing an effective system for “hard” enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol is a formidable task that has only partially been accomplished by the Marrakesh Accords. A possible explanation is that the design of a compliance system for the climate regime involved a careful balancing of the desire to minimize non-compliance against other important considerations.

• Hovi, Jon (2001). Decentralized enforcement, sequential bargaining and the clean development mechanism. CICERO Senter for Klimaforskning. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  While there is a vast literature both on international bargaining and on how international agreements can be enforced, very little work has been done on how bargaining and enforcement interact. An important exception is Fearon (1998), who models international cooperation as a two-stage process in which the bargaining process is constrained by a need for decentralized enforcement (meaning that the agreement must be enforced by the parties themselves rather than a third party, such as a court). Using the Clean Development Mechanism as an example, the present paper proposes a different model of this kind of interaction. The model follows Fearon’s in so far as we both use the infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma to capture the enforcement phase of the game. However, while Fearon depicts the bargaining stage as a War of Attrition, the present model sees that stage as a sequential bargaining game of the Ståhl-Rubinstein type. The implications of the present model are compared both to those of the Ståhl-Rubinstein model and to those of the Fearon model. A surprising conclusion is that a need for decentralized enforcement tends to make the bargaining outcome more symmetrical than otherwise. Thus, the impact of bargaining power is actually smaller when the resulting agreement must be enforced by the parties themselves than it is if enforcement is taken care of by a third party.

• Hovi, Jon (2001). Føre var-prinsippet som rasjonelt beslutningskriterium. CICERO Senter for Klimaforskning. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Notatet spør om føre var-prinsippet kan betraktes som et rasjonelt beslutningskriterium. Forfatteren fokuserer på i alt seks uavklarte spørsmål: 1. Representerer prinsippet et bestemt sett av politiske handlingsalternativer, eller et det et genuint beslutningskriterium? 2. Hvis det er det siste, lar prinsippet seg presisere i retning av noe annet eksisterende kriterium for beslutninger under usikkerhet? 3. Hva er prinsippets relevansområde? 4. Hva er dets relasjon til andre sentrale prinsipper for miljøforvaltning? 5. Hvor plausibelt er prinsippets krav om omvendt bevisbyrde? 6. Kan forkjemperne for miljøtiltak helt frikjennes for bevisbyrde? En hovedkonklusjon er at prinsippet i hvert fall foreløpig inneholder for mange uklare elementer til at det kan sies tilnærmet å tilfredsstille de krav til entydighet og konsistens som det er rimelig å stille til et rasjonelt beslutningskriterium.

• Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon (1999). Bayesisk oppdatering og bayesisk perfekt likevekt: En innføring. Institutt for statsvitenskap. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Hovi, Jon & Holtsmark, Bjart J (1997). Betingete posisjoner i klimaforhandlingene. CICERO Senter for Klimaforskning. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

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