DefDem When will citizens defend democracy?

• Goldstein, Daniel A. N. & Magiya, Yusuf (2026). How Much War Builds a State? Fiscal Bargaining in the Shadow of War. Open Science Framework (OSF). doi: 10.31235/osf.io/ex3gb_v1. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We present a formal model that examines how external conflict reshapes the bargaining process over fiscal control between a central state and a peripheral elite. Our findings reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between war-related pressures and state fiscal control. Low-to-moderate war pressure enhances state fiscal control by strengthening the state's bargaining power. However, excessive pressure undermines state control. This outcome is influenced by the degree to which the interests of the state and the elites align. We also identify instances when states fall into a `capacity trap,' where those with low initial fiscal control sacrifice future revenues to finance ongoing conflict. Using historical fiscal revenue data from Europe and case studies of Ancien Régime France and the Ottoman Empire, we test the predictions and find supporting evidence. These findings refine bellicist theory by highlighting the contingent benefits of conflict on state development when accounting for the complexities involved in state financing.

• Goldstein, Daniel A. N. & Schumock, Collin Thomas (2026). The Weight of Precedent: Parties, Trust, and Executive Norms. Open Science Framework (OSF). doi: 10.31235/osf.io/9dv4u_v4. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Political executives often adhere to traditions set by their predecessors that establish expected behavior, such as informal limits to their power. However, it remains a puzzle why executives follow norms, which lack legal backing, when they face incentives to violate them. To address this question, we analyze an infinite-horizon formal model incorporating within-party and across-party dynamics to examine when informal constraints on executives persist or collapse. Norm survival hinges on an executive's willingness to transgress a norm and their party condoning this act. The driving mechanism is coordination: violating a norm degrades cooperation between the executive and their party. We also show that the same conditions can support a high-trust equilibrium among parties in which norms survive and a low-trust equilibrium of preemptive violation. Trust-driven collapse is greatest under balanced party competition. The model classifies executive norms by fragility and traces the life cycle of the American presidential two-term tradition.

• Goldstein, Daniel A. N.; Bakke, Kaja Sparre; Dahlum, Sirianne & Wig, Tore (2026). Elites as Democratic Gatekeepers: Theory and Evidence from Norway. Open Science Framework (OSF). doi: 10.31235/osf.io/2rwgt_v2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Numerous studies have examined voters’ support for democracy and reactions to democratic violations by elites. Yet, we know less about the democratic preferences of political elites. This gap matters because elites may act as ``democratic gatekeepers'' by blocking autocratic colleagues from power. We develop a theory of elite gatekeeping and test it using pre-registered survey experiments on a sample of approximately 2,000 national, regional, and local representatives and party officials in Norway. Using multiple experimental designs, we measure internal gatekeeping -- the willingness to punish anti-democratic colleagues within one's own party -- and external gatekeeping -- the willingness to block a governing coalition with anti-democratic parties. Elites engage in both, but neither is absolute: the penalty for anti-democratic behavior is no larger than for ordinary misconduct, and roughly 70% would accept an anti-democratic coalition partner when it secures a governing majority. Democracy's gatekeepers may be less steadfast than they appear.

• Dahl, Marianne; Dahlum, Sirianne; Fjelde, Hanne; Gjerløw, Haakon; Knutsen, Carl Henrik & Strøm-Sedgwick, Carina [Vis alle 7 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2025). Mass Mobilization in the Modern Era: Introducing the Opposition Movements and Groups (OMG) Dataset, 1789–2019. Comparative Political Studies. ISSN 0010-4140. doi: 10.1177/00104140251369330. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The nature and consequences of mass mobilization are core topics in the social sciences. How have mass mobilization movements evolved over time? How do key characteristics of such movements, including their social composition or ideology, influence their ability to overthrow or alter political institutions? We introduce the Opposition Movements and Groups (OMG) dataset, which – due to its unique contents and extensive coverage – will help researchers to better address these and many other questions about mass mobilization movements. OMG includes information on the stated goals, duration, size, tactics, ideology, and social and organizational composition of 1452 mass mobilization movements, globally, from 1789 to 2019. We discuss OMG’s contents, construction, validity and reliability issues, and how it complements existing datasets. We showcase the data, first, by documenting several key trends in movement characteristics since the French Revolution, and, second, by shedding new light on the much-discussed relationship between nonviolent movements and democratization.

• Dahlum, Sirianne; Langsæther, Peter Egge & Wig, Tore (2025). New evidence on citizens’ reactions to democratic norm violations in an advanced democracy. Electoral Studies: an international journal on voting and electoral systems and strategy. ISSN 0261-3794. 97. doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2025.102971. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We investigate citizens’ commitments to democratic norms in a democratic “posterchild”, using the case of Norway. Previous research suggests that citizens often accept elite violations of democratic norms. We distinguish between more subtle infractions and explicit rejections of democracy, and we assess how citizens respond when democratic violations are framed as necessary to achieve pressing societal goals. We find that concrete democratic-norm violations, such as accepting violent rhetoric, meet only weakly punitive reactions among citizens. Policy disagreement or party identification are not important moderators. This may suggest significant opportunity space for elite-driven democratic backsliding even in highly advanced democracies. Yet, citizens heavily punish the most outright rejections of democracy, that question democracy itself, even when justified in order to reach desired political and social outcomes. These findings are consistent with the notion that citizens tolerate specific anti-democratic actions because these are not necessarily considered as violating democracy, while statements clearly violating democracy are punished more.

• Dahlum, Sirianne; Hanson, Torbjørn; Johnsen, Åshild Auglænd; Kotsadam, Andreas & Wuttke, Alexander (2025). Is support for authoritarian rule contagious? Evidence from field and survey experiments. American Journal of Political Science (AJPS). ISSN 0092-5853. doi: 10.1111/ajps.70067. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The increasing popularity of strongman rule in democratic societies underscores the need to explore how authoritarian regime preferences might spread socially. We assess the role of social influence on support for leaders with authoritarian inclinations through preregistered field and survey experiments in the Norwegian Armed Forces. The field experiment randomly assigned soldiers to different rooms during boot camp, so soldiers lived among peers with varying levels of openness to authoritarian rule. We found that many individuals adjusted their privately reported support for authoritarian rule to align more closely with their peers. Further survey-experimental evidence among soldiers and the general Norwegian population confirms that learning about others’ level of support for authoritarian rule changes both perceptions and own support. Our results suggest that support for authoritarian rule can have a social basis and could potentially spread through social contagion in established democracies.

• Claassen, Christopher; Ackermann, Kathrin; Bertsou, Eri; Borba, Lucas; Carlin, Ryan E. & Cavari, Amnon [Vis alle 22 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2024). Conceptualizing and Measuring Support for Democracy: A New Approach. Comparative Political Studies. ISSN 0010-4140. doi: 10.1177/00104140241259458. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Much of what we know about public support for democracy is based on survey questions about “democracy,” a term that varies in meaning across countries and likely prompts uncritically supportive responses. This paper proposes a new approach to measuring support for democracy. We develop a battery of 17 survey questions that cover all eight components of liberal democracy as defined by the V-Dem project. We then ask respondents from 19 national samples to evaluate these rights and institutions. We find considerable heterogeneity across countries in how our items cohere, especially in less developed contexts. Yet, those items that are more weakly connected with general support for liberal democracy tend to reveal the influence of political events and actors, arguably indicating weaknesses in political cultures. We further identify a concise subset of seven items that provide a reliable and valid measure of support for liberal democracy across our different samples.

• Dahlum, Sirianne (2023). Joining forces: Social coalitions and democratic revolutions. Journal of Peace Research. ISSN 0022-3433. 60(1), s. 42–57. doi: 10.1177/00223433221138614. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  When are mass protest movements able to overthrow authoritarian regimes and promote democratic transitions? This article considers whether socially diverse protest movements are more conducive to democratization than movements restricted to one or a few social groups. Coalitions across social groups should impose higher costs on authoritarian regimes through access to a wide range of resources, strategies and sources of leverage. Heterogenous protest coalitions are also more likely to socially overlap with regime supporters and the security forces, which should encourage regime splits and defections. But, diverse protest movements may also be more vulnerable to fragmentation and in-fighting, which may particularly threaten prospects of democracy in the aftermath of an authoritarian regime breakdown. Analyzing new global data mapping the social group composition of anti-regime protest campaigns from 1900 to 2013, the article finds consistent evidence that socially diverse protest movements are more likely to overthrow authoritarian regimes, and this is not driven by protest size. Socially diverse movements are also more likely to end in the short- and long-run establishment of more democratic institutions, suggesting that heterogenous protest movements’ potential for bringing about democracy is more promising than expected. These findings speak to the importance of securing broad and not only large mass movements to promote democracy.

• Dahlum, Sirianne; Pinckney, Jonathan & Wig, Tore (2022). Moral Logics of Support for Nonviolent Resistance: Evidence From a Cross-National Survey Experiment. Comparative Political Studies. ISSN 0010-4140. 56(3), s. 326–362. doi: 10.1177/00104140221100198. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mechkova, Valeriya; Dahlum, Sirianne & Petrarca, Constanza Sanhueza (2022). Women's political representation, good governance and human development. Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions. ISSN 0952-1895. doi: 10.1111/gove.12742. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  As women's political inclusion has become the international norm, many countries have implemented gender quotas or actively tried to increase women's political representation. Women's inclusion is also expected to bring positive development outcomes, as women, both as voters and politicians, may prioritize policies conducive to development. Yet, previous research has shown that descriptive representation does not automatically improve governance, and that various contextual factors influence (female) politicians' ability to shape policy outcomes. In this article, we examine how political corruption affects the dynamics of women's representation. We argue that while the presence of women in politics has the potential to increase development, it can also be used as “window-dressing” to legitimize rule where in reality male patrons continue to dominate policy decisions. Thus, women representatives recruited from the same corrupt networks as these male patrons may be used to perpetuate the status-quo or even decrease development outcomes. Building on previous research, we argue that patriarchal gender norms and relatively weaker standing of women in corrupt environments can explain why women in these societies may support policy decisions that go against their preferences and interests as a group. We conduct a quantitative analysis drawing on time-series cross-sectional data on 182 countries from 1900 to 2014 to shed light on the linkage between women empowerment, corruption, and development. We find that women's representation only promotes human development if corruption is at low levels, while under high level of corruption women's inclusion is associated with worsened development outcomes. This finding suggests that women political empowerment might not always be a silver bullet to increasing substantive representation, and especially not under very poor levels of governance and prevalent corruption.

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• Gerring, John; Wig, Tore; Apfeld, Brendan & Tollefsen, Andreas Forø (2022). Deep Roots of Modern Democracy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781009115223. 480 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

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• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick; Bakke, Kaja Sparre; Dahlum, Sirianne & Wig, Tore (2026). Elites as Democratic Gatekeepers: Theory and Evidence from Norway. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2026). Political Bright Lines: Norms, Information, and Accountability. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2026). Political Bright Lines: Norms, Information, and Accountability. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick; Dahlum, Sirianne & Wuttke, Alexander (2025). The Social Dynamics of Democratic Preferences. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2025). The Emergence of Political Bright Lines. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick; Schumock, Collin & Wiedemann, Johannes (2025). The ‘Daily Mail Test’: How Public Trust Constrains Bureaucratic Discretion in Public Procurement. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick; Wig, Tore; Dahlum, Sirianne & Bakke, Kaja Sparre (2025). Elites as Democratic Gatekeepers: Theory and Evidence from Norway. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Studies of democratic backsliding suggest that political elites can, but often fail to, serve as ``democratic gatekeepers'' by punishing autocratic colleagues to protect democracy. While there is a substantial body of literature examining voters' preferences for democracy and their reactions to democratic violations by elites, we know less about elites' preferences for democratic gatekeeping in contemporary democracies. We develop a theory of democratic gatekeeping among political elites in democracies, examining the practice within and between parties. We then tested the implications of this theory in a pre-registered survey targeting approximately 11,000 national and local elected representatives and party officials in Norway, which is widely considered a stable, consolidated democracy. Using various experimental approaches, we reveal the preferences of Norwegian political elites regarding gatekeeping when exposed to anti-democratic party colleagues and anti-democratic political parties as potential coalition partners.

• Dahlum, Sirianne (2025). Democracy under pressure: How and why are democracies undermined”, invited talk at the Reuter’s Institute of Journalism, Oxford University. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dahlum, Sirianne (2025). Social norms and democracy: Evidence from Lab Experiments”, invited talk at Department of Politics and International Relations (DPIR) Politics Colloqium, Oxford University. doi: https:/www.politics.ox.ac.uk/event/social-dynamics-democracy-insights-laboratory-experiments. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dahlum, Sirianne (2025). The Social Transmission of Authoritarianism: Evidence from Field and Survey Experiments, invited talk at the Nuffield College Political Science Seminar, Oxford University. doi: https:/www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/news-events/events-and-seminars/political-science-seminar-ht25-week-7/. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dahlum, Sirianne (2025). KI og valg - Universitetet i Oslo. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Valgdagen er over – men spørsmålene om KIs påvirkning lever videre. Dagen etter stortingsvalget inviterer vi til fersk kaffe og debrief: Hvilken rolle spilte kunstig intelligens – hvis noen?

• Dahlum, Sirianne (2025). UiOs prisar 2025: – Norsk ungdom har for liten kunnskap om kva demokrati er - Uniforum. [Journal]. Uniforum. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Professor i statsvitskap Sirianne Dahlum gir skulen ansvaret for dårleg opplæring om demokrati. No er ho tildelt UiOs pris for yngre forskarar for 2025.

• Dahlum, Sirianne (2025). Demokratiet i fare: Hvorfor roper ingen varsko? - Universitetet i Oslo. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Les denne saken på UiOs nettsider.

• Dahlum, Sirianne (2025). (+) – Valget i Polen bidrar med momentum til en bevegelse med klare anti-demokratiske tendenser. [Journal]. Minerva. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Sirianne Dahlum fikk nylig pris for sin demokratiforskning. Hun er ingen optimist på Europas vegne.

• Dahlum, Sirianne; Langsæther, Peter Egge & Wig, Tore (2024). Meninger: Norske statsvitere: – Også i Norge er den autoritære trusselen reell. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Forskningen viser at autoritære politikere kan vinne frem i demokratiske valg selv om de truer demokratiet. Også i Norge er denne trusselen reell.

• Dahlum, Sirianne (2024). Statusrapport om det norske demokratiet. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2024). Reversals of Capacity. Journal of Politics Blog. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Wig, Tore; Dahlum, Sirianne; Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick & Bakke, Kaja Sparre (2024). Elite commitments to democracy: Experimental evidence from Norway. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Wig, Tore (2024). Krigens konsekvenser: Militærteknologi former også styresett og politisk utvikling. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2024). Despite concerns about democratic backsliding, Americans are happy to punish those who break democratic norms. London School of Economics US American Politics and Policy Blog. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2024). Bargaining over State Building in the Shadow of War. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dahlum, Sirianne (2024). Intervju om unges forpliktelse til demokrati i Norge på Nyhetsmorgen. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2024). The Weight of Precedent: Parties, Institutions, and Executive Norms. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Wig, Tore (2024). Demokratiets historie. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2024). Bargaining over State Building in the Shadow of War. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick; Wig, Tore; Dahlum, Sirianne & Bakke, Kaja Sparre (2024). Elite Commitments to Democracy: Evidence from Norway. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick; Wig, Tore; Dahlum, Sirianne & Bakke, Kaja Sparre (2024). Elite Commitments to Democracy: Evidence from Norway. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2024). The Social Foundations of Democratic Norms. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dahlum, Sirianne (2023). Interviewed at Dagsnytt 18 on Norwegian citizens support for democracy, NRK P2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dahlum, Sirianne; Neundorf, Anja; Aykut, Ozturk & Frederiksen, Kristian Skaaning (2023). Security over democracy? A cross-country study of citizens' trade-offs between societal characteristics. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2023). Endogenous State Capacity. Broadstreet blog. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dahlum, Sirianne (2023). Interviewed in a 3-episode series on global democratic backsliding, NRK P2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Wuttke, Alexander; Dahlum, Sirianne; Kotsadam, Andreas & Johnsen, Åshild Auglænd (2023). Peer effects on authoritarianism: Evidence from Norway. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dahlum, Sirianne (2023). Hvordan er demokratiet i krise? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dahlum, Sirianne; Neundorf, Anja; Frederiksen, Kristian Skaaning & Aykut, Ozturk (2023). Security over democracy? A cross-country study of citizens' trade-offs between societal characteristics. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dahlum, Sirianne (2023). Hvordan er demokratiet i fare? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dahl, Marianne; Dahlum, Sirianne; Wig, Tore; Gjerløw, Haakon; Knutsen, Carl Henrik & Metternich, Nils W. (2023). The role of collective social groups in democratization: Evidence from two centuries of mass protest. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2023). Bargaining over State Building in the Shadow of War. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dahlum, Sirianne (2022). Hvordan og hvorfor forvitrer demokratiet? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dahl, Marianne; Fjelde, Hanne; Rudolfsen, Ida & Dahlum, Sirianne (2022). Sivilsamfunnet jobber i motbakke for å forsvare demokratiet. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dahlum, Sirianne; Dahl, Marianne; Fjelde, Hanne & Rudolfsen, Ida (2022). The Dark Side of Mobilisation: Global Evidence on Authoritarian Protests. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dahlum, Sirianne (2022). How deeply rooted is mass support for democracy? Evidence from Norway. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dahlum, Sirianne (2021). Et blaff av demokrati? Issa, Wahab og Dahlum. Panelsamtale på Litteraturhuset. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dahlum, Sirianne (2021). The Case for Democracy: Do democracies provide better education? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goldstein, Daniel A. N. & Schumock, Collin (2025). The Weight of Precedent: Parties, Institutions, and Executive Norms. Open Science Foundation. doi: 10.31235/osf.io/9dv4u_v2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Political executives often adhere to informal traditions established by their predecessors. Yet, without legal backing, elites have incentives to violate norms for political gain. Under what conditions do constraining executive norms persist and when are they abandoned? We address this question by using an infinite horizon formal model to analyze the maintenance of executive norms. We identify intra-party accountability and variation in patience among actors within the same party as significant for norm maintenance. We also detail how expectations about the expected behavior of out-of-power parties shape the willingness to violate norms while in office. The insights from the model enable us to classify a number of executive norms according to their fragility and to examine the trajectory of one norm in-depth: the two-term tradition of the American presidency. Our findings shed light on how informal institutions regulate executive behavior and advance our understanding of institutional stability and erosion.

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