Reform capacity - the ability of leaders to adopt and implement policy changes that benefit an organization, or society as a whole - can be achieved in both power-concentration systems - where losers are ignored - and power-sharing systems - where support for reform are built by compensating losers. However, if decision-makers are able to solve the bargaining problems that sometimes complicate negotiations between winners and losers, power-sharing systems have certain advantages over power-concentration systems. In his book Reform Capacity (2017), Johannes Lindvall argues that power sharing can lead to high reform capacity in societies where interest groups are powerful enough to block reforms. Power sharing can also lead to high reform capacity when reforms have short-term costs and long-term benefits, as power sharing may contribute to correct short-sightedness.
After a key note lecture by Johannes Lindvall, there will be a paper session. We invite papers that address the topic of public policy or organizational reform. What are the characteristics of such reforms? How do policy/organizational reforms come about? How can we explain reform outcomes? When and why do reforms fail, and when do they succeed, and according to which criteria should we measure successes/failures?
If you want to present a paper, send an abstract to Cathrine Holst (email@example.com) no later than 1 November 2019.
If you want to join the paper session (including lunch and dinner) without a paper, send an e-mail to Cathrine Holst (firstname.lastname@example.org) by 1 December 2019.
Lindvall's key note lecture from 11:00-12:30 is open for all.
11:00-12:30 Reform Capacity: Institutions, Processes, Outcomes. Key note by Johannes Lindvall, Aud. 5 Eilert Sundt
13:30-18:00 Paper session (including coffee breaks), Instituttstyrerommet, Harriet Holter
20:00 Dinner (TBA)
Organized by the seminar APO - Arbeid, politikk og organisasjon (Work, politics and organization)