Abstract:
I have elsewhere argued that victims of injustice have unique access to knowledge about injustice in a way that is not trivial to political philosophers. I have therefore further argued that political philosophers should take victim testimony seriously as part of their theorising (Engelstad 2023; 2025). While victim input obviously has relevance to theorising about injustice, I also argue that it matters for how we arrive at an understanding of justice. Coinciding with this line of reasoning is the general movement towards more empirically informed political methodologies, most notably non-ideal theory and political realism. However, victim testimony is rarely incorporated within either of these methodological strands. Which, if any, could be good candidates for taking victim testimony into account in an epistemically and ethically responsible manner? In this paper, I assess the suitability of one form of empirically informed political philosophy, often named ‘non-ideal theory’ (though this is a contested category). I do this as part of a larger project to determine what available political methodologies are best suited to incorporate victim testimony. I conclude that non-ideal theory is ill suited.