Seminar with Martin Vinæs Larsen (Aarhus University)
Title of the presentation: "How Jurisdiction Size Affects the Politics of Land Use"
This article argues that increasing the average jurisdiction size of local governments reduce their incentive to permit new housing, as it attenuates interjurisdictional competition for high-wage workers and lowers their exposure to local economic shocks. It explores this argument by studying the effects of a reform that dramatically increased the jurisdictional size of some Danish local governments. Constructing a panel of granular data on housing permits issued by these local governments, I identify the effect of this reform using a set of difference-in-difference models. I find that in areas where jurisdiction size increased local governments issued markedly fewer permits for market rate housing, especially in municipalities which experienced a large decrease in interjurisdictional competition and tax-base-volatility. These findings should give pause to anyone who hopes to ameliorate the affordability crisis by centralizing power over land use policy.
To receive the Zoom link, please contact Marina Povitkina