ECPR Workshop on The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences

The number of democracies in the world today is higher than in any other time. The majority of these democracies adopt a parliamentary constitution, that is, one that is based on assembly confidence. Assembly confidence regimes are those in which governments, in order to come to and stay in power, must be at least tolerated by a legislative majority. They can be divided into positive and negative parliamentarism. The aim of the workshop is to examine the origins and consequences of the mechanisms of positive and negative parliamentarism.

In positive parliamentarism, a majority is required to explicitly express its support for the government; in negative parliamentarism such an explicit expression of majority support is not required. Positive parliamentarism is characterized by a variety of instruments, related to both the making and breaking of governments and their governing capacity (investiture rules, confidence vote, package vote, exclusive government initiative, etc.). We believe the distinction between the two regimes is crucial for understanding the way they operate. Yet, what we know about them is surprisingly sparse and rudimentary. Given that most democracies in the world have adopted some form of parliamentary institutions, understanding the consequences of variation in parliamentarism is both theoretically and practically important.

We invite papers that: (1) develop conceptually the distinction between types of parliamentary systems; (2) provide an historical account of the emergence of parliamentary institutions; (3) examine the impact of types of parliamentarism on political outcomes such as government type, government stability, legislative success, coalition management and the ability to respond to economic and political crisis.

Workshop directors:

Hanna Bäck (Lund University, Sweden)

Bjørn Erik Rasch (University of Oslo, Norway)


Workshop program (by 31 March).

Deadline for distribution of papers: Monday 31 March.  We have 45 minutes for each paper. Presentations by the author should be brief, and take no more than 15 minutes. Discussants may use up to 10 minutes, leaving at least 20 minutes for general discussion.


Hazan, Reuven Y. The Evolution of the Constructive Vote of No-Confidence and Its Political Consequences.

Shomer, Yael. Executive-Legislative Relations and the Relative Power of the Legislature and Government: Four Decades of Israeli Cameral Procedure Change.

Russo, Federico & Luca Verzichelli. The Adoption of Positive and Negative Parliamentarism: Systemic or Idiosyncratic Differences?

Fruhstorfer, Anna. Presidential Power in Parliamentary Systems.

Louwerse, Tom. Unpacking 'positive' and 'negative' parliamentarism.

Field, Bonnie N. Parliamentary Institutions and the Governing Capacity of Minority Parliamentary Governments: The Case of Spain.

Manow, Philip & Valentin Schröder. Is Negative Parliamentarism sometimes no Parliamentarism after all? Evidence on Tiered Systems of Power Separation from the Weimar Republic, 1920-1932.

Mölder, Martin. Coherence of Coalition Governments Across Types of Parliamentarism.

Goetz, Klaus H., Christian Stecker & David Willumsen. Heterotemporal Parliamentarism: Does Staggered Membership Renewal Matter?

Weipert-Fenner, Irene. The emergence of parliamentarism in Egypt, 1866-1882.

Heller, William B. Who's in Charge? The Party Leader, Legislative Institutions, and Party Preferences.

Nikolenyi, Csaba. Power Dispersion and Its Consequences: Three Models of Post-Communist Parliamentarism.

Amat, Francesc & Albert Falco-Gimeno. When the Median Legislator Matters: Redistribution and the Investiture Vote.

Eppner, Sebastian & Steffen Ganghof. Cabinet Selection and Removal Rules in the German Länder.

Cheibub, Jose Antonio, Shane Martin & Bjørn Erik Rasch. To Invest or Not to Invest? Modes of Government Selection in Parliamentary Democracies and their Origins.

Bucur, Cristina. Cabinet ministers and parliamentary government: How institutions and internal party politics affect ministerial accountability.

Zubek, Radoslaw. The Evolution of Agenda Control Rules in New European Democracies.

Bergman, Torbjörn & Johan Hellström. Country-specific configurations and constants in cross-national variable analysis.

Óskarsdóttir, Stefania. From Majoritarian Parliamentarism to Semi-Presidentialism?

Lundgren, Lydia L. and Kaare W. Strøm. Reserved Legislative Seats for Ethnic Minorities: A Global Analysis.

Published May 10, 2013 9:25 PM - Last modified Oct. 30, 2020 9:42 AM