Compliance and Conditionality*
Professor Jeffrey T. Checkel**
ARENA/Universitetet i Oslo
Conditionality is a basic strategy through which international institutions promote compliance by national governments. Recent years have seen an explosion in both its aggregate use and a change in its underlying purpose, with political conditionality coming to the fore. This quantitative and qualitative expansion has attracted critical scrutiny from both academics and policymakers. While conditionality will never disappear, a growing body of research suggests we need to broaden our conceptual toolkit when considering the causal nexus between it and national compliance. Examining the current expansion of regional organization in post-Cold War Europe, I argue that the traditional incentive game of conditionality needs to be supplemented by strategies that seek to alter the very nature of interests in the transition states of East Europe and the former USSR.
Conditionality -- the use of incentives to alter a state's behavior or policies -- is a basic strategy through which international institutions (II's) promote compliance by national governments. While traditionally associated with World Bank and, especially, International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending programs, the use of political conditionality has grown dramatically in recent years. Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in post-Cold War Europe, with organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union (EU) and Council of Europe (CE) offering membership to various countries in East Europe and the former Soviet Union. The conditions they impose upon applicants -- restructuring of civil-military relations, establishment of the rule of law, creation of new human-rights agencies -- go far beyond the standard IMF conditionality package and, instead, intrude into the core socio-political attributes of these states.
Indeed, recent years have seen an explosion in both the aggregate use of conditionality and a change in its underlying purpose, with the promotion of political and institutional reform now on a par with the economic sort. Not surprisingly, this quantitative and qualitative expansion has attracted critical scrutiny from both academics and policymakers. While conditionality will never disappear, a growing body of research suggests we need to broaden our conceptual toolkit when considering the causal nexus between it and national compliance. 
The present essay addresses such issues, and does so in four parts. It begins by reviewing the literature on conditionality and compliance, with a particular concern being to make explicit the assumptions about human/state behavior that underlie much of this work. Next, I turn my attention to contemporary Europe, a rich laboratory for exploring the role of conditionality given the dramatic expansion of regional organization underway. The conditionality policies of three organizations are compared: the EU, NATO and the CE. The third section is a case study of the relation between Council of Europe conditionality and change in human-rights policy/practice in post-Soviet Ukraine. The conclusion highlights the policy and theoretical implications of my analysis.
Before proceeding, two caveats are in order. First, this is a first cut at working through the conditionality literature, teasing out analytic lacunae in it, highlighting possible alternatives, and applying them empirically. It makes a plausible case for my arguments, but does not offer a definitive test of them. Second, I am neutral over whether II conditionality is a good thing. My empirically informed suspicion is that some form of it is an indispensable component of any compliance toolkit. However, current practice suggests that one can have "too much of a good thing." The goal here is thus not to displace conditionality wholesale, but to supplement it with other strategies -- premised upon alternative logics of state action -- for promoting compliance with II stipulations.
Compliance and Conditionality
The literature on conditionality is voluminous and I make no pretense to summarize it. Instead, my goals are more modest: to review scholarly critiques of conditionality; to explore the models of human behavior on which it is based; and to survey possible alternatives to it. However, I begin with a few definitions. 
Formally, conditionality is "a mutual arrangement by which a government takes, or promises to take, certain policy actions," in support of which an II will provide specified amounts of assistance -- usually financial or technical. So defined, conditionality has at least three aspects or "modalities." A first is so-called pre-conditions. These are policy actions agreed upon during negotiations between an II and a national government that must be undertaken before the former approves a credit arrangement (in the case of the IMF) or formally grants membership (the EU, say).
Next come trigger actions, which are often referred to as performance criteria or legal requirements. To continue the example, it is compliance with these that trigger a government's access to another credit tranche (IMF); for an II like the EU, such actions might be a legal requirement for adoption of certain portions of the acquis before membership negotiations can proceed to the next stage. Finally, one has policy provisions that are additional commitments contained in the overall agreement, but which are neither pre-conditions or trigger criteria. By nature, these are the least binding. 
Regarding compliance, I define it as the extent to which agents act in accordance with and in fulfilment of the conditions prescribed by international institutions. To minimize reliance on correlational arguments when studying compliance, I consider not only the observable degree of it among agents, but also explore the motives and attitudes that lead them to act in accordance with II conditions. 
With these definitions in hand, the issue to explore is whether conditionality promotes national compliance. On this score, an emerging consensus among academics and influential critics within several II's argues that the record is at best mixed, with one study concluding that conditionality leads to compliance only 60% of the time. Indeed, a growing body of econometric, statistical and case study research finds only a weak connection between the two variables. The financial and other incentives being offered by international and regional institutions do not seem to alter the calculations of domestic agents in the proper direction -- that is, towards compliance. Why not? 
Three reasons are key. First, at the international level, the corporate shareholders that stand behind II's -- their member states -- often politicize conditionality. In particular, they have pressured institutions such as the IMF to release funds despite failures in national compliance. More and more, states know they can get "something for nothing," thus undermining the entire incentive logic behind conditionality. Nowhere is this more clear than in the sad tale of IMF lending programs to Russia, where persistent US pressure has made a mockery of conditionality.
Second, conditionality, particularly in its stronger versions, creates an ownership problem domestically. Reforms are seen to be the result of external imposition; the incentive to comply is lower given foreign domination of the reform process. Support for policy change thus lacks a strong political base and compliance becomes problematic.
Third, conditionality fares badly in national contexts marked by poor or fragmented policy environments. When political institutions have collapsed -- or are in the process of collapsing -- it should come as no surprise that the incentive magic of conditionality is weakened. The obvious nature of these conclusions has led one academic observer to decry the "shallow intellectual environment" that has characterized all too much thinking on the II-conditionality-compliance nexus. It is almost as if proponents of conditionality assume that it is imposed in a vacuum, where history and institutions do not matter. As one critic argues, conditionality is "profoundly ahistorical." 
The validity of these scholarly critiques is enhanced by the extent to which they coincide with concerns expressed by the broader international policy community. Consider two examples. First, in November 1999, Joseph Stiglitz, then the World Bank's chief economist, resigned -- in part due to disagreement over the Bank's continuing use of conditionality. When asked whether II conditionality was an effective way of changing national policies, Stiglitz's reply was unambiguous: "There is increasing evidence that it was not. Good policies cannot be bought." Instead, he argued that countries should be encouraged to arrive at a national consensus to create their own reform policies. To say this is simply to restate in frank policy terms the academic argument about ownership. 
Second, both the World Bank and IMF -- as institutions -- are beginning to rethink the role of conditionality. There is now talk of less numerous conditionality requirements and, perhaps more important, an emphasis on "the role of consultations with all national 'stakeholders'," in a participatory approach. Similarly, new IMF head Horst Koehler argues that "less is more" when it comes to conditionality. Compliance, it seems, will be promoted through mechanisms beyond financial inducements and coercion. 
Put in more academic terms, until recently the theory and practice of conditionality and its link to compliance have been premised on an economic model of human/state behavior. Inducing compliance is a matter of international institutions -- via their conditionality policies -- getting the incentives right. Faced with the proper incentives, national agents will engage in cost/benefit calculations that should then lead them to align domestic policy and behavior with conditions set by the international community. So conceived, conditionality is premised on a materialist ontology (money, material incentives), a consequentialist theory of action (means-end calculations), and, at most, influences state policy and behavior. Core state properties -- interests, preferences -- are assumed to be fixed; they cannot be influenced by II's or the broader international community. 
What is wrong with this economic model? In principle, absolutely nothing! We have abundant evidence that national agents are often calculating and strategic when seeking assistance from the international community or membership in a particular II. Moreover, rational-choice theory, on which this model is built, has a long and rich tradition in political science and economics. Given these facts, the proper question is not one of right or wrong, but what is missing here? 
Clearly, experts on conditionality think something is missing as they have suggested several additions to it. I note three that have received the greatest attention. First, there is selectivity, which amounts to ensuring that aid goes only to good policy environments. Conditionality is no longer ex ante and based on promises, but is now ex post and premised on retrospective assessments of performance. Of course, one problem here is that such an approach leaves non-reforming governments by the wayside. However, one advocate of selectivity argues that, by creating "star performers," it would induce countries with poor policy environments to change their ways due to "the pressures of emulation." 
Second, scholars have argued that II's should move away from the taskmaster role implied by ex ante conditionality to that of knowledge banks, where the emphasis is on "the production and dissemination of knowledge." Compliance is induced not so much by incentives and coercion as through education and teaching by the II and learning at the national level. This knowledge-bank role is especially important vis-a-vis states with poor policy environments, where strict conditionality anyway often fails. 
Third, a growing number of scholars and policymakers have advocated that conditionality be supplemented by a policy-dialogue approach. The arguments in favor of such dialogue are two-fold. For one, in an era where numerous countries in Europe, Latin America and Africa are in the midst of democratic transformations, policy dialogues will not only transfer expertise (the knowledge-bank role), but also help build political support for reforms. As one critic has put it, traditional conditionality works best in authoritarian contexts, where the number of stakeholders who need to consulted are few in number. For sure, there is still an element of external imposition in any such "dialogues," but it is softened by much greater II appreciation of and efforts at consensus building. 
In addition, current II conditionality is often of the political sort, where far-ranging institutional and societal reforms are expected of states -- for example, in East Europe and the former USSR. Such reforms affect large parts of society, thus heightening the need for dialogue and consensus building -- especially in democratizing contexts. Policy dialogues will accelerate the transfer of new knowledge and learning among national elites; they comply because they learn new ways of doing things. These dialogues should offer "low-key advice" and be structured around "informal exchanges" that emphasize "intellectual persuasion." 
The latter two alternatives to conditionality share several common assumptions and are based on a more sociological model of human/state behavior. Inducing national compliance is now a matter of knowledge transfer and education on the part of international institutions. National agents do not so much engage in cost/benefit calculations as puzzle, debate and argue with international interlocutors over the scope and direction of change. So conceived, compliance is premised on a much more social ontology (knowledge, norms), a non-consequentialist theory of action (learning, persuasion), and may affect the interests and preferences of national decisionmakers.
Summary. A growing body of academic literature and real-world evidence indicate that conditionality often fails to promote compliance, especially in transition states where II's demand political/institutional changes. Critics have suggested several alternative strategies, about which three final comments are in order. First, these are not presented in either/or terms. Analysts recognize that dialogue or persuasion alone are unlikely to produce compliance; there is still a role for the pressure and material incentives of traditional, ex ante conditionality. 
Second, with an emphasis on dialogue and persuasion, these alternatives -- largely advanced by development economists -- are strikingly similar to "managerial" or "legal process" work on compliance by specialists in international law. They will also be familiar to those constructivists in political science who highlight the roles of persuasion/argumentation and, more generally, the non-strategic bases of human/state action. 
Third, the analytic basis of the more recent work on policy dialogues and the like is not clear, with a number of key questions left unanswered. What are the causal pathways and mechanisms through which dialogue and knowledge transfer lead to compliance by national agents? Under what conditions do these mechanisms operate? Absent compelling answers to such puzzles, these alternatives risk getting labelled pie in the sky. After all, one can point to numerous and well documented instances when persuasion and dialogue fall on deaf ears.
In the conclusion, I suggest tentative answers to these puzzles, drawing upon recent work by communications theorists and social psychologists. However, first it is important to consider the case of post-Cold War Europe, where an array of regional organizations are seeking to promote national compliance in former communist states.
Regional Organization, Enlargement and Conditionality in the New Europe
Enlargement is the buzzword of the day among European regional institutions. The dominant organizations in the politico-economic (EU), security (NATO) and human-rights (CE) realms are all engaged in ambitious projects to expand their membership, taking in new members from the transition states of East Europe and the former USSR. In all three cases, however, membership comes with strings attached: Conditionality -- albeit of differing sorts -- is being employed to promote compliance with the rules, norms and policies of the II's. 
European Union. Along quantitative and qualitative dimensions, the EU's conditionality policies are the most stringent and extensive of the three organizations. Not only is this a very traditional conditionality regime, but its scope has increased dramatically over the past decade. Beginning with the Copenhagen European Summit of 1993, EU member states made clear that both economic and political conditionality would be applied to new applicants for membership; however, its precise terms were left unclear. 
The accession partnerships presented in 1998 to 10 central and east European applicants did much to remove this ambiguity. For one, conditionality has now been strictly defined in terms of pre-conditions, that is, as policy actions to be undertaken by applicants before they are granted membership. In addition, the conditions laid out -- adoption of the entire acquis communautaire (over 80,000 pages of legal text), reforms in the areas of justice and home affairs (on prison conditions and border control) -- extend well beyond what has been asked of current members. Finally, there is no possibility of negotiating the opt-outs secured by many other states (the UK with respect to Schengen; Denmark on EMU; etc); in fact, there is little room for negotiation of any sort. Clearly, the EU is a "hegemonic actor" in this process. 
Of course, hegemony often has benefits, and if the EU's hard-line conditionality regime were promoting national compliance and implementation, then so much the better. However, there are accumulating signs that it may be problematic in several respects. Most important, there is a growing and disconcerting gap between word and deed among applicant countries, which is a source of constant frustration in Brussels. 
Also, this is a conditionality regime seemingly crafted in ignorance of the academic and policy critiques surveyed above. As one analyst has noted, with more and more II's "moving away from reliance on conditionality ... only the European Commission appeared to be moving the other way." Indeed, although the EU's accession agreements "are supposed to be 'partnerships' decided in collaboration with each applicant, in practice the process of consultation seems to have involved only cursory attention to CEE objections to either the content or sequencing of demands." Applicant state preferences have been consistently marginalized, with predictable results. Absent any policy dialogue with a larger set of national stakeholders, the partnerships come off as external imposition -- from one set of technocratic elites in Brussels to another in the various national capitals. This replication of the EU's democratic deficit in applicant states has hindered the building of political consensus favoring reform -- as the appearance of increasingly vociferous anti-EU voices in Poland and elsewhere attests. 
NATO. The policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization vis-a-vis new members occupy a middle ground between the hard (EU) and soft (CE) conditionality strategies employed by other regional organizations. On the one hand, NATO has established a number of explicit political pre-conditions -- for example, effective civilian control of the military -- for applicant countries. This is a straight-forward application of traditional II conditionality: the use of incentives -- the security benefits that flow from membership in the world's most powerful military alliance -- to alter a state's behavior or policies. 
On the other, NATO has gone to some lengths to promote dialogue and to build a broader domestic political consensus favoring change. From the modest beginnings of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in the early 1990s, these efforts were significantly accelerated with the January 1994 adoption of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Over the past 6 years, PfP has developed dramatically, with most NATO officials now arguing that "the level of transparency, knowledge and cooperation is nearly as great for countries that participate fully in PfP as for full NATO members. Partners are 'de facto members: they plan, exercise, and consult'." In 1997, NATO established the Partnership Coordination Cell in Mons, Belgium (NATO headquarters), which is staffed by officers from PfP countries (that is, non-members) who work closely with the Alliance's supreme command. It is hard to imagine a similar unit being established at the EU Commission. 
What is the purpose of PfP? In the words of one NATO official, "the whole point of PfP was to teach them [possible new members] how NATO does these things." Both official documents and field work confirm this interpretation. On the former, NATO's own enlargement study emphasizes how PfP should promote knowledge transfer and learning through seminars, workshops and day-to-day interactions. Moreover, recent field work suggests that the seminars and "defense diplomacy" of PfP have had just such value-transmission effects in several states, including the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
One can thus argue that NATO is seeking to induce national compliance via two, complementary causal pathways. One is traditional: a clear set of pre-conditions, the fulfilment of which is linked to particular benefits. The hope is to alter the calculations of national officials so that state policy becomes compliant with core NATO aims. The second pathway is more ambitious and has clear links to the policy-dialogue approach advanced by critics of conditionality. The goal, over time and through sustained social interaction, is to promote compliance by diffusing knowledge. The hope is not so much to change the calculations of domestic elites, but their very ways of thinking.
Council of Europe. Of the three European regional organizations surveyed here, traditional, ex ante conditionality has played the smallest role in the CE's post-1989 enlargement. Three reasons explain this state of affairs. Until the immediate post-Cold War years, the Council had rarely faced instances of major non-compliance by current or prospective members. Its was a comfortable club of West European democracies, most of which most of the time were in compliance with the CE's core norms -- enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). For sure, there have been numerous cases of non-compliant behavior regarding particular aspects of the ECHR. However, with the exceptions of Greece during the late 1960s (military rule) and Turkey in the 1980s/1990s (situation of the Kurds), major episodes of non-compliance were notable only by their absence during the Council's first fifty years. Thus, conditionality was not necessary as a policy tool. 
A second reason for the lack of conditionality was geo-political and bureaucratic. During the early 1990s, several CE member states and officials in its Political Directorate endorsed a policy of rapid enlargement, with the specific goal of offering Russia membership at an early date. The former favored this for geo-strategic reasons. No matter what its rights record, Russia was simply too large and powerful to exclude from the Council. The latter endorsed the policy largely for bureaucratic reasons. The more extensive the CE's official ties with Russia, the greater a role for the Political Directorate, which would be responsible for coordinating the various inter-governmental programs that would precede and follow its formal accession. Individuals in the CE's Human Rights Directorate, who had a much better sense of the real human-rights situation in Russia, strongly opposed early admission. Instead, they argued for a slower enlargement process with clear elements of political conditionality.
Proponents of the go-slow approach lost the battle, however, and countries like Russia (February 1996) and Ukraine (November 1995) were granted membership despite non-compliance with basic Council norms. Their accession did come with a form of conditionality, but it was very soft and not ex ante. That is, Russia and Ukraine (and several other countries) were granted membership, but with a stipulation that by a certain future date they would take specific actions -- for example, elimination of the death penalty and ratification of the ECHR. In some areas, this strategy worked (Russia's February 1998 ratification of the ECHR), but in other cases and most notably with the death penalty, these stipulations were not met by the agreed times. A pattern of partly non-compliant behavior thus emerged, which was all too predictable to critics of this weak form of conditionality. 
A third reason for the CE's reluctance to utilize conditionality for promoting compliance is more philosophical and normative. In particular, there is a deeply held belief in Strasbourg that a crucial alternative compliance pathway is "to bring them [new members] into the club, where we can use peer pressure and the force of example to socialize them into our way of doing things" -- as more than one CE official told me. In social science terms, one could argue that many in Strasbourg see the Council as a social and persuasive institution, whose members are crucially affected and changed by their participation in it. 
This philosophy is reflected in several CE compliance initiatives in the post-Cold War era. Already in early 1990s, it moved to create a special guest observer status, where prospective members were invited to participate in an array of Council activities. The hope, much like for NATO's PfP, was that sustained, daily interaction would lead to value transmission and learning on the applicant's part. In a similar fashion, over the past five years, the CE has developed a new, confidential monitoring procedure that is again premised on the belief that participation, dialogue and socialization are a necessary part of any II compliance toolkit. To drive home that the monitoring is really about mutual dialogue and not imposition by the strong (long-standing members) on the weak (applicants, new members), it is extended to all Council member states. 
In sum, the Council has begun to craft a compliance program consistent with the critiques offered of standard IMF-type conditionality. On the one hand and much more so than in the early 1990s, it recognizes there is a role for political conditionality, with its attendant elements of pressure and coercion. On the other, it emphasizes strategies consistent with the policy-dialogue approach for promoting compliance. The CE thus views national agents as both strategic actors and as social beings capable of learning and value change. Given that such views accord well with empirical reality (for agents do regularly enact both roles), there is much to be said for this program. At the same time, it in no way reflects a carefully crafted compliance master plan; rather, through trial and error, the Council has stumbled and found its way to this combined approach. 
Human Rights in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Conditionality and Dialogue
My focus in the current section is narrow. While recognizing that a number of different regional organizations and transnational groups have sought to promote Ukrainian compliance with basic international rights standards, I consider only efforts by the Council of Europe. This choice was influenced by analytic concerns. Recall that my interest is to theorize better the alternatives advanced by critics of traditional conditionality strategies. Given that the CE has ended up with a conditionality-compliance policy that includes these alternatives, it is an obvious choice on theoretical grounds. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. I begin by reviewing post-Soviet Ukraine's record of compliance with core CE standards in several areas, including citizenship and minority rights. I then offer an institutional explanation for the country's growing record of non-compliance in recent years. A third sub-section examines the Council's response to this state of affairs: Its development of a mixed -- conditionality and dialogue -- compliance strategy. I close by asking an important counterfactual: Would Ukraine's compliance record with European rights standards be any different absent the Council?
Human Rights in Ukraine. During Ukraine's guest observer status (1992 - 1995) and, since 1995, full membership, its discourse and law on citizenship and rights issues have changed in ways consistent with CE norms. For example, it has created a civic definition of citizenship, which helped policymakers craft one of the more liberal minority-rights regimes in the former Soviet area. A decree and law on national minorities permitting a high degree of cultural autonomy were promulgated. In addition, civic conceptions of citizenship and minority rights were explicitly embraced in the new constitution adopted in June 1996. These liberalizing changes brought key aspects of Ukrainian rights policy into compliance with post-Cold War CE norms on nationality-citizenship and minority rights. 
This pattern of successful compliance should not be underestimated. From the vantage point of today, such changes perhaps appear as insignificant or pre-ordained. However, this was not the consensus view of analysts in the years immediately following the Soviet collapse in 1991. Many feared that Ukraine, with its multi-ethnic make-up and large (20%) Russian minority population, would fall prey to the violent ethnic separatism seen in Moldova, Georgia and the former Yugoslavia. Yet, this never came to pass. Moreover, Ukraine never even experienced the ethnic tension that has plagued states such as Estonia and Latvia, which also have large Russian populations.
Aside from CE norms, several other factors combined to produce this positive outcome -- most importantly, a legacy of multi-cultural tolerance in and a historical context one of whose defining features is Ukraine's lack of a developed sense of national identity. On the last point, it has been over 300 years since Ukraine had anything approaching an independent existence. 
These cultural and historical factors made Ukrainian elites during the early and mid-1990s susceptible to the CE's soft conditionality policies for promoting compliance. There is considerable process-level evidence that Ukraine's observer status, along with numerous CE-sponsored seminars and workshops designed to promote social interaction and dialogue, played important roles in helping the country formulate its nationality and rights policies. For sure, interviews reveal that incentives offered by the CE and careful, strategic calculations by Ukrainian elites were factors, for membership in the Council would legitimize both Ukraine's return to Europe and its independence from Russia. Yet, just as important were the persuasion and dialogue that helped Ukrainian elites learn the proper rights policies for a democratizing, European polity. 
Domestic Institutions and Non-Compliance. If I stopped at this point (1995-96), Ukraine would appear as a success story: The Council's "bring-them-into-the-club," soft conditionality-compliance approach had worked. Indeed, a September 1995 CE assessment noted "the spectacular progress in bringing the constitutional provisions and general legislation of Ukraine into conformity with the Council of Europe's general principles (notably the European Convention on Human Rights)." 
More recent events paint a different picture and suggest, as critics have noted, the importance of integrating institutional variables into studies of the II-conditionality-compliance relation. At first glance, it seems puzzling that the same agents who had learned new preferences on human/minority rights and citizenship were unmotivated to insure that proper bureaucratic machinery was in place to implement laws and policies based on them. However, given the continuing centralization of state structures in Ukraine and consequent autonomy from key societal actors, they had few strategic incentives for worrying about such matters. 
Not surprisingly then, Ukraine went from being one of the Council of Europe's "star pupils" to something more akin to a "problem child" as the 1990s progressed. Problems arose in citizenship policy (situation of Crimean Tartars), minority rights (status of Russian language) and human rights (implementing penal reform; continuing use of death penalty). My argument is not that Ukrainian policymakers had unlearned their new preferences or that Council compliance strategies had failed; rather, incentives flowing from the domestic institutional context led these elites unintentionally to undercut Ukraine's ability to comply with CE prescriptions. Specifically, the institutional incentive structure inherited from Soviet times generated unintended consequences, namely, inattention to implementation mechanisms. The result was what one might call involuntary non-compliance. 
An example taken from the human-rights area is helpful. An important step forward for Ukraine has been elimination of the death penalty. Indeed, a condition of CE membership is that states eliminate death penalty statutes from their judicial codes. When Ukraine joined the Council in November 1995, it agreed that such laws would be removed within three years, that is, by November 1998. However, this still had not occurred as of mid-1999. In 1995, President Kuchma had done the logical thing, given the institutional context. Just like in Soviet times, he issued a decree -- in this case, announcing a moratorium on executions. The necessary implementation procedures -- changes to the Ukrainian constitution and judicial code, an information campaign to convince a sceptical public why the penalty should be banned -- were never fully carried out. In fact, Ukraine conducted 167 executions during 1996, which, worldwide, was second only to China. 
Conditionality, Dialogue and Compliance. To say the least, Council officials were dismayed at this sequence of events, and began to rethink their policies on the conditionality-compliance nexus. The outcome was not a turn to the hard, ex ante conditionality practiced by the IMF or EU, but a two-fold, mixed response.
First, since roughly 1997, there has been a much greater willingness on the CE's part to employ the pressure and incentives that are the stock in trade of the traditional conditionality toolkit. This is seen most notably in a series of monitoring resolutions passed by the Council's Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), which have demanded compliance with CE norms by certain states by fixed dates. These resolutions are in the public domain and intended to generate pressure on recalcitrant governments by mobilizing domestic and transnational pressure. For the non-compliant states, the incentive to comply is an explicit threat to suspend them from PACE and, at a later date, to recommend their expulsion from the Council. Clearly, this is an attempt to influence the compliance calculations of national elites. 
Second, the CE has sought to reinforce the social context of membership, where compliance is not coerced, but learned through interaction and debate. Since late 1994, the Council's Committee of Ministers (CM) -- its top decisionmaking body -- has been developing a new, confidential monitoring procedure, many features of which resonate with the policy-dialogue approach advocated by critics of conditionality. This non-public process is designed not to sanction, but persuade recalcitrant members to move toward compliance. 
Several aspects of the CM monitoring are worth highlighting. For one, it is built around an ongoing series of small, private meetings in Strasbourg that bring together CE bureaucrats, experts and national officials. There are at least three such meetings per year, each of which lasts two days. They are thus not a set of disconnected events, but a "continuous exercise" designed to promote constructive social interaction and exchange. 
To minimize feelings of resentment and imposition, the sessions operate on the principle of non-discrimination, which means that the compliance records of all member states are considered. This works as follows. Each two-day session is devoted to a particular theme -- compliance with CE norms on freedom of expression, say. Prior to each meeting, the Secretary General's Monitoring Unit prepares an extensive dossier of materials, which includes a country-by-country overview -- to continue the example -- on freedom of expression. In compiling data, the Monitoring Unit relies on materials provided by national governments and "any relevant information it has been able to attain." The latter often comes from independent experts, media reports or NGOs, and can offset potential biases in materials submitted by the states themselves.
These overviews, and the debates and discussions they spark, are then returned to at later sessions for follow up. The Committee of Ministers (or, more typically, their deputies) will then adopt certain decisions. These may include the convening of practitioner-expert seminars (for example, on CE norms regarding freedom of expression), revisions to the CE's cooperation program with a particular state (so as to assist it with compliance problems), or other undefined "specific actions." Whatever their exact form, these decisions are designed to promote compliance more through cooperation and dialogue than through coercion or sanctions. 
Indeed, the central dynamic at the sessions is not finger pointing and shaming, but discussion and persuasion. The operative principle is that monitoring should take "the form of 'co-operation' (rather than confrontation and the levelling of accusations)." It is worth quoting at length one Council document on how the meetings work.
There is thus both an individual and collective recognition that certain situations are not compatible with commitments entered into and that these situations must be changed. This process of recognition is facilitated by the fact that the discussions take place in camera and that an atmosphere of understanding and co-operation allows Representatives of member States to become aware of other member States' opinions on certain aspects of their national situation. They also discover that other member States have had to face similar problems. Exchange of experience can therefore take place to identify ways of dealing with the situation.
In this process, "diplomatic persuasion" is seen as playing a central role. 
If the above outlines how the new monitoring procedure works in theory, the next -- and more important -- step is to explore its practical application. Has it made a difference in improving the compliance record of states such as Ukraine, and, if so, how exactly has this occurred? In official documents, the Council argues the new monitoring procedure has had some success, and that "in certain cases the national authorities have changed situations that have been the subject of Committee of Minister's monitoring." My own field work provides tentative support for this assertion, however, with the proviso that other factors -- most notably, threats and pressure generated through PACE's public monitoring -- have played a role as well. 
To substantiate the latter claim, I return to the case of Ukraine and its mixed pattern of compliance/non-compliance with core CE norms, especially as regards capital punishment. Recall that by late 1998, the country was clearly non-compliant with an obligation it had undertaken in November 1995 to remove death-penalty laws from its statutes within three years. The Council's response proceeded along two tracks: increased pressure and coercion, and enhanced dialogue and attempts at persuasion. On the former, the CE gradually escalated pressure on Ukraine, most notably through hearings and resolutions of its Parliamentary Assembly. These began in December 1997 and became more specific -- and threatening -- with time. By late 1998, these threats had apparently led Ukrainian President Kuchma to realize that he had to do more than issue decrees to eliminate the death penalty: In December 1998, he called on the Ukrainian legislature to pass a law abolishing the death penalty. 
During the latter half of 1999, the pressure was further increased. In May and June, PACE's standing Monitoring Committee issued a report, which went into considerable detail on Ukraine's record of compliance/non-compliance -- including on the death penalty. It gave a deadline of January 2000 by which point the Assembly should start procedures that could lead to Ukraine's expulsion. This first CE track thus sought to use explicit incentives -- continuing membership in the Council -- to influence the calculations of Ukrainian elites. Compliance with CE norms on the death penalty would result from public pressure and shaming. Indeed, the head of the CE's Committee of Ministers publicly condemned Ukraine in October 1999, declaring that it "must have the same standards on the rule of law, on the rule of right, on democracy" as other members. 
In parallel with this first track, however, a much less public CE effort was underway to convince Ukrainian elites that abolishment of capital punishment was the appropriate thing to do as a democratizing, rule-of-law polity. Here, the Council's new confidential monitoring procedure played an important role. By the fall of 1998, the Committee of Ministers had decided that compliance with CE norms on the death penalty should be a theme of the in-camera monitoring. During the first half of 1999, the Secretary General's Monitoring Unit collected information on the status of the death penalty in CE member states. In keeping with the non-discrimination principle, data were collected from all states, but in reality this particular theme was chosen because of compliance problems in two members: Russia and Ukraine. In June and November 1999, confidential monitoring sessions were then held on the death penalty, each lasting two days. 
What happened during these meetings? First and true to its spirit of dialogue, the monitoring was not characterized by finger pointing and arm-twisting. Rather, it was marked by attempts at persuasion, peer pressure and giving practical advice. For sure, it was immediately obvious to all that Ukraine -- and Russia -- were the problem cases. Yet, when a Ukrainian representative noted that it would be "political suicide" to ban the death penalty given popular support for it, he/she was not threatened with expulsion from the Council. Instead, CE officials and representatives from several other member states offered practical advice on "changing people's minds" about the issue, or how they, in earlier years, had dealt with a public supportive of capital punishment. As one representative said: "Look, you [Ukraine] have a problem; we earlier had a similar problem; here is how we dealt with it." 
Second, the language and policy of overt threats or sanctions were notable by their absence. Several different countries pointed out to Ukraine (and Russia) that, as a matter of principle and in regards to the use of capital punishment, Awe just don't do things that way" as civilized, rule-of-law states in Europe. The emphasis, instead, was on suggesting practical solutions.
The sessions thus tried to walk a fine line when it came to non-compliant states. On the one hand, it was felt that peer pressure and persuasion would only work if such states felt themselves in a "weak and exposed position," if they were a bit "uncomfortable." On the other, you "don't want to stretch things too much, humiliating and embarrassing a country." This would lead to a breakdown in the collective spirit of problem solving and learning.
Did any of this "jawboning" matter? That is, did the attempts at dialogue and persuasion have causal effect? Both discursive/language-based and behavioral indicators suggest the answer is a partial yes. On the former, one Ukrainian participant at the meetings has indicated they helped him/her think about the death penalty issue in new ways. The combination of subtle peer pressure ("we just don't do things that way in Europe") and new knowledge (a principled discussion of why capital punishment was unacceptable in a democratic polity) had induced a process of learning. In this particular instance, it was likely facilitated by the individual's background. Before coming to Strasbourg, he/she had been a professor of law in Ukraine. This type of professional training made him/her more open to the argumentative, academic discourse that characterizes the confidential monitoring sessions. 
At the behavioral level, additional evidence that the monitoring mattered comes from the dramatic change in Ukrainian policy on the death penalty. In late December 1999 -- that is, in the period immediately following the two in-camera monitoring sessions -- Ukraine ruled the death penalty to be unconstitutional, thus removing any legal basis for it in domestic legal statutes. The CE praised this ruling and its Parliamentary Assembly has since put in abeyance moves toward suspending Ukraine's membership. 
In sum, the Council, as a social institution, has had some success in socializing and teaching Ukraine about its ways -- as the death penalty case suggests. Compliance, in part, has been learned through social exchange and not coerced through incentives. My choice of language here -- "partial yes," "in part" -- is intentional. For the evidence is clear that the overt CE pressure documented above played a role as well. "It is no accident," as the Soviet news agency TASS used to declare, that the change in Ukrainian policy came in the face of escalating public pressure and threats from the Council and, especially, PACE. 
At the same time, it would be a mistake to attribute all the causal weight in this story to pressure and coercion. The public threats had been a constant since late 1997. Yet, Ukrainian policy only changed two years later, which suggests other factors were at work. The difference, by late 1999, was the existence of a two-track CE compliance strategy of conditionality/coercion and socialization/learning. It reached different parts of the Ukrainian political spectrum -- political elites in Strasbourg and Kyiv, members of the legislature -- through a combination of techniques, thus maximizing the likelihood of a successful compliance outcome. 
The Counterfactual: Human Rights in Ukraine Absent the CE. At this point, it is important to consider a counterfactual. Specifically, one could ask whether Ukrainian policy on nationality-citizenship, the death penalty and rights more generally would have been any different in the absence of norms promoted by the Council. That is, am I mistakenly attributing causality in the above account, arguing that national compliance was a function of the Council's mixed conditionality strategy when other factors were in fact at work?
Consider two possibilities, both of which would suggest the dominance of domestic political calculations in explaining "compliance." For starters, over 25% of Ukraine's population consists of national minorities, and the majority of these are Russians. With a large neighbour who clearly has difficulty in reconciling itself to its loss of empire, could not calculating self interest alone explain the adoption of liberal citizenship and rights policies? Moreover, as a newly established, democratizing state, it might very well be in the political self interest of Ukrainian elites to bind themselves to CE norms, thus locking in domestic reforms (such as elimination of the death penalty) against potential non-democratic threats. 
There are weak and strong responses to such queries. The weak one is that, yes, self interest explains why new policies were considered in the first place, but that Council-sponsored norms tell much about their content. In this account, the foundational causal factor is a calculation of costs and benefits that has little, if anything, to do with the CE and its conditionality policies. The appearance of compliance is just that -- an appearance.
A stronger answer begins by observing that a country's objective interest in dealing with basic rights issues is not always clear -- for example, consider the differing ways in which Estonia, Hungary and Latvia have dealt with minorities within their borders. Compared to other similarly situated and democratizing countries with similar problems, Ukraine has reacted with a more liberal and inclusive conception of minorities' place within the state. Here, there is a much greater role for CE norms in shaping the very definition of interests. More specifically, it is compliance with these norms -- through both strategic and non-strategic modes of interaction -- that helps explain Ukrainian policy. Compliance is real and no longer epiphenomenal.
While my research is still in progress, the evidence at this point supports the stronger answer, where the compliance story does have causal force. Moreover, my process-tracing research methodology minimizes reliance on correlational arguments, and thus reduces the likelihood that I have overlooked the type of factors raised by exploring the counterfactual. Finally, as the above analysis makes clear, I am already well aware of the role played by strategic considerations.
My analysis has both policy and analytic implications. I treat each in turn.
Conditionality and Enlargement. The current expansion of European regional organization suggests three lessons for the broader literature on and debate about the II-conditionality-compliance nexus. First, hard, ex ante conditionality, when practiced in isolation, either does not work (the IMF in Russia and Ukraine) or, if successful, is likely to have detrimental consequences in the future. On the latter, the EU's strict conditionality regime appears already to be generating the ownership and lack-of-consensus problems that are all too predictable to critics. While there is little doubt that most applicant countries in East Europe will comply with EU dictates, the cost may well be serious domestic political problems down the road.
Second, soft, more participatory approaches -- again when practised in isolation -- do not work. The Council of Europe tried this tactic in the early 1990s, and the record is clear. Where such socialization policies "worked," they were probably not needed to promote compliance in the first place -- for example, with a country such as Hungary that was well on the way to being a rule-of-law democracy when it joined the CE. Moreover, they failed spectacularly vis-a-vis hard cases like Ukraine or Russia. Put differently, advocates of both the "bring-them-into-the-club-where-we-can-socialize-them" and the "keep-them-outside-the-club-until-they-are-already-compliant" policies are wrong.
Third, a two-track, conditionality-plus-dialogue approach is a real alternative. The national compliance record attained by both NATO (hard, political conditionality plus a robust participatory element [PfP]) and, more recently, the CE (its combined incentives-persuasion strategy) appears promising. Such approaches, which lack the element of strong external imposition characteristic of ex ante conditionality, can help applicant states develop the necessary domestic institutional capacity and political consensus for making compliance in word turn into compliance in deed. There is still much wrong here -- for example, both the NATO and CE strategies are too elitist in orientation -- but the basic strategy seems sensible.
Theorizing Policy Dialogues. Students of international law, constructivists in political science and development economists who criticize traditional IMF-type conditionality all agree. Promoting national compliance with II procedures and norms is not just a matter of getting the incentives and threats right. Something else is needed -- policy dialogues, jawboning, learning, persuasion and the like. The exact word or phrase may vary, but all these scholars share a common insight: The very process of social interaction within II's can promote compliance through knowledge transfer and socialization. The Economist newspaper, no friend of most II's, is in fact paying them a back-handed complement when it characterizes organizations like the CE as a mere "talking shop" that "works hard to help its new members to understand their responsibilities." 
The challenge, though, is to theorize this role for talk, language and communication. In a larger project, I have turned to work in communications research and social psychology to analyze the processes of persuasion, argumentation and social learning advocated by proponents of policy dialogues. This has allowed me to develop testable hypotheses and scope conditions for when persuasive agents embedded in international institutions are more or less likely to promote compliance by changing the basic values of individuals through social communication. The approach not only begins to develop an analytic base for notions of dialogue and jawboning; it also fills a decisionmaking- and agency-gap in constructivist studies of international institutions. 
Let me provide a few examples, which reinterpret the above empirics in light of theoretical propositions drawn from the larger project. For one, my hypotheses suggest that persuasion is more likely to be effective in promoting compliance when the persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the persuadee belongs or wants to belong. Returning to the case study, this helps explain why the strategy of making states like Ukraine and Russia (the persuadees, in this case) feel a bit "weak and exposed ... and uncomfortable" during the confidential CM monitoring sessions made sense. It highlighted the existence of in- and out-groups even within the CE, thus facilitating persuasion's causal role.
The literature also indicates that persuasion is more likely to be effective in promoting compliance when the persuader does not lecture or demand, but, instead, acts out principles of serious deliberative argument. In retrospect, this suggests that making constructive discussion and debate the central dynamic at the sessions was a wise choice on the CE's part. As several interviewees noted, this created a non-confrontational atmosphere where national agents could reconsider their views, thus creating an opening where peer pressure and persuasion could help change attitudes.
Finally, one can deduce from the literature that persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuader-persuadee interaction occurs in less politicized and more insulated, in-camera settings -- as with the CM monitoring procedure. With its emphasis on secrecy, this hypothesis raises important questions of democratic accountability and legitimacy both within international institutions and between them and their member states. Still, the evidence adduced above -- and elsewhere -- indicates that persuasion is more likely to promote compliance in these insulated contexts. 
I recognize that these propositions are only a start, and need further specification and testing. Yet they do capture and help model a seemingly ubiquitous, social feature of the role played by international institutions in promoting compliance. As critics never tire of noting, such bodies are often nothing more than talk shops. Yet, as the above suggests, under certain conditions "talk" can promote compliance. Given the current and dramatic expansion of regional organization in Europe and given our incomplete analytic toolkit for exploring the II-conditionality-compliance nexus, a move in the directions sketched here would seem essential.
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[*] FIRST DRAFT: COMMENTS MOST WELCOME! Prepared for delivery at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 31 - September 3, 2000. Copyright by the American Political Science Association. The financial support of the Norwegian Research Council is gratefully acknowledged. I would also like to thank a number of individuals at the Council of Europe; their professionalism and openness made possible the research on which this essay is based.
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. On the quantitative and qualitative expansion of conditionality, see Killick 1998, 1-6.
. Killick 1998, passim, is a useful introduction to the theory and practice of conditionality.
. Killick 1998, 6-9 -- quotes at p.6.
. Chayes and Chayes 1993; Underdal 1998, 20-23; and Joerges and Zuern 1999, 5-7.
. The following draws upon Nelson 1996; Collier 1997, chapter 2; Killick 1998, chapters 2-3; Gilbert, Powell and Vines 1999, F616-F622; Zuern 2000, 19-20; and "Dancing in Kenya to the Donors' Tune," Economist, August 5, 2000. The 60% figure is cited in Gilbert, Hopkins, Powell and Roy 1997, 509n.
. Collier 1997, 54; Killick 1998, 156, respectively.
. Alan Beattie, "World Bank Aid Strategy Flawed Says Departing Chief Economist," Financial Times, November 29, 1999 (for quote); and "The Bumpy Ride of Joe Stiglitz," Economist, December 18, 1999.
. "Development Finance: Old Battle; New Strategy," Economist, January 8, 2000; and "Koehler's Quest," Economist, July 29, 2000. Also see Paul Krugman, "Bash the IMF for the Right Reasons," International Herald Tribune, March 11-12, 2000.
. Gilbert, Hopkins, Powell and Roy 1997; Collier 1997, 64; and Killick 1998, 10-11, 101, 108. Both Gilbert's political economy and Killick's principal/agent models of conditionality are fully consistent with the assumptions laid out above. See Gilbert, Hopkins, Powell and Roy 1997, 514; and Killick 1998, chapter 5.
. For evidence of calculating, strategic behavior by elites in post-Cold War Europe in the face of western conditionality, see Haggard 1993; and Andrew Tully, "Ukrainian Official Not Disappointed by Washington Visit," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (hereafter, RFE/RL) Newsline, August 7, 2000.
. Collier 1997, 64, 73-75 (quotes at p.75). Also see Killick 1998, 176-77.
. Gilbert, Powell and Vines 1999, passim (quotes at p.F615). See also "The Bumpy Ride of Joe Stiglitz," Economist, December 18, 1999.
. Killick 1998, 114.
. Killick 1998, 11, 40-50, 177-90 (quotes at pp.183, 187-88). Also see Nelson 1996, 1553-58; and Gilbert, Hopkins, Powell and Roy 1997, 512-14.
. Gilbert, Hopkins, Powell and Roy 1997, 514; Gilbert, Powell and Vines 1999, F621-F622.
. For the international-law work, see Chayes and Chayes 1995; Koh 1997, 2648-49; and Joerges and Zuern 1999. For the constructivist arguments, see Risse 2000; and Checkel 2000a.
. On EU enlargement, see Fierke and Wiener 1999; Grabbe 1999; Monar 2000, 15-19; on NATO, see Wallander 2000b, 35-41; on the CE, see Checkel 2000b, and below. More generally on the post-Cold War expansion of European regional organization, see Schimmelfennig 2000a; and Idem 2000b.
. The following draws upon Grabbe's excellent and balanced analysis. Grabbe 1999. See also Vachudova 1998; and Smith 1998, 259-62.
. Grabbe 1999, 24. While most of the impetus for this expanded conditionality came from the EU Commission, European Parliament or member states, a few applicant countries actively sought it, thus hoping "to tie their hands" in the face of domestic opposition to reform. Jacoby 1998, 10-11; and Grabbe 1999, 35-36. Also see Moravcsik's discussion of the "lock in" and "democratic delegation" strategies employed by democratizing states. Moravcsik 2000.
. Grabbe 1999, 36.
. Killick 1998, 175; and Grabbe 1999, 22, 34-37, respectively. On the linkage between EU conditionality and growing anger within applicant states, see Fierke and Wiener 1999; Iankova 2000, 26; Schimmelfennig 2000c; John Lloyd, "A New Wall for Europeans to Climb Over," Financial Times, January 11, 2000; and Laurent Fabius and Hubert Vedrine, "How Russia Can be Helped to Help Itself," Financial Times, April 25, 2000.
. Formally, it is a misnomer to refer to applicant countries. NATO invites countries to join; they may not apply themselves. On NATO, its enlargement and its conditionality policies, see NATO 1995 -- especially chapter 5, paragraphs 70, 72.
. Wallander 2000b, 38-39 (for quote); and Jacoby 1998, 11. Wallander's research is based on extensive field work and interviewing in Brussels and Washington.
. Wallander 2000b, 37; NATO 1995, chapter 3, paragraphs 32, 37-39; and Gheciu 2000, respectively. Also see Wallander 2000a; and Alexander Nicoll, "'Defense Diplomacy' Hopes to Make Allies of Old Foes," Financial Times, August 8, 2000. On NATO's constitutive, value-shaping properties, see also Risse-Kappen 1995.
. My insights on the CE's conditionality policies draw upon five rounds of field work and interviewing at its headquarters in Strasbourg. Interviewees included approximately 25 middle- and high-ranking officials in its Human Rights, Political and Legal directorates, as well as individuals in the Secretary General's office.
. Collier 1997, 59-60; and "Walter Schwimmer, Timid Moral Policeman," Economist, November 27, 1999. On the conditionality attached to Ukrainian and Russian membership in the Council, see Council of Europe 1999a, 42-57.
. Interviews, Council of Europe Secretariat, April 1997, November 1998.
.Council of Europe 1996, 4-5. Again, the contrast with the EU's conditionality strategies is instructive. It is hard to imagine the Commission establishing a procedure where both current and prospective members would be assessed on their degree of compliance with the acquis.
. A skeptic might ask whether conditionality can play any role with the CE. It has few material incentives to offer applicants, especially when compared to the EU (access to regional funds, say), NATO (enhanced military security) or the IMF. However, it can offer social legitimacy: Membership marks an applicant state's return to Europe as a democratizing, rule-of-law polity. For why such legitimacy matters to states, see Franck 1990; for evidence of why it clearly matters to elites in East Europe, see Schimmelfennig 2000a.
. On the other institutions and groups seeking to influence human rights in transition states such as Ukraine, see Adler 1998; Farrell and Flynn 1999; Ratner 2000 (all on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe); and Mendelson and Glenn 2000 (on transnational NGOs).
. Markus 1996a; Idem 1996b; Economist, July 6, 1996; Korshak and Sych 1998; Basiuk 2000, 40-41. For background, see Wilson 1996; and Wolchik and Zviglyanich 2000, Introduction. For the CE's nationality and minority rights norms, see Council of Europe 1994; Idem 1997a; Idem 2000; and, for analysis, Checkel 1999, 93-96; and Idem 2000c.
. Von Hagen 1995; and Laba 1996, 12-13.
. By process-level evidence, I mean a reconstruction of Ukrainian-CE interactions that draws upon three data streams: interviews with Council and Ukrainian policymakers; official CE and Ukrainian documents; and other Ukrainian primary-source materials. See Checkel 2000a, 23-31, for details.
. Opinion No.190 (26 September 1995) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, as reproduced in Council of Europe 1999b, 166-67.
. On the linkage between domestic institutions and conditionality more generally, see Nelson 1996, 1553-54.
. This is similar to what two-level game theorists call involuntary defection. Evans, Jacobson, Putnam 1993, 440-42. For the institutional logic, see Cortell and Peterson 2000, chapter 1. Some students of compliance also refer to involuntary non-compliance, but attribute it to a lack of domestic institutional capacity. Zuern 2000, 10-11. On more recent developments in Ukraine, see Interviews, Council of Europe Secretariat, April 1997, November 1998, December 1999; Financial Times, May 25, 1999; and Hyde 1999.
. Interviews, Oleksandr Pavlichenko, Director, Center for Information and Documentation of the Council of Europe in Ukraine, Kyiv, June 1997; Council of Europe Secretariat, April 1997; "Keine Gnade fuer Moerder: Der Europarat protestiert, doch die Ukraine exekutiert," Sueddeutsche Zeitung, June 21-22, 1998; and Council of Europe 1999a, 45.
. On PACE's compliance resolutions and monitoring, see Council of Europe 1998, 7-8. See also "Europe's Council of Correctness," Economist, May 8, 1999.
. Interviews, Andrew Drzemczewski, Head, and Markus Jaeger, Deputy Head, Secretary General's Monitoring Unit, Council of Europe Secretariat, April 1997, November 1998, December 1999; Council of Europe 1997b; and, especially, Idem 1998, 8-24. This behind-the-scenes approach of the CM monitoring thus complements PACE's public procedures.
. Council of Europe 1998, 13.
. Council of Europe 1998, 13-15. For a detailed listings of official decisions taken as a result of CM monitoring, see Council of Europe 1999d, passim.
. Council of Europe 1998, 10, 20-21.
. Council of Europe 1998, 19-20, n43.
. "Council of Europe may Suspend Ukraine over Executions," RFE/RL Newsline, December 18, 1997; "Kuchma asks Parliament to Abolish Death Penalty," RFE/RL Newsline, December 21, 1998; "Ukraine's Membership in Council of Europe's Assembly Threatened," RFE/RL Newsline, January 29, 1999.
. Charles Clover, "Unhappily Poised between East and West," Financial Times, October 29, 1999. See also Council of Europe 1999c -- especially section I, paragraph 3; "Council of Europe Body Moves to Suspend Ukraine," RFE/RL Newsline, May 21, 1999; and "Council of Europe Delays Decision on Ukraine," RFE/RL Newsline, June 25, 1999.
. Council of Europe 1999d, Appendix V; Idem 1999e, Appendix II. Council of Europe 1999e, 8-131, compiles the information on the death penalty submitted by member states.
. Interviews, Andrew Drzemczewski, Head, Secretary General's Monitoring Unit, CE Secretariat; Markus Jaeger, Deputy Head, Secretary General's Monitoring Unit, CE Secretariat; Hans-Peter Furrer, Head, Political Directorate, CE Secretariat; Ambassador Olexandre Kupchyshyn, Head, Ukrainian Permanent Representation to the Council of Europe; Jean-Louis Laurens, Deputy Head, Political Directorate, CE Secretariat; and Jiri Vogl, Advisor, Political Directorate, CE Secretariat -- all in December 1999. Drzemczewski, Jaeger, Furrer and Kupchyshyn participated in the sessions described here. A methodological note: My account should be considered preliminary pending access to additional, primary sources -- for example, summaries of the actual monitoring sessions.
. Critics of the new monitoring procedure attack it precisely because of its academic nature, which -- they feel -- substitutes persuasion and debate for diplomatic pressure and arm twisting. Interviews, Hans-Peter Furrer, Head, Political Directorate, CE Secretariat; and Jean-Louis Laurens, Deputy Head, Political Directorate, CE Secretariat -- both in December 1999. On jawboning and compliance, see Chayes and Chayes 1993, 204-5.
. "Death Penalty in Ukraine Declared Unconstitutional," RFE/RL Newsline, January 3, 2000; and "Council of Europe Praises Ukraine for Move to Abolish Death Penalty," RFE/RL Newsline, January 6, 2000.
. Hyde 2000; and Interview, Jean-Louis Laurens, Deputy Head, Political Directorate, CE Secretariat, December 1999.
. See also David Snelbecker, "Ukraine Must Not be Abandoned," Financial Times, April 13, 2000, who similarly argues that the IMF's compliance strategy in Ukraine has failed because of its sole reliance on a one-track, pressure/incentives approach.
. On the latter, see Moravcsik 2000, 220, 245-46, passim.
. Chayes and Chayes 1995, chapter 1; Koh 1997, Part III; Risse 2000; Killick 1998, chapter 7; "Where Worlds Collide," Economist, August 19, 2000; and "Walter Schwimmer, Timid Moral Policeman," Economist, November 27, 1999, respectively.
. For a full discussion of the theory and its operationalization, see Checkel 2000a, 10-17. Within the social psychology and communications literature, see Zimbardo and Leippe 1991; Perloff 1993; Brody, Mutz and Sniderman 1996; Cobb and Kuklinski 1997; and Gibson 1998. On the last point, see Johnston 1998a, b; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Finnemore 1999, chapter 5; and Risse 2000.
. In Checkel 2000a, 17-31, I contrast CE efforts to promote compliance via persuasion in contemporary Germany and Ukraine. Such efforts fare much better in the latter case, due to the still overwhelmingly insulated nature of its political institutions.
[Date of publication in the ARENA Working Paper series: 15.09.2000]