Solveig Hillesund

• Hillesund, Solveig (2022). To fight or demonstrate? Micro foundations of inequality and conflict. Conflict Management and Peace Science. ISSN 0738-8942. 39(2), p. 166–190. doi: 10.1177/07388942211017881. Full text in Research Archive
• Hillesund, Solveig & Østby, Gudrun (2020). Inequality, Identity, and Conflict. In Osler Hampson, Fren; Özerdem, Alpaslan & Kent, Jonathan (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Peace, Security and Development. Routledge. ISSN 9780815397854. p. 213–223.
• Dyrstad, Karin & Hillesund, Solveig (2020). Explaining Support for Political Violence: Grievance and Perceived Opportunity. Journal of Conflict Resolution. ISSN 0022-0027. 64(9), p. 1724–1753. doi: 10.1177/0022002720909886. Full text in Research Archive
• Hillesund, Solveig; Barrett, Gray; Bahgat, Karim; Dupuy, Kendra; Gates, Scott & Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv [Show all 10 contributors for this article] (2018). Horizontal inequality and armed conflict: a comprehensive literature review. Revue canadienne d'études du développement. ISSN 0225-5189. p. 1–19. doi: 10.1080/02255189.2018.1517641. Full text in Research Archive
• Hillesund, Solveig (2017). Choosing Whom to Target: Horizontal Inequality and the Risk of Civil and Communal Violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution. ISSN 0022-0027. 63(2), p. 528–554. doi: 10.1177/0022002717734286. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Do different types of inequality spur violence with different targets? This article explores whom violent movements choose to target when they take to arms, by comparing civil conflicts, which target the state, to communal conflicts, which target other ethnic groups. Different types of ethnic group disadvantage relate to conflict through different mechanisms. Political exclusion is expected to promote the choice to target the central government rather than other ethnic groups, while economic disadvantages should increase the risk of both civil and communal conflicts. The different expectations stem from two important differences between political and economic horizontal inequalities: only the government has the authority to change the political distribution, while there can be many avenues to economic redistribution; and blame is more straightforwardly assigned to the government for political than for economic disadvantages. Statistical analysis of 155 politically relevant ethnic groups in Africa (1991–2009) provides support for both propositions.

• Hillesund, Solveig (2015). A dangerous discrepancy: Testing the micro-dynamics of horizontal inequality on Palestinian support for armed resistance. Journal of Peace Research. ISSN 0022-3433. 52(1), p. 76–90. doi: 10.1177/0022343314551080.
• Hillesund, Solveig (2014). Rasjonalitet, frustrasjon og væpnet motstand: Palestinske holdninger til vold og kompromiss. Babylon - Nordisk tidsskrift for Midtøstenstudier. ISSN 1503-5727. 12(1), p. 56–71. doi: 10.5617/ba.4147.

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• Hillesund, Solveig; Gates, Scott & Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv (2019). Choosing Targets and Tactics: How Horizontal Inequality Spurs Conflict. Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Oslo.
• Sivertsen, Gunnar; Solberg, Espen; Børing, Pål; Hillesund, Solveig & Piro, Fredrik Niclas (2019). Bibliometric analysis and career mapping of the SFF scheme : Sub-report II to the SFF evaluation panel. Nordisk institutt for studier av innovasjon, forskning og utdanning NIFU. ISSN 978-82-327-0444-6.
• Bahgat, Karim; Barrett, Gray; Dupuy, Kendra; Gates, Scott; Hillesund, Solveig & Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv [Show all 10 contributors for this article] (2017). Inequality and Armed Conflict: Evidence and Policy Recommendations. Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). ISSN 978-82-7288-791-8. 2017(1).

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