Jacob Nyrup

• Schmid, Jonas Willibald & Nyrup, Jacob (2026). Governing for Growth? Economic Performance and Finance Minister Survival in Democracies and Autocracies. Political research quarterly. ISSN 1065-9129. doi: 10.1177/10659129261445888. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Are the highest-ranking public officials rewarded for good performance? Using the case of finance ministers, we argue that this depends on the type of regime. Democratic leaders have incentives to retain high-performing finance ministers because they are accountable to the population through free and fair elections. In the absence of free and fair elections, autocrats face opposing incentives. While growth stabilizes the regime, a high-performing minister of finance can also be a potential rival. Moreover, autocratic finance ministers will, to a higher degree than democratic, be judged on their ability to enrich the leader rather than creating growth. As a result, autocrats reward finance ministers less for economic growth than democrats. Using data on over 2,800 finance ministers in the period 1966–2021, we demonstrate a close link between economic growth and the retention of finance ministers in democracies but not in autocracies. The findings indicate that democracies are better at fostering and rewarding competence at the highest level of political office, speaking to the merits of democracy relative to autocracy.

• Nyrup, Jacob; Knutsen, Carl Henrik; Langsæther, Peter Egge & Kristiansen, Ina Lyftingsmo (2025). Paths to Power: A New Dataset on the Social Profile of Governments. British Journal of Political Science. ISSN 0007-1234. 55. doi: 10.1017/s0007123425100598. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Systematized information on the background of policymakers across long time-periods and all geographical regions of the world remains limited. In this article, we introduce Paths to Power (PtP), a new dataset on the educational, occupational, and social background of cabinet members. PtP contains detailed individual-level data – whenever identifiable – on 44,789 cabinet members across 141 countries in the period 1966-2021. This comprehensive dataset will be of relevance to numerous scholars (and others) interested in understanding politics and recent political history, and it enables a wide variety of new, empirically founded insights. We first present how the data is created and then discuss data quality and limitations. Next, we show how PtP is useful for researchers in diverse fields, including comparative politics, political sociology, gender studies, public administration, and international relations.

• Elkjær, Mads Andreas; Ansell, Ben; Bokobza, Laure; Cansunar, Asli; Haslberger, Matthias & Nyrup, Jacob (2025). Why is it so Hard to Counteract Wealth Inequality? Evidence from the United Kingdom. World Politics. ISSN 0043-8871. 77(3), p. 515–561. doi: 10.1353/wp.2025.a964464. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Despite high and rising levels of wealth inequality, many advanced democracies have cut taxes on inherited wealth in recent decades. To explain this puzzle, the authors argue that taxing inherited wealth is politically difficult because, paradoxically, the people who have the strongest material interest in higher taxes—low-wealth renters—are those least likely to express a clear opinion about inheritance taxation. Instead, the political terrain is shaped by the preferences of homeowners and their children, who have a strong material interest in lower inheritance taxes. Empirically, the authors first evaluate this argument using original survey data from the United Kingdom. In two survey experiments, they next examine how exposure to information influences views on inheritance taxation. While the authors find no effect of providing statistical information about the distribution of housing wealth, preferences are influenced by explanatory information that explicitly outlines the potential effects of inheritance taxation.

• Bokobza, Laure & Nyrup, Jacob (2024). Authoritarian multiparty governments. Democratization. ISSN 1351-0347. doi: 10.1080/13510347.2024.2338858. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  In 2020, almost 50% of dictatorships included multiple parties in their government. Existing research has not studied this systematically, and generally considers granting outsiders access to ministerial cabinets a risky and costly strategy. This article provides evidence of authoritarian multiparty governments (AMGs) being a global and increasingly common phenomena. We argue that AMGs are a power-sharing strategy whereby autocrats co-opt outsiders through cabinet appointments to divide the opposition and consolidate their rule. Using individual-level data on ministers' partisan affiliation in autocracies worldwide, we show that AMGs positively correlate with ethnic divides, civil war, and “democratic” institutions, and we use new measures of power sharing to demonstrate that coalition partners often exert a real influence through their ministerial mandates. Our findings suggest that AMG is an overlooked survival strategy for autocrats and highlight the need to focus more on the organization and composition of the political executive in autocracies.

• Hjorth, Frederik; Nyrup, Jacob & Larsen, Martin Vinæs (2024). Reining in the Rascals: Challenger Parties’ Path to Power. Journal of Politics. ISSN 0022-3816. doi: 10.1086/732962. Full text in Research Archive
• Bøggild, Troels; Göbel, Sascha; Lutscher, Philipp Matthias & Nyrup, Jacob (2024). Standing with Ukraine? How citizens trade off self-interest and principles in supporting war-torn international partners. Research & Politics. 11(2). doi: 10.1177/20531680241252399. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an attack on democracy, human rights, and the international order. While European democracies have supported their war-torn partner, Russia has sought to undermine public support by stopping its gas supply and imposing economic costs on European citizens. In consequence, Europeans find themselves caught between economic self-interest and principles. We present a theoretical argument and test how corresponding arguments for and against continued backing of Ukraine affect citizens’ support using experimental and observational data collected while concerns with gas shortage and inflation mounted in Germany and Denmark. We find that support for Ukraine does not falter due to economic concerns. In contrast, citizens become more supportive when presented with arguments related to human rights, democracy, and respect for territorial boundaries. We discuss implications for understanding citizens’ responses to autocratic power strategies and how support likely depends on the type of partner and domestic elite rhetoric.

• Limberg, Julian; Steinebach, Yves & Nyrup, Jacob (2024). Dedicated climate ministries help to reduce carbon emissions. npj Climate Action. 3. doi: 10.1038/s44168-024-00147-9. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Several countries have introduced dedicated national climate ministries in the last two decades. However, we know little about the consequences of these ministries. We demonstrate that the introduction of climate ministries helps to reduce carbon emissions. A difference-in-differences analysis of a global sample of countries reveals robust and statistically significant evidence that introducing a dedicated climate ministry lowers carbon emissions substantially. At the same time, establishing such climate ministries does not significantly influence the introduction of new climate policies. This indicates that climate ministries primarily amplify climate action by improving the effectiveness of the governmental measures taken rather than by increasing the number of climate policies themselves.

• Nyrup, Jacob; Yamagashi, Hikaru & Bramwell, Stuart (2023). Consolidating Progress: The Selection of Female Ministers in Autocracies and Democracies. American Political Science Review. ISSN 0003-0554. p. 1–20. doi: 10.1017/S000305542300062X. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Though governments historically have been a men’s club, women are increasingly gaining access. We argue that democratic institutions are important drivers of women’s inclusion in government. This stems from the rationales of autocratic versus democratic leaders when selecting ministers. Autocrats fear a coup by inner-circle elites, who are mostly men, incentivizing them to assign ministerial positions as co-optation. In contrast, democratic leaders are accountable to the citizenry through elections and must satisfy increasing demands for gender equality. Furthermore, we argue that it is historical experience with democracy that matters, rather than the level, as it takes time to create an even playing field, change attitudes, and generate trust in democracy. To support this, we contribute with the first study using the most comprehensive dataset, WhoGov, on women’s access to cabinets. Overall, we show that democracy is a process that gradually enables women to enter the highest echelons of power.

• Ansell, Ben; Hjorth, Frederik; Nyrup, Jacob & Larsen, Martin Vinæs (2022). Sheltering Populists? House Prices and the Support for Populist Parties. Journal of Politics. ISSN 0022-3816. 84(3), p. 1420–1436. doi: 10.1086/718354. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Populist parties, particularly from the right of the political spectrum, have sharply increased their electoral support in recent years, creating great media and scholarly interest. Existing work examining the economic underpinnings of populist support has focused on labor market shocks and the presence or absence of government compensation. In this paper we suggest that the housing market may have been as important as the labor market in defining who switched to populist voting and where they were located. We build on existing work that connects house prices to ‘first dimension politics’ of redistribution and classic left-right political identification to argue that house prices might also shape preferences on the ‘second dimension’ of politics: support for populist nationalism versus liberal cosmopolitanism. Using both novel precinctand individual-level data from Denmark, we show that negative shocks to house prices over the election cycle are strongly associated with shifts to support for the Danish People’s Party, a pattern that has amplified over recent elections. We then turn to corroborate this relationship using local housing data in Sweden, Norway, and Finland.

• Dahl, Malte & Nyrup, Jacob (2021). Confident and cautious candidates: Explaining under-representation of women in Danish municipal politics. European Journal of Political Research. ISSN 0304-4130. 60(1), p. 199–224. doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12396. Full text in Research Archive
• Bokobza, Laure; Krishnarajan, Suthan; Nyrup, Jacob; Sakstrup, Casper & Aaskoven, Lasse (2021). The Morning After: Cabinet Instability and the Purging of Ministers after Failed Coup Attempts in Autocracies. Journal of Politics. ISSN 0022-3816. 84(3), p. 1437–1452. doi: 10.1086/716952. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  All autocrats rely on inner-circle elites to stay in power. It is commonly assumed that dictators will purge these elites if they unsuccessfully try to unseat the dictator in a coup. However, this assumption has never been tested in a global analysis. Furthermore, little is known about whom dictators target in such purges. This article focuses on the highest levels of the regime, namely cabinet ministers. Using a new global dataset, our analysis covers over 23,000 cabinet members in 115 autocracies from 1967 to 2016. We demonstrate that failed coups induce autocrats to increasingly purge their cabinets, and that they do so selectively by targeting higher-ranking cabinet members and those who hold strategic positions, while keeping more loyal and veteran ministers in post. The article presents the most detailed individual-level evidence to date on purges and offers key insights into power-sharing mechanisms in autocracies.

• Aaskoven, Lasse & Nyrup, Jacob (2021). Performance and Promotions in an Autocracy: Evidence from Nazi Germany. Comparative politics. ISSN 0010-4159. doi: 10.5129/001041521x16132218140269. Full text in Research Archive
• Larsen, Martin Vinæs; Nyrup, Jacob & Petersen, Michael Bang (2020). Do survey estimates of the public’s compliance with COVID-19 regulations suffer from social desirability bias? Journal of Behavioral Public Administration (JBPA). 3(2). doi: 10.30636/jbpa.32.164. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  The COVID-19 pandemic has led governments to instate a large number of restrictions on and recommendations for citizens’ behavior. One widely used tool for measuring compliance with these strictures are nationally representative surveys that ask citizens to self-report their behavior. But if respondents avoid disclosing socially undesirable behaviors, such as not complying with government strictures in a public health crisis, estimates of compliance will be biased upwards. To assess the magnitude of this problem, this study compares measures of compliance from direct questions to those estimated from list-experiments - a response technique that allows respondents to report illicit behaviors without individual-level detection. Implementing the list-experiment in two separate surveys of Danish citizens (n>5,000), we find no evidence that citizens under-report non-compliant behavior. We therefore conclude that survey estimates of compliance with COVID-19 regulations do not suffer from social desirability bias.

• Nyrup, Jacob & Bramwell, Stuart (2020). Who governs? a new global dataset on members of cabinets. American Political Science Review. ISSN 0003-0554. 114(4), p. 1366–1374. doi: 10.1017/s0003055420000490. Full text in Research Archive

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• Malthe-Sørenssen, Anders; Harang, Fabian Andsem; Johnson, Victoria Christine Årang; Nyrup, Jacob; Lie, Knut-Andreas & Sandve, Geir Kjetil Ferkingstad [Show all 7 contributors for this article] (2026). Hvordan endrer KI-agenter forskningsprosessen? Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Dette møtet vil ta for seg de forskningsetiske spørsmålene som reiser seg i møte med bruken av KI-agenter i forskning

• Wig, Tore; Nilsen, Eric Gabo Ekeberg; Nyrup, Jacob & Schmid, Jonas Willibald (2024). Cabinet Composition and Interstate War. Full text in Research Archive

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