Abstract:
What, within individual experience, is behind support for democratic ethics, politics, and institutions? The theoretical hypothesis I explore here is that “democracy” has existential meanings that are prior to, and possibly more fundamental than, democratic values, ethics, or commitments to democratic institutions. I experiment with the idea that meanings of democracy—or, less ambitiously, “proto-democratic sentiments”—are embedded in relationships to self and others, and exist even when experience with legacy democratic institutions generates disaffection, or even where there is little experience of democracy, as in authoritarian or theocratic regimes. Positively, these sentiments might include desires to be recognized, for social investments to be reciprocated, hope for the future, and desires for new generations to have a better life. Negatively, proto-democratic sentiments include revulsion at rules and arbitrariness imposed by the powerful, at disrespect, marginalization, and oppression. These sentiments are, I shall suggest, built into what it means to be a socialized and socially-embedded human; they are quite possibly universally embedded in the human condition. Proto-democratic sentiments become democratic sentiments when they combine with respect for, and reciprocity with others; when these sentiments are generalized; and when they settle into rules for settling conflict and generating collective action—that is, democratic practices and institutions. But proto-democratic sentiments are not yet democratic values, because they can be mobilized negatively: particularly in the form of resentments and disaffections when legacy democratic institutions fail to capture and build upon proto-democratic sentiments—leaving them available for mobilization by populist authoritarians. In the first section, I define the problem, particularly the potential sources of life-world support for democracy. In the second, I discuss research traditions and strategies within political science that deal with versions of this problem, particularly those that seek to find democratic values in “habits of the heart,” or look for diffuse support for democracy. In the third section, I develop the concept of existential meanings of democracy by mining resources from social theory and philosophy, dividing the analysis into relationships to self and to others. Finally, I briefly discuss institutions that might mobilize existential meanings of democracy, focusing on rights, welfare supports, and democratic innovations.