NLGR Det kommunale og regionale sjølvstyrets grenser under omforming

• Askim, Jostein & Houlberg, Kurt (2026). Regulating against freeriding: effects of state regulations on pre-merger overspending by municipalities. Journal of Public Policy. ISSN 0143-814X. s. 1–22. doi: 10.1017/s0143814x26101160. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Abstract Local government amalgamations lead to pre-merger overspending. To prevent this, higher levels of government can temporarily restrict local fiscal autonomy. However, scholars have been unable to demonstrate the effect of reform-specific regulations due to the difficulty in comparing regulated and non-regulated scenarios. Reformers consequently cannot assess the costs and benefits of regulations, resulting in cases of unrestricted overspending incentives. The article studies the effect of regulating opportunistic fiscal behavior in the context of mergers of local governments. It compares local government reforms in Norway (non-regulation) and Denmark (multiple regulations), using a Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference design to estimate the cost of non-regulation. The results show that the costs are significant. In the final year before merging, Norwegian municipalities overspent substantially in relation to both current expenditure and capital investment compared to their regulated Danish counterparts. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed, including the case for not implementing regulations of opportunistic fiscal behavior.

• Myksvoll, Thomas M. (2023). Conditional support from below? Understanding the dynamics of municipal amalgamation preferences among local politicians. Regional & Federal Studies. ISSN 1359-7566. doi: 10.1080/13597566.2023.2191318. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Municipal amalgamations are commonly undertaken with promises of scale effects. But territorial reforms also invoke issues of local identity and democracy, which may be negatively impacted by upscaled local government. This article explores how these frames play out as drivers of amalgamation preferences among local representatives. Utilizing survey data of Norwegian local politicians during the 2014–2020 Local Government Reform, this article shows that local politicians are more likely to support amalgamation when prioritizing and supporting functional scale considerations. Conversely, they are less likely to support amalgamation when invoking issues of local belonging, democracy, and citizens’ influence. But these attitudes are not static. Sources of support and aversion towards amalgamation are at times conditional; the characteristics of the municipality, the individual's status in the local political environment, and the views of the population may both enhance and weaken the degree to which functional or communitarian frames are rallied to support or oppose amalgamation.

• Askim, Jostein Rosfjord; Houlberg, Kurt & Klausen, Jan Erling (2023). Local government amalgamations and pre-merger overspending: Central naivety meets local opportunism. Journal of Urban Affairs. ISSN 0735-2166. 47(2), s. 451–467. doi: 10.1080/07352166.2023.2187302. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Amalgamation of local governments is an incentive for pre-merger overspending as the costs are transferred to the merged unit of the future. The article updates application of the common pool theory to such opportunistic pre-merger behavior. It studies Norway’s reform of the 2010s and paints a uniquely nuanced picture of pre-merger overspending, comparing fiscal policies before and after enactment of the reform among merging and non-merging municipalities. It provides corroboration that local governments that are about to merge overspend prior to the merger. New insights are gained into local governments’ differential incentives to allocate overspending to capital or current expenditure, and their opportunities to act on these incentives in the final and penultimate years before mergers are implemented. New insights are also gained into the differential incentive structures of junior and senior partners to a merger. Juniors overspend the most on current expenditure, while junior and senior partners overspend equally on capital expenditure. These insights not only have theoretical value but also practical applications.

• Askim, Jostein Rosfjord & Houlberg, Kurt (2022). The Moderating Effects of Social Norms on Pre-merger Overspending: Results from a Survey Experiment. Urban Affairs Review. ISSN 1078-0874. 59(5), s. 1295–1320. doi: 10.1177/10780874221090873. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Askim, Jostein; Houlberg, Kurt & Klausen, Jan Erling (2021). Fiscal easing in Local Governments Facing Potential Merger: Visible in Budgets or Hidden in Overruns? Public Administration. ISSN 0033-3298. doi: 10.1111/padm.12781. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Mergers incentivize local governments to ease their fiscal policies before the merger is implemented. This incentive is powerful: it is known that local governments start easing fiscal policies even before they know for sure that a merger will occur and even if merging is what they want. Based on a study of Norwegian municipalities, this article shows that irrespective of whether local governments face certain or potential mergers, their fiscal easing is manifested primarily in budget overruns rather than candidly documented in budgets. Among local governments facing a potential merger, unwilling governments ease their fiscal policies more than willing ones do and to a larger extent apply a concealment strategy.

• Vabo, Signy Irene; Fimreite, Anne Lise & Houlberg, Kurt (2021). Why such a different choice of tools? Analysing recent local government reforms in Denmark and Norway. Local Government Studies. ISSN 0300-3930. doi: 10.1080/03003930.2021.2013210. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Local government amalgamation reforms are politically demanding ventures because potential benefits are often diffuse and long term, while costs are concentrated and immediate. We investigate the role of national political actors in forming alliances and choosing policy tools in such demanding reform contexts. Empirically, we compare the Danish amalgamation reform, characterised by the use of authoritative government tools and a nationally directed amalgamation process, and the Norwegian reform, which primarily used softer tools that involved substantial autonomy at the local level. Our analysis is built on a rich set of qualitative data. We show that differences in the pro-reform alliances established by the two national governments help explain the different choices of government tools for carrying out the local government reforms. A strong pro-reform alliance, as was the case in Denmark, lent legitimacy to the use of authoritative tools.

• Klausen, Jan Erling; Askim, Jostein & Christensen, Tom (2021). Local Government Reform: Compromise Through Cross-Cutting Cleavages. Political Studies Review. ISSN 1478-9299. doi: 10.1177/1478929919887649. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Public sector reforms often take place in heterogeneous reform environments. Key political, administrative, and societal actors often advocate different definitions of problems and solutions. A major leadership challenge is to choose a reform strategy that ensures the requisite level of support, even when the initial conflict structure is highly complex. Using cleavage theory, we develop assumptions about how the reform leader’s assessment of the initial conflict affects the leader’s choice between three distinct reform strategies. These assumptions are applied to a case study of a complex and contested public sector reform, Norway’s national local government reform. We show how the government’s choice of a reform strategy can be understood in light of cleavage theory, and discuss the implications of these findings for further theory development.

• Bukve, Oddbjørn (2021). Avgjerdsfelle eller tvitydig reform? Kvifor haltar kommunereforma? Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift. ISSN 0801-1745. 37(2), s. 96–115. doi: 10.18261/issn.1504-2936-2021-02-02. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Den nylege norske kommunereforma resulterte i stor lokal og regional variasjon i samanslåingstakta, både mellom fylke og mellom regiontypar. Formålet med artikkelen er å forklare dei geografisk varierande resultata ved å sjå kommunereforma i lys av to ulike teoretiske rammeverk, teorien om avgjerdsfeller og strøymingsmodellen. Teorien om avgjerdsfeller seier at der politikkutforminga er prega av forhandlingar mellom nivå, vil utfallet gjerne bli det minste felles multiplum for aktørane, som ofte er status quo. Denne forventninga blir i all hovudsak innfridd. Der resultatet blir eit anna, er det fordi dei involverte kommunane sjølve har vore samde om ei endring. Fokus kunne då bli på problemløysing meir enn forhandlingar. Det som teorien om avgjerdsfeller ikkje forklarer tilfredsstillande, er variasjonen i utfall i tid og rom. Her har vi meir nytte av strøymingsmodellen, som peikar på at komplekse tiltak og uklare avgjerdsreglar skaper tvitydnad og rom for å legitimere ulike standpunkt og handlingsalternativ. Tvitydnad gjev grunnlag for varierande løysingsframlegg både blant fylkesmennene og på kommunenivået. Dessutan peikar denne modellen på at variasjon i den politiske straumen mellom ulike avgjerdspunkt i rom og tid gjev ulike utfall av den politiske prosessen, noko vi kunne finne att i ulike fasar av kommunereforma.

• Myksvoll, Thomas; Tatham, Michaël & Fimreite, Anne Lise (2021). Understanding bureaucratic support for coerced institutional change. Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions. ISSN 0952-1895. 35(4). doi: 10.1111/gove.12647. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Institutional reform processes can be contested. The more so by those working in the affected institutions. Bureaucracies, in particular, can be resistant to change. To better understand such processes, we study the regional reform in Norway. This reform is interesting as it mixes “voluntary” and “forced” dynamics. Indeed, Norwegian regions (fylkeskommuner) can remain unchanged, merge voluntarily, or be forced to merge by central government. This provides an opportunity to better understand support for coerced change. Through a survey of regional bureaucrats, we test different explanations of support for forced mergers. We find that two logics are at play. A “logic of discipline” which appeals to right-wing bureaucrats, advocates larger units, and streamlined bureaucracies, even if this is against the wishes of the main actors involved. And an “identity logic” which recognizes that feelings of attachment are powerful shapers of preferences beyond what efficiency and functionality dictate.

• Stokstad, Sigrid (2020). Kommune- og regionreformen til domstolene? Uten sammenligning. Festskrift til Eivind Smith 70 år. Fagbokforlaget. ISSN 9788245033007. s. 541–562. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Myksvoll, Thomas M. (2020). Reserved but Principled – and Sometimes Functional: Explaining Decentralisation Preferences Among Regional Bureaucrats. Scandinavian Journal of Public Administration (SPJA). ISSN 2001-7405. 24(3), s. 73–101. doi: 10.58235/sjpa.v24i3.8605. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  In recent decades, decentralisation measures have been implemented in most advanced democracies. While such reforms may be driven by subnational pressures and demands for empowerment, the central government usually has the deciding power to decentralise. Literature on regional preference has proliferated since the 1990s, though we know little of regional administrative preferences in relation to this process. As policy formulators and implementers, they are directly affected by dispersion of authority downwards, as it directly affects their organisational structures and portfolio of responsibilities. This article analyses decentralisation preferences among regional bureaucrats in Norway in the context of the 2015-2020 Regional Government Reform. Utilising an original survey and testing five explanations, the bureaucrats are generally reserved about taking on additional functions, with support for increasing their portfolio primarily explained by a principled motivation to increase regional autonomy, followed by feelings of regional attachment. Functional arguments also matter, though to a lesser extent. The bureaucrats’ principled, rather than functional, attitude towards regionalisation deviates from theoretical premises of decentralisation literature, while also challenging more underlying notions of bureaucratic thinking, inviting further research into how these dynamics manifest themselves among members of the civil service.

• Sørensen, Eva & Vabo, Signy Irene (2020). A Public Innovation Perspective on Change in Local Democracy. The Innovation Journal - Public Sector Innovation Journal. ISSN 1715-3816. 25(1), s. 1–19. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

Se alle arbeider i NVA

• Myksvoll, Thomas M. (2021). Byråkratiets rolle i kommune- og regionreformen. Stat & Styring. ISSN 0803-0103. 31(2), s. 24–27. doi: 10.18261/issn.0809-750X-2021-02-07. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Flo, Yngve (2020). Kommunal reform - i historisk tvangstrøye? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Flo, Yngve (2020). På jakt etter oppgåver. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Flo, Yngve (2020). Fylkespolitikken i Vestland. Rammevilkår og journalistiske satsingsområde. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Analyse av regionreforma, ålment og i Vestland

• Flo, Yngve (2020). Fylkessamanslåinga der den eine sørgjer, medan den andre knapt bryr seg. [Internet]. NRK Vestland. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Flo, Yngve (2020). - Bergen sit att med svarteper dersom Sunnhordland går til Rogaland. [Internet]. Stord24. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Flo, Yngve (2020). Intervju om spenningar knytt til nye Vestfold og Telemark fylkeskommune. [Radio]. NRK Vestfold og Telemark. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Flo, Yngve (2020). "... en naturlig inndeling med sterk forankring i livsforholdene i landet". Dei historiske føresetnader for valdistriktsinndelinga ved stortingsval. (Vedlegg 2 til NOU 2020: 6 Frie og hemmelige valg. Ny valglov). Departementenes sikkerhets- og serviceorganisasjon. ISSN 9788258314452. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

Se alle arbeider i NVA