Solveig Hillesund

Hillesund, Solveig (forthcoming). Choosing whom to target: Horizontal inequality and the risk of civil and communal violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 

Hillesund, Solveig (2015). A dangerous discrepancy: Testing the micro-dynamics of horizontal inequality on Palestinian support for armed resistance. Journal of Peace Research,  52(1): 76- 90 . 

Stave, Svein Erik and Solveig Hillesund (2015). Impact of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labour market. ILO/Fafo report. http://www.fafo.no/index.php?option=com_zoo&task=item&item_id=7715&Itemid=923&lang=nb

Hillesund, Solveig (2014). Rasjonalitet, frustrasjon og væpnet motstand: Palestinske holdninger til vold og kompromiss. Babylon, 12(1), s 56- 71. https://www.journals.uio.no/index.php/babylon/article/view/4147/3619

Hillesund, Solveig, Tewodros A. Kebede and Jon Pedersen (2014). The role of education in the transition from relief to Development: A review of existing knowledge and suggested way forward. CAERUS project deliverable D3.1.

Hillesund, Solveig (2013). A Dangerous discrepancy: Testing the micro dynamics of opportunity and grievance on Palestinian support for armed resistance. Masteroppgave, Universitetet i Oslo.

• Hillesund, Solveig; Barrett, Gray; Bahgat, Karim; Dupuy, Kendra; Gates, Scott; Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv; Rustad, Siri Camilla Aas; Strand, Håvard; Urdal, Henrik & Østby, Gudrun (2018). Horizontal inequality and armed conflict: a comprehensive literature review. Revue canadienne d'études du développement / Canadian Journal of Development Studies.  ISSN 0225-5189.  s 1- 19 . doi: 10.1080/02255189.2018.1517641 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv.
• Hillesund, Solveig (2017). Choosing Whom to Target: Horizontal Inequality and the Risk of Civil and Communal Violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution.  ISSN 0022-0027.  63(2), s 528- 554 . doi: 10.1177/0022002717734286 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  Do different types of inequality spur violence with different targets? This article explores whom violent movements choose to target when they take to arms, by comparing civil conflicts, which target the state, to communal conflicts, which target other ethnic groups. Different types of ethnic group disadvantage relate to conflict through different mechanisms. Political exclusion is expected to promote the choice to target the central government rather than other ethnic groups, while economic disadvantages should increase the risk of both civil and communal conflicts. The different expectations stem from two important differences between political and economic horizontal inequalities: only the government has the authority to change the political distribution, while there can be many avenues to economic redistribution; and blame is more straightforwardly assigned to the government for political than for economic disadvantages. Statistical analysis of 155 politically relevant ethnic groups in Africa (1991–2009) provides support for both propositions.

• Hillesund, Solveig (2015). A dangerous discrepancy: Testing the micro-dynamics of horizontal inequality on Palestinian support for armed resistance. Journal of Peace Research.  ISSN 0022-3433.  52(1), s 76- 90 . doi: 10.1177/0022343314551080
• Hillesund, Solveig (2014). Rasjonalitet, frustrasjon og væpnet motstand: Palestinske holdninger til vold og kompromiss. Babylon - Nordisk tidsskrift for Midtøstenstudier.  ISSN 1503-5727.  12(1), s 56- 71

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• Bahgat, Karim; Barrett, Gray; Dupuy, Kendra; Gates, Scott; Hillesund, Solveig; Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv; Rustad, Siri Camilla Aas; Strand, Håvard; Urdal, Henrik & Østby, Gudrun (2017). Inequality and Armed Conflict: Evidence and Policy Recommendations. Conflict Trends. 1.
• Hillesund, Solveig (2014). A Dangerous Discrepancy Testing the microdynamics of horizontal inequality on Palestinian support for armed resistance.

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