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Nakkerud, Erik; Palacios Haugestad, Christian Andres & Balsvik, Eivind
(2022).
En innføring i klimapsykologi.
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Balsvik, Eivind & Holtsmark, Katinka Kristine
(2021).
«Samfunnsøkonomi: Økonomiske virkemidler for å redusere utslipp av drivhusgasser. Andre episode av klima-podkasten til SVEXFAC».
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Balsvik, Eivind & Midtbøen, Arnfinn Haagensen
(2021).
«Naturkatastrofenes sosiologi. Sjette episode av klimapodkasten til SVEXFAC".
-
Balsvik, Eivind & Eriksen, Thomas Hylland
(2021).
«Overoppheting: Sosialantropologi og klimakrisen. Femte episode av klima-podkasten til SVEXFAC».
-
Balsvik, Eivind & Jordhus-Lier, David Christoffer
(2021).
«Samfunnsgeografi: Oljearbeiderne og det grønne skiftet. Fjerde episode av klima-podkasten til SVEXFAC»-
.
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Balsvik, Eivind & Skodvin, Tora
(2021).
«Statsvitenskap: Global oppvarming og internasjonale klimaavtaler. Tredje episode av klima-podkasten til SVEXFAC»
.
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Balsvik, Eivind & Nakkerud, Erik
(2021).
"Klima-psykologi. Første episode av klima-podkasten til SVEXFAC".
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2018).
"Mennesket i samfunnsvitenskapene".
I Gundersen, Ståle; Larsen, Tarjei Mandt & Wittusen, Cato (Red.),
Utvalgte filosofiske emner til EXPHIL.
Universitetsforlaget.
ISSN 978-82-15-03125-5.
s. 147–165.
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Balsvik, Eivind & Solli, Susanna Maria
(2018).
"Forord".
I Solli, Susanna Maria & Balsvik, Eivind (Red.),
Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapene; Bind 2. (3. utgave).
Universitetsforlaget.
ISSN 978-82-15-02966-5.
s. 13–14.
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2018).
"Introduksjon" til Del V, Normative problemstillinger i vitenskap og samfunn.
I Solli, Susanna Maria & Balsvik, Eivind (Red.),
Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapene; Bind 2. (3. utgave).
Universitetsforlaget.
ISSN 978-82-15-02966-5.
s. 189–193.
-
Balsvik, Eivind
(2018).
"Introduksjon" til Del IV, Vitenskapelige forklaringer og metodologi.
I Solli, Susanna Maria & Balsvik, Eivind (Red.),
Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapene; Bind 2. (3. utgave).
Universitetsforlaget.
ISSN 978-82-15-02966-5.
s. 101–104.
-
Balsvik, Eivind
(2018).
"Forskningsetikk for samfunnsvitenskapene – en oversikt".
I Solli, Susanna Maria & Balsvik, Eivind (Red.),
Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapene; Bind 2. (3. utgave).
Universitetsforlaget.
ISSN 978-82-15-02966-5.
s. 194–219.
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Balsvik, Eivind & Solli, Susanna Maria
(2017).
"Innledning".
I Balsvik, Eivind & Solli, Susanna Maria (Red.),
Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapene; Bind 1 (3. utgave).
Universitetsforlaget.
ISSN 978-82-15-02967-2.
s. 13–17.
-
Balsvik, Eivind & Solli, Susanna Maria
(2017).
"Forord".
I Balsvik, Eivind & Solli, Susanna Maria (Red.),
Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapene; Bind 1 (3. utgave).
Universitetsforlaget.
ISSN 978-82-15-02967-2.
s. 11–12.
-
Balsvik, Eivind
(2017).
"Introduksjon" til Del II, Modeller av menneske og samfunn.
I Balsvik, Eivind & Solli, Susanna Maria (Red.),
Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapene; Bind 1 (3. utgave).
Universitetsforlaget.
ISSN 978-82-15-02967-2.
s. 143–146.
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2017).
"Rasjonalitetsantakelser i samfunnsvitenskap".
I Balsvik, Eivind & Solli, Susanna Maria (Red.),
Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapene; Bind 1 (3. utgave).
Universitetsforlaget.
ISSN 978-82-15-02967-2.
s. 192–212.
-
Balsvik, Eivind
(2017).
"Mennesket i samfunnsvitenskapene".
I Balsvik, Eivind & Solli, Susanna Maria (Red.),
Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapene; Bind 1 (3. utgave).
Universitetsforlaget.
ISSN 978-82-15-02967-2.
s. 147–165.
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2017).
"Adam Smith: Moralske følelser og Nasjonenes velstand".
I Balsvik, Eivind & Solli, Susanna Maria (Red.),
Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapene; Bind 1 (3. utgave).
Universitetsforlaget.
ISSN 978-82-15-02967-2.
s. 40–60.
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2017).
"When interpretation becomes challenging".
Vis sammendrag
In favorable circumstances, interpreting social behavior is relatively straightforward. If an individual is sincere, and if his verbal behavior matches his non-verbal behavior, an interpreter can use the verbally expressed beliefs and desires to give meaning to the non-verbal behavior, and the non-verbal behavior to confirm the interpretations based upon the verbal-behavior (Cf. Hopkins’ (1999) method of testing for normative accord). However, in cases where there is a mismatch between an individual’s verbal and non-verbal behavior, interpretation becomes quite challenging. This presentation investigates difficulties to interpretation posed by three kinds of cases where verbal behavior and non-verbal behavior do not mesh: self-deception, akrasia and implicit racism or sexism. These phenomena occur frequently, and will often be of interest to social scientists. I shall try not to get bogged down by the literature on competing conceptualizations of these phenomena, and will initially base my discussion on vignettes similar to the one’s developed and discussed by Gendler (2008), Mele (2009) and Schwitzgebel (2010). When suggesting refined interpretations, I shall however, appeal to theories from the behavioral sciences (social psychology, behavioral economics).
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-
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2016).
"Interpretation theory and the problem of confabulation".
Vis sammendrag
There is a longstanding tradition within the social sciences to regard social behavior as being under rational, conscious control. A case in point is that interpreters, according to the principle of charity, are under a basic methodological constraint to interpret so as to construe people as predominantly rational in thought and action, and as predominantly correct in their beliefs. The presumption of first-person authority holds that people’s self-ascriptions of occurrent mental states should in the first instance be taken to be true, without need of supplementary evidence, even if error and correction is possible. Whereas Davidson (1980; 1984; 2001) depicts these principles as being a priori, yet empirically defeasible presuppositions of interpretation, Quine (1960) depicts them as being the empirically most likely hypotheses. However, since then, more and more psychological studies suggest that social behavior is both less rational, and less controlled than previously presumed, and claims to privileged and authoritative access have been strongly opposed. In the light of such studies, interpretation theory and interpretivist social science seem to rest on a bad psychology.
The purpose of this presentation is two-fold: I wish to recount the psychological research which challenges the presuppositions of interpretation theory, and discuss whether it is possible to incorporate these findings, without abandoning the guiding idea that social phenomena and social action should at least in part be understood from the point of view of those being studied. Henderson (1987; 1993) provides the general framework for how I believe this psychological updating should be accomplished.
Psychological findings pose a challenge to interpretation theory because it seems to undermine both the tenability of the principle of charity and the presumption of first-person authority. The tenability of principle of charity seems to be undermined by experiments which show that human beings tend to systematically and reliably fail to conform to the norms of rationality spelled out by classical logic, probability theory, epistemology, and decision theory (Ariely 2008; Kahneman 2011). The tenability of the presumption of first-person authority seems to be undermined by studies which show that people have a tendency to confabulate explanations of their behavior, because their conscious selves do not know why they do what they do, and therefore create the explanations that make most sense (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Wilson 2002; Carruthers 2011, Haidt 2012; Cassam 2015).
Henderson (1987; 1993) recommends that we should follow Quine in regarding the presumptions of rationality in interpretation theory as an empirical hypothesis. “[T]he weighting of the principle of charity is to be informed by psychological theory regarding the relative likelihood of various types of error.” (Henderson 1993, 43) Henderson also suggests that the principle of charity should be refined into what he calls the principle of explicability: “so [interpret] as to maximize the explicability of beliefs and actions attributed to subjects.” (Henderson 1987, 324) Henderson (1993) tells us how to deal with the problem of irrationality, but he does not discuss the confabulation-data or the status and role of the presumption of first-person authority in interpretation theory. I shall focus on the question whether the confabulation-data forces us to abandon the presumption of first-person authority and privilege as a methodological constraint on interpretation, as suggested by Carruthers (2011) ISA theory, and Cassam’s (2015) inferentialism. Carruthers and Cassam take the confabulation data to suggest that there is no difference in principle between how a person knows his own mind, and the minds of others. They therefore take these data to rebut the principle of first-person authority.
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2016).
"Forskningsetikk for samfunnsvitenskapene-en oversikt".
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2016).
"Vitenskapelige forklaringer og hypotetisk deduktiv metode i samfunnsvitenskapene".
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2016).
"Mennesket i samfunnsvitenskapene".
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2014).
Samfunnsvitenskapen og "Den biologiske tornadoen".
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2013).
"Interpretation, First-person Authority, and the Corrigibility of self-ascriptions of Beliefs".
Vis sammendrag
Inquiring into the beliefs and desires of social actors is a peculiar kind of enterprise. Since it is only by performing actions—by saying things and doing things—that social actors can express or reveal their mental contents, social scientists have only got behavioral evidence to go on when describing and explaining someone’s beliefs and desires. This descriptive and explanatory endeavor is, however, facilitated by the fact that individuals have a special capacity for self-knowledge. For a wide range of mental states, events and processes, individuals themselves are able to gain a peculiarly direct and immediate, authoritative knowledge which is available to them only. Thus, when an individual sincerely expresses his own mind in speech, there is a presumption of first-person authority which entails that what he says accurately reflects his state of mind. This makes the endeavor of the social scientist easier because wishing to know how a social actor thinks and feels about something, he can simply ask that individual. The presumption that the response constitutes accurate information about the individual’s attitudes, suggests that the researcher can take it at face value
This paper attempts to illuminate the role of first person authority in the interpretation of a social actor’s speech and other behavior. The core idea, is that an interpreter, in order to arrive at precise interpretations of a social actor’s verbal and non-verbal behavior, correlates and compares the social actor’s self-ascriptions with his other verbal and non-verbal behavior. This allows him to identify the common set of mental causes (i.e. the motives) that underlie this behavior. In correlating and comparing the informant’s self-ascriptions with his other verbal and non-verbal behavior, the presumption of first-person authority plays an essential role. The remainder of this paper concerns complications due to the fact that it might be difficult to square an informant’s self-ascriptions with observations of his conduct, casting doubt about their accuracy or correctness. In some cases the discrepancy is compatible with the presumption of first-person authority and the assumption that the informant is being rational, but in other cases I contend that the counter evidence available to the perspective of an interpreter defeats sincere self-ascriptions of belief.
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2013).
"Tverrfaglige utfordringer og akademisk dannelse".
Socius.
ISSN 0809-5574.
s. 93–95.
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2012).
Intervju med streikelederne ved UiO.
[Radio].
Radio nova.
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2011).
"-Ikke til å leve med!".
[Avis].
Dagbladet.
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-
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2011).
"Universitetslektorar får ikkje søkja om forskningstermin".
[Internett].
Uniforum.
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2011).
"Kan miste retten til forskningstermin".
[Internett].
Uniforum.
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-
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2011).
"UiO som akademisk arena og arbeidsplass".
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2011).
"Mennesket i samfunnsvitenskapene".
I Balsvik, Eivind & Solli, Susanna Maria (Red.),
Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapene; Bind 1.
Universitetsforlaget.
ISSN 978-82-15-01842-3.
s. 201–217.
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2011).
"Introduksjon til Del II. Modeller av mennesker og samfunn".
I Balsvik, Eivind & Solli, Susanna Maria (Red.),
Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapene; Bind 2.
Universitetsforlaget.
ISSN 978-82-15-01843-0.
s. 197–201.
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Balsvik, Eivind & Solli, Susanna Maria
(2011).
"Innledning".
I Balsvik, Eivind & Solli, Susanna Maria (Red.),
Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapene; Bind 2.
Universitetsforlaget.
ISSN 978-82-15-01843-0.
s. 13–17.
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2010).
"Et ”akademikernes faglige utvalg”? – ytringskulturdebatten etter Nedkvitne-dommen".
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2010).
"Ytringsfrihet eller arbeidsmiljø?".
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2010).
"Altfor mange midlertidig ansatt".
Aftenposten (morgenutg. : trykt utg.).
ISSN 0804-3116.
-
Balsvik, Eivind
(2010).
"Spennende med AFU".
Dagens næringsliv.
ISSN 0803-9372.
-
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2009).
"Prosess faglige prioriteringer".
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2009).
"Et liv på gress? Midlertidighet i akademia - utfordringer og mulige løsninger".
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2009).
"Stoppeklokkeforskning? Tid til forskning og tidsregistrering i akademia".
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2009).
"Kraftig svekket dannelse".
Aftenposten (morgenutg. : trykt utg.).
ISSN 0804-3116.
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2009).
"Ikke forstyrr, jeg forsker".
Aftenposten (morgenutg. : trykt utg.).
ISSN 0804-3116.
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2009).
Kritikk for lukkede ører.
Dagens næringsliv.
ISSN 0803-9372.
s. 3–3.
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2009).
"Lønn i himmelen for forskere?".
Aftenposten (morgenutg. : trykt utg.).
ISSN 0804-3116.
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Balsvik, Eivind & Thorsen, Arve T.
(2009).
"Misforstått timetelling".
Aftenposten (morgenutg. : trykt utg.).
ISSN 0804-3116.
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2009).
Interpretasjon og førstepersonsautoritet. Kan oppriktige selvtilskrivelser av ønsker og oppfatninger være feilaktige?
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2008).
Davidson's Explanation of First Person Authority.
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Balsvik, Eivind; Solli, Susanna Maria; Fangen, Katrine & Sira, Per
(2007).
"Videointervju med Katrine Fangen".
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Balsvik, Eivind; Storesletten, Kjetil & Sira, Per
(2007).
"Videointervju med Kjetil Storesletten".
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Balsvik, Eivind; Solli, Susanna Maria; Semb, Anne Julie & Sira, Per
(2007).
"Videointervju med Anne-Julie Semb".
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Balsvik, Eivind; Solli, Susanna Maria; Teigen, Karl Halvor & Sira, Per
(2007).
"Videointervju med Karl-Halvor Teigen".
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Balsvik, Eivind; Solli, Susanna Maria; Wikan, Unni & Sira, Per
(2007).
"Videointervju med Unni Wikan".
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Balsvik, Eivind; Solli, Susanna Maria; Bojer, Hilde & Sira, Per
(2007).
"Videointervju med Hilde Bojer".
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2007).
Bruk av videointervjuer i forelesningen, konsentrasjons- og læringsfremmende, eller bare distraherende?
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2005).
The Corrigibility of Self-ascriptions of Beliefs.
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2003).
"Om metaforers kognitive rolle i filosofi".
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2002).
"Veiledning og prosjektplanlegging; noen erfaringer fra Universitetet i Miami".
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Balsvik, Eivind
(2002).
"Triangulation, Interpretation and First-Person Authority. An essay on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson.".
UMI Dissertation Services.
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Balsvik, Eivind
(1997).
"Praxeological Externalism. A Wittgensteinian approach to Mind and Meaning".
Universitetet i Bergen.