Tora Skodvin

• Hovi, Jon; Tveit, Andreas Kokkvoll; Aamodt, Solveig; Andresen, Steinar E; Bang, Guri & Boasson, Elin Lerum [Show all 13 contributors for this article] (2026). A Lifetime of Research on Environmental Politics: A Tribute to Arild Underdal (1946–2025). Global Environmental Politics. ISSN 1526-3800. p. 1–12. doi: 10.1162/glep.a.739. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Abstract The late Arild Underdal profoundly impacted how scholars and policymakers understand international and domestic environmental governance. We summarize his influence on studies of leadership in international negotiations, policy integration, treaty design, climate clubs, regime effectiveness, and the domestic politics of international environmental agreements. For each topic, we also offer brief suggestions for future research based on Arild’s academic legacy. Finally, we highlight Arild’s role in academic leadership and research organization.

• Stankovic, Tatjana; Hovi, Jon; Skodvin, Tora & Øverland, Indra Nobl (2024). Regulating production rather than consumption? Comparing the challenges of supply-side and demand-side climate agreements. Energy Research & Social Science. ISSN 2214-6296. 114. doi: 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103601. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  A growing strand of climate policy literature explores the potential for a supply-side treaty—an international agreement among fossil-fuel-producing states to reduce their output. Proponents argue that such a treaty is cost-efficient; that it is easier to enforce than a demand-side treaty; that it encourages investment in low-carbon technology; and that it addresses concerns such as “the green paradox” and “carbon leakage.” We contribute to this literature by examining the conditions under which a supply-side climate treaty can be effective and by systematically comparing the prospects for each type of agreement to overcome two major impediments—collective-action problems and distributive conflict issues. Having noted that most large greenhouse gas emitters are also major fossil-fuel producers, we conclude that mitigating anthropogenic climate change would likely be no less challenging for a supply-side treaty than for a demand-side treaty. In particular, distributive conflict remains a significant obstacle to effective climate action regardless of whether it is pursued through a demand-side treaty or a supply-side treaty.

• Huseby, Robert; Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2024). Protecting Future Generations Through Minilateralism: Climate Clubs and Normative Legitimacy. Politics and Governance. 12. doi: 10.17645/pag.7674. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Despite three decades of global climate negotiations and high expectations for the 2015 Paris Agreement, global emissions continue to grow. To protect future generations from severe harm, scholars, environmentalists, and politicians alike explore potential supplements to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process. One potential supplement is climate clubs of a type where a small number of “enthusiastic” countries embark on ambitious mitigation efforts while encouraging other, more “reluctant” countries to join. Previous research has shown that this club type possesses a significant potential for expanding membership and eventually becoming highly effective in reducing global emissions. A common criticism of climate clubs, however, is that they lack legitimacy. Assessing this criticism, we argue that climate clubs of the type considered here can be normatively legitimate. The main challenge for normative legitimacy concerns climate clubs’ use of incentives, particularly negative incentives, to attract members. However, we argue that even negative incentives for participation can be legitimate, assuming they meet a set of relevant legitimacy criteria—including that the club respects human rights, provides a comparative benefit, maintains institutional integrity, implements only proportional incentives, and fulfills a requisite set of epistemic criteria. We also argue that the normative legitimacy of climate clubs’ use of incentives for compliance is less challenging than the normative legitimacy of their use of incentives for participation.

• Asayama, Shinichiro; Pryck, Kari de; Beck, Silke; Cointe, Béatrice; Edwards, Paul N. & Guillemot, Hélène [Show all 30 contributors for this article] (2023). Three institutional pathways to envision the future of the IPCC. Nature Climate Change. ISSN 1758-678X. 13, p. 877–880. doi: 10.1038/s41558-023-01780-8. Full text in Research Archive
• Tørstad, Vegard Heggelund; Nahm, Jonas; Hovi, Jon; Skodvin, Tora & Dietrichson, Gard Olav (2023). Economic recessions and decarbonisation: analysing green stimulus spending in Canada and the US. New Political Economy. ISSN 1356-3467. p. 1–19. doi: 10.1080/13563467.2023.2294744. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Existing research has demonstrated that government policies often prioritise growth over climate during economic downturns. Yet government stimulus spending during economic downturns also offers an opportunity for decarbonisation through long-term investments in infrastructure, transportation electrification, building efficiency, and clean energy technologies able to reduce emissions and sustainably shift the economy away from fossil fuels. We study the size and distribution of green stimulus spending in response to two recent economic downturns – the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic. Focusing on Canada and the US – two major economies with strong incumbent fossil fuel interests – we explore the determinants of green stimulus spending. Counter to conventional wisdom, our findings provide little evidence to support the notion that institutional permeability to industry lobbying influenced the share of green stimulus spending. Instead, drawing on a novel dataset on green recovery spending and lobbying, we show that the strength of liberal parties in the legislatures shapes the distribution of stimulus funds. Our analysis suggests that liberal parties committed to decarbonisation can leverage economic crises to align economic and climate policy making, even in the face of strong lobbying efforts by the fossil fuel sector.

• Skodvin, Tora (2023). The challenges of effective international climate cooperation in an unequal world, Handbook of International Development and the Environment. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISSN 9781800883772. p. 267–280. doi: 10.4337/9781800883789. Full text in Research Archive
• Skodvin, Tora (2023). Origin and design. In Pryck, Kari de & Hulme, Mike (Ed.), A Critical Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press. ISSN 9781316514276. p. 11–18. doi: 10.1017/9781009082099.004. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  This chapter discusses the precursors and origin of the IPCC, with a particular focus on the developments that led to the panel’s intergovernmental design. When the IPCC was established in 1988 as an intergovernmental body, the design choice was both novel and risky and came to have significant consequences for the panel’s subsequent operation and impact. The chapter summarises some prominent events from the early scientific discovery of a possible human influence on global climate to the various international science–policy initiatives of the 1970s and 1980s that preceded the IPCC’s establishment. It then draws attention to a set of factors that can explain the decision to deliberately establish the IPCC as an intergovernmental body.

• Stankovic, Tatjana; Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2023). The Paris Agreement’s inherent tension between ambition and compliance. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. 10(550). doi: 10.1057/s41599-023-02054-6. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Parties to the Paris Agreement face mounting social pressure to raise their ambition, thereby reducing the gap between individual pledges and collective temperature goals. Although crucial for inciting positive change, especially given that the Paris Agreement lacks an enforcement mechanism, it is also important to consider social pressure’s potential negative unintended consequences. First, it might undermine the Paris Agreement’s celebrated flexibility, which allows countries to design their Nationally Determined Contributions according to domestic conditions and capabilities. Second, it might result in widespread noncompliance by inciting pledges that the countries concerned prove unwilling or even unable to fulfill. Should that happen, confidence in the Paris Agreement and its institutions might falter. Further research is therefore needed to identify the scope conditions for social pressure to work effectively in the domain of international climate policy.

• Skodvin, Tora (2022). Amerikanske delstaters motsetningsfylte klimapolitikk. Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift. ISSN 0801-1745. 38(1), p. 21–36. doi: 10.18261/nst.38.1.2. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  I denne artikkelen analyserer jeg to tilsynelatende uforenlige tendenser i amerikansk klimapolitikk: På den ene siden vedtar delstater klimatiltak i forholdsvis stort omfang, uavhengig av føringer fra føderale myndigheter. På den andre siden benytter mange av de samme delstatene rettsapparatet til å motsette seg klimareguleringer vedtatt av føderale myndigheter. Med utgangspunkt i delstaters søksmålsaktivitet i 2015, som var året da det største søksmålet mot Obama-administrasjonen ble reist, finner jeg at både økonomiske og ideologiske interesser har betydelig effekt på delstaters søksmålspraksis. Effekten av delstatsadvokatens partitilhørighet er spesielt tydelig. Også delstatens fossilavhengighet har innvirkning på valget om søksmålsdeltakelse, men denne effekten er noe mer usikker. Delstater har blitt omtalt som «laboratorier» for demokrati og politisk innovasjon. Min analyse indikerer at delstatsadvokatenes søksmålspraksis representerer en hindring for at delstaters klimaengasjement kan danne grunnlag for føderale klimatiltak.

• Skodvin, Tora (2018). Nonstate actors in international policy making: The Kyoto Protocol and beyond. In Luterbacher, Urs & Sprinz, Detlef (Ed.), Global Climate Policy: Actors, Concepts, and Enduring Challenges. MIT Press. ISSN 9780262535342. p. 217–234. Full text in Research Archive
• Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2017). Why the United States Supports International Enforcement for Some Treaties but Not for Others. Politics and Governance. 5(2), p. 79–92. doi: 10.17645/pag.v5i2.886. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Under what conditions should we expect the United States to support international enforcement of treaties? We hypothesize that U.S. support is most likely for treaties where international enforcement will cause considerable (desired) behavioral change by other countries but little (undesired) behavioral change by the United States. Similarly, U.S. support is least likely for treaties where international enforcement will generate the converse effects. In developing this hypothesis, we derive specific conditions under which we should expect U.S. benefits of international enforcement to outweigh U.S. costs (or vice versa). We also provide empirical examples. Finally, we consider three alternative explanations of U.S. views on international enforcement—concern for U.S. sovereignty, desire to prevent infringements on U.S. constitutional protection of individual rights, and the usefulness of international enforcement as a domestic commitment device. We discuss these alternative explanatory factors’ relationship to our own hypothesis.

• Bang, Guri; Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2016). The Paris Agreement: short-term and long-term effectiveness. Politics and Governance. 4(3), p. 209–218. doi: 10.17645/pag.v4i3.640. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  The 2015 Paris Agreement was widely greeted with enthusiasm. We assess the short-term and long-term potential effectiveness of Paris. Concerning short-term effectiveness, we contend that while Paris scores high on participation, and reasonably high on the depth of the parties’ commitments (ambition), its Achilles’ heel will likely be compliance. Concerning long-term effectiveness, we argue that Paris does little to restructure states’ incentives so as to avoid free riding. At worst, it might end up as a failure, much like Kyoto did. On the other hand, domestic and international norms could continue to develop in a direction that makes it more and more difficult for individuals, firms, and states alike to ignore the plea to limit and reduce their carbon footprints. Technological progress that gradually reduces abatement costs, combined with leadership by major emitters such as the United States, might further strengthen climate cooperation and enhance other countries’ willingness to follow through. However, deep political polarization continues to represent a significant barrier to U.S. leadership on climate change.

• Skodvin, Tora & Bang, Guri (2014). Nasjonale drivkrefter i USAs klimapolitikk. Internasjonal Politikk. ISSN 0020-577X. 72(2), p. 199–223. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Da Obama overtok som president i 2009, var ett av hovedmålene å styrke amerikansk klimapolitikk. Fem år senere er målet fortsatt ikke blitt realisert. For å forklare denne manglende måloppnåelsen undersøker vi tre forhold: Først analyserer vi koalisjonsbyggingsstrategiene som ble brukt i Kongressen for å bygge bro over tradisjonelle konfliktlinjer i amerikansk klimapolitikk, og finner at det var nær umulig for senatsledelsen å bygge kompromisser som kunne mobilisere nok støttespillere for en klimalov. Deretter undersøker vi hvordan tre begivenheter påvirket debatten mellom lovgiverne og forsterket konfliktlinjene: Etableringen av «Tea Party»-bevegelsen, «Deepwater Horizon»-ulykken i Mexicogulfen samt finanskrisens påvirkning på folks holdninger til klimaproblemet. For det tredje undersøker vi hvilke implikasjoner Obama-administrasjonens klimapolitikk har for utsiktene til amerikansk deltakelse i en internasjonal klimaavtale. Amerikansk deltakelse i internasjonalt samarbeid er sterkt avhengig av politikken som føres på nasjonalt nivå, og vi finner at de dype konfliktene rundt klimapolitikken i Kongressen betyr at det er svært lite sannsynlig at USA vil slutte seg til en internasjonal klimaavtale i overskuelig framtid.

• Skodvin, Tora & Bang, Guri (2014). Domestic drivers of U.S. Climate policy. Internasjonal Politikk. ISSN 0020-577X. 72(2), p. 199–223. Full text in Research Archive
• Bang, Guri & Skodvin, Tora (2014). US climate policy and the shale gas revolution. In Cherry, Todd L.; Hovi, Jon & McEvoy, David M. (Ed.), Toward a New Climate Agreement. Conflict, Resolution and Governance. Routledge. ISSN 9780415643795. p. 76–90. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Climate change is one of the most pressing problems facing the global community. Although most states agree that climate change is occurring and is at least partly the result of humans’ reliance on fossil fuels, managing a changing global climate is a formidable challenge. Underlying this challenge is the fact that states are sovereign, governed by their own laws and regulations. Sovereignty requires that states address global problems such as climate change on a voluntary basis, by negotiating international agreements. Despite a consensus on the need for global action, many questions remain concerning how a meaningful international climate agreement can be realized. This book brings together leading experts to speak to such questions and to offer promising ideas for the path toward a new climate agreement. Organized in three main parts, it examines the potential for meaningful climate cooperation. Part 1 explores sources of conflict that lead to barriers to an effective climate agreement. Part 2 investigates how different processes influence states’ prospects of resolving their differences and of reaching a climate agreement that is more effective than the current Kyoto Protocol. Finally, part 3 focuses on governance issues, including lessons learned from existing institutional structures. The book is unique in that it brings together the voices of experts from many disciplines, such as economics, political science, international law, and natural science. The authors are academics, practitioners, consultants and advisors. Contributions draw on a variety of methods, and include both theoretical and empirical studies. The book should be of interest to scholars and graduate students in the fields of economics, political science, environmental law, natural resources, earth sciences, sustainability, and many others. It is directly relevant for policy makers, stakeholders and climate change negotiators, offering insights into the role of uncertainty, fairness, policy linkage, burden sharing and alternative institutional designs.

• Hovi, Jon; Skodvin, Tora & Aakre, Stine (2013). Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed? Politics and Governance. 1(2), p. 138–150. doi: 10.12924/pag2013.01020138. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  More than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accords, but have nevertheless made very limited progress in curbing global emissions of greenhouse gases. This paper considers whether negotiations can succeed in reaching an agreement that effectively addresses the climate change problem. To be effective, a climate agreement must cause sub­stantial emissions reductions either directly (in the agreement's own lifetime) or indirectly (by paving the way for a future agreement that causes substantial emissions reductions directly). To reduce global emissions substantially, an agreement must satisfy three conditions. Firstly, participation must be both comprehensive and stable. Secondly, participating countries must accept deep commitments. Finally, the agreement must obtain high compliance rates. We argue that three types of enforcement will be crucial to fulfilling these three conditions: (1) incentives for countries to ratify with deep commitments, (2) incentives for countries that have ratified with deep commitments to abstain from withdrawal, and (3) incentives for countries having ratified with deep commitments to comply with them. Based on assessing the constraints that characterize the climate change negotiations, we contend that adopting such three-fold potent enforcement will likely be politically infeasible, not only within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but also in the framework of a more gradual approach. Therefore, one should not expect climate change negotiations to succeed in producing an effective future agreement—either directly or indirectly.

• Underdal, Arild; Hovi, Jon; Kallbekken, Steffen & Skodvin, Tora (2012). Can conditional commitments break the climate change negotiations deadlock? International Political Science Review. ISSN 0192-5121. 33(4), p. 475–493. doi: 10.1177/0192512111432564. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Can a conditional commitment by a major actor (for example, the European Union) induce other major actors (such as the USA, China, India, or Japan) to do more to mitigate global climate change? We analyse this question by first estimating the impact of emission reductions by one of these actors on the mitigation costs of the others and, second, by exploring how domestic politics influence the willingness of the European Union and the USA to contribute. We find that an emission cut by any actor will reduce mitigation costs for all the others and thereby expand the settlement range. These cost reductions seem, however, insufficient to induce significant unilateral policy change. Emissions trading can cut aggregate costs further, but also redistribute wealth. Domestic politics tend to add weight to the concerns of powerful actors that stand to lose from more ambitious mitigation policies.

• Skodvin, Tora (2012). Climate regime design, the global warming potential, and climate risk management. In Dauvergne, Peter (Eds.), Handbook of Global Environmental Politics, 2nd edition. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISSN 9781849809405. p. 64–71. doi: 10.4337/9781849809412.00014. Full text in Research Archive
• Andresen, Steinar E & Skodvin, Tora (2011). The Climate Regime: Achievements and Challenges. In Vidas, Davor & Schei, Peter Johan (Ed.), The World Ocean in Globalisation. Brill | Nijhoff. ISSN 9789004191754. p. 165–186. doi: 10.1163/9789004204225_011. Full text in Research Archive
• Gullberg, Anne Therese & Skodvin, Tora (2011). Cost effectiveness and target group influence in Norwegian climate policy. Scandinavian Political Studies. ISSN 0080-6757. 34(2), p. 123–142. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9477.2011.00266.x. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Cost effectiveness is a key principle of climate policies in industrialised countries, yet there are significant political barriers against its implementation.The Norwegian case demonstrates that differences in the climate policy instruments targeting different sectors cannot be explained by the sectors’ relative significance in the national economy.Whereas the economically insignificant energy-intensive industries (EIIs) successfully resisted mandatory greenhouse gas (GHG) regulations until 2008, the offshore petroleum industry (the most important sector for Norway’s gross domestic product) has paid NOK 300 per tonne of CO2 since 1991. What explains why some sectors successfully resist GHG regulations while others do not? This analysis indicates that a key determinant is interdependence between target groups and decision makers in winning coalitions. EIIs were capable of issuing relevant and credible threats to shut down and relocate if costly GHG policies were imposed. In contrast, decision makers did not perceive as credible the offshore petroleum industry’s claim that a CO2 tax would undermine its competitiveness. Moreover, when target groups can issue effective threats, private information becomes more relevant and reinforces decision makers’ dependence on target group cooperation.

• Skodvin, Tora (2010). Pivotal politics" in US energy and climate legislation. Energy Policy. ISSN 0301-4215. 38(8), p. 4214–4223. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2010.03.050. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  In the 110th Congress (2007–2008) legislation related to climate change was introduced at a faster pace than in any previous Congress, yet it did not result in a corresponding increase in enacted climate-related laws. A pertinent example of the political infeasibility of climate policy change in the 110th Congress is the case of tax credit extensions for production of renewable energy. While this issue in itself was uncontroversial, the extensions were only adopted in the 11th hour, after innumerable failed attempts. With an analytical point of departure in Krehbiel’s theory of pivotal politics, this paper seeks to identify pivotal legislators in the case of the tax credit extensions and discusses how changes in the composition of pivotal legislators in the 111th Congress (2009–2010) may impact the prospects of moving climate legislation more generally. The analysis indicates that a majority of the legislative pivots in the case of tax credit extensions were Republican senators representing coal-producing states. In the case of climate change, however, the regional dimension is likely to be more significant for Democratic voting behaviour. Thus, the opportunity space for climate legislation in the 111th Congress remains narrow even with a reinforced Democratic majority in Congress.

• Skodvin, Tora; Gullberg, Anne Therese & Aakre, Stine (2010). Target-group influence and political feasibility: the case of climate policy design in Europe. Journal of European Public Policy. ISSN 1350-1763. 17(6), p. 854–873. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2010.486991. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Political feasibility (or infeasibility) is often associated with target-group support (or opposition) of specific policy alternatives. We argue that target-groups’ capacity to influence the spectrum of politically feasible policy options tends to be higher when (1) target groups control resources needed by decision-makers, that (2) are agenda-setters and/or veto players in the decision-making process. In the 2008 revision of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) exemptions from the basic principle of full auctioning of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions allowances can all be traced to target-group interest representation by single veto players or blocking minorities in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Our analysis indicates that target groups succeeded in constraining the spectrum of politically feasible policy options to the extent that their positions were unified and threats to shut down or relocate activity were perceived to be relevant, severe and credible. Our findings confirm both the significance and the limits of portfolio assignment in the Commission. Even with Directorate General (DG) Environment in an agenda-setting role, target groups acquired exemptions through their relations with veto players in the Council.

• Skodvin, Tora & Andresen, Steinar (2009). An agenda for change in US climate policies? Presidential ambitions and congressional powers. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics. ISSN 1567-9764. 9(3), p. 263–280. doi: 10.1007/s10784-009-9097-7. Full text in Research Archive
• Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2008). Which way to U.S. Climate Cooperation? Issue Linkage versus a U.S.-based Agreement. Review of Policy Research. ISSN 1541-132X. 25(2), p. 129–148. doi: 10.1111/j.1541-1338.2007.00315.x. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Several scholars have suggested that the United States can be compelled to reengage in the Kyoto process by linking cooperation on climate change to cooperation on trade or technology research and development. We argue that such issue linkage would likely fail and suggest that a more promising road to U.S. cooperation is to develop an alternative climate agreement based on federal U.S. climate policy. However, the question then becomes whether the Kyoto countries might be prepared to abandon the Kyoto process in favor of such a U.S.-based agreement. We argue that if a U.S.-based agreement were to be built on President Bush's current climate policy, the Kyoto countries (especially the European Union) would likely be reluctant to go along. However, if a U.S.-based agreement were to be built on the many Kyoto-like initiatives now emerging at state and local levels, the Kyoto countries might well be more favorably inclined.

• Skodvin, Tora & Andresen, Steinar (2006). Leadership revisited. Global Environmental Politics. ISSN 1526-3800. 6(3), p. 13–27. Full text in Research Archive
• Skodvin, Tora & Andresen, Steinar E (2006). Leadership revisited. Global Environmental Politics. ISSN 1526-3800. 6(3), p. 13–27. doi: 10.1162/glep.2006.6.3.13. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  In the late 1980s/early 1990s the concept of leadership was introduced in the study of international regimes to describe the role negotiating parties some-times would take on to craft agreement. The concept seemed to grasp an essential feature of multilateral cooperative efforts: that parties can be differentiated by the extent to which they are capable of, and willing to, take on a particular responsibility of guiding other parties in directions that could lead to joint solutions. The concept of leadership has only to a small extent been subjected to critical analytical and conceptual discussion. In this article we revisit the concept by asking: What are the characteristic features of leadership in international negotiations? Our analysis shows that current conceptualizations of leadership are associated with significant ambiguities that make it hard to distinguish leadership behavior from other types of bargaining behavior and that these problems are reproduced in empirical identifications of this mode of bargaining behavior.

• Skodvin, Tora & Andresen, Steinar (2003). Nonstate Influence in the International Whaling Commission, 1970-1990. Global Environmental Politics. ISSN 1526-3800. 3(4), p. 61–86. Full text in Research Archive
• Fuglestvedt, Jan; Berntsen, Terje Koren; Godal, Odd; Sausen, Robert; Shine, Keith & Skodvin, Tora (2003). Metrics of Climate Change: Assessing Radiative Forcing and Emission Indices. Climatic Change. ISSN 0165-0009. 58(3), p. 267–331. doi: 10.1023/1023905326842. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  In this paper, we review existing and alternative metrics of climate change, with particular emphasis on radiative forcing and global warming potentials (GWPs), in terms of their scientific performance. Radiative forcing is assessed in terms of questions such as the utility of the concept, uncertainties and sensitivity to key assumptions. The assessment of emission indices focuses on the climate and other resulting impacts (end points) against which emissions are weighted; the extent to which (and how) time dependence is included, with regard to both emission control and impact; how cost issues are dealt with; and the sensitivity of the metrics to various assumptions. It is concluded that the radiative forcing concept is a robust and useful metric of the potential climatic impact of various agents and that there are prospects for improvement by weighing different forcings according to their effectiveness. We also find that although the GWP concept is associated with serious shortcomings, it retains advantages over any of the proposed alternatives in terms of political feasibility. Alternative metrics, however, make a significant contribution to addressing important issues, and this contribution should be taken into account in the further development of refined metrics of climate change.

• Andresen, Steinar E; Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2003). The Persistence of the Kyoto Protocol: Why Other Annex I Countries Move on Without the United States. Global Environmental Politics. ISSN 1526-3800. 3(4), p. 1–23. Full text in Research Archive
• Andresen, Steinar E & Skodvin, Tora (2003). Nonstate Influence in the International Whaling Commission. Global Environmental Politics. ISSN 1526-3800. 3(4), p. 61–86. Full text in Research Archive
• Fuglestvedt, Jan S.; Godal, Odd; Berntsen, Terje Koren; Skodvin, Tora; Shine, Keith P & Sausen, Robert (2002). The adequacy of current metrics of climate change and emission indices. In Ham, J. van; Baede, A.P.M.; Guicherit, R. & Williams-Jacobse, J.G.F.M. (Ed.), Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases: Scientific Understanding Control Options and Policy Aspects. Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium NCGG-3. Millpress. ISSN 9789077017708. p. 389–394. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  The Global Warming Potential index applied in the Kyoto Protocol to compare emissions of greenhouse gases has been debated and various alternatives have been proposed. In this paper we give a brief overview of some of these alternatives. We discuss the adequacy of these indices and seek to evaluate their relevance and applicability in a future climate regime. Their performance is assessed according to guidelines given in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and in terms of political feasibility. We find that some of the alternative approaches to the GWP concept are more adequate in terms of effective mitigation of human-induced climate change but have a lower political feasibility.

• Fuglestvedt, Jan; Skodvin, Tora; Godal, Odd & Berntsen, Terje Koren (2000). Climate implications of GWP-based reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Geophysical Research Letters. ISSN 0094-8276. 27, p. 409–412. Full text in Research Archive

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• Skodvin, Tora & Skjærseth, Jon Birger (2003). Climate Change and the Oil Industry: Common Problem, Varying Strategies. Manchester University Press. ISBN 9780719065583. 246 p. Full text in Research Archive
• Andresen, Steinar E; Skodvin, Tora; Underdal, Arild & Wettestad, Jørgen (2000). Science and Politics in International Environmental Regimes: Between Integrity and Involvement. Manchester University Press. ISBN 9780719058066. 221 p. Full text in Research Archive

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• Lahn, Bård Lappegård; Skodvin, Tora; Sælen, Håkon; Farstad, Fay Madeleine & Sandanger, Gunnell (2021). Ny grønn giv med USA? [Internet]. CICERO - KLIMA. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Joe Biden har vunnet valget i USA – kan vi håpe på en grønn ny giv? Hvilken innflytelse har miljøbevegelsen i USA, og hva skjer med internasjonal klimapolitikk?

• Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2016). Når har internasjonale avtaler behov for håndheving? In Malnes, Raino Sverre (Eds.), Velkommen til statsvitenskap. Gyldendal Akademisk. ISSN 9788205494718. p. 242–258. Full text in Research Archive
• Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2016). Editorial to the Issue on Climate Governance and the Paris Agreement. Politics and Governance. 4(3), p. 111–114. doi: 10.17645/pag.v4i3.721. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  This thematic issue of Politics and Governance serves as a Festschrift in honor of Professor Dr. Philos. Arild Underdal on his 70th birthday. In this editorial, the guest editors summarize a few of Professor Underdal’s many academic merits and achievements. They also provide a synopsis of each of the ten contributions to the Festschrift, which focuses on climate governance in general and the 2015 Paris Agreement in particular.

• Skodvin, Tora & Hovi, Jon (2015). Kan de internasjonale klimaforhandlingene lykkes? 73(4), p. 529–537. Full text in Research Archive
• Bang, Guri & Skodvin, Tora (2014). Nasjonale drivkrefter i USAs klimapolitikk. Hvor hender det?. ISSN 0801-9509. Full text in Research Archive
• Hovi, Jon & Skodvin, Tora (2013). Norge og veien til lavutslippssamfunnet. Dagens næringsliv. ISSN 0803-9372. Full text in Research Archive
• Andresen, Steinar; Bang, Guri & Skodvin, Tora (2012). Klimadiplomati på tomgang. Full text in Research Archive
• Skodvin, Tora & Bang, Guri (2012). Ingen ny amerikansk klimapolitikk. Full text in Research Archive
• Fuglestvedt, Jan; Godal, Odd; Berntsen, Terje Koren; Skodvin, Tora; Shine, Keith & Sausen, Robert (2002). The adequacy of current metrics of climate change and emission indices. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  The Global Warming Potential index applied in the Kyoto Protocol to compare emissions of greenhouse gases has been debated and various alternatives have been proposed. In this paper we give a brief overview of some of these alternatives. We discuss the adequacy of these indices and seek to evaluate their relevance and applicability in a future climate regime. Their performance is assessed according to guidelines given in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and in terms of political feasibility. We find that some of the alternative approaches to the GWP concept are more adequate in terms of effective mitigation of human-induced climate change but have a lower political feasibility.

• Skodvin, Tora (2007). Exploring the notion of political feasibility in environmental policy. CICERO Senter for Klimaforskning. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  This essay explores the notion of political feasibility in environmental policy with an aim to develop an analytical approach that incorporates key aspects from both economics and political science. It assesses some of the relevant literature on political feasibility with a main focus on which sets of factors may make it more difficult for policy to achieve the necessary support – that is, which factors may serve to constrain policymakers’ “freedom of choice” of policies and policy instruments. The discussion indicates that political feasibility may be seen as a function of three main categories of constraints: 1) the distribution of costs and benefits associated with environmental regulation among target groups; 2) the distribution of power among and between target groups and decision-makers; and 3) the institutional setting within which decision-making takes place.

• Fuglestvedt, Jan S.; Berntsen, Terje Koren; Godal, Odd; Sausen, Robert; Shine, Keith P. & Skodvin, Tora (2001). Assessing metrics of climate change: Current methods and future possibilities. CICERO Senter for Klimaforskning. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  With the principle of comprehensiveness embedded in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Art. 3), a multi-gas abatement strategy with emphasis also on non-CO2 greenhouse gases as targets for reduction and control measures has been adopted in the international climate regime. In the Kyoto Protocol, the comprehensive approach is made operative as the “aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions” of six specified greenhouse gases or groups of gases (Art. 3). With this operationalisation, the emissions of a set of greenhouse gases with very different atmospheric lifetimes and radiative properties are transformed into one common unit – “CO2 equivalents”. This transformation is based on the Global Warming Potential (GWP) index, which in turn is based on the concept of radiative forcing. The GWP metric and its application in policy making has been debated, and several other alternative concepts have been suggested. In this paper, we review existing and alternative metrics of climate change, with particular emphasis on radiative forcing and GWPs, in terms of their scientific performance. This assessment focuses on questions such as the climate impact (end point) against which gases are weighted; the extent to which and how temporality is included, both with regard to emission control and with regard to climate impact; how cost issues are dealt with; and the sensitivity of the metrics to various assumptions. It is concluded that the radiative forcing concept is a robust and useful metric of the potential climatic impact of various agents and that there are prospects for improvement by weighing different forcings according to their effectiveness. We also find that although the GWP concept is associated with serious shortcomings, it retains advantages over any of the proposed alternatives in terms of political feasibility. Alternative metrics, however, make a significant contribution to addressing important issues, and this contribution should be taken into account in the further development of refined metrics of climate change.

• Alfsen, Knut H.; Fuglestvedt, Jan; Seip, Hans Martin & Skodvin, Tora (2000). Climate change. Scientific background and processes. CICERO Senter for Klimaforskning. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  The paper gives a brief description of natural and man-made forces behind climate change and outlines climate variations in the past together with a brief synopsis likely future impacts of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. The paper also gives a briefing on the background, organisation and functioning of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

• Skodvin, Tora (1999). Science-policy interaction in the global greenhouse: Institutional design and institutional performance in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). CICERO Senter for Klimaforskning. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Research input constitutes a key component in the development of effective international environmental regimes. Scientific knowledge is called for not only in the design of policies that are effective in terms of solving the problems for which they were designed, but also (increasingly) in the identification of the problem itself. Scientific knowledge in its "original" form, however, is not readily available for policy-makers to "use" in a particular policy-making context. While relevant, scientific knowledge usually does not explicitly address the particular problems policy-makers struggle with. Scientific knowledge is also produced within a context; within structures of knowledge and theories that constitute the basis for the knowledge generated, and which implies that scientific knowledge is characterised by a certain context dependency. Also scientific knowledge is provided in a technical form which is not applicable in policy-making. Thus, for scientific knowledge to be applicable in policy-making, it needs to be interpreted and "translated" – transformed – into a form in which it may serve as a premise for policy choice. In this process of transformation, the competence of both scientists and policy-makers is needed. Scientific competence is needed to ensure that the knowledge base provided is representative of state-of-the-art knowledge within relevant fields and disciplines. Policy competence is needed to ensure its relevance and applicability to the particular policy problem for which the input is sought and developed. Thus, scientific knowledge for policy-making is generated in processes of science–policy interaction. Science–policy interaction is difficult and demanding because of its immanent tension between impartiality and disinterestedness on the one hand, and strategic behaviour and interest realisation on the other. This tension is generated by the interaction between two distinctively different systems of behaviour. While science (ideally) is conceived of as a truth-seeking endeavour – whose norms and guidelines for behaviour are directed towards the generation of "objective" and disinterested knowledge – politics constitutes a system for the generation of (collective) decisions, where behaviour is directed towards the realisation of (individual) rational interests in these decisions. In contrast to the ideal of impartiality characterising the scientific method, political behaviour is characterised by strategic reasoning where the instrumental utilisation – as well as manipulation and distortion – of knowledge may constitute central elements in political strategies whereby individual interests are sought realised. This tension is reinforced, moreover, by an image of the relationship between science and politics as one of opposite poles, where science is everything politics is not: pure, objective, subject to rational analytical reasoning and thus not hostage to manipulation tactics and coercive power – ingredients often associated with politics. While both theoretical analyses and experience show that the relationship between science and politics by far is as clear-cut as this image suggests, this image has a strong position in the public as well as among practising scientists and policy-makers themselves. Thus, any interactive dialogue between these two systems of behaviour takes place in the shadow of this image which suggests that the interaction itself implies a risk of political "contamination" of the scientific process and a serious loss of legitimacy. In dealing with this immanent tension, processes of science–policy interaction face a difficult challenge which may represent a significant obstacle to their effectiveness. In this paper, we explore the nature and dynamics of science–policy interaction and the extent to which and how institutional arrangements may be utilised as instruments for enhancing the effectiveness of the dialogue. Our analysis is premised on the assumption that processes of science–policy interaction take place within the framework of institutions that to a varying extent are capable of or designed for tackling the challenges science–policy interaction presents. Institutional arrangements are social constructions and may as such, in principle, be designed and manipulated to improve institutional performance. To the extent that institutions capable of handling these challenges may be developed by conscious design, therefore, institutional design may represent a potential instrument whereby the effectiveness of the process of science–policy interaction may be enhanced. The analysis is divided into three parts: In the first part of the paper, the theoretical framework for the study is developed. The point of departure for the analysis is the internal dynamics of science and politics in their "pure" forms, and the nature of the dynamics that are generated when these two distinct systems of behaviour meet. On this basis, then, the question of which functions the institutional apparatus should be able to serve in order to enhance the effectiveness of the science–policy dialogue is addressed in part two. In part three, this approach is employed in an empirical case study of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) from its establishment in 1988 until the provision of the Second IPCC Assessment Report in 1995: To what extent is the institutional apparatus of the IPCC process capable of serving the suggested functions and to what extent and in which manner has this contributed to enhance the effectiveness of the endeavour?

• Torvanger, Asbjørn & Skodvin, Tora (1999). Implementing the Kyoto Protocol: The role of environmental agreements. CICERO Senter for Klimaforskning. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Voluntary agreements between an industry or a company and the government to regulate various environmental impacts is a popular policy tool in many OECD countries. Since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in December 1997 there has been a discussion of choice of policy tools to implement the Protocol in many industrialized countries. Not enough parties to make it enter into force have yet ratified the Kyoto Protocol, but many parties are making preparations for the implementation phase. This study focuses on the suitability of voluntary agreements to curb emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Can such agreements be a more efficient policy tool than taxes, tradable emission permits, or traditional command and control? In this perspective we examine under what circumstances voluntary agreements could be an attractive policy option from the regulator’s (i.e. government’s or its agency’s) perspective. Voluntary agreements is a very imprecise term since they can range from declarations of intent from a company, to binding contracts with a regulator with penalties specified in case on non-compliance. Furthermore, such agreements are not voluntary in a strict sense since there in most cases is an implicit or explicit threat from the regulator to impose other policy tools if the company is unwilling to negotiate. Also, if the target is not met the company could meet other, stricter regulations, such as emission fees or the introduction of taxes. These are important reasons why other terms like agreements, environmental agreements, negotiated agreements, codes of conduct, industry covenants, eco-contracts, and self-regulation have been used. For the purpose of avoiding misunderstandings on the nature of such agreements we will in this study denote all as Environmental Agreements (EAs). A general definition of an EA is: "An agreement between government and industry to facilitate voluntary action with a desirable social outcome, which is encouraged by the government, to be undertaken by the participant based on the participant’s self interest" (Storey, 1996). In this study we focus on international EAs to curb emissions of GHGs. A general definition of an international EA is: An agreement between an industry in one country and a regulator in another country, or between an industry in a group of countries and a regional regulator, with the aim to solve a regional or international environmental problem. The first of these EA types is denoted a bilateral EA, whereas the latter type is denoted a regional EA. Five main conclusions to be drawn from this study are:Experience with Environmental Agreements in a number of OECD countries suggests that these agreements are most attractive as a supplement to traditional command and control, or to market-based policy tools. This finding is also supported by the academic literature. The academic literature indicates that skillful design of Environmental Agreements can improve their efficiency, for instance through including a menu of contracts (i.e. agreements) the company can choose between, or through the introduction of subsidies in case of over-fulfillment combined with a tax in case of under-fulfillment of the target. Bilateral Environmental Agreements is an interesting policy option to regulate pollution from other countries, provided a general agreement between the two governments is established. Regional Environmental Agreements are rare, even within the European Community, but could have important advantages and be an interesting supplement to other policy tools. Environmental Agreements can play a role as a ‘soft’ transition stage from traditional command and control to domestic emission trading, and further on to a Kyoto Protocol regime of emission trading and joint implementation. In terms of the first main conclusion a large variety of EAs is found in a number of OECD countries. Given their undocumented environmental effectiveness, it is odd that EAs have gained such a widespread recognition by governments as an instrument for environmental management. The lack of environmental effectiveness is partly due to a missing specification of baselines and reference scenarios to which the GHG abatement effect is compared and measured, but also due to the fact that regulators do not always participate in setting targets for EAs. Another concern is that the EA negotiation process in many cases is closed for third parties, and consequently more closed than a traditional policy making process in many countries. Such a closed process is undemocratic and can lead to weak EAs. The popularity of EAs may, however, lie in their political feasibility. With the negotiation of EAs, arenas for dialogue, partnership and co-operation between governments and industry have been established. For the industry, EAs are seen as a tool for enhanced predictability in environmental regulation. For governments, EAs may be seen as a tool for a more rapid behavioral change towards environmental accountability within industrial sectors than what is possible in case traditional policy tools are employed. In the long run, however, the societal legitimacy of this instrument will depend upon its demonstrated environmental effectiveness as well as the transparency and openness of the process in which it is developed. Due to these potential advantages of EAs but their undocumented environmental effectiveness, EAs seem most attractive as a supplement to other policy tools. In terms of the second main conclusion the academic literature on EAs is limited. The literature does not give clear indications of whether EAs should be preferred to other policy tools, but claim that EAs have some potential benefits that can be harvested under some, but likely not the majority of, circumstances. Thus more and broader studies are required to give clear recommendations on the circumstances where EAs should be preferred to traditional command and control and market-based instruments. However, EAs may work well as a supplement to other policy tools under a wider set of circumstances than employing EAs alone. Studies based on principal-agency theory have shown that menu-based EAs could be an interesting policy tool alternative in a situation of asymmetrical information between regulator and companies. Such EAs can do better than tradable permits and taxes in terms of welfare effects. This conclusion is based on a model where the survival of a specific company (or industry) is a vital constraint. Also of importance is the administrative cost of EAs compared to other policy tools. The administrative cost is likely to be reduced if the EA is negotiated with an industry federation instead of single companies. However, this could mean a heavier administrative burden on the industry federation. If EAs are analyzed in an incomplete contract framework one tentative conclusion is that there is some potential for designing EAs in a way that reduces the problem of too lax targets for GHG abatement in companies and industries in EA contracts. One solution can be to introduce a subsidy in the case of over-fulfillment of the target, and a tax in the case of under-fulfillment of the target. Another suggestion from such models is that a shared investment in GHG abatement technologies between the regulator and companies is helpful in this context. As a case in point there are likely benefits for the companies in terms of improved energy-efficiency if investment is made in technologies that reduce GHG emissions. Finally, third parties like NGOs or representatives from the local community can play a helpful role in the negotiations and monitoring process of an EA to ascertain targets that are ambitious enough to be welfare-increasing. Through further analyses in an incomplete contract framework more insights can be gained into the efficient design of EAs. In terms of the third main conclusion a bilateral EA is defined as a case where a regulator in one country negotiates an EA with a company or industry in another country. Bilateral EAs can be part of a national environmental policy or a supplement to an international environmental treaty. One example of bilateral EAs is the agreements from 1991 between the city of Rotterdam in the Netherlands and a number of German chemical firms to reduce pollution to the Rhine River. In terms of the fourth main conclusion a regional EA is negotiated between a regional regulator and one or more industries in a group of countries. We have surveyed EAs at European Community level, but find that such agreements are rare. To date there are three agreements of this kind, of which one is with the European automobile industry to reduce CO2 emissions from new passenger cars. There may be significant advantages associated with the development of EAs at Community level, particularly in terms of harmonization of policy instruments and the implications this may have for market and competition conditions for European industries. Consequently regional EAs could more or less counteract the decentralization and de-harmonization drive associated with a large number of national EAs in EU member states. In addition there may be a potential for cost reductions attached to regional EAs. It is also clear, however, that a wider use of EAs at Community level would require a change in EU institutions. Given the current ambiguity with regard to the actual environmental effectiveness of this policy instrument, it might be wise to await further documentation of effectiveness in general and conditions for effectiveness in particular, before embarking upon such a process of institutional change. In terms of the fifth and final main conclusion EAs can play an important role in a transition phase from established policy tools, and in particular command and control, to a Kyoto Protocol regime of emissions trading, joint implementation, and CDM. Thus the emission permits defined by EAs can later be made tradable at a domestic emission trading market, which later could be part of an international emission trading regime. In this manner national EAs could be a ‘stepping stone’ to full-fledged international emission trading. Alternatively, bilateral EAs could be combined with or develop into joint implementation, or possibly CDM projects.

• Alfsen, Knut H.; Fuglestvedt, Jan S. & Skodvin, Tora (1998). Climate change: Some elements from the scientific background and the scientific process. CICERO Senter for Klimaforskning. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Concluding remarks: On the nature of the climate problem The problem of climate change is not, despite popular conception, mainly a problem of increased global average temperature. The seriousness of the problem is more related to the potential variability and instability of the global climate and the local weather. We now know that the climate system in the past has shown great and rapid fluctuations for ‘natural’ causes. The stable climate regime observed after the last ice age is currently perturbed by the large outpouring of greenhouse gases due to human activities of many kinds. The question then is whether the stability of the current climate regime is able to withstand this kind of disturbance. The answer to this we really do not know at present. Furthermore, if the climate system should change to a more unstable regime, it is very difficult to predict the local and even regional consequences with any precision. Thus, the problem of climate change is riddled with uncertainties, and the main challenge for us in this situation is to devise a rational response to this uncertainty. Certainly we should be willing to pay some form of insurance premium in order to reduce the risk of damaging climate change, but how high a premium? And how much of the premium should be in the form of greenhouse gas emission reductions and how much in the form of investments in better defence against a more unstable climate? IPCC’s work is important in allowing us to get a best possible scientific foundation for answering these questions. However, providing an academic answer is one thing, to get a politically feasible answer is another. The merging of the scientific consensus and the political realities is therefore necessary, and the processes in the plenary sessions of IPCC are therefore important steps in the direction of providing practical answers to the challenge of climate change.

• Alfsen, Knut H. & Skodvin, Tora (1998). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and scientific consensus: How scientists come to say what they say about climate change. CICERO Senter for Klimaforskning. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  In its Second Assessment Report (SAR) from 1995 the IPCC concluded that «The balance of evidence, from changes in global mean surface air temperature and from changes in geographical, seasonal and vertical patterns of atmospheric temperature, suggests a discernible human influence on global climate. There are uncertainties in key factors, including the magnitude and patterns of long-term natural variability.» Although carefully worded the statement has created a rather heated debate, also among climate scientist. Some well-known and respected scientists disagree that we at this moment in time are able to discern a human influence on the global climate. Also in connection with the production of the last Assessment report, some procedural errors were introduced in the final editing of the chapters of the report. These errors were then used by interest groups opposed to climate change policy to discredit the whole report and the organisation producing the report - IPCC. On this background it is understandable that some have come to see IPCC and its reports as mainly political manifestations, to be discussed within the political arena on par with other political topics such as the ‘right’ fiscal policy, etc. Thus, a basic misconception of IPCC as a political body has been spreading. In this presentation we will first of all try to convey what IPCC is and what it is not. Then we will come back to a discussion of the above statement on the likely human impact on climate change and briefly relate it to natural climate change in the past. In closing, we will finally say a few words on the nature of the problem of climate change.

• Skodvin, Tora (1994). Structure and agent in scientific diplomacy: Institutional design and leadership performance in the science-politics interface of climate change. CICERO Senter for Klimaforskning. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Science constitutes a central component in international environmental policy-making. Scientific advisory bodies have increasingly become integral parts of negotiating efforts to combat common environmental problems. Still, the conditions for, and mechanisms under which, scientific knowledge is transformed into decision premises for policy decisions at the international level has to a very little extent been subject to systematic analysis. This study takes as its point of departure the internal dynamics of both science and politics in order to explore the character of the interface between them, within which the science-policy dialogue of regime formation processes takes place. In particular, the study investigates, first, the extent to which and how the institutional arrangements of the science-policy dialogue may influence, and serve as instruments for facilitating the transformation of scientific knowledge into decision premises. Second, the paper explores the role and impact of scientific élites in performing leadership functions in the process. The paper explores these questions first theoretically, then empirically in a case study of the regime formation process on global warming.

• Andresen, Steinar; Skodvin, Tora; Underdal, Arild Karsten & Wettestad, Jørgen (1994). Scientific management of the environment? Science, politics and institutional design. CICERO Senter for Klimaforskning. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Internasjonalt miljø- og ressurssamarbeid karakteriseres av en nær kobling mellom forskning og politikk. Vitenskapelige organer for frembringelse av ny og oppdatert kunnskap utgjør som regel en integrert del av internasjonale miljø- og ressursregimer. Likevel ser vi at kunnskapen som frembringes gjennom disse organene ikke alltid omdannes til beslutningspremisser: Noen ganger fattes reguleringsvedtak på et vitenskapelig grunnlag, andre ganger ikke. I et samarbeidsprosjekt mellom Fridtjof Nansens Institutt og CICERO har søkelyset blitt rettet mot i hvilken grad institusjonsutformingen i ulike regimer kan bidra til å forklare denne variasjonen.

• Skodvin, Tora (1992). Organizational setting, institutional design and actor behaviour in the IPCC process. CICERO Senter for Klimaforskning. Full text in Research Archive

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