Prof. Mark Bell and Fabian Hoffmann argue that for Europe to assume responsibility for its own security is not simply a matter of generating more political will, higher defense budgets, or better coordinated procurement processes. Europe must navigate a strategic trilemma regarding its nuclear options.
European leaders have three goals they would like to achieve: credible and effective deterrence against Russia; strategic stability, understood as lower incentives for any state to be the first to use a nuclear weapon; and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to new states. Unfortunately, Europe cannot achieve them all. In fact, choosing any two makes the third impossible. If Europe chooses strategic stability and nonproliferation, it may not be able to deter Russia. But to fortify its nuclear posture enough for credible deterrence, Europe must either allow new states to acquire the weapons or sacrifice a degree of strategic stability.
None of the available choices are ideal. But in the absence of protection from across the Atlantic, Europe would be best served by choosing nonproliferation and credible deterrence. Accepting a level of strategic instability in European-Russian relations requires assuming genuine nuclear risks. The alternatives, however, would be even more dangerous.