Magnus Bergli Rasmussen

• Rasmussen, Magnus Bergli (2021). Farmers and the Origin of the Welfare State: Evidence from 308 Roll Call Votes between 1882 and 1940^☆. Scandinavian Political Studies. ISSN 0080-6757. doi: 10.1111/1467-9477.12222.
• Andersen, David; Jensen, Carsten & Rasmussen, Magnus Bergli (2021). Suffering from suffrage: welfare state development and the politics of citizenship disqualification. Social Science History. ISSN 0145-5532. doi: 10.1017/ssh.2021.38.
• Skorge, Øyvind Søraas & Rasmussen, Magnus Bergli (2021). Volte-Face on the Welfare State: Social Partners, Knowledge Economies, and the Expansion of Work-Family Policies. Politics & Society. ISSN 0032-3292. s. 1–33. doi: 10.1177/00323292211014371.
• Cools, Sara; Finseraas, Henning & Rasmussen, Magnus Bergli (2020). The Immigrant-Native Gap in Union Membership: A Question of Time, Sorting, or Culture? Labour. ISSN 1121-7081. doi: 10.1111/labr.12186. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Rasmussen, Magnus Bergli & Skorge, Øyvind Søraas (2020). The business of change: Employers and work-family policy reforms. I Nijhuis, Dennie Oude (Red.), Business Interests and the Development of the Modern Welfare State. Routledge. ISSN 9780815377917. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Rasmussen, Magnus Bergli & Knutsen, Carl Henrik (2019). Party Institutionalization and Welfare State Development. British Journal of Political Science. ISSN 0007-1234. doi: 10.1017/S0007123419000498. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Knutsen, Carl Henrik & Rasmussen, Magnus Bergli (2019). Majoritarian systems, rural groups, and (arrested) welfare state development. International Political Science Review. ISSN 0192-5121. doi: 10.1177/0192512118809106. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  While some scholars suggest that rural groups contribute to welfare state expansion, we highlight their incentives to restrain it. The ability of rural groups to achieve this preference hinges on their power resources, but also on the electoral system. We propose that in majoritarian systems, rural groups can often veto welfare legislation. In proportional systems this is less feasible, even for resource-rich groups. Instead, agrarian groups sometimes accept welfare legislation in return for other policy-concessions in post-electoral bargaining. We illustrate the argument with British and Norwegian historical experiences, and test the implications using panel data from 96 democracies. We find evidence that resourceful agrarian groups effectively arrest welfare state development in majoritarian systems, but not in proportional systems. As expected, the electoral system matters less for welfare state expansion when agrarian groups are weak. The results are robust to using alternative estimators, measures, samples and model specifications.

• Knutsen, Carl Henrik & Rasmussen, Magnus Bergli (2018). Electoral Rules, Labor Market Coordination and Macroeconomic Performance. Scandinavian Political Studies. ISSN 0080-6757. 41(3), s. 367–378. doi: 10.1111/1467-9477.12126. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Knutsen, Carl Henrik & Rasmussen, Magnus (2018). The Autocratic Welfare State: Old-Age Pensions, Credible Commitments, and Regime Survival. Comparative Political Studies. ISSN 0010-4140. 51(5), s. 659–695. doi: 10.1177/0010414017710265. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  In this article, we argue that autocratic regimes are no less likely than democracies to adopt old-age pensions, although autocratic programs are less universal in their coverage. Our theoretical argument focuses on the strong incentives that autocratic regimes have for enacting and maintaining such programs to ensure regime survival. Autocratic pension programs can be considered club goods that (a) are targeted to critical supporting groups and (b) solve credible commitment problems on promises of future distribution, thereby mitigating probability of regime breakdown. We test three implications from the argument, drawing on a novel dataset on welfare state programs and including 140 countries with time series from the 1880s. First, we find that autocracies are no less likely than democracies to have old-age pension programs. But, second, autocracies have less universal pension programs than democracies. Third, pension programs effectively reduce the probability of autocratic breakdown.

• Rasmussen, Magnus & Pontusson, Jonas (2017). Working-Class Strength by Institutional Design? Unionization, Partisan Politics, and Unemployment Insurance Systems, 1870 to 2010. Comparative Political Studies. ISSN 0010-4140. 51(6), s. 793–828. doi: 10.1177/0010414017710269. Vis sammendrag

  Many studies have found that countries with union-administered unemployment insurance have higher rates of unionization than countries with state-administered unemployment insurance. With data going further back in history, this article demonstrates that the introduction of so-called “Ghent systems” had no effect on unionization rates. We argue that the Ghent effect identified by the existing literature came about as a result of increasing state subsidization and benefit generosity in the 1950s and 1960s. Exploring the partisan politics of unemployment insurance, we show that progressive Liberals (“Social Liberals”) favored Ghent designs while Social Democrats favored state-administered unemployment insurance before the Second World War. We also present some evidence suggesting that Left governments, inheriting Ghent systems that were not of their choosing, promoted state subsidization in the postwar era and thus helped generate the Ghent effect identified by the existing literature.

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• Rasmussen, Magnus (2017). Forskning viser at: Velgerne går til høyre i nedgangstider. Dagens næringsliv. ISSN 0803-9372.
• Knutsen, Carl Henrik & Rasmussen, Magnus (2017). Offering pensions can help autocrats stay in power longer. Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286.
• Rasmussen, Magnus; Jensen, Carsten & Andersen, David (2017). Suffering from Suffrage: Welfare State Development and the Politics of Negative Conditionality.
• Rasmussen, Magnus & Knutsen, Carl Henrik (2017). Party Institutionalization and Welfare State Development. Vis sammendrag

  We propose that the extent to which political parties are institutionalized shapes welfare state development. Institutionalized parties allow politicians to overcome coordination problems, avoid capture by special interests, and form stable linkages with broad social groups. These features enable and incentivize politicians to pursue generous and universal welfare policies. Employing recent measures of party institutionalization and welfare law features, we test implications from our argument on data covering from 169 countries and extending back to 1900. Even when accounting for country- and year-fixed effects and institutional features such as electoral system, regime type and state capacity, we find very robust evidence that party institutionalization leads to more extensive, universal, and generous welfare arrangements. The relationship is more pronounced in democracies, but exists also in autocracies. When disaggregating party institutionalization and evaluating mechanisms, the linkages that institutionalized parties form with social groups constitute one important, but not the only relevant, factor.

• Sterri, Aksel Braanen & Rasmussen, Magnus (2011). Sommerferieeffekten. Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift. ISSN 0800-336X. 28(2), s. 213–218.
• Pedersen, Axel West; Grødem, Anne Skevik; Rasmussen, Magnus Bergli & Wagner, Ines (2019). Inntektssikring for befolkningen i yrkesaktiv alder – en sammenligning av syv nordeuropeiske land. Institutt for samfunnsforskning.

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