The Economics and Politics of Conservation
European Research Council (ERC) Consolidator Grant 683031
2016 - 2021
Photo: Neil Palmer/CIAT
- Contracts and Induced Institutional Change, Harstad and Mideksa.
- Does the Salience of Risk Affect Large, Risky Asset Purchases?, by Garnache.
- Conservation contracts for exhaustible resources, in progress, by Harstad and Framstad.
- Technology and Time Inconsistency, Harstad, Journal of Political Economy 128(7), 2020: 2653-89.
- The Role of Research in Common-pool Problems, by Kuusela and Laiho, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Volume 100, March 2020, 102287.
- The Political Economy of Weak Treaties, Battaglini and Harstad, Journal of Political Economy 128(2), 2020: 544–90.
- The case for a supply-side climate treaty, by Asheim, Fæhn, Nyborg, Greaker, Hagem, Harstad, Hoel, Lund, Rosendahl, Science Policy Forum 365(6451): 325-27, 2019.
- Gridlock and Inefficient Policy Instruments, by Austen-Smith, Dziuda, Harstad, and Loeper, Theoretical Economics 14(4), 2019: 1483–1534.
- Compliance Technology and Self-enforcing Agreements, by Harstad, Lancia, and Russo, Journal of the European Economic Association 17(1), 2019: 1-30.
- Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes, by Harstad and Mideksa, Review of Economic Studies 84(4), 2017: 1708-34.
- The Market for Conservation and Other Hostages, by Harstad. Journal of Economic Theory 166(November), 2016: 124-151.
- Buy Coal! A Case for Supply-Side Environmental Policy, by Harstad. Journal of Political Economy 120(1), 2012: 77-115.
Funding is provided by the European Research Council (ERC) Consolidator Grant.
The project has a budget of 1,57 million Euro (15 million NOK) and lasts five years, August 1st 2016 – July 31st 2021.
This is the second ERC project led by principal investigator Bård Harstad. The first project, a European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grant called "General Institutional Equilibrium: Theory and Policy Implications", was operational from 2012 to 2016.