Blurred lines between conventional and nuclear weapons: Implications for deterrence and stability
Technological shifts are eroding the line between nuclear and conventional weapons. We discuss the implications for strategic stability, and examine Russia’s and South Korea’s deterrence strategies.
Owing to technological developments such as the accuracy revolution in missile technology, nuclear arsenals are increasingly vulnerable to strikes from advanced conventional weapons. How will growing entanglement between nuclear and conventional weapons affect the deterrence strategies of nuclear as well as non-nuclear states? How may it affect strategic stability, including the risk of arms races and of nuclear weapons being used in a crisis?
In collaboration with Oslo Nuclear Project (Oslo University), and the Royal Danish Defense College, the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies/Norwegian Defence University College invites you to join us for a seminar to address these questions.
Based on the article “South Korea's Deterrence Strategy and Stability on the Korean Peninsula”, published in International Security, Ian Bowers and Henrik Hiim will examine how non-nuclear states may rely on conventional weapons to deter nuclear-armed adversaries. They will further discuss the dilemmas associated with such strategies. How credible is deterrence based on conventional weapons? How may such strategies affect arms race dynamics, as well as escalation risks in a crisis?
Drawing on her article "Russian nuclear strategy and conventional inferiority" in the Journal of Strategic Studies and on her more recent research, Kristin Ven Bruusgaard will explore how a nuclear-armed state like Russia seeks to deter conventional aggression of a scale that it deems existential with both nuclear and conventional capabilities. This blending of conventional and nuclear deterrence, through for example expansive use of dual-capable systems, may produce novel escalatory risks in crisis and undermine stability.