Daniel Goldstein

• Goldstein, Daniel A. N. & Magiya, Yusuf (2026). How Much War Builds a State? Fiscal Bargaining in the Shadow of War. Open Science Framework (OSF). doi: 10.31235/osf.io/ex3gb_v1. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  We present a formal model that examines how external conflict reshapes the bargaining process over fiscal control between a central state and a peripheral elite. Our findings reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between war-related pressures and state fiscal control. Low-to-moderate war pressure enhances state fiscal control by strengthening the state's bargaining power. However, excessive pressure undermines state control. This outcome is influenced by the degree to which the interests of the state and the elites align. We also identify instances when states fall into a `capacity trap,' where those with low initial fiscal control sacrifice future revenues to finance ongoing conflict. Using historical fiscal revenue data from Europe and case studies of Ancien Régime France and the Ottoman Empire, we test the predictions and find supporting evidence. These findings refine bellicist theory by highlighting the contingent benefits of conflict on state development when accounting for the complexities involved in state financing.

• Goldstein, Daniel A. N. & Schumock, Collin Thomas (2026). The Weight of Precedent: Parties, Trust, and Executive Norms. Open Science Framework (OSF). doi: 10.31235/osf.io/9dv4u_v4. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Political executives often adhere to traditions set by their predecessors that establish expected behavior, such as informal limits to their power. However, it remains a puzzle why executives follow norms, which lack legal backing, when they face incentives to violate them. To address this question, we analyze an infinite-horizon formal model incorporating within-party and across-party dynamics to examine when informal constraints on executives persist or collapse. Norm survival hinges on an executive's willingness to transgress a norm and their party condoning this act. The driving mechanism is coordination: violating a norm degrades cooperation between the executive and their party. We also show that the same conditions can support a high-trust equilibrium among parties in which norms survive and a low-trust equilibrium of preemptive violation. Trust-driven collapse is greatest under balanced party competition. The model classifies executive norms by fragility and traces the life cycle of the American presidential two-term tradition.

• Goldstein, Daniel A. N. & Wig, Tore (2026). The Moral Question: Norms and Anti-System Politics. Open Science Framework (OSF). doi: 10.31235/osf.io/nwrtz_v2. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Although moral norms are often invoked as political guardrails, their measurement and causal influence remain understudied. We theorize the link between moral norms, personal judgments, and attitudinal consequences and test it in a pre-registered survey experiment with financial incentives. Citizens rarely confront democratic violation alone, but rather bundled ``anti-system'' behaviors of potentially unequal moral weight. Respondents faced moral trade-offs concerning political violence, corruption, and anti-democratic actions, with personal scandals as a baseline. Using a second-order approach to elicit beliefs about what others consider morally wrong, we find that norms against democratic violations are descriptively the weakest, and all lag behind norms against violence. Norms primarily shift judgments when respondents face large discrepancies from their initial perceptions and have strong conformity motives, but this largely does not translate into attitudinal shifts. The findings reveal a moral hierarchy among anti-system behaviors, and detail the consequences and limitations of moral norms for politics.

• Goldstein, Daniel A. N.; Bakke, Kaja Sparre; Dahlum, Sirianne & Wig, Tore (2026). Elites as Democratic Gatekeepers: Theory and Evidence from Norway. Open Science Framework (OSF). doi: 10.31235/osf.io/2rwgt_v2. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Numerous studies have examined voters’ support for democracy and reactions to democratic violations by elites. Yet, we know less about the democratic preferences of political elites. This gap matters because elites may act as ``democratic gatekeepers'' by blocking autocratic colleagues from power. We develop a theory of elite gatekeeping and test it using pre-registered survey experiments on a sample of approximately 2,000 national, regional, and local representatives and party officials in Norway. Using multiple experimental designs, we measure internal gatekeeping -- the willingness to punish anti-democratic colleagues within one's own party -- and external gatekeeping -- the willingness to block a governing coalition with anti-democratic parties. Elites engage in both, but neither is absolute: the penalty for anti-democratic behavior is no larger than for ordinary misconduct, and roughly 70% would accept an anti-democratic coalition partner when it secures a governing majority. Democracy's gatekeepers may be less steadfast than they appear.

• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick & Stommes, Drew (2025). Who Should Fight? Experimental Evidence on Policy Corrections to the Unequal Costs of US Wars. International Studies Quarterly. ISSN 0020-8833. 69(4). doi: 10.1093/isq/sqaf071. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  The physical costs of war—who fights and experiences casualties—are borne unequally in the USA. However, little is known about how informing individuals about this disparity affects preferences about how to address it. We introduce a framework of “policy corrections” that differentially allocates the costs associated with providing public goods to socioeconomic groups. A formal model then presents competing perspectives, for example, in-group versus altruistic, on how citizens would prefer these policies. A survey experiment tests how informing Americans that low-income communities disproportionately bear the physical costs of US wars affects their support for each policy correction. Our empirical results reveal heightened support for increased military recruitment among the wealthiest half of Americans (a direct correction), but unchanged preferences for increasing taxes on this group (an indirect correction). Textual analysis of open-ended responses suggests that treated respondents’ preferences for policy corrections are motivated by notions of fairness. Our results suggest that war casualties transcend in-group socioeconomic calculus, leading even individuals who benefit from the disparity to support redressing the unequal costs associated with the provision of defense.

• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2024). Reversals of Capacity: Norms, Culture, and Institutional Disruption. Journal of Politics. ISSN 0022-3816. doi: 10.1086/726969. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick & Johannes, Wiedemann (2022). Who Do You Trust? The Consequences of Partisanship and Trust for Public Responsiveness to COVID-19 Orders. Perspectives on Politics. ISSN 1537-5927. doi: 10.1017/S1537592721000049. Full text in Research Archive

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• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick & Wig, Tore (2026). The Moral Question: Norms and Anti-System Politics. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick & Wig, Tore (2026). The Moral Question: Norms and Anti-System Politics. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick; Bakke, Kaja Sparre; Dahlum, Sirianne & Wig, Tore (2026). Elites as Democratic Gatekeepers: Theory and Evidence from Norway. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2026). Political Bright Lines: Norms, Information, and Accountability. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2026). Political Bright Lines: Norms, Information, and Accountability. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick & Wig, Tore (2026). The Moral Question: Norms and Anti-System Politics. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick & Svolik, Milan (2026). Putting Theory to the Test: Conjoint Evidence on Formal Models of Political Competition. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick & Wig, Tore (2025). Moral Norms and Public Judgment of Anti-System Politicians. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick; Dahlum, Sirianne & Wuttke, Alexander (2025). The Social Dynamics of Democratic Preferences. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick & Wig, Tore (2025). Moral Trade-offs and Political Violence in the US. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2025). The Emergence of Political Bright Lines. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick; Schumock, Collin & Wiedemann, Johannes (2025). The ‘Daily Mail Test’: How Public Trust Constrains Bureaucratic Discretion in Public Procurement. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick & Svolik, Milan (2025). Putting Theory to the Test: Conjoint Evidence on Formal Models of Political Competition. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick & Wig, Tore (2025). Moral Norms and Public Judgment of Anti-System Politicians. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Do moral norms constrain anti-system behavior by political elites? Recent episodes of democratic backsliding, corruption, and political violence in established democracies underscore the importance of understanding the social and electoral basis of elite misconduct. This paper examines the role of moral norms in shaping public responses to such behavior. Although moral norms are frequently invoked as constraints on political conduct, their conceptualization, measurement, and causal influence remain understudied. We introduce a ``second-order'' approach to measuring moral norms that captures individuals’ beliefs about what others consider morally acceptable. We also test the norms' causal impact on public perceptions. Using a large-scale survey experiment in the United States, financial incentives are used to elicit expectations about prevailing norms related to political violence, corruption, and anti-democratic actions. By experimentally manipulating perceived moral norms, we identify their causal effects on key attitudinal outcomes, including support for co-partisan politicians who engage in anti-system behavior. Our findings offer new insight into how moral norms shape political accountability and the boundaries of acceptable elite conduct.

• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick; Wig, Tore; Dahlum, Sirianne & Bakke, Kaja Sparre (2025). Elites as Democratic Gatekeepers: Theory and Evidence from Norway. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Studies of democratic backsliding suggest that political elites can, but often fail to, serve as ``democratic gatekeepers'' by punishing autocratic colleagues to protect democracy. While there is a substantial body of literature examining voters' preferences for democracy and their reactions to democratic violations by elites, we know less about elites' preferences for democratic gatekeeping in contemporary democracies. We develop a theory of democratic gatekeeping among political elites in democracies, examining the practice within and between parties. We then tested the implications of this theory in a pre-registered survey targeting approximately 11,000 national and local elected representatives and party officials in Norway, which is widely considered a stable, consolidated democracy. Using various experimental approaches, we reveal the preferences of Norwegian political elites regarding gatekeeping when exposed to anti-democratic party colleagues and anti-democratic political parties as potential coalition partners.

• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick & Magiya, Yusuf (2025). How Much War Builds a State? Fiscal Bargaining in the Shadow of War. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  We present a formal model that examines how external conflict reshapes the bargaining process over fiscal control between a central state and a peripheral elite. Our findings reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between war-related pressures and state fiscal control. Low-to-moderate war pressure enhances state fiscal control by strengthening the state's bargaining power. However, excessive pressure undermines state control. This outcome is influenced by the degree to which the interests of the state and the elites align. We also identify instances when states fall into a `capacity trap,' where those with low initial fiscal control sacrifice future revenues to finance ongoing conflict. Using historical fiscal revenue data from Europe and a case study of the Ottoman Empire, we test the predictions and find supporting evidence. These findings refine bellicist theory by highlighting the contingent benefits of conflict on state development when accounting for the complexities involved in state financing.

• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2024). What the second Trump administration may mean for federal agencies and their capacity to deliver. doi: https:/blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2024/12/06/what-the-second-trump-administration-may-mean-for-federal-agencies-and-their-capacity-to-deliver/. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2024). Reversals of Capacity. Journal of Politics Blog. Full text in Research Archive
• Wig, Tore; Dahlum, Sirianne; Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick & Bakke, Kaja Sparre (2024). Elite commitments to democracy: Experimental evidence from Norway. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2024). Despite concerns about democratic backsliding, Americans are happy to punish those who break democratic norms. London School of Economics US American Politics and Policy Blog. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2024). Bargaining over State Building in the Shadow of War. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2024). The Weight of Precedent: Parties, Institutions, and Executive Norms. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2024). Bargaining over State Building in the Shadow of War. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick; Wig, Tore; Dahlum, Sirianne & Bakke, Kaja Sparre (2024). Elite Commitments to Democracy: Evidence from Norway. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick; Wig, Tore; Dahlum, Sirianne & Bakke, Kaja Sparre (2024). Elite Commitments to Democracy: Evidence from Norway. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2024). The Social Foundations of Democratic Norms. Full text in Research Archive
• Wig, Tore & Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2024). Moral norms and political violence in democracies. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2023). Endogenous State Capacity. Broadstreet blog. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick (2023). Bargaining over State Building in the Shadow of War. Full text in Research Archive
• Goldstein, Daniel A. N. & Schumock, Collin (2025). The Weight of Precedent: Parties, Institutions, and Executive Norms. Open Science Foundation. doi: 10.31235/osf.io/9dv4u_v2. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Political executives often adhere to informal traditions established by their predecessors. Yet, without legal backing, elites have incentives to violate norms for political gain. Under what conditions do constraining executive norms persist and when are they abandoned? We address this question by using an infinite horizon formal model to analyze the maintenance of executive norms. We identify intra-party accountability and variation in patience among actors within the same party as significant for norm maintenance. We also detail how expectations about the expected behavior of out-of-power parties shape the willingness to violate norms while in office. The insights from the model enable us to classify a number of executive norms according to their fragility and to examine the trajectory of one norm in-depth: the two-term tradition of the American presidency. Our findings shed light on how informal institutions regulate executive behavior and advance our understanding of institutional stability and erosion.

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