Observers of the war in Ukraine are regularly confronted with a paradox. On one hand, Russia is suffering horrendous casualties and failing — at least by the measure of its initial political objectives. On the other hand, European NATO states are scrambling to rearm in response to what they increasingly view as an existential threat. These two images of Russia — the failing army and the existential threat — seem difficult to reconcile.
Fabian Hoffmann argues that the key to resolving this paradox lies in understanding that a war between NATO and Russia would look fundamentally different from the war currently unfolding in Ukraine. Rather than attempting to seize and hold large swaths of territory, Russia would likely pursue a short, high-intensity campaign aimed at fracturing NATO’s political cohesion. The goal would not be total military victory, but to break the alliance’s resolve.
Generating the forces required for such a scenario is likely manageable for Russia in the short term, particularly once the fighting in Ukraine slows or concludes. Crucially, Russia would not need to restore its full pre-2022 force structure to pose a credible threat in a limited incursion against NATO.
From NATO’s perspective, preparing for such a scenario requires urgent movement toward a credible forward defense posture, the development of a conventional counterstrike capability, and adaptation in the nuclear domain — especially as confidence in the U.S. extended deterrent continues to erode in Europe.