A special position
The terrorist attacks of 22 July 2011 placed Norway in a special position. No other Western country has lost more people to terrorism relative to its population size – not even the United States after 11 September 2001. Nevertheless, despite extensive measures, the Norwegian authorities have not managed to prevent new attacks. As recently as last year, a new right-wing extremist terrorist attack with fatal consequences was carried out at Kampen in Oslo – an attack in which violence was intended to create fear in order to promote a political message.
What can we learn from recent events? What characterizes the landscape of right-wing extremist violence in Norway after 22 July? And what does the threat from non-violent right-wing extremist currents, which are growing in other Western countries, look like in Norway?
These questions are central in a new book written in collaboration with several researchers at C-REX: “Right-wing Extremism in Norway after 22 July”. The book summarizes ten years of research at C-REX and is based on extensive empirical data on both violent and non-violent right-wing extremist actors and attitudes in Norway after 22 July.
Here, we highlight some key findings.
A persistent threat of violence
When we study what characterizes serious right-wing extremist violence in Norway after 22 July, two different types of threats emerge.
On the one hand, most attacks are committed by individuals without ties to right-wing extremist organizations. This violence stems from various combinations of everyday racism, group dynamics, intoxication and social strain. The most widespread violence is therefore more familiar and less spectacular, even though it is naturally experienced as deeply frightening and traumatic by those affected – primarily ethnic minorities. This is violence that often flies under the radar for most people, even though there have been at least 20 such serious attacks in Norway since 2010. The violence generates significant fear in parts of the population and thus constitutes a democratic problem.
On the other hand, there is a minority of terrorist attacks. Here, the terrorist attack of 22 July represents a turning point, as it was the first in a series of attacks inside and outside Norway carried out alone by men radicalized online, with the aim of mass killing. Mental health disorders are often present, but do not appear to be an alternative explanation to ideology. Rather, it is the interaction between ideological conviction, psychiatric problems and social isolation that makes these actors particularly dangerous. With 22 July, the attack on the al-Noor mosque in Bærum in 2019, and most recently the terrorist attack at Kampen, where the perpetrator also intended to travel to a mosque to commit further killings, Norway has experienced three such attacks. This places us in the upper tier of the statistics covering occurrences of this type of attack in Western Europe – a list that is topped by Sweden.
One should be cautious about drawing sweeping conclusions based on a few attacks. Nevertheless, there is reason to reflect on certain factors that may facilitate such incidents both in Norway and Sweden. The fact that Norway is often described as one of the best countries in the world to live in, with great opportunities that in theory should be available to everyone, may make the sense of failure even greater for those who do not succeed. Generous welfare schemes, combined with relatively limited surveillance, also mean that young men who end up on the margins can isolate themselves and withdraw from society to spend disproportionate amounts of time on the internet. Such conditions are by no means sufficient to explain this type of terrorism, but they can function as enabling factors in a broad and complex radicalization process.
The threat from these men radicalized online is also characterized by being difficult to grasp, not least because so many others resemble them. Online, there are many who promote the same ideas without posing a real threat of violence. This creates a demanding preventive task for the authorities, where human rights must be balanced against security concerns. In this context, we must remind ourselves not to let the fear of terrorism take over when, in reality, it is the non-violent right-wing extremist currents that constitute the greatest threat to democracy in the world today.
What does this threat look like in Norway?
Beyond the violence statistics
Right-wing extremism is a far greater societal challenge than the figures on violence would suggest. Everyday racism and ethno-nationalist ideas shape relationships in schools, workplaces and local communities, and materialize in discrimination, social exclusion and insecurity for people with minority backgrounds – especially for Muslims, Jews, and people with non-Western backgrounds. Illiberal discourses related to, among other things, immigration, gender, international cooperation and science undermine trust in democratic institutions, the media, research and the rule of law, and open for a system-critical perspective in which political opponents are described as enemies or even traitors.
An attitude survey we conducted in 2022 showed that about six per cent of the Norwegian population have right-wing extremist sympathies, in the sense that they somewhat or strongly agree with several of the following statements: “Only people with white skin color should live in Norway”. “It is acceptable to use violence to defend Norwegian culture”. “Norway is about to become a lawless society.”
Such attitudes are most widespread among voters for the Progress Party, a right-wing populist party, where roughly one in five agree with (some of) these statements. At the same time, the same survey shows that there is a significantly larger surrounding group of voters in many parties with strong nationalist or populist attitudes – attitudes that can be the starting point of a radicalization process.
Offline and online mobilization
On the ‘street’, dissatisfaction with the Progress Party in government and international developments have contributed to more protests and more radical means of action from right-wing extremist actors. The increase, which occurred primarily in the wake of the so-called refugee crisis in 2015, began with PEGIDA’s relatively large march in central Oslo with around 200 participants, followed by the Nordic Resistance Movement’s demonstrations in towns such as Fredrikstad and Kristiansand. After this, Sian (Stop the Islamization of Norway) began burning the Qur’an, often in immigrant-dense districts of Oslo such as Mortensrud, Stovner and Grønland, which ultimately gave the group prime-time exposure on the popular TV program “Debatten” (The Debate), aired by the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation.
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the scope of right-wing extremist protests in Norway is limited compared with other countries, and that most of the groups are also short-lived, marked by internal splits and little cooperation.
Online, however, technological changes have contributed to the emergence of a digital ecosystem with “alternative media” and right-wing extremist websites that mimic news journalism, the use of major social media platforms (Facebook, X, TikTok, YouTube) as “digital amplifiers”. There has also been an increase in activity on more closed platforms such as Telegram, chan forums and Discord, where the content can be more openly fascist, neo-Nazi and accelerationist.
For the Norwegian extreme right, the most important functions of online mobilization are the spread of propaganda, the normalization of extremist ideas and community building, rather than direct mass mobilization for street activism. It is difficult to know exactly how many Norwegians are active in such digital networks, but the large groups on more established social media platforms have thousands of members, and leaked lists show that several Norwegians are also present on the more closed platforms.
So where do we go from here?
Preventing extremism
The findings in “Right-wing Extremism in Norway after 22 July» challenge several common assumptions and therefore have consequences for how we think about prevention, both in Norway and in similar contexts. When it comes to right-wing extremist violence, it is unrealistic to believe that we can identify individuals in a violent radicalization process with accuracy and before they act – based on clear “risk profiles”. The same risk factors – trauma, substance abuse, poor mental health and economic marginalization – are found among myriad people who never become violent extremists. People with right-wing extremist attitudes are also not a homogeneous group.
Our findings therefore point towards a more nuanced and broader preventive perspective:
• Continuous efforts to combat everyday racism from both political elites and ordinary citizens, because much of the violence stems from racist attitudes rather than sophisticated ideology.
• Better follow-up of poor mental health and social isolation, because these factors are often present in the most serious acts of terror committed by online-radicalized lone actors. This includes clearer mandates and structures for local cooperation. When no one knows who holds the primary responsibility, cases fall between the cracks.
• More effective measures against exclusion and social strain, because many of the perpetrators behind serious violence and those with right-wing extremist attitudes experience difficult life situations, including hardships such as financial pressure or a perceived loss of status.
• Strong prevention of substance abuse and responsible drug and alcohol policies, because excessive use of alcohol and narcotics is strongly present in a large share of the cases.
• A better understanding of where the “battle” is being fought. It is to a small extent about large, uniformed groups in the streets. Giving small groups such as Sian or the Nordic Resistance Movement a lot of attention may even be counterproductive – especially if the goal is to limit the visibility of right-wing extremist groups in the public space. Rather, the battle is being fought in nightlife venues and on weekends, where intoxication and racism meet; in online forums and gaming rooms, where frustrated young men can be radicalized; and in schools, social services and mental health services, where signs of isolation and radicalization can be detected – or overlooked.
Reducing the risk of future attacks requires not only more knowledge, but a collective and political will to see those who are falling behind the pack – before they fall so far that violence becomes their language. Norway has already paid a high price to learn this. The question is whether we can use this lesson to prevent history from repeating itself, yet again.
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This blog post is based on an op’ed by the authors, originally published in Aftenposten.
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