Andrea Mattozzi, EUI: Public versus Secret Voting in Committees

ESOP seminar. Andrea Mattozzi is Professor of Microeconomics at the European University Institute. He will present the paper "Public versus Secret Voting in Committees", written jointly with Marcos Y. Nakaguma.

Andrea Mattozzi. Photo: EUI


This paper studies a committee decision-making problem. Committee members are heterogeneous in their competence, they are biased towards one of the alternatives and career oriented, and they can choose whether to vote or abstain. The interaction between career concern and bias a§ects the voting behavior of members depending on transparency of individual votes. We show that transparency attenuates the pre-existing biases of competent members and exacerbates the biases of incompetent members. Public voting leads to better decisions when the magnitude of the bias is large, while secret voting performs better otherwise. We provide experimental evidence supporting our theoretical conclusions.

Host: Bård Harstad

Published Sep. 12, 2016 1:48 PM - Last modified Apr. 23, 2019 9:17 AM