When Jürgen Habermas died March 14, 2026, the German Bundespresident Frank-Walter Steinmeier, wrote:
‘With Jürgen Habermas we lose a great champion of Enlightenment who has traversed the contradictions of modernity. He taught us the ethos of democratic discourse and justified the emancipation of human beings as a goal that cannot be relinquished.’
Several heads of state, prime ministers and presidents are now acknowledging his importance and offering their condolences. However, Habermas is not a “state philosopher” in the manner of Hegel. For him, everything revolves around democracy rooted in civil society, in civic relationships and the public sphere, in protest and opposition. The breadth and depth of his academic work are astonishing.
The body of work he has left behind is unparalleled in its level of abstraction, differentiation and specificity. Its political-theoretical scope is without equal, as is the systematic quality and rigor with which social, political and moral questions are analyzed. When the turned 90 the publisher Suhrkamp announced that a new major work has been completed: 1,700 pages on the Western constellation of faith and knowledge; on the sources of rational freedom and post-metaphysical thinking. Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie: Vernunftige Freiheit. Spuren des Diskurses uber Glauben und Wissen, Vol. 2. Berlin: Suhrkamp (Three volumes by Polity Press).
Bold theses
Originality and controversy has been the case with all of Habermas’ major works: from the 1962 thesis on the structural transformation of the public sphere, which still gives rise to feuds, via the studies on knowledge-constitutive interests, which he himself later abandoned, via the theory of communicative action from 1981, which still stands, to the works of law and democracy the 1990s. All of these moved the research frontier and stimulated new research. The contributions are too many to be named here. All of them contain bold theses. Some of them Habermas has later retracted, others he has defended and further developed. Habermas has been a pioneer both in the social sciences and in political and legal theory. His works provide insight and perspective.
In these days when research is absolutely required to have impact, Habermas is a striking example that nothing is as practical as a good theory. When Jon Elster edited a book on deliberative democracy at the end of the 1990s, he began by saying that it is thanks to Habermas that we now have this understanding of democracy.
The theoretical edifice is complex, but at the same time Habermas has held on to a simple basic intuition about communication free from coercion. Already in his doctoral dissertation on Friedrich Schelling from the mid-1950s, Habermas formulated the idea that historical injustice can only be judged through a practice that is itself free of domination.
Facts and norms
The concept of communicative rationality gravitates on the peculiar, compelling yet non-coercive force of the better argument. Our entire civilization, our democratic constitutional state, rests on the assumption that argument alone should be able to resolve disputes. This is hard to swallow for realists and populists. Habermas had however no illusions about rational political argumentation under present conditions; the imperatives of power are all too evident for that. Rather, the point is that there cannot be a functioning judiciary, a sensible school system, a critical press, a public political conversation, unless we have confidence in the power of argument.
Language is a container of rationality. Speaking and acting people ask why stuff happens to them and require reasons for what is claimed. They want an answer, an answer that may be accepted or rejected. We can say yes or no to a claim as well as to an explanation. Anyone who makes a claim must be prepared to justify it. To resolve disagreements and disputes by means of arguments, interlocutors must be able to refer to criteria of truth or to presumptively valid norms. From this insight Habermas developed an entire social theory, a moral philosophy, a philosophy of right, and a political theory. It is the possibility of reaching agreement that explains how modern societies hang together and how new patterns of interaction are formed.
In 1992 the magnum opus Between Facts and Norms appeared, which is at the same time a philosophy of law and a democratic theory. Law is both the basis and the limit of power. It is only through law that solidarity with strangers can be established. In this work, the opposition between liberalism and republicanism, between rights and popular sovereignty, was addressed, and here basis for constitutional patriotism was established. In this work there is a reckoning with the idea of a mythical people as the basis of democracy. The tension between universalism and particularism was formulated in new ways.
Habermas has helped to clarify the basis for criticism and opposition and has sharply rejected all attempts at revolutionary romanticism as well as all attempts to undermine democratic procedures through populist appeals to “the people.” Who the people are can only be known when everyone has had their say, when the democratic procedures have been followed.
The commitment to criteria for truth and justice is inescapable for science and politics. Just as he accused activists of left-wing fascism during the student uprisings of the late 1960s because they did not renounce violence, in the 1990s he accused postmodernists of relativism and irrationality.
The place of religion in society
In the 1990s he was involved in illuminating debates with, among others, Richard Rorty, John Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin. Central to these debates was his discourse theory of law and politics. One might have thought that this would be the end, that he, like Hegel, would conclude with a philosophy of right. But then Habermas threw himself into the philosophy of religion, having first taken issue with biogenetics’ manipulation of human nature. Here Habermas had to go beyond discourse ethics to establish standards of criticism. The concept of human nature—the unity of the person with the body—was used to show that cloning devalues the person’s moral self-evaluation. In 2005 a book on naturalism and religion was published, and his conversations with Cardinal (Pope) Joseph Ratzinger were released.
The place of religion in the public sphere was also the theme of Habermas’ lecture in connection with the reception of the Norwegian Holberg Prize in 2005, and it is the theme to which he has now contributed a 1,700-page clarification. If religion is a cry for what is lacking, how then does it relate to the idea of freedom based on reason? How can faith and knowledge be reconciled? Can a religious society be democratic? Hardly according to post-metaphysical thinking. We must manage ourselves. We cannot place our trust in the cunning of reason or in higher powers, in the hope that a redeeming justice will save us in the end. It is through the public use of reason that human beings can attain a critical distance from their particular belongings and loyalties, put themselves in the place of others, and think autonomously and consistently.
A cosmopolitan world order
In the meantime, from the financial crisis in 2008, which threw the EU into a prolonged crisis, and right up until recently, he has dealt with the European integration process in several publications. These concern not only incisive criticism of the EU’s crisis management and of attempts to roll back the integration project. He has also provided a new contribution to how we should understand the EU’s constitutional basis. The EU is founded on a divided sovereignty between two constituting subjects: the citizens and the states. Again, this sparked controversy.
This work on the EU follows in the tracks of his work on a cosmopolitan world order. What can such an order mean today? Not a world state, but a constitutional regime for the protection of human rights and the prevention of war. Such a regime must be supplemented with an elected world parliament. Those who want to reform the UN should learn from the EU.
With his intellectual capacity and moral courage, Habermas has left a clear mark on the new, liberal Germany. Since the so called historians’ dispute in the 1980s, he has hammered home what is required of the Germans: “we, the sons, daughters, and grandchildren of barbaric nationalism.” His criticism is often biting, as when he called out the country’s evasiveness in handling Europe’s financial crisis.
There have, however, been some political victories. He had to rub his eyes in disbelief when Angela Merkel opened the borders to refugees in 2015. But then came the backlash, the myth of “the people” re-emerged as a mobilizing force against foreigners. Once again Hitler’s crown jurist, Carl Schmitt, is in vogue; once again intellectual mobilization is needed. Such mobilization would benefit a lot from Habermas work, in fact from his works the fifties (on Heidegger) up until 2026.
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