Jon Hovi

• Hovi, Jon, Detlef Sprinz, Håkon Sælen and Arild Underdal 2019. "Climate Clubs: A Gateway to Effective Climate Cooperation?" British Journal of Political Science 49 (3): 1071-1096. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000788
• Helland, Leif, Jon Hovi and Håkon Sælen 2018. "Climate Leadership by Conditional Commitments", Oxford Economic Papers 70 (2): 417-442. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpx045
• Hovi, Jon and Tora Skodvin (guest eds.) 2016. "Climate Governance and the Paris Agreement", Politics and Governance 4 (3): 111-223 (Thematic Issue). 
• Aakre, Stine, Leif Helland and Jon Hovi 2016. "When Does Informal Enforcement Work?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 60 (7): 1312- 1340 .
• Hovi, Jon, Hugh Ward and Frank Grundig 2015. "Hope or Despair? Formal Models of Climate Cooperation", Environmental and Resource Economics 62 (4): 665-688.
• Hvidsten, Andreas and Jon Hovi 2015. "Why No Twin-track Europe? Unity, Discontent and Differentiation in European Integration", European Union Politics 16 (1): 3-22.
• Cherry, Todd L., Jon Hovi and David M. McEvoy (eds.) 2014. Toward a New Climate Agreement. Conflict, Resolution and Governance. London and New York: Routledge.
• Hovi, Jon, Tora Skodvin and Stine Aakre 2013. "Can Climate Negotiations Succeed?" Politics and Governance 1 (2): 138-150.
• Underdal, Arild, Jon Hovi, Steffen Kallbekken and Tora Skodvin 2012. "Can Conditional Commitments Break the Climate Change Negotiations Deadlock?", International Political Science Review 33 (4): 475-493.
• Hovi, Jon, Detlef F. Sprinz and Guri Bang 2012. "Why the United States Did Not Become a Party to the Kyoto Protocol. German, Norwegian and US Perspectives", European Journal of International Relations 18 (1): 129-150.
• Aakre, Stine and Jon Hovi 2010. "Emission Trading: Participation Enforcement Determines the Need for Compliance Enforcement", European Union Politics 11 (3): 427-45.
• Hovi, Jon, Camilla B. Froyn and Guri Bang 2007. "Enforcing the Kyoto Protocol: Can Punitive Consequences Restore Compliance?", Review of International Studies 33 (3): 435-449.
• Asheim, Geir B., Camilla B. Froyn, Jon Hovi and Fredric C. Menz 2006. "Regional versus Global Cooperation for Climate Control", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 51 (1): 93-109.
• Hovi, Jon, Robert Huseby and Detlef F. Sprinz 2005. "When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?" World Politics 57 (4): 479-499.
• Hovi, Jon, Tora Skodvin and Steinar Andresen 2003. "The Persistence of the Kyoto Protocol: Why Other Annex I Parties Move on Without the United States", Global Environmental Politics 3 (4): 1-23.
• Hovi, Jon, Detlef F. Sprinz and Arild Underdal 2003. "The Oslo-Potsdam Solution to Measuring Regime Effectiveness: Critique, Response, and the Road Ahead", Global Environmental Politics 3 (3): 74-96.

• Kverndokk, Snorre; Figenbaum, Erik & Hovi, Jon (2020). Would my driving pattern change if my neighbor were to buy an emissions-free car?. Resource and Energy Economics.  ISSN 0928-7655. . doi: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2020.101153
• Dimitrov, Radoslav; Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef F.; Sælen, Håkon & Underdal, Arild (2019). Institutional and environmental effectiveness: Will the Paris Agreement work?. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change (WIRESs).  ISSN 1757-7780.  10(4) . doi: 10.1002/wcc.583 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv.
• Grundig, Frank; Hovi, Jon & Ward, Hugh (2018). Cooperation on Climate Change: Insights from Game Theory, In Urs Luterbacher & Detlef Sprinz (ed.),  Global Climate Policy: Actors, Concepts, and Enduring Challenges.  MIT Press.  ISBN 9780262535342.  Chapter 4.  s 93 - 123
• Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon & Sælen, Håkon (2018). Climate Leadership by Conditional Commitments. Oxford Economic Papers.  ISSN 0030-7653.  70(2), s 417- 442 . doi: 10.1093/oep/gpx045 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  Under the 2015 Paris climate agreement, each Party sets its own mitigation target by submitting a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) every …five years. An important question is whether including conditional components in NDCs might enhance the agreement’s effectiveness. We report the results of a closely controlled laboratory experiment – based on a mixed sequential-simultaneous public good game with one leader and three followers –that helps answer this question. The experiment investigates how two factors infl‡uence the effectiveness of leadership based on intrinsically conditional commitments. Measuring e¤ectiveness in terms of followers’' and total contributions, we …find that it may help if the conditional promise is credible and if its implementation in‡fluences followers'’ welfare substantially. Importantly, however, for both factors we fi…nd a signi…cant effect only if the leader does not reap disproportionate gains from the group'’s efforts. These fi…ndings have important implications concerning the future success of the Paris agreement.

• Hovi, Jon & Underdal, Arild (2018). Implementation, Compliance, and Effectiveness of Policies and Institutions, In Urs Luterbacher & Detlef Sprinz (ed.),  Global Climate Policy: Actors, Concepts, and Enduring Challenges.  MIT Press.  ISBN 9780262535342.  Chapter 11.  s 297 - 322
• Sprinz, Detlef; Sælen, Håkon; Underdal, Arild & Hovi, Jon (2018). The effectiveness of climate clubs under Donald Trump. Climate Policy.  ISSN 1469-3062.  18(7), s 828- 838 . doi: 10.1080/14693062.2017.1410090 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  On 1 June 2017, President Trump announced that the US intends to leave the Paris Agreement if no alternative terms acceptable to his administration can be agreed upon. In this article, an agent-based model of bottom-up climate mitigation clubs is used to derive the impact that lack of US participation may have on the membership of such clubs and their emissions coverage. We systematically analyse the prospects for climate mitigation clubs, depending on which of Three conceivable roles the US takes on: as a leader (for benchmarking), as a follower (i.e. willing to join climate mitigation clubs initiated by others if this is in its best interest) or as an outsider (i.e. staying outside of any climate mitigation club no matter what). We investigate these prospects for three types of incentives for becoming a member: club goods, conditional commitments and side-payments. Our results show that lack of US leadership significantly constrains climate clubs’ potential. Lack of US willingness to follow others’ lead is an additional, but smaller constraint. Only in a few cases will US withdrawal entail widespread departures by other countries. We conclude that climate mitigation clubs can function without the participation of an important GHG emitter, given that other major emitters show leadership, although these clubs will rarely cover more than 50% of global emissions.

• Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2017). Why the United States Supports International Enforcement for Some Treaties but Not for Others. Politics and Governance.  ISSN 2183-2463.  5(2), s 79- 92 . doi: 10.17645/pag.v5i2.886 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  Under what conditions should we expect the United States to support international enforcement of treaties? We hypothesize that U.S. support is most likely for treaties where international enforcement will cause considerable (desired) behavioral change by other countries but little (undesired) behavioral change by the United States. Similarly, U.S. support is least likely for treaties where international enforcement will generate the converse effects. In developing this hypothesis, we derive specific conditions under which we should expect U.S. benefits of international enforcement to outweigh U.S. costs (or vice versa). We also provide empirical examples. Finally, we consider three alternative explanations of U.S. views on international enforcement—concern for U.S. sovereignty, desire to prevent infringements on U.S. constitutional protection of individual rights, and the usefulness of international enforcement as a domestic commitment device. We discuss these alternative explanatory factors’ relationship to our own hypothesis.

• Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef; Sælen, Håkon & Underdal, Arild (2017). Climate Clubs: a Gateway to Effective Climate Cooperation?. British Journal of Political Science.  ISSN 0007-1234.  49(3), s 1071- 1096 . doi: 10.1017/S0007123416000788 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  Although the Paris Agreement arguably made some progress, interest in supplementary approaches to climate change co-operation persist. This article examines the conditions under which a climate club might emerge and grow. Using agent-based simulations, it shows that even with less than a handful of major actors as initial members, a club can eventually reduce global emissions effectively. To succeed, a club must be initiated by the ‘right’ constellation of enthusiastic actors, offer sufficiently large incentives for reluctant countries and be reasonably unconstrained by conflicts between members over issues beyond climate change. A climate club is particularly likely to persist and grow if initiated by the United States and the European Union. The combination of club-good benefits and conditional commitments can produce broad participation under many conditions.

• Aakre, Stine; Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon (2016). When Does Informal Enforcement Work?. Journal of Conflict Resolution.  ISSN 0022-0027.  60(7), s 1312- 1340 . doi: 10.1177/0022002714560349 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  We study experimentally how enforcement influences public goods provision when subjects face two free-rider options that roughly parallel the nonparticipation and noncompliance options available for countries in relation to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Our results add to the MEA literature in two ways. First, they suggest that compliance enforcement will fail to enhance compliance in the absence of participation enforcement. Second, they indicate that compliance enforcement will boost compliance significantly in the presence of participation enforcement. Our results also add to the experimental literature on public goods provision, again in two ways. First, they reveal that previous experimental findings of enforcement boosting cooperation are valid only in settings with forced (or enforced) participation. Second, they show that subjects’ willingness to allocate costly punishment points is significantly stronger when the enforcement system permits punishment of both types of free riding than when it permits punishment of only one type.

• Bang, Guri; Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2016). The Paris Agreement: short-term and long-term effectiveness. Politics and Governance.  ISSN 2183-2463.  4(3), s 209- 218 . doi: 10.17645/pag.v4i3.640 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  The 2015 Paris Agreement was widely greeted with enthusiasm. We assess the short-term and long-term potential effectiveness of Paris. Concerning short-term effectiveness, we contend that while Paris scores high on participation, and reasonably high on the depth of the parties’ commitments (ambition), its Achilles’ heel will likely be compliance. Concerning long-term effectiveness, we argue that Paris does little to restructure states’ incentives so as to avoid free riding. At worst, it might end up as a failure, much like Kyoto did. On the other hand, domestic and international norms could continue to develop in a direction that makes it more and more difficult for individuals, firms, and states alike to ignore the plea to limit and reduce their carbon footprints. Technological progress that gradually reduces abatement costs, combined with leadership by major emitters such as the United States, might further strengthen climate cooperation and enhance other countries’ willingness to follow through. However, deep political polarization continues to represent a significant barrier to U.S. leadership on climate change.

• Gullberg, Anne Therese & Hovi, Jon (2016). Regulating solar radiation management: The roles of public engagement and legislative procedures. European Journal of Risk Regulation.  ISSN 1867-299X.  7(1), s 75- 86 . doi: 10.1017/S1867299X00005419 Vis sammendrag

  Climate engineering in general and solar radiation management (SRM) in particular raise profound and complex political, legal, social, and ethical questions that go well beyond technical-feasibility issues. We consider three such questions. First, can existing EU decision-making processes accommodate sufficient public engagement to ensure legitimate decisions on SRM? Second, does politics influence the choice of legislative procedure for SRM regulation? Third, does the choice of legislative procedure influence the likelihood of SRM implementation? Three main conclusions emerge from our analysis. First, existing EU decision-making processes can – given certain conditions – accommodate considerable public engagement and hence ensure legitimate decisions on SRM. Second, politics matters; indeed, the EU’s choice of legislative procedure concerning SRM may well become subject to political negotiations. Finally, the choice of legislative procedure may substantially influence the likelihood of SRM implementation.

• Hovi, Jon; Høyland, Bjørn & Rasch, Bjørn Erik (2016). Topptidsskrifter i statsvitenskap. Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift.  ISSN 0801-1745.  32(3), s 290- 298
• Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef; Sælen, Håkon & Underdal, Arild (2016). Climate Change Mitigation: A Role for Climate Clubs?. Palgrave Communications.  ISSN 2055-1045.  2 . doi: 10.1057/palcomms.2016.20 Vis sammendrag

  The limited success of the UNFCCC negotiations has enticed scholars, environmentalists, and policymakers alike to propose alternative approaches to climate cooperation. This article reviews the scholarly literature concerning one such proposed alternative—climate clubs. According to the club approach, it would be promising to start with small groups of “enthusiastic” countries. These countries would outline what they are willing and able to do, conditional on what other enthusiastic countries offer and implement. Moreover, these enthusiastic countries would try to entice “reluctant” countries to join via “exclusive and contingent” measures. Focusing on the conditions for a climate club to effectively reduce global emissions, we organize our review around four main questions: first, what is a climate club’s potential for providing benefits that accrue exclusively to club members? Second, how might leadership influence a climate club’s ability to eventually become effective? Third, what insights can the formal modelling literature offer concerning the effectiveness of climate clubs? Finally, which is the empirical record of existing climate clubs? We conclude by providing several suggestions for future research.

• Hovi, Jon; Ward, Hugh & Grundig, Frank (2015). Hope or Despair? Formal Models of Climate Cooperation. Environmental and Resource Economics.  ISSN 0924-6460.  62(4), s 665- 688 . doi: 10.1007/s10640-014-9799-3 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  We review formal (and some more informal) models of climate cooperation derived from economics and political science. These models convey two main messages. On one hand, they suggest that the prospects for effective climate cooperation are bleak: The standard view is that stable coalitions are small and that renegotiation-proof equilibria require that only a few countries participate. On the other hand, there might be light at the end of the tunnel after all. First, more recent work suggests that larger coalitions can be made stable. Second, other recent work suggests that it may be possible to design a renegotiation-proof climate agreement with broad or even full participation. Third, deposit-refund systems might help solve some of the obstacles for effective climate cooperation. Fourth, although the “law of the least ambitious program” pinpoints severe constraints on effective cooperation, this law has its limits. Fifth, countries may use cooperative probes to build trust. Sixth, cooperation might emerge in a completely decentralized fashion. Finally, experiments indicate that some of the conditions for effective cooperation that are taken for granted in most formal models might in fact be overly strict.

• Hvidsten, Andreas H & Hovi, Jon (2015). Why no twin-track Europe? Unity, discontent, and differentiation in European integration. European Union Politics (EUP).  ISSN 1465-1165.  16(1), s 3- 22 . doi: 10.1177/1465116514557964
• Cherry, Todd L.; Hovi, Jon & McEvoy, David M. (2014). Introduction: Toward a New Climate Agreement, In Todd L. Cherry; Jon Hovi & David M. McEvoy (ed.),  Toward a New Climate Agreement. Conflict, Resolution and Governance.  Routledge.  ISBN 978-0-415-64379-5.  Introduction.  s xix - xxix
• Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef Friedrich & Underdal, Arild (2014). Bottom Up or Top Down?, In Todd L. Cherry; Jon Hovi & David M. McEvoy (ed.),  Toward a New Climate Agreement. Conflict, Resolution and Governance.  Routledge.  ISBN 978-0-415-64379-5.  Ch. 12.  s 167 - 180
• Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine & Hovi, Jon (2013). Hvordan kan en internasjonal klimaavtale håndheves?. Samfunnsøkonomen.  ISSN 1890-5250.  (2), s 28- 35 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv.
• Hovi, Jon; Skodvin, Tora & Aakre, Stine (2013). Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?. Politics and Governance.  ISSN 2183-2463.  1(2), s 138- 150 . doi: 10.12924/pag2013.01020138 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  More than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accords, but have nevertheless made very limited progress in curbing global emissions of greenhouse gases. This paper considers whether negotiations can succeed in reaching an agreement that effectively addresses the climate change problem. To be effective, a climate agreement must cause sub­stantial emissions reductions either directly (in the agreement's own lifetime) or indirectly (by paving the way for a future agreement that causes substantial emissions reductions directly). To reduce global emissions substantially, an agreement must satisfy three conditions. Firstly, participation must be both comprehensive and stable. Secondly, participating countries must accept deep commitments. Finally, the agreement must obtain high compliance rates. We argue that three types of enforcement will be crucial to fulfilling these three conditions: (1) incentives for countries to ratify with deep commitments, (2) incentives for countries that have ratified with deep commitments to abstain from withdrawal, and (3) incentives for countries having ratified with deep commitments to comply with them. Based on assessing the constraints that characterize the climate change negotiations, we contend that adopting such three-fold potent enforcement will likely be politically infeasible, not only within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but also in the framework of a more gradual approach. Therefore, one should not expect climate change negotiations to succeed in producing an effective future agreement—either directly or indirectly.

• Hovi, Jon; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine & Holtsmark, Bjart (2012). A credible compliance enforcement system for the climate regime. Climate Policy.  ISSN 1469-3062.  12(6), s 741- 754 . doi: 10.1080/14693062.2012.692206 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  The compliance enforcement system of the Kyoto Protocol provides only weak incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments. For example, the penalties for non-compliant countries are not legally binding, and moreover, there is no second-order punishment for those countries that fail to implement them. Thus, a Party can simply refuse to comply without consequence. The alternative compliance enforcement systems that have been proposed in the literature also face substantial problems. A simple, flexible, potent, and credible compliance enforcement system for a post-Kyoto climate agreement, based on deposits, is proposed here: at ratification, each country deposits a significant amount of money, and continues to do so in the preparation stage each year until the start of the commitment period. At the end of this period, those countries that meet their emissions limitation targets receive a full refund of their deposit, while those that fail to do so forfeit part or all of it. A simplified two-country model of the deposit system and a numerical example of an agreement involving the US, Japan, Russia, and Europe is also provided. If each country’s deposit is no less than its abatement costs, there is a strong incentive for participating countries to avoid noncompliance.

• Bang, Guri; Hovi, Jon & Sprinz, Detlef F. (2012). US presidents and the failure to ratify multilateral environmental agreements. Climate Policy.  ISSN 1469-3062.  12(6), s 755- 763 . doi: 10.1080/14693062.2012.699788 Vis sammendrag

  Whereas the US President signed the Kyoto Protocol, the failure of the US Congress to ratify it seriously hampered subsequent international climate cooperation. This recent US trend, of signing environmental treaties but failing to ratify them, could thwart attempts to come to a future climate agreement. Two complementary explanations of this trend are proposed. First, the political system of the US has distinct institutional features that make it difficult for presidents to predict whether the Senate will give its advice and consent to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and whether Congress will pass the required enabling legislation. Second, elected for a fixed term, US presidents might benefit politically from supporting MEAs even when knowing that legislative support is not forthcoming. Four policy implications are explored, concerning the scope for unilateral presidential action, the potential for bipartisan congressional support, the effectiveness of a treaty without the US, and the prospects for a deep, new climate treaty.

• Grundig, Frank; Hovi, Jon; Underdal, Arild & Aakre, Stine (2012). Self-enforcing Peace and Environmental Agreements. Toward Scholarly Cross-fertilization?. International Studies Review.  ISSN 1521-9488.  14(4), s 522- 540 . doi: 10.1111/misr.12003 Vis sammendrag

  Enforcement of agreements can be a major challenge in international politics. However, the interest in mechanisms of self-enforcement seems significantly lower among scholars studying international peace agreements (IPAs) than among scholars studying international environmental agreements (IEAs). Moreover, practically no exchange of ideas and findings about enforcement can be found between these two fields of research. We argue that a combination of similarities and differences between the two issue-areas provides fertile ground for mutual learning. To facilitate communication we develop a unifying but differentiated definition of self-enforcing agreements (SEAs). We then use this conceptual framework to explore lessons about IEA design that might be learned by studying IPAs and lessons about IPA design that might be learned by studying IEAs. We submit that this kind of compare-and-contrast analysis may provide important input for the development of a more refined and general theory of SEAs.

• Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon & Monkerud, Lars Christian (2012). Can exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence. European Journal of Government and Economics.  ISSN 2254-7088.  1(2), s 106- 125 Vis sammendrag

  Elected representatives serving their final period face only weak incentives to provide costly effort. However, overlapping generations (OLG) models suggest that exit prizes sustained by trigger strategies can induce representatives in their final period to provide such effort. We evaluate this hypothesis using a simple OLG public good experiment, the central treatment being whether exit prizes are permitted. We find that a significantly higher number of subjects in their final period contribute when exit prizes are permitted. However, this result does not originate from use of trigger strategies. More likely explanations include gift-exchange and focal-point effects.

• Hovi, Jon (2012). Strategibegrepet i spillteorien, I: Sverre Diesen (red.),  Strategi: Mellom Vitenskap, Intuisjon og Etikk.  Universitetsforlaget.  ISBN 978-82-15-01956-7.  Kapittel 3.  s 32 - 48
• Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef F. & Bang, Guri (2012). Why the United States did not become a party to the Kyoto Protocol: German, Norwegian, and US perspectives. European Journal of International Relations.  ISSN 1354-0661.  18(1), s 129- 150 . doi: 10.1177/1354066110380964 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  According to two-level game theory, negotiators tailor agreements at the international level to be ratifiable at the domestic level. This did not happen in the Kyoto negotiations, however, in the US case. We interviewed 26 German, Norwegian, and US participants in and observers of the climate negotiations concerning their views on three explanations for why the United States did not become a party to Kyoto. Explanation 1 argues that Kyoto delegations mistakenly thought the Senate was bluffing when adopting Byrd–Hagel. Explanation 2 contends that Europeans preferred a more ambitious agreement without US participation to a less ambitious agreement with US participation. Finally, explanation 3 suggests that in Kyoto the Clinton–Gore administration gave up on Senate ratification, and essentially pushed for an agreement that would provide them a climate-friendly face. While all explanations received some support from interviewees, explanation 1 and (particularly) explanation 3 received considerably more support than explanation 2.

• Underdal, Arild; Hovi, Jon; Kallbekken, Steffen & Skodvin, Tora (2012). Can conditional commitments break the climate change negotiations deadlock?. International Political Science Review.  ISSN 0192-5121.  33(4), s 475- 493 . doi: 10.1177/0192512111432564 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  Can a conditional commitment by a major actor (for example, the European Union) induce other major actors (such as the USA, China, India, or Japan) to do more to mitigate global climate change? We analyse this question by first estimating the impact of emission reductions by one of these actors on the mitigation costs of the others and, second, by exploring how domestic politics influence the willingness of the European Union and the USA to contribute. We find that an emission cut by any actor will reduce mitigation costs for all the others and thereby expand the settlement range. These cost reductions seem, however, insufficient to induce significant unilateral policy change. Emissions trading can cut aggregate costs further, but also redistribute wealth. Domestic politics tend to add weight to the concerns of powerful actors that stand to lose from more ambitious mitigation policies.

• Hovi, Jon (2011). Trusler i internasjonal politikk, I: Jon Hovi & Raino Sverre Malnes (red.),  Anarki, makt og normer : Innføring i internasjonal politikk.  Abstrakt forlag.  ISBN 978-82-7935-317-1.  kapittel 3.  s 67 - 86
• Hovi, Jon; Underdal, Arild & Ward, Hugh (2011). Potential Contributions of Political Science to Environmental Economics. Environmental and Resource Economics.  ISSN 0924-6460.  48(3), s 391- 411 . doi: 10.1007/s10640-010-9453-7 Vis sammendrag

  While political science has much to offer, at least some of its contributions might be difficult to incorporate into economic models. Nevertheless, we argue that environmental economics might benefit from supplementing, combining, or sometimes even replacing the rational choice approach with other approaches commonly used in political science. We develop our argument by examining three core components of political science analysis: ideas, power, and institutions. For each component we review political science approaches and propositions with a view to determining “what’s in it” for environmental economics.

• Aakre, Stine & Hovi, Jon (2010). Emission trading: Participation enforcement determines the need for compliance enforcement. European Union Politics (EUP).  ISSN 1465-1165.  11(3), s 427- 445 . doi: 10.1177/1465116510369265 Vis sammendrag

  We identify and explain significant differences between the compliance enforcement systems of three cap-and-trade programmes: the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), the US SO2 emission trading programme and the Kyoto Protocol. Because EU-ETS’s compliance enforcement system is somewhat less potent than that of US SO2, but vastly more potent than Kyoto’s, it might be tempting to predict that EU-ETS will (1) not quite achieve the SO2 programme’s near-perfect compliance rates, yet (2) achieve significantly better compliance rates than Kyoto. However, we offer a novel theoretical framework suggesting that how compliance enforcement affects compliance will depend on how the emission trading programme addresses participation. We conclude that while (1) will likely prove correct, (2) will not; Kyoto may even outperform EU-ETS compliance-wise because whereas EU-ETS (and US SO2) specify mandatory participation, most Kyoto member countries participate voluntarily.

• Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon (2010). Non-instrumental behavior in an environmental public goods game. Homo Oeconomicus.  ISSN 0943-0180.  27(3), s 241- 262 Vis sammendrag

  This paper reports a puzzling result from an experiment based on an indefinitely repeated N -player Prisoners’ Dilemma game carried out in a PC lab. The experiment used real monetary payoffs, and was conducted in the context of international cooperation to curb climate change. It was puzzling that after the experiment, a large majority of subjects reported they were at least partially motivated out of concern for the climate; however, nothing they did in the experiment could possibly have had an impact on the climate. We show that subjects acting out of concern for the climate incurred a real cost in monetary terms, and argue that many subjects’ behavior in the experiment deviated quite fundamentally from instrumental rationality. Although much recent research on public goods provision questions the traditional assumption that players are purely self-regarding, the assumption of instrumental rationality is typically preserved. The results reported in this paper go some way towards challenging the validity of this assumption.

• Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon (2009). Renegotiation Proofness and Climate Agreements: Some Experimental Evidence. Nordic Journal of Political Economy.  ISSN 0805-7508.  34, s 1- 26 Vis sammendrag

  The notion of renegotiation-proof equilibrium has become a cornerstone in non-cooperative models of international environmental agreements. Applying this solution concept to the infinitely repeated N-person Prisoners' Dilemma generates predictions that contradict intuition as well as conventional wisdom about public goods provision. This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test two such predictions. The first is that the higher the cost of making a contribution, the more cooperation will materialize. The second is that the number of cooperators is independent of group size. Although the experiment was designed to replicate the assumptions of the model closely, our results lend very little support to the two predictions.

• Hovi, Jon (2009). Towards a Better Compliance System for the Climate Regime?, In Christophe P. Vasser (ed.),  The Kyoto Protocol: Economic Assessments, Implementation Mechanisms, and Policy Implications.  Nova Science Publishers, Inc..  ISBN 978-1-60456-983-4.  Kap. 5.
• Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef & Underdal, Arild (2009). Implementing Long-Term Climate Policy: Time Inconsistency, Domestic Politics, and International Anarchy. Global Environmental Politics.  ISSN 1526-3800.  9(3), s 20- 39
• Froyn, Camilla Bretteville & Hovi, Jon (2008). A climate agreement with full participation. Economics Letters.  ISSN 0165-1765.  99(2), s 317- 319 . doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.07.013
• Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon (2008). Renegotiation proofness and climate agreements some experimental evidence. Nordic Journal of Political Economy.  ISSN 0805-7508.  34, s 1- 26
• Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon (2008). Renegotiation-profness and Climate Agreements: Experimental Evidence. Nordic Journal of Political Economy.  ISSN 0805-7508.  34(2), s 1- 26
• Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2008). Which way to U.S. Climate Cooperation? Issue Linkage versus a U.S.-based Agreement. Review of Policy Research.  ISSN 1541-132X.  25(2), s 129- 148 . doi: 10.1111/j.1541-1338.2007.00315.x Vis sammendrag

  Several scholars have suggested that the United States can be compelled to reengage in the Kyoto process by linking cooperation on climate change to cooperation on trade or technology research and development. We argue that such issue linkage would likely fail and suggest that a more promising road to U.S. cooperation is to develop an alternative climate agreement based on federal U.S. climate policy. However, the question then becomes whether the Kyoto countries might be prepared to abandon the Kyoto process in favor of such a U.S.-based agreement. We argue that if a U.S.-based agreement were to be built on President Bush's current climate policy, the Kyoto countries (especially the European Union) would likely be reluctant to go along. However, if a U.S.-based agreement were to be built on the many Kyoto-like initiatives now emerging at state and local levels, the Kyoto countries might well be more favorably inclined.

• Hovi, Jon; Froyn, Camilla Bretteville & Bang, Guri (2007). Enforcing the Kyoto Protocol: can punitive consequences restore compliance?. Review of International Studies.  ISSN 0260-2105.  33 . doi: 10.1017/SO260210507007590
• Bang, Guri; Froyn, Camilla Bretteville; Hovi, Jon & Menz, Fredric C. (2007). The United States and international climate cooperation: International "pull" versus domestic "push". Energy Policy.  ISSN 0301-4215.  35(2), s 1282- 1291 . doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2006.03.015 Vis sammendrag

  The U.S. government is being pressured by both international and domestic influences to re-engage in international climate control. This paper considers whether the international “pull” and the domestic “push” will be strong enough to accomplish this. First, we discuss whether changes in the architecture of the current climate regime might induce the United States to re-engage at the international level. We argue that the United States is unlikely to rejoin any global climate regime that is based on the Kyoto architecture, even if Kyoto were to be “reformed.” Second, we discuss whether domestic political developments might eventually cause the United States to re-engage. We conclude that U.S. re-engagement is likely to require the emergence of a new climate regime that basically extends U.S. regulation to other countries. However, the forging of a unified U.S. climate policy is still in the making. Furthermore, a new regime can gain widespread participation only if the Kyoto countries accept the idea of replacing Kyoto with some alternative architecture, which seems unlikely in the near future.

• Hovi, Jon (2007). Trusler i internasjonal politikk, I: Jon Hovi & Raino Sverre Malnes (red.),  Anarki, makt og normer.  Abstrakt forlag.  ISBN 978-82-7935-228-0.  kapittel 3.  s 66 - 85
• Kallbekken, Steffen & Hovi, Jon (2007). The Price of Non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol: The Remarkable Case of Norway. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics.  ISSN 1567-9764.  7(1), s 1- 15
• Gullberg, Anne Therese; Hovi, Jon & Vevatne, Jonas (2006). U-landsdeltakelse i klimaregimet - muligheter og barrierer. Internasjonal Politikk - Skandinavisk tidsskrift for internasjonale studier.  ISSN 0020-577X.  64(2), s 147- 172 Vis sammendrag

  De aller fleste u-land har ratifisert Kyotoprotokollen. I motsetning til i-landene (utenom USA og Australia), er u-landene imidlertid ikke underlagt bindende forpliktelser om å begrense utslipp av klimagasser. Formålet med denne artikkelen er firedelt. Først redegjør vi for noen viktige politiske og institusjonelle barrierer for u-landsdeltakelse. Dernest diskuterer vi om det er mulig å stimulere til mer forpliktende u-landsdeltakelse innenfor rammen av det eksisterende klimaregimet. Så behandler vi spørsmålet om hvorvidt andre måter å organisere klimasamarbeidet på kan gjøre det mer attraktivt for u-landene å delta. Endelig analyserer vi enkelte tiltak som – i hvert fall i prinsippet – vil kunne øke u-landenes interesse for å delta i klimaregimet. Vår konklusjon er at bindende forpliktelser om utslippsreduksjoner for u-landene er lite sannsynlig i overskuelig fremtid. Dels gjør den tette koblingen mellom klimautslipp og økonomisk vekst det vanskelig å motivere mange u-land til å akseptere reelle utslippsbegrensninger. Dessuten tilsier rettferdighetsbetraktninger små eller ingen forpliktelser for u-landene. Og selv om det skulle være mulig å overkomme disse barrierene, kan det likevel bli politisk vanskelig å endre u-landenes posisjon i klimaforhandlingene som følge av de ekstremt konserverende beslutningsreglene som benyttes i G77 og i klimaregimet.

• Hovi, Jon & Holtsmark, Bjart (2006). Cap-and-Trade or Carbon Taxes? The Feasibility of Enforcement and the Effects of Non-Compliance. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics.  ISSN 1567-9764.  6(2), s 137- 155 Vis sammendrag

  One of the proposed alternatives to Kyoto’s cap-and-trade approach is a regime based on internationally harmonized carbon taxes. In this paper, we consider and compare the enforcement problems associated with a tax regime and a cap-and-trade regime, respectively. The paper tries to convey two main points. First, both types of regime require an effective enforcement mechanism. However, such a mechanism is unlikely to be adopted as part of a regime with full participation, because the political process tends to water down the enforcement mechanism to a point where it no longer has much bite. And if this is somehow avoided, countries expecting compliance to be difficult or costly will almost certainly decline to sign – not to mention ratify – the resulting agreement. Second, the implications of non-compliance in a tax regime differ in important ways from the corresponding implications in a cap-and-trade regime. In a cap-and-trade regime, emissions trading can make inaction legitimate for buyers of emission permits. In particular, overselling of permits by a few permit exporting countries might completely undermine the regime’s environmental effect. In a tax regime, by contrast, one country's non-compliance can not make inaction by other countries legitimate, meaning that an agreement based on harmonized carbon taxes will always have some effect, so long as at least one country complies. We thus conclude that enforcement is more important for a cap-and-trade regime than for a tax regime.

• Asheim, Geir Bjarne; Froyn, Camilla Bretteville; Hovi, Jon & Menz, Fredric C. (2006). Regional versus global cooperation for climate control. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.  ISSN 0095-0696.  51 . doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2005.04.004 Vis sammendrag

  This paper considers whether international environmental public goods provision, such as mitigation of climate change, is better dealt with through regional cooperation than through a global treaty. Previous research suggests that, at best, a global environmental treaty will achieve very little. At worst, it will fail to enter into force. Using a simple dynamic game-theoretic model, with weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium as solution concept, we demonstrate that two agreements can sustain a larger number of cooperating parties than a single global treaty. The model provides upper and lower bounds on the number of parties under each type of regime. It is shown that a regime with two agreements can Pareto dominate a regime based on a single global treaty. We conclude that regional cooperation might be a good alternative–or supplement–to global environmental agreements.

• Halvorssen, Anita M. & Hovi, Jon (2006). The Nature, Origin and Impact of Legally Binding Consequences: The Case of the Climate Regime. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics.  ISSN 1567-9764.  6(2), s 157- 171 Vis sammendrag

  The Marrakesh Accords provide a detailed compliance system for the Kyoto Protocol. An innovative feature of this system is an Enforcement Branch authorized to apply punitive measures or ‘consequences’ in the second commitment period to Annex I Parties that have been found to be in non-compliance in the first commitment period. However, even after the latest Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), COP-11, and the first Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, COP/MOP-1, it is not yet clear whether these consequences will be legally binding. The purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, we examine the legal nature of the punitive consequences embedded in the Marrakesh Accords. Second, we discuss potential motives for making these consequences legally binding. We point out that one such motive is that their implementation requires cooperation by the Party that is in non-compliance. In this regard, Kyoto’s compliance system differs from other international compliance systems equipped with punitive consequences, such as those of the WTO and the UN. Finally, we consider whether making the punitive consequences legally binding is likely to make a difference. The conclusion, which should be of interest to both academic researchers and the policy community, is that the legal status of the consequences is likely to have only a modest effect on compliance levels. A country that deliberately fails to abide by other legally binding commitments under the Kyoto Protocol is also likely to resist the application of punitive consequences, regardless of whether these consequences are made legally binding or not.

• Hovi, Jon & Sprinz, Detlef (2006). The limits of the law of the least ambitious program. Global Environmental Politics.  ISSN 1526-3800.  6, s 28- + Vis sammendrag

  Arild Underdal’s work on the Law of the Least Ambitious Program (LLAP) is a significant contribution to our understanding of the logic of international collaboration. The LLAP, however, applies only under particular conditions. After comparing the law to the joint decision trap and the veto player concept, we discuss four observations that tend to limit the law’s domain. First, while the LLAP is intended to apply to decision-making under unanimity, in a number of international bodies decisions are made by some kind of majority voting. Second, the LLAP assumes that the alternative to collective agreement is individual decision-making, yet in practice the relevant alternative (the “reversion rule”) is often the continuation of some pre-existing collaborative arrangement. Third, whereas the LLAP assumes that the unanimity rule invariably favors the least ambitious program, there are interesting cases where this assumption does not hold. Finally, the LLAP does not take into account that the outcome of international decision-making not only depends on the decision rule and the reversion rule, but also on the voting sequence.

• Hovi, Jon (2005). The Domino Theory, I: Stein Ugelvik Larsen (red.),  Theory and Methods in Poilitical Science.  Columbia University Press.  ISBN 0-88033-998-5.  Chapter 9.  s 171 - 183
• Hovi, Jon (2005). The Future of Kyoto's Compliance System, In Olav Schram Stokke; Jon Hovi & Geir Ulfstein (ed.),  Implementing the Climate Regime: International Compliance.  Earthscan / James & James.  ISBN 1-84407-161-8.  Epilogue.  s 233 - 236
• Hovi, Jon (2005). The Pros and Cons of External Enforcement, In Olav Schram Stokke; Jon Hovi & Geir Ulfstein (ed.),  Implementing the Climate Regime: International Compliance.  Earthscan / James & James.  ISBN 1-84407-161-8.  Chapter 6.  s 129 - 145
• Hovi, Jon; Huseby, Robert & Sprinz, Detlef (2005). When do (imposed) economic sanctions work?. World Politics.  ISSN 0043-8871.  57(4), s 479- 499 Vis sammendrag

  Previous research has documented a modest success rate for imposed sanctions. By contrast, the success rate is higher in cases that are settled at the threat stage. In this article, we provide new insights about the circumstances under which sanctions cause behavioral change only after being imposed: First, the target must initially underestimate the impact of sanctions, miscalculate the sender’s determination to impose them, or wrongly believe that sanctions will be imposed and maintained whether it yields or not. Second, the target’s misperceptions must be corrected after sanctions are imposed. A game-theoretical model with incomplete information is used to develop and clarify our argument.

• Hovi, Jon; Stokke, Olav Schram & Ulfstein, Geir (2005). Introduction and main findings, In Olav Schram Stokke; Jon Hovi & Geir Ulfstein (ed.),  Implementing the Climate Regime: International Compliance.  Earthscan / James & James.  ISBN 1-84407-161-8.  0.  s 1 - 14
• Hovi, Jon (2004). Causal Mechanisms and the Study of International Environmental Regimes, In Arild Underdal & Oran R Young (ed.),  Regime Consequences: Methodological Challenges and Research Strategies.  Kluwer Academic Publishers.  ISBN 1-4020-2070-8.  Chapter 4.  s 71 - 86
• Hovi, Jon & Areklett, Ivar (2004). Enforcing the Climate Regime: Game Theory and the Marrakesh accords. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics.  ISSN 1567-9764.  4(1), s 1- 26
• Andresen, Steinar E; Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2003). The Persistence of the Kyoto Protocol: Why Other Annex I Countries Move on Without the United States. Global Environmental Politics.  ISSN 1526-3800.  3(4), s 1- 23
• Hovi, Jon (2003). Dominoteorien, I: Stein Ugelvik Larsen (red.),  Teori og metode i statsvitenskap.  Fagbokforlaget.  ISBN 8276747221.  Kapittel 9.  s 137 - 147
• Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef & Underdal, Arild (2003). Regime Effectiveness and the Oslo-Potsdam Solution: A Rejoinder to Oran Young. Global Environmental Politics.  ISSN 1526-3800.  3(3), s 105- 107
• Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef & Underdal, Arild (2003). The Oslo-Potsdam Solution to Measuring Regime Effectiveness: Critique, Response, and the Road Ahead. Global Environmental Politics.  ISSN 1526-3800.  3(3), s 74- 96
• Hovi, Jon (2002). Etikk og klimapolitikk, I: Pia Hverven Axell (red.),  Med forskerblikk på verdier.  Norges forskningsråd, Oslo.  ISBN 82-12-01674-9.  s 173 - 187
• Hovi, Jon (2002). Rationality, Microbehaviour and Macroevents: Notes on the Prospects for Prediction. Electronic Review of World Politics.  ISSN 1471-325X.  1(2)
• Hovi, Jon (2001). Decentralized enforcement, sequential bargaining and the clean development mechanism. Nordic Journal of Political Economy.  ISSN 0805-7508.  27(2), s 135- 152
• Hovi, Jon (2001). Hvorfor økonomiske sanksjoner virker - tross alt. Internasjonal Politikk - Skandinavisk tidsskrift for internasjonale studier.  ISSN 0020-577X.  59(4), s 509- 524
• Hovi, Jon (2001). Klimapolitiske strategier og etikk. Internasjonal Politikk - Skandinavisk tidsskrift for internasjonale studier.  ISSN 0020-577X.  59(2), s 179- 199
• Hovi, Jon (2001). Strategisk tenkning - 35 år etter. Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning.  ISSN 0040-716X.  42(4), s 591- 608
• Hovi, Jon (2001). Trusler i internasjonal politikk, I:  Normer og makt. Innføring i internasjonal politikk.  Abstrakt forlag.  ISBN 82-7935-017-9.  s 117 - 136
• Hovi, Jon & Malnes, Raino Sverre (2001). Innledning, I:  Normer og makt. Innføring i internasjonal politikk.  Abstrakt forlag.  ISBN 82-7935-017-9.  s 7 - 10
• Hovi, Jon & Malnes, Raino Sverre (2001). Modeller og teorier: En bruksanvisning, I:  Normer og makt. Innføring i internasjonal politikk.  Abstrakt forlag.  ISBN 82-7935-017-9.  s 339 - 354
• Malnes, Raino Sverre & Hovi, Jon (2001). Modeller og teorier: en bruksanvisning, I:  Normer og makt. Innføring i internasjonal politikk.  Abstrakt forlag.  ISBN 82-7935-017-9.  s 339 - 354 Vis sammendrag

  Artikkelen gjøre rede for bruken av teorier og modeller i forklaring og prediksjon av internasjonale begivenheter.

• Hovi, Jon & Holtsmark, Bjart (1998). Betingete posisjoner i klimaforhandlingene. Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift.  ISSN 0801-1745.  14(4), s 153- 174
• Hovi, Jon (1998). The Relevance of Unrealistic Models for Empirical Political Science. Homo Oeconomicus.  ISSN 0943-0180.  XV(1), s 45- 59

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• Cherry, Todd L.; Hovi, Jon & McEvoy, David M. (ed.) (2014). Toward a New Climate Agreement. Conflict, Resolution and Governance. Routledge.  ISBN 978-0-415-64379-5.  328 s. Vis sammendrag

  Climate change is one of the most pressing problems facing the global community. Although most states agree that climate change is occurring and is at least partly the result of humans’ reliance on fossil fuels, managing a changing global climate is a formidable challenge. Underlying this challenge is the fact that states are sovereign, governed by their own laws and regulations. Sovereignty requires that states address global problems such as climate change on a voluntary basis, by negotiating international agreements. Despite a consensus on the need for global action, many questions remain concerning how a meaningful international climate agreement can be realized. This book brings together leading experts to speak to such questions and to offer promising ideas for the path toward a new climate agreement. Organized in three main parts, it examines the potential for meaningful climate cooperation. Part 1 explores sources of conflict that lead to barriers to an effective climate agreement. Part 2 investigates how different processes influence states’ prospects of resolving their differences and of reaching a climate agreement that is more effective than the current Kyoto Protocol. Finally, part 3 focuses on governance issues, including lessons learned from existing institutional structures. The book is unique in that it brings together the voices of experts from many disciplines, such as economics, political science, international law, and natural science. The authors are academics, practitioners, consultants and advisors. Contributions draw on a variety of methods, and include both theoretical and empirical studies. The book should be of interest to scholars and graduate students in the fields of economics, political science, environmental law, natural resources, earth sciences, sustainability, and many others. It is directly relevant for policy makers, stakeholders and climate change negotiators, offering insights into the role of uncertainty, fairness, policy linkage, burden sharing and alternative institutional designs.

• Hovi, Jon & Malnes, Raino Sverre (red.) (2011). Anarki, makt og normer : Innføring i internasjonal politikk. Abstrakt forlag.  ISBN 978-82-7935-317-1.  423 s.
• Hovi, Jon (2008). Spillteori. En Innføring. Universitetsforlaget.  ISBN 978-82-15-01296-4.  125 s.
• Hovi, Jon & Underdal, Arild (2008). Internasjonalt samarbeid og internasjonal organisasjon. Universitetsforlaget.  ISBN 978-82-15-01204-9.  254 s.
• Hovi, Jon & Malnes, Raino Sverre (red.) (2007). Anarki, makt og normer. Abstrakt forlag.  ISBN 978-82-7935-228-0.  407 s.
• Stokke, Olav Schram; Hovi, Jon & Ulfstein, Geir (ed.) (2005). Implementing the Climate Regime: International Compliance. Earthscan / James & James.  ISBN 1-84407-161-8.  240 s.
• Hovi, Jon & Underdal, Arild (2003). Internasjonalt samarbeid og internasjonal organisasjon. Universitetsforlaget.  ISBN 8215005160.  216 s.
• Malnes, Raino Sverre & Hovi, Jon (2001). Normer og makt. Innføring i internasjonal politikk. Abstrakt forlag.  ISBN 82-7935-017-9.  361 s. Vis sammendrag

  Boken inneholder artikler som behandler både teoretiske og empiriske problemstillinger i studiet av internasjonal politikk.

• Hovi, Jon (1998). Games, Threats and Treaties. Understanding Commitments in International Relations. Pinter.  ISBN 1-85567-488-2.  152 s.
• Hovi, Jon & Rasch, Bjørn Erik (1998). Samhällsvetenskapliga analysprinciper. Studentlitteratur, Lund.  ISBN 91-44-00420-6.  150 s.
• Hovi, Jon (1997). Metode og statistikk for samfunnsfag. Eksamensoppgaver med løsningsforslag. Fagbokforlaget.  ISBN 82-7674-316-1.  114 s.
• Hovi, Jon & Rasch, Bjørn Erik (1996). Samfunnsvitenskapelige analyseprinsipper. Fagbokforlaget.  ISBN 82-7674-185-1.  189 s.
• Hovi, Jon & Rasch, Bjørn Erik (1993). Strategisk handling. Universitetsforlaget.  ISBN 82-00-21891-0.  200 s.

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• Holtermann, Helge; Hovi, Jon & Huseby, Robert (2018). Syria: Tvilsom avskrekkingseffekt. Klassekampen.  ISSN 0805-3839.
• Holtermann, Helge & Hovi, Jon (2017). Det må strenge sanksjoner til mot Myanmars myndigheter: Fordømmelse er ikke nok. Klassekampen.  ISSN 0805-3839.
• Holtermann, Helge; Hansen, Vibeke Wøien; Hovi, Jon & Stankovic, Tatjana (2016). Bargaining, Enforcement, and Civil War.
• Hovi, Jon (2016). Blir Paris-avtalen effektiv?.
• Hovi, Jon (2016). Climate Clubs: A Gateway to Effective Climate Cooperation?.
• Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2016). Editorial to the Issue on Climate Governance and the Paris Agreement. Politics and Governance.  ISSN 2183-2463.  4(3), s 111- 114 . doi: 10.17645/pag.v4i3.721 Vis sammendrag

  This thematic issue of Politics and Governance serves as a Festschrift in honor of Professor Dr. Philos. Arild Underdal on his 70th birthday. In this editorial, the guest editors summarize a few of Professor Underdal’s many academic merits and achievements. They also provide a synopsis of each of the ten contributions to the Festschrift, which focuses on climate governance in general and the 2015 Paris Agreement in particular.

• Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2016). Når har internasjonale avtaler behov for håndheving?, I: Raino Sverre Malnes (red.),  Velkommen til statsvitenskap.  Gyldendal Akademisk.  ISBN 978-82-05-49471-8.  Kapittel 14.  s 242 - 258
• Sælen, Håkon & Hovi, Jon (2016). When can a small number of states drive effective global cooperation on climate change?.
• Skodvin, Tora & Hovi, Jon (2015). Kan de internasjonale klimaforhandlingene lykkes?. Internasjonal Politikk - Skandinavisk tidsskrift for internasjonale studier.  ISSN 0020-577X.  73(4), s 529- 537
• Hovi, Jon; Sælen, Håkon; Sprinz, Detlef F. & Underdal, Arild (2014). The Club Approach: A Gateway to Effective Climate Cooperation?.
• Sælen, Håkon Grøn; Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef Friedrich & Underdal, Arild (2014). Climate Mitigation Clubs: An agent-based model.
• Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon & Aakre, Stine (2013). Punishment under Anarchy.
• Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2013). Norge og veien til lavutslippssamfunnet. Dagens næringsliv.  ISSN 0803-9372.
• Mauritzen, Cecilie; Hovi, Jon; Torvanger, Asbjørn & Aaheim, Asbjørn (2013). Sats på regionale klimaavtaler. Aftenposten (morgenutg. : trykt utg.).  ISSN 0804-3116.  s 6- 6
• Hovi, Jon (2012). Håndheving, deltakelse og etterlevelse i den neste klimaavtalen.
• Hovi, Jon (2012). Internasjonale klimaavtaler: Hvor viktig er håndheving?.
• Hovi, Jon (2012). Kan klimaforhandlingene lykkes?.
• Hovi, Jon (2012). The Pros and Cons of Bottom Up Agreements.
• Hovi, Jon (2012). When Does Enforcement Matter? An Experimental Study.
• Voigt, Christina; Gullberg, Anne Therese; Hovi, Jon; Lahn, Bård & Ulfstein, Geir (2012). Can Law Save the Climate?.
• Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon & Monkerud, Lars Christian (2009). Can contingent prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence.
• Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon & Monkerud, Lars Christian (2009). Can contingent prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence.
• Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon & Monkerud, Lars Christian (2009). Can contingent prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence.
• Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon & Monkerud, Lars Christian (2009). Can exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence.
• Helland, Leif; Asheim, Geir; Hovi, Jon & Høyland, Bjørn (2008). Self-serving dictators. memoranda. 26/2008.
• Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon (2008). Non-Instrumental Behavior in an Environmental Public Good Game.
• Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon (2004). Non Instrumental Behavior in a Public Goods Game: Experimental Evidence.
• Hovi, Jon (2003). Gaute Torsvik: Menneskenatur og samfunnsstruktur. Økonomisk forum.  ISSN 1502-6108.  57(6), s 39- 41
• Hovi, Jon (2002). Bokmelding av C. Ragin, Fuzzy Set Social Science. Sosiologi i dag.  ISSN 0332-6330.  32(3)
• Hovi, Jon (2002). Internasjonalt samarbeid.
• Hovi, Jon & Areklett, Ivar (2002). Enforcing the climate regime: Game theory and the Marrakesh Accords. Working paper / CICERO, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research-Oslo. 6.
• Hovi, Jon (2001). Føre var-prinsippet som rasjonelt beslutningskriterium. Working paper / CICERO, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research-Oslo. 13.
• Hovi, Jon (2000). Etikk og klimapolitikk: Forebygging best - men ikke nok?. Cicerone.  ISSN 0804-0508.  (5), s 19- 21
• Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon (1999). Bayesisk oppdatering og bayesisk perfekt likevekt: En innføring.

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