Background
I am currently a Postdoc working on the GETGOV-project at the University of Oslo. Previously, I worked at Stockholm University, where I continue to be a member of the DEMCOOP-project (on a 20% position). I received a PhD for my dissertation “Patterns of minister turnover across regime types” from the University of Oslo in 2024.
See my personal webpage for more details:
https://willibaldschmid.github.io/
Academic interests
My current research focuses primarily on the effects of regime type on international cooperation, the interplay of political institutions and elites, and autocratic politics.
- Political elites
- Autocratic politics
- International cooperation
- Democratic breakdown and resilience
Courses taught
At UiO:
Education
- PhD, Political Science, 2024, University of Oslo
- M.A., Politics & Public Administration, 2019, University of Konstanz
- M.Res., Political Science, 2019, Pompeu Fabra University
- B.A., Political Science, 2017, Technical University Dresden
Publications
- Austin S. Matthews and Jonas W. Schmid. Forthcoming. "The price of incompetence: Security failures and selective accountability in autocracies." Journal of Conflict Resolution.
- Jonas W. Schmid, Faradj Koliev, and Jonas Tallberg. 2026. "The rise of autocracies and the transformation of global governance." WFD/PSA Policy Brief Series: The Authoritarian Ecosystem.
- Jonas W. Schmid and Jacob Nyrup. 2026. "Governing for growth? Economic performance and finance minister removal across regime type." Political Research Quarterly. Online first.
- Edward Goldring, Jonas W. Schmid, and Fulya Apaydin. 2026. "Blame-shifting in autocracies following large-scale disasters: Evidence from Turkey." Perspectives on Politics 24(3): 1021–1044.
- Jonas W. Schmid and Lasse Aaskoven. 2025. "Constrainers vs. enablers? Fiscal deficits and the political survival of finance ministers across regime types." Political Studies. Online first.
- Jonas W. Schmid. 2025. "Electoral autocracies, hybrid regimes, and multiparty autocracies: Same, same but different?" Democratization 32(6): 1565–1588. (Winner of the Frank Cass Prize for the best Democratization article by a young scholar)
- Fulya Apaydin, Ferit Serkan Öngel, Jonas W. Schmid, and Erol Ülker. 2022. "When do workers support executive aggrandizement? Lessons from the recent Turkish experience." Industrial Relations Journal 53(2): 142–159.
Tags:
Democracy,
Dictatorship,
Elites,
Comparative Politics,
International relations,
International politics,
International cooperation
Publications
-
Schmid, Jonas Willibald & Nyrup, Jacob
(2026).
Governing for Growth? Economic Performance and Finance Minister Survival in Democracies and Autocracies.
Political research quarterly.
ISSN 1065-9129.
doi:
10.1177/10659129261445888.
Full text in Research Archive
Show summary
Are the highest-ranking public officials rewarded for good performance? Using the case of finance ministers, we argue that this depends on the type of regime. Democratic leaders have incentives to retain high-performing finance ministers because they are accountable to the population through free and fair elections. In the absence of free and fair elections, autocrats face opposing incentives. While growth stabilizes the regime, a high-performing minister of finance can also be a potential rival. Moreover, autocratic finance ministers will, to a higher degree than democratic, be judged on their ability to enrich the leader rather than creating growth. As a result, autocrats reward finance ministers less for economic growth than democrats. Using data on over 2,800 finance ministers in the period 1966–2021, we demonstrate a close link between economic growth and the retention of finance ministers in democracies but not in autocracies. The findings indicate that democracies are better at fostering and rewarding competence at the highest level of political office, speaking to the merits of democracy relative to autocracy.
-
Goldring, Edward; Schmid, Jonas Willibald & Apaydin, Fulya
(2025).
Blame Shifting in Autocracies following Large-Scale Disasters: Evidence from Turkey.
Perspectives on Politics.
ISSN 1537-5927.
doi:
10.1017/S1537592725102120.
Full text in Research Archive
Show summary
Large-scale disasters, particularly when handled poorly, often spark popular outrage and threaten an autocrat’s hold on power. Autocrats frequently employ blame-shifting strategies to redirect public anger and weather these storms. We examine whether blame shifting after a large-scale disaster helps or hurts an autocrat’s popularity through a mixed-methods research design in the electoral autocracy of Turkey in April–July 2023, following the February 2023 earthquakes. An online survey experiment (n = 3,839) identifies the effects of blaming the aftermath of the earthquakes on the opposition, a force majeure, private construction companies, or a government minister, while focus groups explore the mechanisms behind these effects. We find that blaming the opposition or a force majeure leads to a backlash, especially among those more able to critically evaluate information. Focus groups reveal that these backlash effects are driven by voters’ dismay at electoral opportunism and the incumbent’s polarizing language following a large-scale disaster.
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Apaydin, Fulya; Öngel, Ferit Serkan; Schmid, Jonas Willibald & Ülker, Erol
(2022).
When do workers support executive aggrandizement? Lessons from the recent Turkish experience.
Industrial relations journal.
ISSN 0019-8692.
53(2),
p. 142–159.
doi:
10.1111/irj.12360.
Full text in Research Archive
View all works in NVA
Published
Sep. 11, 2026 10:52 AM
- Last modified
Sep. 28, 2026 9:58 AM
