About the project
This project aims to contribute internationally to the knowledge and understanding of the current climate regime, the climate negotiations, international environmental agreements more generally, and those aspects having to do with compliance, enforcement, participation, and regime design in particular. We analyse in detail how the conditions for a robust climate agreement (an agreement with broad participation, deep commitments and high compliance rates) can be satisfied
Objectives
The primary objective of the project is to consider how the conditions for a robust future climate agreement can be satisfied. In addition, the project has seven secondary objectives:
- To analyze how trade sanctions might increase the robustness of a future climate treaty
- To study whether deep unilateral emission cuts in developed countries might lead to later deep emission cuts in developing countries through technological advances
- To study how a cap-and-trade agreement might be designed so as to induce developing countries to accept emission caps
- To analyse whether an agreement with broad participation can be implemented as a renegotiation-proof equilibrium in models which assume that emissions are a stock pollutant.
- To analyse the implications of different uses of the term self-enforcing agreement.
- To consider how an enforcement system’s design affects its political feasibility.
- To use the findings to make suggestions about the design of a Post-Kyoto robust climate agreement
Background
The project runs from 2008 to 2013 and includes researchers from CICERO, Statistics Norway and Department of political science, University of Oslo. The project is interdisciplinary and includes participants from economics and political science, using game theory as an integrating analytical tool.
