Academic interests
- Governments, parliaments, and parliamentary decision-making
- Politicization of appointments to bureaucracy and political-administrative relations
- Politics of bureaucracy
- Quantitative methods
Teaching
Background
- 2020-2022: Research Assistant, University of Oslo
- 2021-2022: Higher Executive Officer, Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development
- 2020-2022: Master in Political Science, University of Oslo
- 2017-2020: Bachelor in Political Science, University of Oslo
Tags:
Public Policy and Administration,
Government,
Politics of Bureaucracy,
Quantitative methods
Publications
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Forum, Bjørn Mo
(2026).
Bureaucratic turnover under new governments: the moderating effect of bureaucratic and political layering.
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (JPART).
ISSN 1053-1858.
doi:
10.1093/jopart/muag016.
Full text in Research Archive
Show summary
Politically motivated personnel turnover affects government bureaucracy’s legitimacy and performance. To understand the conditions of meritocracy, the article explores how variability in hierarchy moderates the effect of government transitions on bureaucratic turnover. Event history analysis of the careers of 948 Norwegian senior bureaucrats (1884–2024) reveals that the organizational layers separating bureaucrats from ministers moderate the effect of government change differently depending on the layer’s political or bureaucratic nature. Bureaucrats directly exposed to political appointees experience heightened turnover during government transitions, while the turnover of bureaucrats separated from appointees by an intervening layer of career employees is unaffected by government transitions. Further analysis of different time periods and senior bureaucratic roles shows that layering alone does not fully explain political influence on bureaucratic careers. Positions must be hierarchically exposed (lacking intervening bureaucratic layers), functionally politicized (involved in tasks that are strategically important to political leadership), and subject to administrative politicization (by being under the purview of political appointees) to be vulnerable to politically motivated turnover. The article advances scholarship on the politicization of senior bureaucrats in merit bureaucracies by examining 140 years of politically induced turnover through a theory of how layering moderates political dynamics.
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Rasch, Bjørn Erik; Forum, Bjørn Mo & Bucur, Cristina
(2026).
Parliamentary institutions and portfolio allocation in coalition governments,
Democracy at the Crossroads – Challenges for Governance and Representation: Essays in Honour of Thomas Saalfeld for Governance and Representation.
Routledge.
ISSN 9781003660248.
p. 329–355.
doi:
10.4324/9781003660248-18.
Full text in Research Archive
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How does variation in the involvement of legislators in the making and breaking of governments affects the share of portfolios that formateur parties reap? Legislative bargaining models typically predict over-compensation of formateur parties in coalition cabinets, yet allocations tend to be highly proportional. We argue that restrictive rules for government formation and termination increase the prospects of coalition durability and provide formateur parties with weaker incentives to overcompensate coalition partners in exchange for their support. Analysing data on 583 coalition governments in 30 parliamentary democracies over 1945–2015, we find that absolute majority requirements for cabinet formation and removal tend to advantage formateur parties in portfolio allocation. These findings are robust to various coalition characteristics and national settings. Moreover, we improve the measurement of portfolio allocation by basing calculations on the Sainte-Lagüe divisor method, removing cabinet-size bias, and providing a substantially meaningful measure of under- and overrepresentation of parties in coalition governments.
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Bach, Tobias; Forum, Bjørn Mo & Hesstvedt, Stine
(2025).
Norway: formal and informal politicization in a merit bureaucracy.
In Peters, B. Guy; Knox, Colin; Francisco, Panizza; Larraburu, Conrado Ramos & Staroňová, Katarína (Ed.),
Handbook of Politicization and Political Patronage.
Edward Elgar Publishing.
ISSN 9781035326235.
p. 78–96.
doi:
10.4337/9781035326242.00012.
Full text in Research Archive
Show summary
The chapter focuses on formal and informal politicization in Norway, particularly examining positions within the state administration for which the cabinet or ministers have the power to make appointments. Additionally, it investigates the selection process for expert commissions, which play a significant role in policy development. We show that the civil service in Norway has experienced a gradual increase in formal politicization, as evidenced by the growing number of political appointees. However, informal politicization is largely absent, except for the appointment of former ministers to the position of county governors. The chapter also shows that civil servants are functionally politicized and face dilemmas between political responsiveness and other civil service values. Finally, the chapter demonstrates that the merit-based civil service was able to accommodate a populist party in government.
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View all works in NVA
Published
Feb. 8, 2023 4:40 PM
- Last modified
Apr. 7, 2026 11:11 AM
