Beliefs about Racial Discrimination: Representative Evidence*

Ingar Haaland† Christopher Roth‡

November 8, 2018
Date of first version: September 21, 2017

Abstract

We provide nationally representative evidence on American people's beliefs about racial discrimination and explore whether these beliefs causally affect support for affirmative action programs. In an online experiment on a large, representative sample of Americans, we elicited incentivized beliefs about the extent of racial labor market discrimination against blacks. We document large heterogeneity in beliefs and find particularly pronounced political differences: Republicans are about 15 percentage points less likely than Democrats to overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. To introduce exogenous variation in beliefs, we provided a random subset of our respondents with research evidence from a correspondence study that tested for discrimination against blacks in the labor market. Respondents strongly and persistently updated their beliefs about racial discrimination in response to the information. Treated respondents who underestimated racial discrimination also increased their donations to a pro-black civil rights organization by 18 percent of a standard deviation. However, the treatment did not reduce political polarization in donations as Republicans who underestimated racial discrimination did not increase their donations. This finding suggests that the political disagreement on affirmative action programs is not mainly determined by differences in beliefs about racial discrimination. (*JEL* C91, D83, F22, J15)

*We would like to thank Roland Bénabou, Björn Bartling, Daniel Benjamin, Alexander Cappelen, James Druckman, Elwyn Davies, Stefano DellaVigna, Jon de Quidt, Armin Falk, Jeremy Freese, Lorenz Götte, Thomas Graeber, Alexis Grigorieff, Johannes Haushofer, Lukas Hensel, Johannes Hermle, Simon Jäger, Fabian Kosse, Matt Lowe, Simon Quinn, Ricardo Perez-Truglia, Matthew Rabin, Gautam Rao, Eirik Strømland, Erik Sørensen, Bertil Tungodden, Jonas Tungodden, Diego Ubfal, Ulf Zoelitz, and seminar participants in Bergen, Bonn, Cologne (EEA), Oxford, and Munich (Cesifo) for helpful comments and discussions. Financial support from Centre for Ethics and Economics at NHH, the Russell Sage Foundation (Small Awards in Behavioral Economics), the Research Council of Norway through its Centres of Excellence Scheme (FAIR project No 262675), and data collection by Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (NSF Grant 0818839, Jeremy Freese and James Druckman, Principal Investigators) is gratefully acknowledged. The study is registered in the AEA RCT Registry as trial 2273, `https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2273`. IRB approvals were obtained from the University of Oxford and NHH Norwegian School of Economics. The usual disclaimer applies.

†NHH Norwegian School of Economics (email: Ingar.Haaland@nhh.no)

‡Institute on Behavior & Inequality (email: Chris.Roth@briq-institute.org)

1 Introduction

Racial discrimination is a pervasive phenomenon that affects many spheres in society, including the functioning of markets (Arrow, 1998; Bertrand and Duflo, 2017; List, 2004). Taking the United States as an example, several studies have documented high levels of racial discrimination in various domains, such as the labor market (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Fryer et al., 2013; Neumark et al., 1996; Nunley et al., 2014; Oreopoulos, 2011; Quillian et al., 2017) and the housing market (Bartoš et al., 2016; Edelman et al., 2016).

Despite the large body of evidence of racial discrimination, Americans are deeply divided in their support for policies to combat racial discrimination. For instance, while 81 percent of Democrats support making changes for racial equality, only 36 percent of Republicans say they support this.[1] This striking political polarization in views on pro-black policies raises two important questions. First, do Republicans and Democrats hold different beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination in society? Second, would a convergence in beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination in society reduce the political polarization in support for pro-black policies? This paper explores these two questions with incentivized data on people's beliefs about racial discrimination and incentivized data on people's support for a pro-black civil rights organisation.

We introduce a novel approach to measure people's beliefs about discrimination. With respondents from a high-quality, probability-based sample of the US household population, we elicited incentivized beliefs about the results of a correspondence study testing for racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market. Respondents were told that researchers sent out resumes that were identical in all respects except for the perceived race of our sender to help wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers. After informing the respondents that resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent

[1] Pew Research Center, accessed November 12, 2017

out 10 times to get one callback on average, we asked them how many times they think resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average. In contrast to traditional survey questions, this approach allows us to elicit quantitative and incentivized beliefs about racial discrimination in a precisely defined environment.

To explore whether beliefs about racial discrimination causally affect people's support for policies to combat discrimination, we introduced exogenous variation in people's beliefs by informing a random subset of the respondents about the actual results from the correspondence study (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). Specifically, we informed respondents in the treatment group that white-sounding names received 50 percent more callbacks for interviews than black-sounding names. To measure whether people update their beliefs about racial discrimination in response to this evidence, we elicited their beliefs about a second correspondence study that tested for racial discrimination in the housing market. Furthermore, to measure whether the information provision affects people's political behavior, we explored treatment effects on real donations to a pro-black civil rights organization as well as self-reported policy views on pro-black policies.

We establish several novel findings about the demand for pro-black policies in America. First, in both the labor market and in the rental market, the majority of Americans tend to overestimate racial discrimination against blacks. We also document that Republicans are about 15 percentage points less likely than Democrats to overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. Second, overestimating racial discrimination is strongly associated with people's donations to a pro-black NGO: Respondents who overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market donate on average 30 percent more to the pro-black civil rights organization. This corresponds to almost one-half of the Democrat–Republican difference in donations. Third, we document that people's beliefs about racial discrimination respond strongly to the research evidence. The treatment closes almost 70 percent of the Republican–Democrat difference in beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market. Fourth, we find that beliefs about racial discrimi-

nation causally affect people's political behavior: The treatment closes 55 percent of the gap in donations between those who initially overestimate and underestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. Exploring political heterogeneity in treatment responses, we find that the treatment is only effective in changing donations for non-Republicans. These findings suggest that the political polarization we observe in views on pro-black policies is not primarily driven by differences in beliefs about racial discrimination: Although the treatment successfully reduces Democrat–Republican differences in beliefs, it is ineffective in reducing Democrat–Republican differences in political behavior. Fifth, exploring treatment responses on self-reported attitudes, we find that views on affirmative action policies are generally unresponsive to information about racial discrimination.

We conducted several additional experiments to explore mechanisms and to test for robustness. First, we conducted an experiment where the main outcome questions on self-reported policy views were only asked one week later in an "obfuscated" follow-up study, which hides the connection between the main study and the follow-up. We show that posterior beliefs about racial labor market discrimination elicited in the follow-up study adjust in response to the research evidence. Further, we replicate that the information does not change self-reported support for affirmative action policies. The only exception from the main study is that we find some evidence on backfiring effects among Republicans: that is, Republicans who initially underestimated racial discrimination become even less in favor of affirmative action policies.

We also run two additional experiments to shed light on the role of political identity and beliefs about effort differences between blacks and whites in driving the partisan gap in views on pro-black policies. We do not find evidence that making party views on affirmative action more salient increases polarization in policy preferences. Correlational evidence in our surveys suggests an important role of beliefs about effort differences between blacks and whites for views on pro-black policies. In our last experiment, we exogenously vary perceptions of effort differences between blacks and whites. We find

no evidence that people whose beliefs about racial stereotypes are challenged through information provision adjust their views on affirmative action.

Our study provides the first evidence on the causal determinants of demand for affirmative action policies in economics. Our main contributions are as follows: First, we collect the first incentivized measures of support for pro-black policies along with quantitative and incentivized data on people's beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market and in the housing market.[2] Since incentives have been shown to reduce partisan bias in people's stated beliefs (Bullock et al., 2015; Prior et al., 2015), an incentivized belief elicitation is particularly important for hotly debated topics such as racial discrimination. Second, we provide the first causal evidence on the role of people's beliefs about racial discrimination on their demand for policies that try to combat this discrimination.[3] We thereby inform the debate on the role that views on pro-black policies play for shaping people's political behavior (DellaVigna, 2010; Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014) and people's attitudes towards affirmative action (Bobo and Kluegel, 1993; Harrison et al., 2006; Jacobson, 1985; Kluegel and Smith, 1983; Kuklinski et al., 1997; Tuch and Hughes, 2011). Kuziemko and Washington (2018) provides evidence that racial attitudes explain why the Democratic Party "lost the South" in the second half of the twentieth century. Our results contribute to this broader debate on the relevance of race for US politics by exploring how people's beliefs about racial discrimination relate to people's political behavior towards blacks. Moreover, our findings also complement previous work examining whether the awareness of racial discrimination reduces racial bias in the NBA (Pope et al., 2017).

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental

[2]Our study is related to concurrent work by Kraus et al. (2017) who measure people's beliefs about racial income inequality in the US.

[3]More generally, we add to the broader literature on how information provision affects people's policy preferences (Alesina et al., 2018; Cruces et al., 2013; Gilens, 2001; Grigorieff et al., 2016; Haaland and Roth, 2017; Karadja et al., 2016; Kuklinski et al., 2000; Kuziemko et al., 2015). This is also related to models of belief updating in response to information that conflicts with people's prior (Fryer et al., 2016).

design and sample. Section 3 provides descriptive data on people's beliefs about racial discrimination. Section 4 present treatment effects on beliefs and preferences from giving people research evidence about the results from the correspondence study. Section 5 presents results from two follow-up experiments that explore the roles of political identity and racial stereotyping in driving political differences in views on pro-black policies. Section 6 concludes and offer suggestions for future work. The Online Appendix provides additional results and the full set of experimental instructions.

2 Experimental design and sample

We conducted two main online experiments with different samples. The experiments were designed to complement each other. In Experiment 1, we collect data on a probablity-based sample of the US population in collaboration with NORC at the University of Chicago. In Experiment 2, we collected data on a US sample representative in terms of several observables, collaborating with Research Now, a US market research company. We collected data for the experiments in June and July 2017. We submitted separate pre-analysis plans to the AEA RCT Registry before each experiment. The pre-analysis plans are available at the following link: `https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2273`.

2.1 Experiment 1: Design

The structure of Experiment 1 is as follows (Figure 2 provides an overview). We first measured our respondents' beliefs about the extent of racial labor market discrimination in the US. We then exposed half of our respondents to the information treatment. Subsequently, we measured people's support for policies to address racial discrimination in the labor market using both self-reports and a behavioral measure. We also elicited

post-treatment beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market.

[Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3 here]

2.1.1 Pre-treatment beliefs about racial labor market discrimination

We used a correspondence study to measure people's beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market. Correspondence studies rely on fictitious applicants to study discrimination in the labor market. Specifically, by manipulating whether a fictitious resume is assigned a minority name, researchers can study racial labor market discrimination by comparing the outcomes for resumes with and without the perceived minority name. A seminal correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) found that white-sounding names were 50 percent more likely to receive a callback than black-sounding names, a finding that has been closely replicated in several subsequent correspondence studies (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017). We rely on this study in our experiment. To familiarize our respondents with the study, we presented them with the following text:

> Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending out fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers.
>
> The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like "Carrie" and "Todd". The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like "Tanisha" and "Kareem". The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants' names to infer whether they were white or black.

We then informed respondents that resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent

out on average 10 times to get one callback for an interview. To measure their beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market, we then simply asked how many times they believe resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out on average to get one callback for an interview. Furthermore, we promised respondents a $2 bonus if their answer was the same "as what the researchers found."

Our belief elicitation has several advantages compared to qualitative survey questions that have traditionally been used to study beliefs about racial discrimination. First, we measure beliefs on a quantitative scale that is easily comparable across respondents and has the same interpretation for everyone. By contrast, many previous studies have assessed beliefs about racial discrimination using a question from the General Social Survey about the amount of discrimination that blacks face in "getting good jobs," which is measured on a 4-point scale from "none at all" to "a lot."[4] One concern with using subjective response scales to measure beliefs is that different people may have different opinions about what, e.g., "some" or "only a little" discrimination means.[5] Furthermore, in our setting, racial discrimination is precisely defined and we can hold our respondents' beliefs about the circumstances of racial discrimination constant. For qualitative survey questions, people may have different definitions of what constitutes "discrimination." These beliefs may be correlated with demographics making it difficult to draw strong conclusions on differences in beliefs about racial discrimination across demographic groups. Our measure avoids these confounds. Second, unincentivized survey questions are more prone to misreporting of beliefs. Indeed, small incentives for correct answers have been shown to strongly increase the accuracy of survey responses and to reduce gaps in reported beliefs across party lines (Bullock et al., 2015; Prior et al., 2015). Since our question has a factual answer, we can incentivize correct responses.

[4]Details about this variable are available at the following link: `https://gssdataexplorer.norc.org/variables/1244/vshow` (accessed May 14, 2018).

[5]For a discussion of problems associated with subjective response scales, see Bond and Lang (2018).

2.1.2 Introducing exogenous variation in beliefs

Two central identification challenges when studying the impact of beliefs on policy preferences are omitted variable bias and reverse causality. We solve these identification challenges by introducing exogenous variation in beliefs by informing respondents in the treatment group about the level of discrimination found in the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). Specifically, we showed the following text to treated respondents:

> The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out 15 times to get one callback for an interview.
>
> Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10 times to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were 50 percent more likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding names compared to applicants with black-sounding names.

By contrast, respondents in the control group did not receive any information and proceeded directly from the belief elicitation to the outcome questions.

2.1.3 Measuring support for pro-black policies: Behavioral measure

A common critique of self-reported survey questions is that they might not be informative of real political behavior and that they are prone to experimenter demand effects. To address these concerns, we also collected a behavioral outcome measure. We focused on donations to a civil rights organization aiming to reduce labor market discrimination. We told our respondents that they have the opportunity to financially support a civil rights organization that works to reduce discrimination against blacks in the labor market. We elicited the respondents' marginal rate of substitution between money for themselves and money for the civil rights organization through a multiple price list. The respondents chose between $5 for the civil rights organization and money for themselves in $1-

increments from $0 to $5. One of the six choices was randomly implemented.[6]

2.1.4 Measuring support for pro-black policies: self-reported policy views

To measure how the treatment affected support for pro-black policies, we first investigated self-reported attitudes. Since our treatment was tailored to shift beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market, we focused on labor market policies. We asked questions about the three different most commonly-discussed policies attempting to address racial inequalities and racial discrimination. Our first question asked respondents whether they "support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job." Our second question asked respondents whether they "support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job." Finally, our third question asked respondents whether they "support or oppose mandatory name-blind recruitment for hiring in public and private jobs." For all three questions, respondents reported their answer on a 5-point scale from (1) "Strongly oppose" to (5) "Strongly support." Further, we asked respondents whether they think that racial discrimination against blacks "is a serious problem."

2.1.5 Measuring beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market

To measure whether respondents updated their beliefs in response to the research evidence, we relied on a second correspondence study that tested for racial discrimination in the housing market (Edelman et al., 2016). We chose to focus on racial discrimination in a different domain because we worried that demand effects, numerical anchoring, or a taste for consistency in survey responses could bias responses if we re-asked the question about discrimination in the labor market shortly after the information provision. We

[6]The experiment involved no deception and we actually donated the relevant amount to the civil rights organization after the experiment.

chose to focus on the housing market for three reasons. First, racial discrimination in the housing market holds strong economic importance, and has received ample academic interest. Second, the core question about racial discrimination in the General Social Survey asks respondents about discrimination in "jobs, income, and housing", which enables us to compare our results to previous landmark studies characterizing beliefs about racial discrimination. Third, the study by Edelman et al. (2016) that serves as our benchmark used identical names as Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), which allows us to easily explain the methodology to respondents and makes the results across domains more comparable. Specifically, we used the following text to familiarize our respondents with the second study:

> Researchers from Harvard Business School conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the rental market by sending out reservation requests from invented accounts to hosts on Airbnb, a website for private rental accommodations. The requests were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the person who sent the request. Half of the requests came from typically white-sounding names, while the other half came from typically black-sounding names. The idea was that the hosts would use the applicants' name to infer whether the reservation requests came from white or black requesters.

We then told them that the researchers found that white-sounding names were accepted 49 percent of the time. To measure their beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market, we then simply asked what percent of the time they believe that black-sounding names were accepted. We also offered a $2 bonus for answers that are within "2 percentage points of what the researchers found."

We purposefully designed the second belief elicitation to deal with numerical anchoring by (i) using a different response scale than the first belief elicitation, and (ii) using

a scale in which higher values implied less racial discrimination. Since higher values implied more discrimination in the first belief elicitation, this means that numerical anchoring makes it less likely that we will find evidence for belief updating.

At the end of the experiment, we told the respondents that the researchers behind the study on labor market discrimination interpreted their findings as clear evidence of discrimination against blacks in the labor market. To measure people's trust in the research evidence, we then asked to what extent they agree with this interpretation of the findings on a scale from (1) "Strongly disagree" to (5) "Strongly agree."

2.2 Experiment 2: Design

While an important question is whether treatment effects persist over time, a potential drawback of re-asking the main outcome questions in a follow-up study is that people's taste for consistency in their survey responses may bias treatment effects (Falk and Zimmermann, 2012). To avoid this confound, we conducted a separate experiment in which we only asked the main outcome questions in a follow-up study (Figure 3 provides a summary of the structure). Furthermore, to address concerns about social desirability bias, we obfuscated the purpose of the follow-up study.

2.2.1 Design of the first wave

We first elicit beliefs about racial discrimination in the same way as in Experiment 1. We also elicited confidence by asking respondents the following question: "How sure are you about your answer to the previous question?" Respondents report their answer on a 5-point scale from 1: "Very unsure" to 5: "Very sure."[7] Finally, we asked the same manipulation check as in Experiment 1, namely whether people think that racial

[7] We did not ask this question in Experiment 1 owing to budget constraints. The cost of adding questions to Experiment 1 was much higher than in Experiment 2 because it used a probability-based sample.

discrimination against blacks "is a serious problem."

2.2.2 Design of the second wave

About one week after the first wave, respondents were invited to participate in the second wave. We chose to have one week between the two waves to trade off between testing for persistence of treatment effects and minimizing attrition.

One general concern about information experiments is that the information provision could change perceptions about what the experimenter expects participants to believe. Even though recent evidence suggests that demand effects are not quantitatively important (de Quidt et al., 2018), we took several steps to obfuscate the purpose of the second wave. First, respondents received a generic invitation form from the survey provider to participate in a 5-minute survey which does not reveal that the two waves are connected (Figure A.6 provides a screenshot of the invitation form from wave 1).[8] Second, we used different Qualtrics accounts for the two studies: in wave 1, the Qualtrics account was from University of Oxford; in wave 2, the Qualtrics account was from NHH Norwegian School of Economics. We also varied the layout of the survey between the waves. Third, we asked respondents several obfuscation questions about their views on investment and religion before asking our main outcome questions.

Following the obfuscation questions, we asked the same questions on self-reported policy views as in Experiment 1: support for (i) a preference for hiring qualified black candidates over equally qualified white candidates, (ii) assistance programs for blacks in getting a job; and (iii) name-blind recruitment. We also asked a series of questions to explore mechanisms. Some people may oppose affirmative action because they think that such programs are ineffective in helping blacks. To explore whether the treatment affects beliefs about the effectiveness of affirmative action, we asked respondents whether

[8]The actual number of days between wave 1 and wave 2 varied between one and 19 days for all respondents, with an average of eight days.

they think that affirmative action programs over the last fifty years have "have helped blacks, hurt them, or had no effect one way or the other." Some people may also oppose affirmative action because they think that differences in outcomes between blacks and whites are mainly due to effort rather than discrimination. To explore whether the treatment affected beliefs about the source of inequality between blacks and whites, we asked the following two questions: (i) to what extent they think that differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are "primarily the result of racial discrimination against blacks," and (ii) to what extent they think that differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are "primarily the result of whites working harder than blacks." We also re-asked the question on whether respondents think that racial discrimination against blacks is a "serious problem".

Near the end of the survey, we elicited posterior beliefs about the extent of racial labor market discrimination using the same correspondence study as in the first wave. As in the first wave, we incentivized correct answers with a $2 bonus. Since we use the same belief elicitation across the two waves, it is natural to assume that respondents realized that the two waves are connected at this point.

2.3 Sample characteristics

2.3.1 Experiment 1: NORC AmeriSpeak

For Experiment 1, we recruited 1538 respondents through NORC's AmeriSpeak panel. AmeriSpeak is a probability-based panel of the US population. The panel uses NORC's National Frame, which is designed to provide at least 97 percent sample coverage of the US population. The NORC National Frame is used for several landmark studies in the US, including the General Social Survey (GSS), which is one of the most frequently-analyzed

data sets in the social sciences.[9]

Table A.1 provides summary statistics for this sample. 46 percent of respondents are male, 66 percent are white, and 11 percent are black. The median household income in our sample is $55,270. 80 percent of our sample have at least some college education. The sample is also representative in terms of regions: 16 percent of our respondents come from the North-East, 29 percent from the Midwest, 33 percent from the South, while the remaining respondents are from the West. In terms of political affiliation, 24 percent of respondents self-identify as Republicans; 36 percent self-identify as Democrats; and the the remaining respondents self-identify as Independents. Observations in the treatment and control group are balanced in terms of observables (Table A.3).[10]

2.3.2 Experiment 2: Research Now

In Experiment 2, we recruited respondents in collaboration with Research Now, which is one of the leading marketing research companies in the US. 2075 respondents completed the first wave, which was the second component of a follow-up study from another experiment that we also conducted with Research Now.[11] 1720 respondents completed the second wave.

Table A.2 provides summary statistics for the Research Now sample. The sample is broadly representative of the US population in terms of several observable characteristics. 50 percent of our respondents are male; 80 percent are white; and 6 percent are black. The median household income in our sample is $56,000. 83 percent of our sample have at least some college education. 23 percent of our respondents come from the North-East; 19 percent from the Midwest; 35 percent from the South; and the remaining 23 percent of

[9] More information about the panel is available at the following web page: `http://amerispeak.norc.org/about-amerispeak/panel-design/` (accessed November 3, 2017).

[10] We did not ask any questions about demographics or political affiliation as part of the experiment. This data was appended by NORC.

[11] In the first wave, respondents also answered demographic questions, questions about their views on the role of government, and questions about their views on immigration.

respondents are from the West. In terms of political affiliation, 26 percent of respondents self-identify as Republicans, 38 percent of our respondents self-identify as Democrats, and the remaining respondents self-identify as Independents. There is balance across treatment arms (Tables A.4 and A.5). Treatment status is not correlated with completing the followup (A.6).

3 Beliefs about racial discrimination: Descriptives

This section uses data from Experiment 1 to provide representative evidence on people's beliefs about racial discrimination. We first explore heterogeneity in people's beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination in America and investigate whether these beliefs correlate with some key background characteristics. We then explore whether beliefs about racial discrimination correlate with people's policy preferences.

3.1 Heterogeneity in beliefs about racial discrimination

Figure 4 provides representative evidence on people's beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market and in the housing market. Panel A of Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution function for beliefs about how many resumes black-sounding names had to send out to get one callback on average (respondents were told that the corresponding number for white-sounding names was 10). The quantitative belief elicitation allows us to assess the fraction of respondents who overestimate and underestimate racial discrimination in society. Compared to the results from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), who found that black-sounding names had to send out 15 resumes to get one callback on average, we find that 31.4 percent of our respondents underestimated racial discrimination in the labor market; 9.2 percent had correct beliefs; and the remaining 59.4 percent overestimated the extent of racial discrimination in the labor market.

Panel B of Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution function for beliefs about how many percent of the time respondents thought reservation requests from black-sounding name were rejected on Airnbn (respondents were told that the corresponding number for white-sounding names was 51 percent). Compared to the results by Edelman et al. (2016), who found that requests from black-sounding names were rejected 60 percent of the time, 21.8 percent of our respondents underestimated racial discrimination in the rental market; 4.3 percent had correct beliefs; and the remaining 74 percent overestimated the extent of racial discrimination in the rental market.

[Insert Figure 4 here]

Our data also allows us to measure the share of respondents who thought that there is discrimination against whites, discrimination against blacks, and the fraction who think that there is no racial discrimination at all. For the labor market, 21 percent of our respondents believed that there is discrimination against whites, eight percent believed that there is no discrimination, and the remaining 71 percent believed that there is discrimination against blacks. For the housing market, we find that 14 percent believed that there is discrimination against whites, 3 percent believed that there is no racial discrimination, and the remaining 83 percent believed that there is discrimination against blacks.

[Insert Figure 5 here]

Figure 5 explores whether beliefs about racial discrimination vary systematically by people's background characteristics. Panel A shows correlations for beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market. We find especially pronounced differences in beliefs based on people's political affiliation: Relative to Republicans, Democrats believed that black-sounding names had to send out 5.1 times more resumes to get one callback on

average ($p<0.01$). In contrast, we find no significant differences between blacks and whites in their beliefs about discrimination in the labor market ($p=0.77$). Other than political views, the only background characteristic that significantly predicted beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market is college education: Relative to those with no college education, college-educated respondents thought that black-sounding names had to send out 2.1 times more resumes to get to get one callback on average ($p<0.05$).[12]

For beliefs about the rental market (Panel B of Figure 5), we also found pronounced differences based on people's political affiliation: Relative to Republicans, Democrats thought that reservation requests from black-sounding names were 5.7 percentage points more likely to be rejected ($p<0.01$). While we did not find evidence of educational differences in beliefs in the rental market, we did find significant racial differences: Relative to whites, blacks thought that reservation requests from black-sounding names were 6.5 percentage points more likely to be rejected ($p<0.05$). Given the findings in this section, our first main results is as follows:

Result 1. *The majority of Americans overestimated racial discrimination against blacks in both the labor market and in the rental market. Furthermore, in both domains, we documented a robust correlation between beliefs about racial discrimination and people's political affiliation.*

3.2 The association between beliefs and policy preferences

Table 1 provides evidence on whether our measure of beliefs about racial labor discrimination correlates with some of our key outcome measures using only control group respondents. Column 1 of Panel A shows a regression of people's real donations to

[12]We also elicited willingness to pay for the research evidence through a multiple price list at the end of experiment 2 for control group respondents. In the online Appendix we show that whites, males and Republicans had a lower willingness to pay for the research evidence. A.9.

the pro-black civil organization on an indicator for overestimating racial labor market discrimination. Overestimating racial discrimination is associated with 0.26 of a standard deviation higher donations to the NGO ($p<0.01$). Including controls in the regression reduces the estimated association to 0.197 of a standard deviation ($p<0.01$, Column 1 of Panel B). This corresponds to 38 percent of the Democrat–Republican difference in donations to the NGO.

Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 show significant associations between overestimating racial discrimination and support for black preference in hiring and support for job assistance programs for blacks, respectively. Column 4 shows that respondents who overestimated racial discrimination in the labor market believed that there is 0.31 of a standard deviation more discrimination in the rental market relative to respondents who underestimated racial discrimination in the labor market. Furthermore, column 5 shows that our belief measure is also predictive of whether people thought that racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a "serious problem." Our next main result is as follows.

[Insert Table 1 here]

Result 2. *Overestimating racial discrimination in the labor market is associated with higher donations to a pro-black civil rights organization. The magnitude of the association corresponds to 38 percent of the Democrat–Republican difference in donations. Beliefs about racial discrimination are also associated with self-reported policy views on pro-black policies.*

Overall, these correlations suggest that our belief measure has high external validity. Not only does it predict responses to qualitative survey questions, it also predicts real donations to a pro-black civil rights organization. But naturally, these correlations need to be interpreted cautiously. The estimated effect of beliefs on donations and self-reported

policy views could be confounded due to measurement error, reverse causality, and omitted variable bias. The next section addresses causality by studying the effects of the randomly assigned information treatment.

4 Treatment effects on beliefs and preferences

This section presents treatment effects from providing people with research evidence about the results from the correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). We first outline our empirical strategy. We then present three sets of results: First, we investigate whether people updated their beliefs in response to the treatment. Second, we analyze how the treatment affected people's political behavior as measured by incentivized donations. Third, we analyze how the treatment affected people's self-reported policy preferences on pro-black policies.

4.1 Empirical strategy

We pre-specified the analysis of both experiments in two documents uploaded to the AEA RCT Registry prior to starting the data collection. The pre-analysis plans are available on the following link: `https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2273`. The empirical strategy outlined in this section follows the pre-analysis plan. The Online Appendix includes all pre-specified results that are not discussed in the main text.

Main specification Since we expect different treatment effects based on whether the respondents initially overestimate or underestimate racial discrimination, our main specification is the following difference-in-differences equation which we estimate using OLS:

$$y_i = a_0 + a_1 \text{Treatment}_i + a_2 \text{Treatment}_i \quad \text{prior}_i + a_3 \text{prior}_i + a_4 \mathbf{x}_i + e_i \tag{1}$$

where y_i is the outcome of interest; Treatment$_i$ is an indicator for whether respondent i received the research evidence; prior$_i$ is an indicator for initially overestimating racial labor discrimination (i.e., for having pre-treatment beliefs that black-sounding names needed to send out strictly more than 15 resumes to get one callback on average)[13]; $\mathbf{x}_i$ is a vector of pre-specified controls[14]; and ε_i is an individual-specific error term. We use robust error terms for inference. Throughout the section, we refer to respondents who initially underestimated and overestimated racial discrimination in the labor market as "underestimators" and "overestimators," respectively.

Heterogeneity by political views There are several reasons to expect Republicans to respond differently to the information than non-Republicans. For instance, Republicans are much more likely than non-Republicans to oppose government action on ideological grounds. In the second main specification of interest, we therefore allow for political heterogeneity in treatment responses by estimating the following triple-difference equation:

$$\begin{aligned} y_i = {} & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Treatment}_i + \alpha_2 \text{Treatment}_i \quad \text{Prior}_i + \alpha_3 \text{Treatment}_i \quad \text{Republican}_i \\ & + \alpha_4 \text{Treatment}_i \quad \text{Prior}_i \quad \text{Republican}_i + \alpha_5 \text{Prior}_i \\ & + \alpha_6 \text{Republican}_i + \alpha_7 \text{Prior}_i \quad \text{Republican}_i + \alpha_8 \mathbf{x}_i + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where Republican$_i$ is an indicator for self-identifying as a Republican. We also report the results of heterogeneity on some other dimensions in the Online Appendix, but these

[13] Since those with accurate pre-treatment beliefs (i.e., 15) should become more confident in their beliefs, which we expected should increase support for pro-black policies, we decided to group them in the same category as those who strictly underestimated racial discrimination.

[14] For Experiment 1, we include the following controls: gender (binary), age (in years), two ethnicity indicators (non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks); three regional indicators; household size (continuous); log household income (continuous); an indicator for having college degree; and indicator for being employed; and two party affiliation indicators (Republicans and Democrats). For Experiment 2, we also include confidence in prior beliefs as a control (integer from 1 to 5) and, to follow the pre-analysis plan, do not include an indicator for self-identifying as a Democrat.

regressions are exploratory as they were not pre-specified. In the main tables, we focus on Equation (2), which was the only pre-specified triple-difference equation for Experiment 1.

4.2 Do people update their beliefs about racial discrimination?

Experiment 1: Beliefs about the housing market We first examine whether people used the information about racial discrimination in the labor market to update their beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market. While respondents were asked about the acceptance rate of black-sounding names (i.e., how many percent of the time they thought reservation requests from black-sounding names were accepted), we recoded the answers such that higher numbers imply more discrimination by showing results for beliefs about implied rejection rates instead. Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A of Table 2 display treatment effects without and with inclusion of controls, respectively. Column 1 shows that treated underestimators increased their estimate of the rejection rate of black-sounding names by 4.1 percentage points ($p<0.01$). By contrast, treated overestimators decreased their estimate of the rejection rate for black-sounding names by 4.9 percentage points ($p<0.01$). These estimates are significantly different from each other ($p<0.01$). Column 2 shows that these results are virtually unaffected by including controls in the regressions, which is as expected given the random treatment assignment. Columns 1 and 2 of Panel B show that there was no significant treatment heterogeneity between Republicans and non-Republicans. One reason for this could be that we incentivized the belief elicitation, which made it costly to engage in motivated partisan reasoning.

[Insert Table 2 here]

Experiment 2: Posterior beliefs about the labor market In Experiment 2, we elicited posterior beliefs about racial discrimination in the one-week follow-up. Columns 3 and 4

of Panel A of Table 2 display treatment effects without and with inclusion of controls, respectively. Column 3 shows that treated underestimators increased their estimate of how many times resumes with black-sounding names need to be sent out to get one callback on average by 2.3 resumes ($p<0.05$). Treated overestimators, by contrast, decreased their estimate by 11 resumes ($p<0.01$). These estimates are significantly different from each other ($p<0.01$). Column 4 shows that the estimates are virtually unaffected by including controls in the regressions, which is as expected due to the randomization and the lack of selective attrition. Furthermore, columns 3 and 4 of Panel B show that there was no significant treatment heterogeneity between Republicans and non-Republicans. Given these estimates, our next main result can be summarized as follows:

Result 3. *People's beliefs about racial discrimination were responsive to new information. Treated respondents strongly updated their beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination in both the labor market and the housing market in response to research evidence from a correspondence study.*

In both experiments, people strongly updated their beliefs about racial discrimination towards higher accuracy in response to the research evidence. This successful "first stage" on beliefs allows us to investigate whether beliefs about racial discrimination causally affected people's behavior and policy views on pro-black policies.

4.3 The causal effect of beliefs on people's political behavior

Table 3 shows regression results from Experiment 1 on people's real donations to a pro-black civil rights organization.[15] In the regression, we z-score the number of donations using the mean and standard deviation of the control group.

[15] We only collected data on donations for respondents in Experiment 1. Respondents could choose between varying amounts of money for themselves or donating $5 to *The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights*, a pro-black civil rights organization founded in 1963 at the request of President John F. Kennedy. We donated $3045 to the organization on behalf of our respondents.

[Insert Table 3 here]

Column 1 of Table 3 shows that treated underestimators increased their donations to the organization by 0.17 of a standard deviation ($p<0.05$). This effect size corresponds to one-third of the Republican–Democrat difference in donations. It also corresponds to two-thirds of the difference in donations between those who initially overestimate and underestimate racial discrimination. By contrast, treated respondents who overestimated racial discrimination do not reduce their donations; the treatment effect estimate is close to zero and not statistically significant ($p=0.65$) even though respondents in this group changed their beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market considerably. The interaction effect between pre-treatment beliefs and the treatment is not statistically significant (p-value=0.18), but goes in the expected direction. Column 2 shows that the estimates are virtually unaffected by including controls in the regressions.

Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 explore political heterogeneity in treatment effects on donations. Among non-Republicans, treated underestimators increased their donations by 0.23 of a standard deviation ($p<0.05$), whereas treated overestimators were essentially unaffected by the treatment. For non-Republicans, the interaction effect between pre-treatment beliefs and the treatment is statistically significant ($p<0.05$). This suggests that the behavioral response to the information treatment was strongest for those who receive the largest information shock.

For Republicans we find no patterns of heterogeneity depending on their prior beliefs. For Republican underestimators, the treatment effect estimate was positive but close to zero and not statistically significant ($p=0.86$) even though this group strongly updated their beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market.[16]

Our fourth main result is the following:

[16]For Republican overestimators, there was no significant treatment effect on donations even though the point estimate of a 0.22 standard deviation increased in donations is sizable ($p=0.09$). However, this effect goes in the opposite direction of what we expected.

Result 4. *Beliefs about racial discrimination causally affected people's political behavior. The effect is asymmetric for people who initially overestimate and underestimate racial discrimination: While the treatment strongly affected donations for underestimators, the treatment had no effect on overestimators. Furthermore, the increase in donations among treated underestimators was entirely driven by non-Republicans.*

The estimated treatment effects are essentially unchanged when we include controls (column 4). Table A.10 shows that results are robust to using a continuous measure of people's pre-treatment beliefs instead of the indicator used in our main specification.

4.4 The causal effect of beliefs on people's policy views

Table 4 shows regression results from both experiments on people's self-reported support for different policies to address racial discrimination in society. Columns 1–4 show results from Experiment 1, while columns 5–8 show results from Experiment 2. In this section, we only report results from the main specification with controls; Table A.11 shows the corresponding results without inclusion of controls. All outcomes are z-scored and coded such that higher values imply higher support for the policies.

[Insert Table 4 here]

4.4.1 Experiment 1: NORC

Support for pro-black policies Columns 2 and 3 of Panel A of Table 4 show support for two "preferential treatment" policies specifically designed to help blacks in the labor market, namely support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job (column 2) and support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job (column 3). In contrast to the correlational evidence, there was essentially no impact of the treatment on policy views on pro-black

policies for both overestimators and underestimators. There was also no significant heterogeneity between Republicans and non-Republicans in treatment responses on these measures (as shown in Panel B). Our next main result is thus as follows.

Result 5. *Views on pro-black labor market policies, such as black preference in hiring and job assistance programs for blacks, correlated with people's beliefs about racial discrimination, but did not change in response to the information.*

One reason for the lack of treatment effects on support for pro-black policies could be that people have strong ideological stances on "preferential treatment" policies, making their support for such policies very unresponsive to changes in beliefs.

Support for name-blind recruitment We further explored treatment effects on support for mandatory name-blind recruitment for hiring in public and private jobs; i.e., a "non-preferential" policy to reduce discrimination in the labor market. The outcome is tightly related to our informational treatment, which gave people information that employers used names on resumes to discriminate against blacks. Column 1 of Panel A of Table 4 shows the results. The treatment had essentially no impact on underestimators. By contrast, overestimators significantly *increased* their support for name-blind recruitment by 0.12 of a standard deviation ($p<0.05$). However, the estimates were not significantly different from each other ($p=0.24$).

Exploring political heterogeneity in treatment responses (Panel B of Table 4), we find significant differences between Republicans and non-Republicans. For non-Republicans, the treatment had a positive but non-significant impact on support for name-blind recruitment among underestimators and essentially no impact among overestimators. For Republicans, by contrast, the treatment decreased support for name-blind recruitment by 0.24 of a standard deviation for underestimators ($p=0.10$) and increased support by 0.35 of a standard deviation for overestimators ($p<0.05$); the increased polarization in

attitudes between Republicans who underestimated and overestimated discrimination is highly significant ($p<0.01$).[17]

While Republicans were less likely to support name-blind recruitment when they thought that discrimination against blacks was larger, the opposite was true for non-Republicans. Overall, these results suggest that Republicans and non-Republicans might support name-blind recruitment for different reasons. One explanation for this could be that Republicans have a stronger self-interested motive to oppose name-blind recruitment than non-Republicans. Our next main result is as follows:

4.4.2 Experiment 2

Support for pro-black policies Column 6–8 of Panel A of Table 4 show treatment effects on support for pro-black policies. While there was essentially no impact of the treatment on overestimators, the treatment "backfired" for underestimators who significantly reduced their support for pro-black policies when they learned that discrimination was larger than they thought. Panel B shows, in line with our previous evidence, that this backfire effect was entirely driven by Republicans. As shown in column 8, treated Republicans who initially underestimated racial discrimination reduced their support for pro-black policies by 0.30 of a standard deviation ($p<0.01$). This estimate is significantly different from the treatment effect on non-Republican underestimators ($p<0.05$). One reason for why we only observed clear backfire effects for these outcomes in Experiment 2 could be that social desirability bias was smaller in this experiment due to the obfuscated follow-up design.

[17] One reason for why Republicans are non-Republicans differ in their support for name-blind recruitment could be that Republicans are more likely to be white. However, we find similar results and even stronger evidence of polarization in attitudes between Republicans if we restrict the sample to non-Hispanic whites ($n=1{,}020$).Results are available upon requests.

Explaining the backfire effect on support for pro-black policies One reason that the treatment backfired for Republicans could be that it simultaneously changed their beliefs about how effective affirmation action programs have been in helping blacks. Among Republicans, we find evidence of strong polarization in beliefs: Republican underestimators were 0.36 of a standard deviation more likely to think that affirmative action programs have hurt blacks ($p<0.01$), whereas Republican overestimators did not significantly change their beliefs in response to the treatment (results are displayed in Column 1 of Table A.8). For non-Republicans, we observed no treatment effect on beliefs about the effectiveness of affirmative action programs. While these results could reflect genuine updating about the effectiveness of affirmative action, an alternative explanation is that treated Republican underestimators engaged in motivated reasoning to justify their lower support for pro-black policies.

Support for name-blind recruitment Column 5 of Panel A of Table 4 shows treatment effects on support for mandatory name-blind recruitment. The treatment decreases support for name-blind recruitment among underestimators by 0.12 of a standard deviation and increases support among overestimators by 0.13 of a standard deviation. Neither effect is significantly different from zero ($p=0.09$ and $p=0.12$, respectively), but the estimates are significantly different from each other ($p<0.01$).

In line with the evidence from the first experiment, the negative treatment effect on underestimators is mainly driven by Republicans (Panel B of Table 4). While the treatment has essentially no impact on non-Republican underestimators, it decreases support for name-blind recruitment among Republican underestimators by 0.2 of a standard deviation ($p=0.12$).

5 Exploring drivers of partisan differences in attitudes

Although provision of the research evidence strongly reduced political polarization in beliefs about racial discrimination, it did not reduce political polarization in views on pro-black policies and donations. This finding raises the question which other factors drive these differences. In this section, we explore the role of political identity and beliefs about effort differences between whites and black in driving the partisan gap in attitudes on pro-black policies.

5.1 The role of political identity

During the last four decades, political polarization in beliefs about whether differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are "mainly due to discrimination" has strongly increased (Figure A.3; data from the General Social Survey). This shift in beliefs is part of a broader trend in which American politics has become more polarized along partisan lines than at any point in recent history.[18] Since political identity might be a factor that influences both beliefs and attitudes, we decided to run a follow-up experiment to test whether increased salience of partisanship further polarized attitudes towards pro-black policies between Republicans and Democrats.

Experimental sample and design We recruited 4000 respondents in collaboration with Research Now, the same market research company as used in Experiment 2. The sample was constructed to be representative of the US population in terms of age, sex, and region. We ran the experiment in July 2018, and we submitted a pre-analysis plan to the same AEA RCT Registry trial as the main experiments before we started the data

[18] http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public, accessed October 31, 2018.

collection.[19]

We randomly assigned respondents into a control group and a treatment group. For respondents in the treatment group, we added the following introductory sentence to the question of whether they support affirmative action in hiring: "In contrast to the Democratic Party, the Republican Party generally opposes all forms of special treatment based on race." In the main specification, we focused on the 2,737 respondents who self-identify as either Democrats or Republicans. We hypothesized that this treatment would polarize attitudes by making Democrats more supportive of pro-black policies and Republicans less supportive.

Results Table A.16 of the Online Appendix displays the result from the experiment. Republicans were 0.61 of a standard deviation less supportive of affirmative action in hiring than Democrats, but—surprisingly—the treatment had essentially no impact on attitudes for neither Democrats nor Republicans. Given our large sample size, we take this as suggestive evidence that political identity is probably not a very important driver of views on affirmative action.[20] This finding underscores that views on affirmative action are hard to move.

5.2 Beliefs about effort differences

A centuries-old false and negative stereotype of blacks is the belief that they are "lazy, shiftless, and unambitious" (Gilens, 2009). One reason for why Democrats and Republicans differ in their views on pro-black policies could be that they differ in the extent to which they subscribe to this negative stereotype.

[19] Instructions are provided in Section D.5 of the Online Appendix.

[20] While the null result could also reflect that the manipulation was too weak to substantially increase the salience of people's political identity, we note that a similar manipulation employed by Cappelen et al. (2017) strongly increased political polarization in views on redistribution. We also note that a stronger manipulation would have probably induced too much experimenter demand to be informative about the underlying question.

In Experiment 2, we asked respondents several questions to shed light on mechanisms, including two questions on whether differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks were primarily the result of "racial discrimination against blacks" or primarily the result of "whites working harder than blacks." Using data from control group respondents, we show that believing that racial inequality is due to "whites working harder than blacks" is, by a large margin, the strongest predictor of attitudes towards pro-black policies (as displayed in Figure A.4). For instance, agreeing to the statement that racial inequalities are due to "whites working harder than blacks" is associated with a 0.87 of a standard deviation lower support for black preference in hiring, conditional on controls for demographics and party affiliations ($p<0.01$). By contrast, agreeing to the statement that racial inequalities are primarily due to "racial discrimination against blacks" is only associated with a 0.1 of a standard deviation higher support for black preference in hiring ($p<0.10$). Furthermore, consistent with views on pro-black policies not primarily being driven by political identity, including these dummies in a regression reduces the conditional Democrat–Republican difference in support for black preference in hiring by 50 percent. To shed light on whether negative stereotyping of blacks causally affects attitudes towards affirmative action policies, we decided to run a second follow-up experiment where we challenge this stereotype with an information intervention.

Experimental design and sample We recruited about 3000 American respondents from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). While respondents on MTurk are not representative of the general US population, several studies find that MTurk respondents provide high-quality responses (Clifford et al., 2015; Hauser and Schwarz, 2016; Horton et al., 2011). MTurk is also commonly used in economic experiments (Cavallo et al., 2016; DellaVigna and Pope, 2018; Kuziemko et al., 2015). We ran the experiment in October 2018, and we submitted a pre-analysis plan to the same AEA RCT Registry trial as the

main experiments before we started the data collection.[21]

In the experiment, we first elicited people's beliefs about which factors they think blacks and whites value the least important characteristics in a job among the following five characteristics: income; job security; short working hours, lots of free time; chances for advances; and importance of work. We then randomized respondents in a treatment and control group. Respondents in the treatment group received information that black and white respondents in the General Social Survey both rate *short working hours, lots of free time* as the least important characteristic in a job. Respondents in the control group did not receive any information. Subsequently, we measured people's support for pro-black policies using the same self-reported questions as in the main study. We hypothesized that respondents in the treatment group would become more positive towards pro-black policies after receiving information contradicting the negative racial stereotype that blacks are lazy and thus place a lot of weight on short working hours.

Results Table A.17 of the Online Appendix displays the results from the experiment. In line with anecdotal evidence on negative racial stereotyping, the respondents thought that whites are 20 percent more likely than blacks to place least weight on short working hours in a job. Furthermore, only 25 percent had correct beliefs that blacks actually placed least weight on short working hours. But while having incorrect beliefs predicted greater opposition to pro-black policies, the information provision did not affect support for pro-black policies. The information treatment did not shift beliefs about whether differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are "primarily the result of whites working harder than blacks," suggesting that the treatment was ineffective in challenging the stereotype of "lazy blacks." Given our large sample size, we take this as suggestive evidence that beliefs governing racial stereotypes are much less elastic to new information than beliefs about racial discrimination. Furthermore, this result emphasizes

[21] Instructions are provided in Section D.6 of the Online Appendix.

that views on pro-black policies are very inelastic to new information.

6 Concluding remarks

In this paper, we provide novel evidence on the demand for pro-black policies. We first provide representative evidence on people's beliefs about racial discrimination. We document strong heterogeneity in beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination in society and find that beliefs about racial discrimination causally affect people's donations to a pro-black NGO. However, although the treatment strongly reduced political polarization in beliefs about racial discrimination, we did not observe a similar convergence in support for pro-black policies to combat racial discrimination. We proposed several explanations in the paper, but we think more work is needed to better understand the causal drivers behind the partisan gap in views on pro-black policies.

The paper introduced a new approach of measuring beliefs about discrimination by leveraging correspondence studies to measure beliefs. The advantage of this approach is that it allows elicitation of quantitative and incentivized beliefs that are easily comparable across respondents. Further, this approach allows for the provision of research evidence based on clean causal evidence. Our study demonstrates the feasibility of this approach by showing that correspondence studies can easily be explained to and understood by a general population sample. The approach could be useful for researchers who wish to study beliefs about discrimination in other domains, such as discrimination against women. Finally, the approach could be used to measure and change beliefs about other CV characteristics, such the returns to human capital investments, e.g. by eliciting beliefs about the increase in callback rates associated with additional years of education on a resume.

References

Alesina, Alberto, Stefanie Stantcheva, and Edoardo Teso, "Intergenerational Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution," American Economic Review, 2018, 108 (2), 521–554.

Arrow, Kenneth J, "What Has Economics to Say about Racial Discrimination?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1998, 12 (2), 91–100.

Bartoš, Vojtech, Michal Bauer, Julie Chytilová, and Filip Matejka, "Attention Discrimination: Theory and Field Experiments with Monitoring Information Acquisition," American Economic Review, 2016, 106 (6), 1437–1475.

Bertrand, Marianne and Esther Du o , "Field Experiments on Discrimination," in Esther Du o and Abhijit Banerjee, eds., Handbook of Field Experiments, Vol. 1, Elsevier, 2017, chapter 8.

_ and Sendhil Mullainathan, "Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination," American Economic Review, 2004, 94 (4), 991–1013.

Bobo, Lawrence and James R Kluegel, "Opposition to Race-Targeting: Self-Interest, Strati cation Ideology, or Racial Attitudes?," American Sociological Review, 1993, pp. 443–464.

Bond, Timothy N and Kevin Lang, "The Sad Truth About Happiness Scales," Journal of Political Economy (forthcoming), 2018.

Bullock, John G, Alan S Gerber, Seth J Hill, and Gregory A Huber, "Partisan bias in factual beliefs about politics," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2015, 10, 519–578.

Cappelen, Alexander, Ingar Haaland, and Bertil Tungodden, "Beliefs about Behavioral Responses to Taxation," Working Paper, 2017.

Cavallo, Alberto, Guillermo Cruces, and Ricardo Perez-Truglia, "In ation Expectations, Learning and Supermarket Prices: Evidence from Field Experiments," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2016, 9 (3), 1–35.

Clifford, Scott, Ryan M Jewell, and Philip D Waggoner, "Are samples drawn from Mechanical Turk valid for research on political ideology?," Research & Politics, 2015, 2 (4), 2053168015622072.

Cruces, Guillermo, Ricardo Perez-Truglia, and Martin Tetaz, "Biased perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from a survey experiment," Journal of Public Economics, 2013, 98, 100–112.

de Quidt, Jonathan, Johannes Haushofer, and Christopher Roth, "Measuring and Bounding Experimenter Demand," American Economic Review (forthcoming), 2018, 108 (11), 3266–3302.

DellaVigna, Stefano, "The Obama Effect on Economic Outcomes: Evidence from Event Studies," Technical Report, Working Paper 2010.

_ and Devin Pope, "What Motivates Effort? Evidence and Expert Forecasts," Review of Economic Studies, 2018, 85 (2), 1029–1069.

Edelman, Benjamin G, Michael Luca, and Dan Svirsky, "Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment," American Economic Journal: Applied (forthcoming), 2016.

Falk, Armin and Florian Zimmermann , "A taste for consistency and survey response behavior," CESifo Economic Studies, 2012, 59 (1), 181–193.

Fryer, Roland G, Devah Pager, and Jörg L Spenkuch, "Racial Disparities in Job Finding and Offered Wages," Journal of Law and Economics, 2013, 56 (3), 633–689.

_ , Philipp Harms, and Matthew O Jackson, "Updating Beliefs when Evidence is Open to Interpretation: Implications for Bias and Polarization," 2016.

Gilens, Martin , "Political Ignorance and Collective Policy Preferences," American Political Science Review, 2001, 95 (2), 379–396.

_ , Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy, University of Chicago Press, 2009.

Grigorieff, Alexis, Christopher Roth, and Diego Ubfal, "Does Information Change Attitudes Towards Immigrants? Representative Evidence From Survey Experiments," IZA DP No. 10419 2016.

Haaland, Ingar and Christopher Roth, "Labor Market Concerns and Support for Immigration," Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3017420 2017.

Harrison, David A, David A Kravitz, David M Mayer, Lisa M Leslie, and Dalit Lev-Arey, "Understanding attitudes toward af rmative action programs in employment: Summary and meta-analysis of 35 years of research," Journal of Applied Psychology, 2006.

Hauser, David J and Norbert Schwarz, "Attentive Turkers: MTurk Participants Perform Better on Online Attention Checks Than do Subject Pool Participants," Behavior research methods, 2016, 48 (1), 400–7.

Horton, John J, David G Rand, and Richard J Zeckhauser, "The Online Laboratory: Conducting Experiments in a Real Labor Market," Experimental Economics, 2011, 14 (3), 399–425.

Jacobson, Cardell K, "Resistance to af rmative action: Self-interest or racism?," Journal of Con ict Resolution, 1985, 29 (2), 306–329.

Karadja, Mounir, Johanna Mollerstrom, and David Seim, "Richer (and Holier) than Thou? The Effect of Relative Income Improvements on Demand for Redistribution," Review of Economics and Statistics (forthcoming), 2016.

Kluegel, James R and Eliot R Smith, "Af rmative action attitudes: Effects of self-interest, racial affect, and strati cation beliefs on Whites' views," Social Forces, 1983, 61 (3), 797–824.

Kraus, Michael W, Julian M Rucker, and Jennifer A Richeson, "Americans misperceive Racial Economic Equality," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2017.

Kuklinski, James H, Paul J Quirk, Jennifer Jerit, David Schwieder, and Robert F Rich, "Misinformation and the currency of democratic citizenship," Journal of Politics, 2000, 62 (3), 790–816.

_ , Paul M Sniderman, Kathleen Knight, Thomas Piazza, Philip E Tetlock, Gordon R Lawrence, and Barbara Mellers, "Racial Prejudice and Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action," American Journal of Political Science, 1997, 4 (2), 402–419.

Kuziemko, Ilyana and Ebonya Washington, "Why Did the Democrats Lose the South? Bringing New Data to an Old Debate," American Economic Review (forthcoming), 2018.

_ , Michael I. Norton, Emmanuel Saez, and Stefanie Stantcheva, "How Elastic are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments," American Economic Review, 2015, 105 (4), 1478–1508.

List, John A, "The Nature and Extent of Discrimination in the Marketplace: Evidence from the Field," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004, 119 (1), 49–89.

Neumark, David, Roy J Bank, and Kyle D Van Nort, "Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1996, 111 (3), 915–941.

Nunley, John M, Adam Pugh, Nicholas Romero, and R Alan Seals, "An Examination of Racial Discrimination in the Labor Market for Recent College Graduates: Estimates from the Field," Mimeo 2014.

Oreopoulos, Philip, "Why Do Skilled Immigrants Struggle in the Labor Market? A Field Experiment with Thirteen Thousand Resumes," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2011, 3 (4), 148–171.

Pope, Devin G, Joseph Price, and Justin Wolfers, "Awareness reduces racial bias," Management Science, 2017.

Prior, Markus, Gaurav Sood, and Kabir Khanna, "You Cannot be Serious: The Impact of Accuracy Incentives on Partisan Bias in Reports of Economic Perceptions," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2015, 10, 489–518.

Quillian, Lincoln, Devah Pager, Ole Hexel, and Arnfinn H Midtbøen, "Meta-analysis of field experiments shows no change in racial discrimination in hiring over time," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2017, p. 201706255.

Stephens-Davidowitz, Seth, "The cost of racial animus on a black candidate: Evidence using Google search data," Journal of Public Economics, 2014, 118, 26–40.

Tuch, Steven A and Michael Hughes, "Whites' Racial Policy Attitudes in the Twenty-First Century: The Continuing Significance of Racial Resentment," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2011, 634 (1), 134–152.

Main gures

Figure 1: Political differences in beliefs and preferences

Notes: Panel A shows beliefs about how many times resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview for Democrats and Republicans separately. Panel B shows the number of times people preferred to give $5 to a pro-black civil rights organizations over money for self in $1 increments from $0 to $5 for Democrats and Republicans separately.

Figure 2: Experiment 1 (NORC sample)



Figure 3: Experiment 2 (Research Now sample)



Figure 4: Beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor and housing market

Notes: Panel A shows data from respondents who were asked how many times resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview. They were informed that the corresponding number for resumes with white-sounding names was 10. Panel B shows data on the rejection rate on reservation requests sent from accounts with black-sounding names. Respondents were initially asked about the percent rate of acceptances of reservation requests for black-sounding names on AirBnB (true rate is 40 percent). They were told that the corresponding number for white-sounding names was 49. We have recoded the values to implied rejection rates by subtracting each estimate from 100.

Figure 5: Correlates of beliefs about racial discrimination

Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (the NORC sample). The dependent variable in Panel A is people's beliefs about the number times resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview. The dependent variable in Panel B is people's beliefs about the percent of time reservation requests from black-sounding names on AirBnB were rejected. Lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.

Main tables

Table 1: Correlates of beliefs about racial discrimination

	(1) Donations to NGO	(2) Black preference	(3) Black assistance	(4) Disc. housing	(5) Disc. ser. problem
Panel A: Without controls					
Overestimating discrimination	0.261***	0.231***	0.284***	0.329***	0.351***
	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.075)
Panel B: With controls					
Overestimating discrimination	0.197***	0.115*	0.164**	0.309***	0.232***
	(0.071)	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.078)	(0.065)
N	723	753	754	722	757
Democrat–Republican gap	0.517	0.826	0.816	0.230	0.907

Note: The table show OLS regressions from control group respondents in Experiment 1 (NORC). In Panel A, we regress the outcome indicated in each column on an indicator for overestimating racial discrimination. In Panel B, we also include pre-speci ed controls in the regression (as listed in Table 3). All outcomes have been z-scored. “Democrat–Republican gap” refers the conditional standardized difference in attitudes between Democrats and Republicans.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2: Belief updating

	Housing market (NORC)		Labor market (RN)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Main speci cation				
Treatment (a)	4.15***	4.07***	2.25**	2.08**
	(1.56)	(1.53)	(1.02)	(1.02)
Prior Treatment (b)	-9.06***	-8.98***	-13.27***	-13.08***
	(1.92)	(1.91)	(1.62)	(1.62)
Prior	6.49***	6.30***	14.64***	14.00***
	(1.53)	(1.53)	(1.33)	(1.34)
N	1475	1475	1701	1701
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control group mean: Dependent variable	71.1	71.1	19.3	19.3
Control group mean: Prior	0.60	0.60	0.45	0.45
P-value: a + b = 0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Panel B: Political heterogeneity				
Treatment (a)	2.98	2.86	1.77	1.61
	(1.87)	(1.84)	(1.22)	(1.22)
Prior Treatment (b)	-8.83***	-8.70***	-13.18***	-12.94***
	(2.25)	(2.22)	(1.89)	(1.89)
Republican Treatment (c)	3.94	4.09	1.65	1.66
	(3.35)	(3.34)	(2.22)	(2.22)
Prior Republican Treatment (d)	0.87	0.76	0.07	-0.15
	(4.44)	(4.46)	(3.71)	(3.65)
Prior	5.65***	5.58***	14.84***	14.21***
	(1.80)	(1.77)	(1.57)	(1.57)
Prior Republican	1.75	1.92	-1.18	-1.04
	(3.55)	(3.57)	(2.97)	(2.95)
Republican	-5.18*	-3.74	-0.86	-1.48
	(2.74)	(2.81)	(1.47)	(1.52)
N	1475	1475	1701	1701
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
P-value: a + c = 0	0.013	0.013	0.066	0.082
P-value: b + d = 0	0.038	0.041	0.000	0.000
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0	0.695	0.710	0.000	0.000

Note: In even-numbered columns, we include pre-speci ed controls (including gender, age, race, region, income, education, employment, and political views. For posterior beliefs, we also include con dence in prior beliefs as a control.

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3: Treatment effects on donations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment (a)	0.174**	0.157**	0.230**	0.213**
	(0.080)	(0.075)	(0.096)	(0.093)
Prior Treatment (b)	-0.142	-0.107	-0.251**	-0.201*
	(0.107)	(0.102)	(0.125)	(0.121)
Republican		-0.230***	-0.365***	-0.173
		(0.063)	(0.112)	(0.111)
Prior	0.261***	0.184***	0.252***	0.213**
	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.087)	(0.085)
Prior Republican			-0.145	-0.119
			(0.158)	(0.154)
Republican Treatment (c)			-0.207	-0.195
			(0.160)	(0.155)
Prior Republican Treatment (d)			0.472**	0.389*
			(0.229)	(0.224)
N	1473	1473	1473	1473
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.65	0.47	0.79	0.88
P-value: a + c = 0			0.86	0.89
P-value: b + d = 0			0.25	0.32
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0			0.089	0.14

Note: The dependent variable has been z-scored. In even-numbered columns, we include the following pre-speci ed controls: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), regions (three indicators), household size, income, education (indicator for having at least a two-year college degree), employment (indicator for having for full-time work), and self-reported political af liation (indicators for Republicans and Democrats).

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 4: Treatment effects on policy preferences

	Experiment 1 (NORC)				Experiment 2 (Research Now)			
	(1) Name-blind screening	(2) Black preference	(3) Black assistance	(4) Problack (Index)	(5) Name-blind screening	(6) Black preference	(7) Black assistance	(8) Problack (Index)
Panel A: Main speci cation								
Treatment (a)	0.009	-0.030	-0.016	-0.026	-0.124*	-0.081	-0.136**	-0.121**
	(0.076)	(0.070)	(0.077)	(0.071)	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.059)
Prior Treatment (b)	0.116	0.011	0.055	0.032	0.255***	0.071	0.137	0.116
	(0.098)	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.087)	(0.093)	(0.088)
Prior	0.008	0.130**	0.174**	0.168***	-0.009	-0.077	0.089	0.002
	(0.071)	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.063)
N	1537	1535	1533	1528	1720	1720	1720	1720
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.05	0.73	0.51	0.91	0.06	0.88	0.98	0.94
Panel B: Political hetereogeneity								
Treatment (a)	0.112	-0.063	-0.073	-0.076	-0.088	-0.015	-0.056	-0.039
	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.086)	(0.077)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.068)
Prior Treatment (b)	-0.043	-0.035	0.046	0.002	0.209*	-0.035	0.012	-0.014
	(0.112)	(0.106)	(0.110)	(0.106)	(0.109)	(0.101)	(0.104)	(0.100)
Republican Treatment (c)	-0.351**	0.111	0.193	0.168	-0.114	-0.223*	-0.268*	-0.276**
	(0.172)	(0.149)	(0.172)	(0.149)	(0.141)	(0.136)	(0.143)	(0.138)
Prior Republican Treatment (d)	0.626***	0.279	0.134	0.228	0.162	0.404**	0.471**	0.493**
	(0.232)	(0.201)	(0.238)	(0.206)	(0.219)	(0.204)	(0.229)	(0.211)
Prior	0.138*	0.163**	0.213***	0.209***	0.099	0.018	0.215***	0.125*
	(0.080)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.072)
Prior Republican	-0.509***	-0.182	-0.205	-0.215	-0.414***	-0.361**	-0.482***	-0.473***
	(0.165)	(0.145)	(0.173)	(0.150)	(0.153)	(0.140)	(0.160)	(0.146)
Republican	0.113	-0.316***	-0.227*	-0.310***	-0.043	-0.237**	-0.192**	-0.244***
	(0.124)	(0.111)	(0.123)	(0.106)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.092)
N	1537	1535	1533	1528	1720	1720	1720	1720
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.32	0.13	0.66	0.24	0.12	0.50	0.56	0.46
P-value: a + c = 0	0.10	0.70	0.41	0.45	0.09	0.04	0.01	0.01
P-value: b + d = 0	0.00	0.15	0.39	0.19	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.01
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.26	0.33	0.33	0.25

Note: The table shows OLS regression results. The dependent variables are indicated in each column. In columns 1–4, we present results from Experiment 1; in columns 4–8, we present results from Experiment 2. For the outcomes Name-blind recruitment (support for mandatory name-blind recruitment), Black preference (support for giving quali ed black candidates preference over equally quali ed white candidates in getting a job), and Black assistance (support for giving quali ed black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1: "Strongly oppose" to 5: "Strongly support." These outcome are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. Problack (index) is the mean of Black preference and Black assistance, this index was pre-speci ed. We include pre-speci ed controls in all regressions.

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Online Appendix:
Beliefs about Racial Discrimination: Representative Evidence

Ingar Haaland and Christopher Roth

Summary of the Online Appendix

Section A provides all the appendix tables. Section A.1 provides summary statistics for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 as well as evidence of covariate balance and results on attrition. Section A.2 provides treatment effect on some mechanisms questions. Section A.3 provides additional results on robustness and heterogeneity of treatment effects. Section A.4 shows treatment effects from the two follow-up experiments (Experiment 3 and Experiment 4). Section A.5 provides additional pre-speci ed tables. Section B provides all the appendix gures. Section C provides screenshots of the consent forms for Experiment 2 and the recruitment email from Research Now. Finally, Section D provides experimental instructions for all the experiments.

A Appendix tables

A.1 Summary statistics, balance and attrition

Table A.1: Summary statistics: Experiment 1 (NORC)

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	Obs.
Respondent age	48.52	16.79	49.00	18.00	92.00	1542
Male	0.46	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	1542
Black	0.11	0.31	0.00	0.00	1.00	1542
White	0.66	0.47	1.00	0.00	1.00	1542
Northeast	0.16	0.36	0.00	0.00	1.00	1542
Midwest	0.29	0.45	0.00	0.00	1.00	1542
South	0.33	0.47	0.00	0.00	1.00	1542
Household size	2.69	1.42	2.00	1.00	6.00	1542
Log household income	10.81	0.86	10.92	7.82	12.27	1542
At least some college	0.80	0.40	1.00	0.00	1.00	1542
Paid employee	0.51	0.50	1.00	0.00	1.00	1542
Self-employed	0.10	0.31	0.00	0.00	1.00	1542
Overestimate racial discr.	0.59	0.49	1.00	0.00	1.00	1542
Prior about racial discrimination	23.23	16.44	20.00	1.00	50.00	1542
Republican	0.24	0.43	0.00	0.00	1.00	1542
Democrat	0.36	0.48	0.00	0.00	1.00	1542

Notes: This table displays summary statistics for Experiment 1 (NORC).

Table A.2: Summary statistics: Experiment 2 (Research Now)

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	Obs.
What is your age?	47.43	15.53	49.50	21.00	69.50	2073
Gender	0.50	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073
African American/Black	0.06	0.24	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073
Non-Hispanic White	0.49	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073
Household size	2.46	1.35	2.00	0.00	10.00	2073
Log household income	10.93	0.83	11.04	8.92	12.32	2073
College	0.83	0.38	1.00	0.00	1.00	2073
Prior (dummy)	0.46	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073
Con dence in prior	3.34	1.00	3.00	1.00	5.00	2073
Republican	0.26	0.44	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073
Democrat	0.38	0.48	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073
West	0.23	0.42	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073
South	0.35	0.48	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073
Northeast	0.23	0.42	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073
Midwest	0.19	0.39	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073

Notes:This table displays summary statistics for Experiment 1 (Research Now).

Table A.3: Balance: Experiment 1 (NORC)

	Treatment (T)	Control (C)	P-value(T - C)	Observations
Respondent age	49.31	47.71	0.062	1542
Male	0.45	0.48	0.258	1542
Black	0.11	0.11	0.767	1542
White	0.67	0.65	0.514	1542
Northeast	0.16	0.15	0.713	1542
Midwest	0.26	0.31	0.033	1542
South	0.34	0.32	0.586	1542
Household size	2.66	2.73	0.308	1542
Log household income	10.84	10.79	0.214	1542
At least some college	0.82	0.78	0.032	1542
Paid employee	0.52	0.50	0.316	1542
Self-employed	0.10	0.11	0.708	1542
Overestimate racial discr.	0.59	0.60	0.746	1542
Prior about racial discrimination	23.61	22.83	0.351	1542
Republican	0.23	0.24	0.825	1542
Democrat	0.36	0.35	0.734	1542

Notes:This table displays covariate means for the treatment and control group.

Table A.4: Balance: Experiment 2 (Research Now; baseline survey)

	Treatment (T)	Control (C)	P-value(T - C)	Observations
What is your age?	47.19	47.66	0.493	2073
Gender	0.50	0.49	0.844	2073
African American/Black	0.06	0.05	0.335	2073
Non-Hispanic White	0.49	0.48	0.812	2073
Household size	2.42	2.50	0.228	2073
Log household income	10.92	10.94	0.691	2073
College	0.83	0.82	0.609	2073
Prior (dummy)	0.47	0.45	0.350	2073
Con dence in prior	3.31	3.36	0.295	2073
Republican	0.25	0.26	0.643	2073
Democrat	0.38	0.37	0.799	2073
West	0.22	0.24	0.225	2073
South	0.35	0.35	0.947	2073
Northeast	0.24	0.22	0.281	2073
Midwest	0.19	0.19	0.940	2073

Notes:This table displays covariate means for the treatment and control group.

Table A.5: Balance: Experiment 2 (Research Now; obfuscated follow-up)

	Treatment (T)	Control (C)	P-value(T - C)	Observations
What is your age?	47.48	48.05	0.449	1671
Gender	0.51	0.51	0.990	1671
African American/Black	0.07	0.06	0.419	1671
Non-Hispanic White	0.49	0.48	0.863	1671
Household size	2.43	2.46	0.640	1671
Log household income	10.92	10.94	0.716	1671
College	0.82	0.82	0.987	1671
Prior (dummy)	0.47	0.45	0.357	1670
Con dence in prior	3.32	3.38	0.218	1670
Republican	0.25	0.27	0.449	1671
Democrat	0.39	0.38	0.642	1671
West	0.22	0.25	0.313	1671
South	0.34	0.35	0.717	1671
Northeast	0.25	0.22	0.286	1671
Midwest	0.19	0.18	0.707	1671

Notes:This table displays covariate means for the treatment and control group.

Table A.6: Experiment 2: Correlates of attrition

	Completed Follow-up	
	(1)	(2)
Treatment	-0.025	-0.026
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Republican		0.049
		(0.023)
Independent		0.041
		(0.021)
Log(Income)		-0.001
		(0.012)
College		-0.050
		(0.024)
Black		0.036
		(0.036)
White		-0.007
		(0.019)
Prior: Beliefs		0.000
about racial discr		(0.000)
Con dence in Prior		0.005
		(0.009)
Male		0.041
		(0.018)
Age		0.001
		(0.001)
Response rate	0.806	0.806
Observations	2073	2073

Notes: The outcome variables takes value 1 if our respondent completed the follow-up study. "Treatment" takes value 1 if the respondent received information about the results from the correspondence study. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

A.2 Mechanisms

Table A.7: Treatment effects: Views on whether discrimination is a “serious problem”

	Experiment 1 (NORC)		Experiment 2 (RN)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Main speci cation				
Treatment (a)	0.178**	0.153**	0.127**	0.108*
	(0.083)	(0.072)	(0.062)	(0.056)
Prior Treatment (b)	-0.058	-0.023	-0.017	-0.001
	(0.104)	(0.090)	(0.086)	(0.078)
Prior	0.351***	0.226***	0.326***	0.325***
	(0.075)	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.055)
N	1538	1538	2073	2073
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.053	0.017	0.061	0.049
Panel B: Political heterogeneity				
Treatment (a)	0.170*	0.136	0.197***	0.189***
	(0.099)	(0.090)	(0.070)	(0.066)
Prior Treatment (b)	-0.112	-0.048	-0.082	-0.083
	(0.118)	(0.108)	(0.095)	(0.090)
Republican Treatment (c)	0.010	0.055	-0.257*	-0.280**
	(0.156)	(0.147)	(0.135)	(0.127)
Republican Prior Treatment (d)	0.262	0.155	0.207	0.283
	(0.211)	(0.202)	(0.189)	(0.178)
N	1538	1538	2073	2073
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.373	0.144	0.070	0.090
P-value: a + c = 0	0.137	0.101	0.602	0.403
P-value: b + d = 0	0.390	0.531	0.444	0.191
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0	0.009	0.017	0.575	0.310

Note: Answers were given from a scale from 1: “Not a problem” at all to 5: “A very serious problem”. The outcome has been z-scored by the mean and standard deviation of the control group.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.8: Experiment 2: Treatment effects – mechanism questions

	(1) Af rmative action hurt	(2) Inequality due to effort	(3) Inequality due to disc.	(4) Disc. ser. problem
Panel A: Main speci cation				
Treatment (a)	0.054	0.015	0.048	-0.022
	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.063)
Prior Treatment (b)	-0.083	-0.121	-0.081	0.189**
	(0.095)	(0.087)	(0.090)	(0.089)
Prior	0.022	-0.080	0.465***	0.105*
	(0.067)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.063)
N	1720	1719	1715	1715
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.669	0.087	0.607	0.008
Panel B: Political heterogeneity				
Treatment (a)	-0.076	-0.046	0.089	0.017
	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Prior Treatment (b)	0.080	0.003	-0.099	0.081
	(0.104)	(0.100)	(0.104)	(0.105)
Republican Treatment (c)	0.441***	0.205	-0.137	-0.131
	(0.155)	(0.139)	(0.132)	(0.134)
Republican Prior Treatment (d)	-0.592**	-0.488**	0.032	0.440**
	(0.240)	(0.204)	(0.211)	(0.194)
N	1720	1719	1715	1715
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.953	0.543	0.891	0.182
P-value: a + c = 0	0.007	0.184	0.664	0.302
P-value: b + d = 0	0.018	0.006	0.716	0.001
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0	0.383	0.013	0.442	0.001

Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variable is indicated in each column. Controls are listed in Table 3.

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.9: Correlates of willingness to pay for research evidence

	Willingness to pay	
	Raw	z-score
Republican	-0.481	-0.172
	(0.220)	(0.079)
Age	0.012	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.002)
Log(Income)	0.018	0.006
	(0.126)	(0.045)
Black	-0.407	-0.145
	(0.414)	(0.148)
White	-0.487	-0.174
	(0.209)	(0.075)
College	0.321	0.115
	(0.255)	(0.091)
Male	-0.469	-0.167
	(0.192)	(0.069)
Prior	0.008	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.002)
Con dence in prior	0.026	0.009
	(0.100)	(0.036)
Mean	3.318	-0.001
Observations	861	861

Notes: "Willingness to pay" is the number of times individuals prefer to receive information over receiving money. * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

A.3 Robustness and additional heterogeneity

Table A.10: Treatment effects on donations: Robustness with continuous prior

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.204**	0.194**	0.285***	0.254**
	(0.089)	(0.085)	(0.107)	(0.104)
Prior Treatment	-0.005	-0.004	-0.009**	-0.007*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Prior	0.006***	0.004*	0.007***	0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Republican		-0.241***	-0.287**	-0.096
		(0.063)	(0.123)	(0.123)
Prior Republican			-0.008*	-0.007
			(0.004)	(0.005)
Republican Treatment			-0.274	-0.232
			(0.180)	(0.176)
Prior Republican Treatment			0.015**	0.012*
			(0.007)	(0.007)
N	1473	1473	1473	1473
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: The dependent variable has been z-scored. In even-numbered columns, we include the following pre-speci ed controls: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), regions (three indicators), household size, income, education (indicator for having at least a two-year college degree), employment (indicator for having for full-time work), and self-reported political af liation (indicators for Republicans and Democrats).

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.11: Treatment effects on policy preferences: Results without controls

	Experiment 1 (NORC)				Experiment 2 (Research Now)			
	(1) Name-blind screening	(2) Black preference	(3) Black assistance	(4) Problack (Index)	(5) Name-blind screening	(6) Black preference	(7) Black assistance	(8) Problack (Index)
Panel A: Main speci cation								
Treatment (a)	0.028	-0.015	0.010	-0.004	-0.101	-0.047	-0.102	-0.083
	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.082)	(0.079)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Prior Treatment (b)	0.089	-0.023	0.019	-0.006	0.224**	0.018	0.088	0.057
	(0.103)	(0.100)	(0.104)	(0.101)	(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.096)
Prior	0.082	0.231***	0.284***	0.289***	-0.008	-0.095	0.107	0.000
	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.068)
N	1537	1535	1533	1528	1720	1720	1720	1720
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
P-value: a + b = 0	0.077	0.55	0.66	0.87	0.091	0.67	0.84	0.72
Panel B: Political hetereogeneity								
Treatment (a)	0.145	-0.038	-0.037	-0.042	-0.071	0.009	-0.034	-0.013
	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.078)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.073)
Prior Treatment (b)	-0.102	-0.097	-0.016	-0.069	0.193*	-0.062	-0.017	-0.046
	(0.117)	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.112)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.105)
Republican Treatment (c)	-0.406**	0.065	0.154	0.121	-0.118	-0.231	-0.267*	-0.280*
	(0.174)	(0.154)	(0.175)	(0.154)	(0.144)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.149)
Republican Prior Treatment (d)	0.755***	0.386*	0.226	0.342	0.133	0.346	0.440*	0.441**
	(0.236)	(0.210)	(0.242)	(0.215)	(0.227)	(0.219)	(0.234)	(0.224)
N	1537	1535	1533	1528	1720	1720	1720	1720
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
P-value: a + b = 0	0.548	0.053	0.426	0.102	0.130	0.481	0.502	0.429
P-value: a + c = 0	0.077	0.824	0.427	0.520	0.115	0.082	0.019	0.024
P-value: b + d = 0	0.001	0.100	0.321	0.131	0.100	0.140	0.043	0.046
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0	0.006	0.012	0.033	0.008	0.387	0.667	0.458	0.496

Note: The table shows OLS regression results. The dependent variables are indicated in each column. In columns 1–4, we present results from Experiment 1; in columns 4–8, we present results from Experiment 2. For the outcomes Name-blind recruitment (support for mandatory name-blind recruitment), Black preference (support for giving quali ed black candidates preference over equally quali ed white candidates in getting a job), and Black assistance (support for giving quali ed black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1: "Strongly oppose" to 5: "Strongly support." These outcome are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. Problack (index) is the mean of Black preference and Black assistance; this index was pre-speci ed.

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.12: Treatment effects on policy preferences: Results with continuous prior

	Experiment 1 (NORC)				Experiment 2 (Research Now)			
	(1) Name-blind screening	(2) Black preference	(3) Black assistance	(4) Problack (Index)	(5) Name-blind screening	(6) Black preference	(7) Black assistance	(8) Problack (Index)
Panel A: Main speci cation								
Treatment	0.010	0.024	0.043	0.040	-0.085	-0.066	-0.131**	-0.109*
	(0.085)	(0.077)	(0.085)	(0.079)	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.062)
Prior Treatment	0.003	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	0.005*	0.001	0.004	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Prior	0.000	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.002	-0.000	0.002	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
N	1537	1535	1533	1528	1720	1720	1720	1720
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel B: Political hetereogeneity								
Treatment	0.086	-0.026	-0.058	-0.044	-0.056	-0.001	-0.048	-0.027
	(0.098)	(0.092)	(0.098)	(0.094)	(0.076)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.070)
Prior Treatment	-0.000	-0.003	0.000	-0.002	0.004	-0.001	0.000	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Republican Treatment	-0.278	0.164	0.355*	0.292*	-0.068	-0.213	-0.319**	-0.297*
	(0.196)	(0.167)	(0.195)	(0.168)	(0.153)	(0.149)	(0.159)	(0.154)
Prior Republican Treatment	0.012*	0.004	-0.004	-0.000	0.000	0.008	0.014**	0.013*
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
N	1537	1535	1533	1528	1720	1720	1720	1720
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: The table shows OLS regression results. The dependent variables are indicated in each column. In columns 1–4, we present results from Experiment 1; in columns 4–8, we present results from Experiment 2. For the outcomes Name-blind recruitment (support for mandatory name-blind recruitment), Black preference (support for giving quali ed black candidates preference over equally quali ed white candidates in getting a job), and Black assistance (support for giving quali ed black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1: "Strongly oppose" to 5: "Strongly support." These outcome are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. Problack (index) is the mean of Black preference and Black assistance; this index was pre-speci ed.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.13: Heterogeneity by race/ethnicity and college (Experiment 1; NORC)

	(1) Disc.: housing	(2) Donations to NGO	(3) Name-blind screening	(4) Black preference	(5) Black assistance	(6) Disc. ser. problem
Panel A: White/non-white						
Treatment (a)	-1.532	0.464*	0.298**	0.060	0.071	0.088
	(2.701)	(0.263)	(0.130)	(0.140)	(0.132)	(0.162)
Prior Treatment (b)	-4.819	-0.151	-0.014	-0.082	-0.073	0.086
	(3.457)	(0.345)	(0.171)	(0.180)	(0.165)	(0.195)
White Treatment (c)	8.491**	-0.244	-0.425***	-0.139	-0.130	0.151
	(3.296)	(0.313)	(0.163)	(0.169)	(0.166)	(0.192)
White Prior Treatment (d)	-6.335	-0.093	0.188	0.139	0.194	-0.180
	(4.129)	(0.417)	(0.212)	(0.218)	(0.209)	(0.235)
N	1475	1473	1537	1535	1533	1538
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control group mean	71.09	1.98	3.47	2.71	3.45	3.20
P-value: a + b = 0	0.004	0.158	0.011	0.844	0.987	0.111
P-value: a + c = 0	0.000	0.197	0.193	0.404	0.564	0.019
P-value: b + d = 0	0.000	0.298	0.165	0.639	0.342	0.470
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0	0.001	0.878	0.548	0.781	0.425	0.074
Panel B: College/no college						
Treatment (a)	1.368	0.474	0.328**	-0.009	-0.033	0.188
	(3.433)	(0.307)	(0.145)	(0.163)	(0.167)	(0.182)
Prior Treatment (b)	-6.282	-0.412	-0.077	-0.120	-0.116	-0.437*
	(4.670)	(0.442)	(0.232)	(0.222)	(0.226)	(0.250)
College Treatment (c)	3.675	-0.228	-0.413**	-0.018	0.030	0.013
	(3.858)	(0.348)	(0.172)	(0.186)	(0.191)	(0.207)
College Prior Treatment (d)	-3.698	0.266	0.261	0.141	0.196	0.470*
	(5.147)	(0.493)	(0.259)	(0.249)	(0.253)	(0.277)
N	1475	1473	1537	1535	1533	1538
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control group mean	71.09	1.98	3.47	2.71	3.45	3.20
P-value: a + b = 0	0.117	0.844	0.164	0.393	0.325	0.146
P-value: a + c = 0	0.003	0.133	0.364	0.766	0.972	0.041
P-value: b + d = 0	0.000	0.502	0.110	0.850	0.484	0.782
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0	0.000	0.485	0.144	0.943	0.254	0.001

Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variable is indicated in each column. Controls are listed in Table 3. The outcomes in columns 2–6 have been z-scored by the control group mean and standard deviation.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.14: Heterogeneity by gender and age (Experiment 1; NORC)

	(1) Disc.: housing	(2) Donations to NGO	(3) Name-blind screening	(4) Black preference	(5) Black assistance	(6) Disc. ser. problem
Panel A: Gender						
Treatment (a)	4.549**	0.242	-0.069	-0.047	-0.149	0.190
	(2.071)	(0.203)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.120)
Prior Treatment (b)	-7.259***	0.161	0.218	0.090	0.265*	0.020
	(2.590)	(0.269)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.151)
Male Treatment (c)	-0.979	0.119	0.164	0.027	0.280*	-0.014
	(3.103)	(0.284)	(0.160)	(0.158)	(0.162)	(0.175)
Male Prior Treatment (d)	-3.824	-0.788**	-0.207	-0.165	-0.440**	-0.099
	(3.844)	(0.384)	(0.207)	(0.205)	(0.205)	(0.220)
N	1475	1473	1537	1535	1533	1538
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control group mean	71.09	1.98	3.47	2.71	3.45	3.20
P-value: a + b = 0	0.081	0.022	0.084	0.623	0.174	0.020
P-value: a + c = 0	0.120	0.072	0.432	0.865	0.294	0.165
P-value: b + d = 0	0.000	0.024	0.944	0.623	0.253	0.616
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0	0.000	0.166	0.272	0.316	0.620	0.309
Panel B: Age						
Treatment (a)	1.120	0.115	-0.184*	-0.027	-0.081	0.062
	(2.062)	(0.202)	(0.110)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.128)
Prior Treatment (b)	-5.793**	0.014	0.340**	-0.048	0.119	0.098
	(2.523)	(0.272)	(0.142)	(0.146)	(0.142)	(0.157)
Age Treatment (c)	5.999*	0.362	0.406**	-0.010	0.114	0.253
	(3.097)	(0.288)	(0.158)	(0.156)	(0.161)	(0.173)
Age Prior Treatment (d)	-6.405*	-0.421	-0.456**	0.126	-0.102	-0.263
	(3.846)	(0.388)	(0.204)	(0.202)	(0.203)	(0.216)
N	1475	1473	1537	1535	1533	1538
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control group mean	71.09	1.98	3.47	2.71	3.45	3.20
P-value: a + b = 0	0.001	0.480	0.084	0.412	0.657	0.083
P-value: a + c = 0	0.002	0.020	0.050	0.722	0.772	0.007
P-value: b + d = 0	0.000	0.142	0.425	0.575	0.910	0.266
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0	0.004	0.709	0.257	0.657	0.588	0.109

Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variable is indicated in each column. Controls are listed in Table 3.

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.15: Treatment effects with probability weights (Experiment 1; NORC)

	(1) Disc.: housing	(2) Donations to NGO	(3) Name-blind screening	(4) Black preference	(5) Black assistance	(6) Disc. ser. problem
Panel A: Man speci cation						
Treatment (a)	2.274	0.177	0.065	0.017	-0.011	0.221*
	(2.108)	(0.181)	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.108)	(0.114)
Prior Treatment (b)	-6.871***	-0.065	0.010	-0.022	0.039	-0.134
	(2.533)	(0.247)	(0.131)	(0.126)	(0.133)	(0.145)
Prior	4.012**	0.212	-0.009	0.055	0.059	0.183*
	(1.928)	(0.174)	(0.090)	(0.085)	(0.095)	(0.103)
N	1475	1473	1537	1535	1533	1538
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control group mean	71.69	1.93	3.47	2.70	3.41	3.18
P-value: a + b = 0	0.001	0.500	0.381	0.946	0.724	0.327
Panel B: Political heterogeneity						
Treatment (a)	1.452	0.236	0.233**	-0.013	-0.139	0.233*
	(2.441)	(0.224)	(0.110)	(0.117)	(0.126)	(0.141)
Prior Treatment (b)	-6.742**	-0.268	-0.232	-0.037	0.103	-0.207
	(2.853)	(0.294)	(0.145)	(0.144)	(0.150)	(0.174)
Republican Treatment (c)	2.778	-0.202	-0.578**	0.103	0.433*	-0.041
	(4.808)	(0.369)	(0.229)	(0.231)	(0.233)	(0.238)
Republican Prior Treatment (d)	0.614	0.893*	0.934***	0.115	-0.126	0.337
	(6.061)	(0.530)	(0.318)	(0.290)	(0.326)	(0.318)
N	1475	1473	1537	1535	1533	1538
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.000	0.869	0.986	0.565	0.671	0.798
P-value: a + c = 0	0.308	0.908	0.086	0.653	0.139	0.320
P-value: b + d = 0	0.255	0.158	0.013	0.757	0.936	0.624
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0	0.568	0.046	0.072	0.261	0.186	0.070

Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variable is indicated in each column. Controls listed in Table 3.

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

A.4 Results from follow-up experiments

Table A.16: Experiment 3: Treatment effects of a political party prime

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.04	0.03	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Republicans	-0.61***	-0.61***	-0.20***	-0.17***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Treatment Republicans	-0.06	-0.03	0.02	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Democrats			0.41***	0.44***
			(0.05)	(0.05)
Treatment Democrats			0.08	0.06
			(0.07)	(0.07)
N	2737	2737	4000	4000
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: The dependent variable is support for "government and private programs that give quali ed black and other racial minority candidates preference over equally quali ed white candidates in getting a job." The question was answered from a scale from 1: Strongly oppose to 5: Strongly support. We have z-scored the response by the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The treatment was a political party prime, where we reminded respondents about party views on af rmative action as follows: "In contrast to the Democratic Party, the Republican Party generally opposes all forms of special treatment based on race. We are interested in what you think about this issue." In even-numbered columns, we include the following pre-speci ed controls: gender, age, and education. In line with the pre-analysis, we exclude Independents from the regression in columns 1–2 as the treatment was tailored for Republicans and Democrats. In columns 3–4, add interaction terms between the treatment and Democrats and add Independents to the regressions. The sample was recruited from Research Now and is representative of the US population on the following observable characteristics: age, sex, and region.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.17: Experiment 4: Treatment effects of shocking racial stereotypes

	(1) Black preference	(2) Black assistance	(3) Problack (Index)	(4) Inequality: effort
Panel A: Main specification				
Treatment	-0.001	0.012	0.006	0.040
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.032)
Panel B: Heterogeneity				
Treatment (a)	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Prior Treatment (b)	-0.09	-0.06	-0.07	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Prior	0.18***	0.11**	0.15***	-0.13***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
N	2999	2999	2999	2999
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.29	0.61	0.37	0.43

Note: The table shows OLS regression results. The dependent variables are indicated in each column. For the outcomes Black preference (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job) and Black assistance (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1: "Strongly oppose" to 5: "Strongly support." These outcome are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. Problack (index) is the mean of Black preference and Black assistance, this index was pre-specified. For the outcome "Inequality: effort" (agreement to the statement that differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are due to whites working harder), answers were given on a scale from 1: "Strongly disagree" to 7: "Strongly agree" and then z-scored. Prior is indicator taking the value 1 for respondents who thought that blacks were most likely to rank "Working hours are short, lots of free time" as the least important characteristic in a job. Controls were pre-specified and include the prior, two racial indicators (black and white), a gender indicator, a college indicator, age, log income, and two indicators for political status (Democrats and Republicans).

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

A.5 Additional pre-speci ed tables

Table A.18: Pre-speci ed regressions: Experiment 1 (NORC)

	Racial discrimination is a serious problem	Preference for blacks	Assistance for blacks	Pro-black policy index	Name-blind screening	Racial discrimination: housing market	Donation NGO
Panel A: Main Effect							
Treatment	0.139	-0.024	0.019	-0.004	0.077	-0.059	0.093
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.051)
		[1.000]	[1.000]				
Observations	1538	1535	1533	1528	1537	1475	1473
Panel B: Prior							
Treatment (A)	-0.023	0.011	0.054	0.029	0.116	-0.455	-0.107
Prior > 15	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.081)	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.102)
Treatment (B)	0.153	-0.031	-0.013	-0.022	0.008	0.206	0.156
	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.077)	(0.064)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.075)
Pr(A+B)=0	0.017	0.730	0.487	0.879	0.047	0.000	0.470
Observations	1538	1535	1533	1528	1537	1475	1473
Panel C: Republican							
Treatment	0.137	0.255	0.251	0.251	-0.029	0.285	0.023
Republican (A)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.117)	(0.091)	(0.116)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Treatment (B)	0.107	-0.085	-0.041	-0.065	0.084	-0.126	0.087
	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.060)
Pr(A+B)=0	0.004	0.048	0.046	0.019	0.593	0.106	0.240
Observations	1538	1535	1533	1528	1537	1475	1473

Notes: For the outcome Racial discrimination serious problem, answers were given from a scale from 1: "Not a problem" at all to 5: "A very serious problem". For the outcomes Support preference for blacks, Support assistance for blacks, and Support name-blind recruitment, answers were given on a scale from 1: "Strongly oppose" to 5: "Strongly support". Policy preference index is an unweighted mean of people's (z-scored) support for giving blacks (i) preference in the hiring process and (ii) assistance programs for blacks. For Racial discrimination — housing market, answers were given on a scale from 0 to 100 (higher values imply more discrimination). For Donation NGO, we count the number of times the respondent preferred money for the NGO over money for self we count the number of times the respondent preferred money for the NGO over money for self (scale 0–6). The outcome variables are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. "Treatment" takes value 1 if the respondent received information about the results from the correspondence study. "Prior> 15" takes value one if our respondents overestimate the extent of racial discrimination. "Republican" takes value 1 if our respondent identi es as a Republican. * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.19: Pre-speci ed regressions: Experiment 2 (Research Now)

	Racial discr: serious problem		Preference	Assistance	Pro-black	Name-blind	Posterior:		Racial Inequality due to	Af rmative
	main	follow-up	for blacks	for blacks	policy index	screening	Belief	Effort	Discrimination	action hurts
Panel A: Main Effect										
Treatment	0.110	0.068	-0.050	-0.073	-0.061	-0.004	-3.982	-0.036	0.007	0.025
	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.047)	(0.815)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.048)
			[0.284]	[0.284]						
Observations	2073	1716	1721	1721	1721	1721	1702	1720	1716	1721
Panel B: Prior										
Treatment (A)	-0.004	0.200	0.082	0.142	0.112	0.257	-13.030	-0.126	-0.097	-0.093
Prior > 15	(0.077)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.093)	(0.077)	(0.094)	(1.630)	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.096)
Treatment (B)	0.111	-0.024	-0.087	-0.139	-0.113	-0.122	2.044	0.022	0.051	0.068
	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.052)	(0.064)	(1.018)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.066)
Pr(A+B)=0	0.045	0.005	0.931	0.961	0.985	0.052	0.000	0.093	0.487	0.713
Observations	2073	1716	1721	1721	1721	1721	1702	1720	1716	1721
Panel C: Republican										
Treatment	-0.153	0.038	-0.064	-0.087	-0.075	-0.071	2.642	0.014	-0.119	0.191
Republican (A)	(0.091)	(0.098)	(0.102)	(0.112)	(0.093)	(0.108)	(1.798)	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.119)
Treatment (B)	0.149	0.059	-0.033	-0.051	-0.042	0.014	-4.672	-0.039	0.037	-0.025
	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.054)	(0.951)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Pr(A+B)=0	0.959	0.247	0.278	0.164	0.152	0.546	0.188	0.773	0.362	0.120
Observations	2073	1716	1721	1721	1721	1721	1702	1720	1716	1721

Notes: For the outcome Racial discrimination serious problem, answers were given from a scale from 1: “Not a problem” at all to 5: “A very serious problem”. For the outcomes Support preference for blacks, Support assistance for blacks, and Support name-blind recruitment, answers were given on a scale from 1: “Strongly oppose” to 5: “Strongly support”. Policy preference index is an unweighted mean of people's (z-scored) support for giving blacks (i) preference in the hiring process and (ii) assistance programs for blacks. “Racial inequality due to effort” is people's agreement to the following statement: “Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of racial discrimination against blacks.” “Posterior belief” is people's estimate of the number of times a resume with black-sounding name had to be sent to get one callback. “Racial inequality due to discrimination” is people's agreement to the following statement: To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of whites working harder than blacks.” Responses to these questions are on a 7-point scale where (1) means “strongly disagree” and (7) means “strongly agree”. “Af rmative action hurts” is people's response to the question: “Overall, do you think af rmative action programs for the past fty years have helped blacks, hurt them, or had no effect one way or the other?” People answer this question on a 7-point scale ranging from (1) strongly helped to (7) strongly hurt. The outcome variables are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. “Treatment” takes value 1 if the respondent received information about the results from the correspondence study. “Prior > 15” takes value one if our respondents overestimate the extent of racial discrimination. “Republican” takes value 1 if our respondent identi es as a Republican. * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.20: Pre-speci ed regressions II: Experiment 2 (Research Now)

	Racial discr: serious problem		Preference	Assistance	Pro-black	Name-blind	Posterior:
	main	follow-up	for blacks	for blacks	policy index	screening	Belief
Panel A:							
Treatment (A)	0.000	0.004	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.004	-0.387
Prior (continuous)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.058)
Treatment (B)	0.114	-0.002	-0.065	-0.125	-0.095	-0.080	3.646
	(0.055)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.054)	(0.064)	(1.185)
Pr(A+B)=0	0.033	0.976	0.282	0.049	0.077	0.226	0.004
Observations	2073	1716	1721	1721	1721	1721	1702
Panel B:							
Treatment (A)	0.052	0.013	-0.183	-0.186	-0.184	-0.031	-3.663
College	(0.104)	(0.123)	(0.111)	(0.116)	(0.099)	(0.122)	(2.013)
Treatment (B)	0.067	0.058	0.100	0.079	0.089	0.021	-0.972
	(0.094)	(0.113)	(0.100)	(0.104)	(0.089)	(0.111)	(1.799)
Pr(A+B)=0	0.005	0.137	0.086	0.037	0.027	0.849	0.000
Observations	2073	1716	1721	1721	1721	1721	1702
Panel C:							
Treatment (A)	-0.167	-0.020	0.092	0.035	0.064	-0.183	-1.145
Male	(0.077)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.092)	(0.077)	(0.094)	(1.625)
Treatment (B)	0.192	0.079	-0.096	-0.091	-0.094	0.088	-3.404
	(0.054)	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.063)	(0.053)	(0.064)	(1.134)
Pr(A+B)=0	0.652	0.334	0.948	0.404	0.593	0.164	0.000
Observations	2073	1716	1721	1721	1721	1721	1702
Panel D:							
Treatment (A)	-0.099	-0.020	0.046	0.008	0.027	-0.075	-1.021
Con dence in prior	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.931)
Treatment (B)	0.439	0.135	-0.203	-0.101	-0.152	0.245	-0.568
	(0.143)	(0.161)	(0.163)	(0.174)	(0.147)	(0.180)	(3.149)
Pr(A+B)=0	0.001	0.320	0.182	0.464	0.240	0.188	0.483
Observations	2073	1716	1721	1721	1721	1721	1702

Notes: For the outcome Racial discrimination serious problem, answers were given from a scale from 1: "Not a problem" at all to 5: "A very serious problem". For the outcomes Support preference for blacks, Support assistance for blacks, and Support name-blind recruitment, answers were given on a scale from 1: "Strongly oppose" to 5: "Strongly support". "Racial inequality due to effort" is people's agreement to the following statement: "Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of racial discrimination against blacks." "Posterior belief" is people's estimate of the number of times a resume with black-sounding name had to be sent to get one callback. The outcome variables are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. "Treatment" takes value 1 if the respondent received information about the results from the correspondence study. "Prior" takes value one if our respondents overestimate the extent of racial discrimination. "Republican" takes value 1 if our respondent identi es as a Republican. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

B Appendix gures

Figure A.1: Belief updating in response to the the research evidence

Notes: In Panel A, answers are given on a scale from 0 to 100 and indicate beliefs about the acceptance rate of black candidates (higher values imply less discrimination). In Panel B, answers are given on a scale from 0 to 100 and indicate people's beliefs about the number of resumes with black-sounding resumes had to be sent to get one callback (higher values imply more discrimination). The errors bars indicate the standard error of the mean.

Figure A.2: Prior and Posterior Beliefs about the number of resumes sent to get one interview

Notes: The gure shows data from respondents who were asked how many times they thought resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview separately for the treatment and control group. They were informed that the corresponding number for resumes with white-sounding names was 10. The top 2 panels show prior beliefs which were asked in the main experiment, while the bottom 2 panels show posterior beliefs which were asked in the follow-up study.

Figure A.3: Political polarization in beliefs about racial discrimination

Notes: The gure shows data from the General Social Survey, http://gss.norc.org/get-the-data . Respondents were asked whether differences the fact that blacks have "worse jobs, income, and housing than white people" is "mainly due to discrimination"; the gure shows the fraction of Democrats and Republicans who agree to this statement.

Figure A.4: Correlates of attitudes towards pro-black policies

Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 2. The dependent variable in Panel A is support for giving black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting in job. The dependent variable in Panel B is support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job. Both outcomes have been z-scored. "Inequality: discrimination" and "Inequality: effort" are agreements to the statements that differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are primarily the result of, respectively, "discrimination against blacs" and "whites working harder than blacks."

Figure A.5: Experiment 1 (NORC): Trust in study

Notes: Treated respondents in Experiment 1 were asked to what extent they agreed that the research evidence provided clear evidence of discrimination against blacks in the labor market. The gure shows the distribution of the responses to this question.

C Screenshots

Figure A.6: Invitation form in the email sent out for the obfuscated follow-up study

Figure A.7: Consent form in the main study

Figure A.8: Consent form in the follow-up study

D Instructions

D.1 Experiment 1 (NORC)

D.1.1 Elicitation of beliefs about racial discrimination

Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending out ctitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers.

The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie” and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like “Tanisha” and “Kareem”. The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical quali cations, but that the employers would use the applicants' names to infer whether they were white or black.

Resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out on average 10 times to get one callback for an interview.

What do you think?

How many times do you think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview?

> I think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out [ ] times to get one callback for an interview.

If your answer is the same as what the researchers found, you will be rewarded a bonus of $2 (2,000 AmeriPoints) in addition to your current incentive of 2,000 Ameri-Points.

D.1.2 Treatment screen

The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out 15 times to get one callback for an interview.

Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10 times to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were 50 percent more likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding names compared to applicants with black-sounding names.

D.1.3 Self-reported outcomes

In the United States today, do you think that racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem?

A very serious problem

A serious problem

A problem

A small problem

Not a problem at all

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give quali ed black candidates preference over equally quali ed white candidates in getting a job?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give quali ed black candidates assistance in getting a job?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

Name-blind recruitment has been suggested as a way to reduce racial discrimination in the labor market by hiding the names of the job applicants from their resumes. Do you support or oppose mandatory name-blind recruitment for hiring in public and private jobs?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

D.1.4 Behavioral measure: Donation

In Washington, D.C., several civil rights organizations work to protect individuals from discrimination in society. One of these organizations, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, tries to help African Americans. One of the organization's key initiatives aims to reduce racial discrimination in the workplace by lobbying for political reforms.

Below, you are given the opportunity to financially support the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights.

Your decision

For each of the 6 choices below, you decide whether the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights should get money or whether you should get money ($1 equals 1000 AmeriPoints).

We will randomly implement your decision for one of these choices, which involve real money, so please consider each choice carefully. Each decision has the same chance of being implemented.

$5 for the organization	$0 for me
$5 for the organization	$1 for me
$5 for the organization	$2 for me
$5 for the organization	$3 for me
$5 for the organization	$4 for me
$5 for the organization	$5 for me

Note: NORC is a non-partisan research organization and has no association with the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights. NORC and the AmeriSpeak Panel do not endorse political or charitable causes.

D.1.5 Belief extrapolation: Discrimination in the rental market

Researchers from Harvard Business School conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the rental market by sending out reservation requests from invented accounts to hosts on Airbnb, a website for private rental accommodations.

The requests were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the person who sent the request. Half of the requests came from typically white-sounding names, while the other half came from typically black-sounding names. The idea was that the hosts would use the applicants' name to infer whether the reservation requests came from white or black requesters.

The researchers found that reservation requests from white-sounding names were accepted 49 percent of the time.

What do you think?

How many percent of the time do you think reservation requests from black-sounding names were accepted?

> I think reservation requests from black-sounding names were accepted percent of the time.

If your answer is within 2 percentage points of what the researchers found, you will be rewarded a bonus of $2 (2,000 AmeriPoints) in addition to your current incentive of 2,000 AmeriPoints.

D.2 Beliefs about strength of the evidence: Treatment group only

The researchers behind the study on labor market discrimination described earlier in this survey interpreted their findings as clear evidence of discrimination against blacks in the labor market.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with this interpretation of their ndings?

Strongly agree

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

D.3 Instructions: Experiment 2 – rst wave (Research Now)

D.3.1 Consent Form

This study has received ethics clearance by the Oxford University Institutional Review Board.

If subjects have questions about this study or their rights, or if they wish to lodge a complaint or concern, they may contact us at the following email: christopher.roth@economics.ox.ac.uk.

{page break}

Consent form

I have read the information provided on the previous page.

I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time.

I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study.

I understand how to raise a concern or make a complaint.

I understand that I can only participate in this experiment once.

I understand that close attention to the survey is required for my responses to count.

If you are 18 years of age or older, agree with the statements above, and freely consent to participate in the study, please click on the “I agree” button to begin the experiment.

I agree

I disagree

D.3.2 Elicitation of beliefs about racial discrimination

Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending out ctitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers.

The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie” and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like “Tanisha” and “Kareem”.

The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical quali cations, but that the employers would use the applicants' names to infer whether they were white or black.

Resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out on average 10 times to get one callback for an interview.

What do you think?

How many times do you think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview?

> I think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out [ ] times to get one callback for an interview.

If your answer is the same as what the researchers found, you will be rewarded with a bonus of $2 in panel currency.

D.3.3 Con dence in priors

How sure are you about your answer to the previous question?

> Very sure

Sure

Somewhat sure

Unsure

Very unsure

D.3.4 Treatment screen

The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out 15 times to get one callback for an interview.

Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10 times to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were 50 percent more likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding names than applicants with black-sounding names.

D.3.5 Manipulation check

In the United States today, do you think that racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem?

A very serious problem

A serious problem

A problem

A small problem

Not a problem at all

D.4 Instructions: Experiment 2 – second wave (Research Now)

D.4.1 Introduction

This survey is conducted by a researcher from NHH Norwegian School of Economics.

In this survey, you will be asked questions on a broad range of different topics. Please pay close attention to all questions.

By continuing this survey, you acknowledge your consent to participate and that you are at least 18 years of age.

D.4.2 Obfuscation: Views on investments

Which of the following do you think is the best long-term investment: bonds, real estate, saving accounts, stock or mutual funds, or gold?

Bonds

Real estate

Saving accounts

Stock or mutual funds

Gold

{page break}

Do you, personally, or jointly with a spouse, have any money invested in the stock market right now – either in an individual stock, a stock mutual fund, or in a self-directed 401-K or IRA?

Yes

No

Do not know

D.4.3 Obfuscation: Views on religion

How important would you say religion is in your own life – very important, fairly important, or not very important?

- Very important
- Fairly important
- Not very important

{page break}

At the present time, do you think religion as a whole is increasing its in uence on American life or losing its in uence?

- Increasing
- Decreasing
- No opinion

D.4.4 Self-reported outcomes

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give quali ed black candidates preference over equally quali ed white candidates in getting a job?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

{page break}

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give quali ed black candidates assistance in getting a job?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

{page break}

Name-blind recruitment has been suggested as a way to reduce racial discrimination in the labor market by hiding the names of the job applicants from their resumes. Do you support or oppose mandatory name-blind recruitment for hiring in public and private jobs?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

D.4.5 Mechanisms

Overall, do you think af rmative action programs for the past fty years have helped blacks, hurt them, or had no effect one way or the other?

- Strongly helped
- Helped
- Somewhat helped
- Neither helped nor hurt
- Somewhat hurt
- Hurt
- Strongly hurt

To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of racial discrimination against blacks.”

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree

Strongly disagree

To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of whites working harder than blacks.”

Strongly agree

Agree

Somewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Somewhat disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

{page break}

In the United States today, do you think that racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem?

A very serious problem

A serious problem

A problem

A small problem

Not a problem at all

D.4.6 Elicitation of posterior about labor market discrimination

Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending out ctitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers.

The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie” and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like “Tanisha” and “Kareem”.

The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical quali cations, but that the employers would use the applicants' names to infer whether they were white or black.

Resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out on average 10 times to get one callback for an interview.

What do you think?

How many times do you think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview?

> I think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out [ ] times to get one callback for an interview.

If your answer is the same as what the researchers found, you will be rewarded bonus of $2 in panel currency.

D.4.7 Con dence in posteriors

How sure are you about your answer to the previous question?

> Very sure

Sure

Somewhat sure

Unsure

Very unsure

D.4.8 Willingness to pay for the information (control group only)

We just explained to you the details of a study which tested for racial discrimination in the labor market.

For each of the seven choices below, you decide whether you would like to receive more information about the results from the study or whether you would like to receive money.

If you decide to receive the information about the results of the study, we will provide you with a short summary of the results, including information on the number of times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out in order to get one callback. If you decide to receive the information about the results of the study, we will also provide you with a link to the research study which further describes the methodology, implementation of the experiment, and discusses the research results.

We will randomly implement your decision for one of these choices after the study has ended, so please consider each choice carefully. Each decision has the same chance of being implemented.

Information	$0.10 for me
Information	$0.20 for me
Information	$0.30 for me
Information	$0.40 for me
Information	$0.50 for me
Information	$0.75 for me
Information	$1 for me

D.4.9 Information provision (depending on people's choices)

The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out 15 times to get one callback for an interview.

Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10 times to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were 50 percent more likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding names compared to applicants with black-sounding names.

http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ321/orazem/bertrand_emily.pdf

D.5 Instructions: Experiment 3

D.5.1 Treatment group

A much debated issue is whether blacks and other racial minorities should get preference over equally quali ed white candidates in getting a job. In contrast to the Democratic Party, the Republican Party generally opposes all forms of special treatment based on race. We are interested in what you think about this issue.

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give quali ed black and other racial minority candidates preference over equally quali ed white candidates in getting a job?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

D.5.2 Control group group

A much debated issue is whether blacks and other racial minorities should get preference over equally quali ed white candidates in getting a job. We are interested in what you think about this issue.

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give quali ed black and other racial minority candidates preference over equally quali ed white candidates in getting a job?

D.5.3 Outcome measure

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give quali ed black and other racial minority candidates preference over equally quali ed white candidates in getting a job?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

D.6 Instructions: Experiment 4

D.6.1 Terms of participation

General instructions

This study is conducted by The Choice Lab at NHH Norwegian School of Economics.

You must be a US citizen of at least 18 years of age to participate in this study. If you do not ful ll these requirements, please do not continue any further.

You are not allowed to participate in this study more than once. If you experience a technical error or problem, do not try to restart or retake the study. Rather, send us an email with a description of your problem and we will get back to you.

Please note that your participation will be registered on the following Amazon Mechanical Turk worker ID:

${e://Field/workerId}

The worker ID was retrieved automatically when you clicked on the link that brought you here. This step is necessary for assigning payments to the right account and to ensure that you only participate in this study once.

If you have any questions regarding this study, please email thechoicelab@nhh.no.

I have read and understood the above and want to participate in this study. [Yes, No]

D.6.2 Pre-treatment background questions

1. Please indicate your gender. [Male, Female]
2. What is your age? [18–24; 25–34; 35–44; 45–54; 55–64; 65 or older]
3. Which category best describes your highest level of education? [Eighth grade or less, Some high school, High school degree/GED, Some college, 2-year college

degree, 4-year college degree, Master's degree, Doctoral degree, Professional degree (JD, MD, MBA)]

4. What was your family's gross household income in 2017 in US dollars? [Less than $15,000; $15,000 to $24,999; $25,000 to $49,999; $50,000 to $74,999; $75,000 to $99,999; $100,000 to $149,999; $150,000 to $200,000; More than $200,000]

5. Which of the following best describes your race or ethnicity? [African American/Black; Asian/Asian American; Caucasian/White; Native American, Inuit or Aleut; Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander; Other; Prefer not to answer]

6. Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin? [Yes, No]

7. In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent? [Republican, Democrat, Independent]

8. In politics, as of today, do you lean towards the Republican Party or lean towards the Democratic Party? [The Republican Party, The Democratic Party; *note: question only shown to Independents*]

D.6.3 Pre-treatment beliefs

In this survey, we will ask you some questions about whites and blacks in America.

Throughout this survey, we will refer to non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks as whites and blacks, respectively.

{*page break*}

The General Social Survey (GSS) is a large and representative survey of Americans.

In the survey, people were asked to rank the importance of the following five job characteristics (from least important to most important):

- High income
- No danger of being fired
- Working hours are short, lots of free time
- Chances for advancement
- Work that is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment

Among **whites**, which response do you think was most commonly chosen as the **least** important characteristic of a job?

High income

No danger of being fired

Working hours are short, lots of free time

Chances for advancement

Work that is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment

Among **blacks**, which response do you think was most commonly chosen as the **least** important characteristic of a job?

High income

No danger of being fired

Working hours are short, lots of free time

Chances for advancement

Work that is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment

D.6.4 Information treatment

The actual results on which response people most commonly chose as **least** important characteristic of a job were as follows:

Among **whites**, the response "Working hours are short, lots of free time" was most commonly chosen as the **least** important characteristic of a job.

Among **blacks**, the response "Working hours are short, lots of free time" was most commonly chosen as the **least** important characteristic of a job.

Source: The General Social Survey

D.7 Views on pro-black policies

We will now ask you a few questions about your attitudes towards policies to help blacks in the labor market.

{*page break*}

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

{*page break, note: We randomize the order of these two questions*}

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

D.7.1 Post-treatment beliefs

To what extent do you agree with the following statement:

"Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of whites working harder than blacks."

Strongly agree

Agree

Somewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Somewhat disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree