EQUALITY • SOCIAL ORGANIZATION • PERFORMANCE

ESOP

ANNUAL REPORT 2010

Senter for fremragende forskning

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THE YEAR 2010

In 2010 a second phase of the financial crisis became more apparent. Rich nations across the globe are taking fiscal budget cuts. They cut their budgets for several reasons. Many countries entered the financial crisis with substantial debt. On top of this they ran huge deficits during the financial crisis to stimulate the economy and they had to pay out packages to the banking system and to troubled industries. Now many countries, like the US, France, and UK and not the least Greece, Ireland and Iceland are doing drastic cuts. Many of these cuts are directly affecting the welfare system and the labour market; both core subjects in ESOPs research. Minimum wages are cut pension ages are raised, income taxes are raised, public employees are laid off, unemployment benefits are cut and health provisions are cut. These are changes that are likely to be long lasting and the consequences are likely also to be long lasting.

We continue to follow our research plan outlined in the ESOP-application; we gradually broaden the scope of ESOP's projects. The study of egalitarian lessons from the Nordic countries is the single most important research theme. We also study equality, social organization and performance more generally, with implications for the assessments of social reforms and policies elsewhere, such as the current health reform in the US, and on-going social reforms in India and China.

ESOP s research is of relevance in understanding many of the mechanisms that such changes may have on the labour market, political economy and incentives, and on social mobility. Not the least within or participation of the GRASP (7^{th} framework programme) where we are in charge of one working package with the focus on Social Policies and Growth in Europe, and our newly started pre-project "Economic Growth and Sustainable Development in India", with funding from RCN. The goal is to strengthen our collaboration with researchers from India significantly, and prepare for a top quality and extensive long term research project with India. We plan to run a series of workshops both in India and in Norway. In this project we plan to explore both environmental and social issues related to economic development and societal transformation. Both issues are highly relevant to Indian development discussions. The country is presently experiencing record high economic growth and it is an ambition of the government to combine growth with redistributive and environmental policies.

In our application to establish ESOP, we listed the following sub-goal: To participate in the public debate and to publish popularized publications on all the important topics we study. ESOP researchers have several hundred popular scientific contributions and media appearances per year. We have also participated in a large number of public debates and contributed to several government committees. ESOP has also held meetings with government officials and official delegations from around the globe. In 2010 for instance we met a delegation from China. Unfortunately the delegation was considerably reduced because of the Nobel peace prize; only four of 16 persons attended our presentation. Moene has also taken part in the preparations for the World Economic Forum in Davos.

The spring 2011 ESOP is evaluated by an international committee, an expert panel, and by RCN. In this context we have updated all our research activities so far, and discovered that our previous publication lists has been incomplete the previous years. We regret this, and to put this right we have therefore decided to extend the annual report this year with a complete publication list from ESOP was founded in 2007.

2010 has been a productive year with 92 publications in scientific refereed journals. At the en of the year 67 researchers and PhD fellows divided on 26 person years was associated with our centre. Some of our PhD students have already completed their projects, and a few more are about to complete their projects. In addition two of our postdoctors have gone to positions elsewhere. Therefore we are looking into 2011 with expectancy, since we have several ongoing projects, and are about to recruit two new PhD students, one postdoctoral fellow and one permanent faculty position.

Prof. Kalle Moene	Prof. Halvor Mehlum	Johannes Elgvin
Centre director	Deputy director	Head of administration

RESEARCH AREAS

We structure our research around five subareas:

- The Welfare State
- Social Organization
- Development and Globalization
- Income and Social Mobility
- Institutions and Society Models

With a flexible interpretation these areas cover most of the research at ESOP.

The Welfare State

It is ESOP's ambition to explore the sustainability of generous welfare states. What determines their performance and their economic and political feasibility?
Welfare states provide valuable safety nets, insurance, and redistribution, but these policies also affect people's incentive to work, save, and invest. The political support for the welfare state depends, among other things, on the distribution of income. Gender also plays an important role as women are strong supporters of the welfare state. The willingness to pay taxes may in turn depend on what the welfare state provides and whom it provides this for. These interdependencies must be accounted for.

Social Organization

It is ESOP's ambition to explore the interaction between markets, social equality and worker security. Do market forces erode social reforms? Do social reforms erode market efficiency? There is a strong interdependence between how the economy is organized, how the workplace is organized, and what culture of trust and cooperation that prevails in a society. Egalitarian societies usually have less hierarchical firms. This work organization in return reinforces the mechanisms that sustain egalitarian features. Small social differences in society and at the workplace may also produce less social conflict, more cohesion, and hence more smoothly functioning societies with more cooperation. The importance of feed-back mechanisms and consistency is often emphasized in Economics, but the framework is usually limited to the

market mechanism. The interconnections between the economic, social, and political forces should be captured within similar frameworks.

Development and Globalization

It is ESOP's ambition to understand the viability of egalitarian market economies. What are the impacts of global competition for the distribution of income and prosperity?
Questions concerning the viability of egalitarian societies are relevant for all countries, rich or poor, egalitarian or inegalitarian. In all countries there are linkages between equality, social organization, and economic performance. These linkages are as important for the survival of the European welfare states as for the feasibility of an equitable society in general. Can Nordic-style welfare arrangements be introduced in all types of societies? Or are they only feasible in consensual, homogeneous and affluent societies with an extraordinary commitment to equality? Do the Nordic lessons have any relevance for countries that are conflict-ridden, heterogeneous, and poor? We study the feasibility of implementing welfare state arrangements in poor countries and to what extent the Scandinavian model can be understood as a development strategy. Can there be a welfare state for the poor? Welfare state arrangements are most needed where they are least developed. Welfare state arrangements in extremely poor countries could perhaps play an essential role for economic growth, social fairness, and gender equality.

Income and Social Mobility

It is ESOP's ambition to understand the linkages between economic performance, distribution, and social disparities. What are the costs and benefits of more equality?
Over the last 30 years, social equality and worker security have persisted in the Nordic countries and economic growth has been at par with the US. In the US, rising inequality has gone hand in hand with social cleavages and lower welfare. In contrast, most of Europe has experienced only a modest rise in inequality, but a sharp rise in unemployment. The Nordic countries, however, have in the same period combined social equality with good macroeconomic performance and full employment. To study the role of inequality, we must first derive what economic theory predicts for these societies. We can then confront the theoretical hypotheses with the observed patterns and draw valid conclusions.

Institutions and Society Models

It is ESOP's ambition to understand the interaction between policies, institutions, and long term development. What set of policies and institutions may generate an egalitarian development path within a consistent arrangement? Institutional complementarities and social spillovers are important to understand modern societies and the Nordic experience. Certain policies, institutions and behaviours fit together and strengthen each other. In the long run, the outcomes may look as if societal arrangements come in certain social and economic organization packages. What are the mechanisms behind this clustering around certain institutional equilibria? Is there a universal relationship between equality and economic performance, or do equality and prosperity go together only under some institutional arrangements?

A quick tour of some projects

Below we present some of ESOPs projects related to each category. The projects listed represent examples of the ongoing research. The list does not cover projects that were adequately covered in last previous years' reports. Some of the projects have just been started and have not yet resulted in published research while others are closer to completion and are also found in the list of Publications or Working Papers later in this report.

Disclaimer: *We define an ESOP project as a research project where at least one author (names in parenthesis) is part of ESOPs research team. Some of the projects below have funding from other sources than the Department or the Research Councils ESOP research grant.*

The Welfare State

ESOP has several projects focusing on the impacts of specific welfare state policies, exploring detailed register data. One paper that we would like to emphasize is Tarjei Havnes and Magne Mogstad (2010), «No Child Left Behind. Subsidized child care and children's long-run outcomes», forthcoming in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. The Scandinavian countries were the first to introduce subsidized child care on a large scale, and their experience is currently a unique source of information about its long-run consequences. The article explores how adult earnings and education are affected by access to universal child care using information on around half a million children, born around 1970. The comprehensive study shows that access to child care raises adult education, as well as the probability of college attendance, high school completion and labour market participation. The effects are particularly strong for girls and children of low educated mothers, indicating that universal child care promotes social mobility and narrows the gender wage gap. The precise and robust difference-in-difference estimates show that child care exposure improves long-run prospects of children considerably, both educational attainment, labour market attachment, and welfare dependency. The additional 17,500 child care places produced 6,200 years of education.

Many other works by ESOP staff also evaluate the interdependencies between welfare arrangements and labour market. Barth and Moene have investigated how equality can

multiply due to complementarities between wage determination and welfare spending. A more equal wage distribution fuels welfare generosity via political competition. A more generous welfare state fuels wage equality via its support of weaker groups. Together the two effects generate a cumulative process that adds up to an important social multiplier. This mechanism explains how equally rich countries may differ in social equality and why countries cluster around different worlds of welfare capitalism. Empirically we identify a sizeable equality multiplier using a panel of 18 OECD countries and a 50 year time series from the US (Barth and Moene, 2010).

Several works focus on disability pensions – A topic which is of great importance for the viability of the welfare state. For instance, Mari Rege has a study where she looks into how plant downsizing in Norway affects the flow into disability pensioning: She finds substantial effects, parts of which must be interpreted as caused by weak employment prospects rather than a result of concrete disability. Another group of works study migrant workers in the labour market. Bratsberg, Raaum, and Røed study how migrants fare over the business cycle. They find that immigrant employment is particularly sensitive to the business cycles, and that the economic downturns of the 1980s and 1990s accelerated their labour market exit.
ESOP has also focused on various health issues: Brekke has studied the inequality of health in Nordic countries. International comparisons reveal that the Nordic countries all have a high degree of correlation between income and health. Kravdal has analysed the consequences of health shocks, i.e. cancer, for the family, in several works. He has studied various issues in particular related to the sharing of burdens within the family. He finds that married men and married women receive a lower income after a cancer diagnosis. Strikingly women's earnings were adversely influenced to the same extent by their own as by their spouses' cancer. Such an effect was not found for men.

A large group of ESOP's works have investigated the tax financing of the welfare state. Storesletten and Zilliboti have studied optimal taxation of capital. Christiansen opposes the common view that high marginal income taxes are purely distortive. Scandinavian countries are often highlighted as prime examples of countries with harmful tax distortions. However, assessing social efficiency by taking marginal tax rates at face value may lead to exaggeration of the tax distortions. The key argument is that the public provision of some private goods, another typical feature of the Scandinavian economies, can make a difference. When selected commodities are publicly provided, part of the marginal income tax reflects real costs, and

part of the tax is nondistortionary because it reflects real costs. This could be one among other reasons why the Scandinavian economies perform so well, although they have very high marginal tax rates.

Social Organization

Hiring, firing and search behaviour are important for the social structure of job markets. Both worker mobility between jobs and the allocation of talents are affected. ESOP has several papers that explore these aspects. One paper that we would like to emphasize is Espen Moen and Åsa Rosen (2010): "Incentives in Competitive Search Equilibrium," forthcoming in Review of Economic Studies. This paper analyses the interaction between internal organization of firms, their agency problems, and the transaction costs associated with search frictions. Attention is paid to the reasonable case where workers know more about their skills and talents than the potential employers. To understand more of the social structure of the job market, and how that can differ across countries, the paper analyses the effect of changes in the macro economic variables on the wage contract and the unemployment rate. The typical result is that private information increases the responsiveness of the unemployment rate to changes in productivity. The incentive power of the wage contracts is positively related to high productivity, low unemployment benefits and high search frictions.

Norms is another research topic that has been extensively studied by ESOP's researchers, both theoretically and in experiments. One set of questions relate to how norms are established and sustained. Brekke, Hauge, Lind, and Nyborg have conducted an experiment to separate the more cooperative players, who are unlikely to shirk, from the less cooperative players, by allowing players to join groups based on willingness to donate money to the Red Cross. Their analysis shows that groups with players who decide to donate to the Red Cross also behave the most cooperatively. Almås, Cappelen, Tungodden, and Sørensen have studied an experiment to see what factors the participants hold each other responsible for. Moene and Baland have studied informal savings groups in a Kenyan slum. They looked at how the participants enforce the obligations to the group, and how the organizational structure itself can be designed to address enforcement issues.

Culture is another factor framing the social organization. Raquel Fernandez has several works on the economics of culture. In one project she studies the effect of culture on economic

outcomes by examining the work and fertility behaviour of second-generation American women from different cultures. She finds that the cultural proxies have positive and significant explanatory power for individual work and fertility outcomes. Moreover, she finds that the effect of culture is amplified for ethnic groups that tend to cluster in the same neighbourhoods.

Development and Globalization

One important research goal is to understand the role of entitlements and egalitarian values in an international perspective. Do people hold the same social preferences and values across countries? Do people in countries with small income differences subscribe to more egalitarian views – or are the differences that we observe basically due to institutional differences? What is the role of basic needs in poor countries? One paper that we would like to emphasize is Alexander W. Cappelen and Karl O. Moene and Erik Ø. Sørensen and Bertil Tungodden (2010) ‘’Needs vs. entitlements – an international fairness experiment’’ (second round in) Journal of the European Economic Association. The paper explores the relative importance of needs, entitlements, and nationality in people's social preferences by a real effort fairness experiment. People in two of the world's richest countries, Norway and Germany, interacted directly with people in two of the world's poorest countries, Uganda and Tanzania. The study provides four main findings. First, entitlement considerations are crucial in explaining distributive behaviour in the experiment; second, needs considerations matter a lot for some participants; third, the participants acted as moral cosmopolitans and did not assign importance to nationality in their distributive choices; and finally, the participants' choices are consistent with a self-serving bias in their social preferences. There is no support in the experiment that Norwegians are more egalitarian than other participants.

ESOP’s research has been directed towards the great inequalities between rich and poor countries, and the many dysfunctional power relations in poor countries. The misuse of power takes many forms from full scale war to corruption and bad policies. The war in Afghanistan has been analysed by Lind, Moene and Willumsen. Using a unique dataset on opium production and conflict events, they show how the recent rise in Afghan opium production is caused by violent conflicts. This is one stark example of how social organization and economics may be interrelated in a drastically counterproductive pattern. Harstad has worked on different forms of corruption and lobbying and its effect on private firms. He finds that

when the level of development is low, firms are more inclined to bend the rules through bribing. This mechanism may account for the common perception that bribery is relatively more common in poor countries, while lobbying is relatively more common in rich ones. Similarly, the comprehensive treatise in Baland, Moene and Robinson emphasizes how bad policies so often tend to be good politics that favour the survival of the ruling elite.

ESOP also has many contributions to the literature on how to measure income and inequality across countries. Almås has developed a new method for comparing incomes across countries, while Lind and Moene have developed a misery index to compare the extent of lack of redistribution of income between rich and poor within different countries.

There are also important works on growth and globalization. Storesletten has analysed China's growth experience since 1992, with high output growth, sustained returns on capital investments, extensive reallocation within the manufacturing sector, falling labour share and accumulation of a large foreign surplus. He finds that the building blocks underlying this performance are capitalist entrepreneurs acting in an environment with financial control and low wages. Hence, China's growth experience is a result of a particular combination of social and institutional features.

The global environmental challenges is another issue of the interaction between organization (or lack thereof) and economic performance. Greaker and Hoel study the effect of carbon taxes on innovation. They argue that if the government can optimally subsidize firms' innovation today, the government avoids the so called time inconsistency problem. Thus, lack of commitment is not an argument for high current subsidies of innovation.

Income and social mobility

A comparative perspective is important, as the Scandinavian countries and the US seem to be on the opposite extremes, both when it comes to income inequality and social mobility. One paper that we would like to emphasize is Jonathan Heathcote, Kjetil Storesletten and Giovanni L. Violante (2010) ''The Macroeconomic Implication of Rising Wage Inequality in the United States,'' forthcoming in Journal of Political Economy. The paper starts from the premise that the US wage structure has been transformed by a rising college premium, a narrowing gender gap, and increasing persistent and transitory residual wage dispersion in

recent years. What are the implications of these changes for cross-sectional inequality in hours worked, earnings and consumption, and welfare? With the changing wage structure as the only primitive force, the model can account for the key trends in cross-sectional US data. Four channels of adjustments seem to be generally important for modern market economies. In terms of alleviating the adverse effects of rising consumption inequality, the four channels – savings, flexible hours, female participation, and enrolment – are all quantitatively important. In terms of overall welfare, female participation and college choice matter much more than saving and flexible labour supply, since the model allows individuals to take advantage of the opportunities created by the dynamics of gender and skill-biased demand shifts.

ESOP's research has been occupied with many aspects of social mobility in Norway. One important mechanism that might prevent social mobility is the interaction between the housing market and school quality. If all good school districts only had expensive housing it could prevent social mobility. Fiva has studied this possibility. He has analysed housing market reactions to the release of previously unpublished information on school quality. He finds a robust short-term housing market reaction to publication of school quality indicators, suggesting that households are willing to pay for better schools. The segregating effects appear to be moderate as the publication effect does not seem to be permanent as prices revert to prepublication levels, after two to three months.

Another aspect of social mobility is related to discrimination. Holden and Rosén have analysed labour market discrimination. Employment protection legislation is an important part of the Nordic labour market. When workers do not face the threat of being fired over night, they need not be afraid to claim their rights, even if it might cause conflict with the employer. However, for groups that face discrimination, general employment protection may reduce their chance of being hired. Holden and Rosén consider a case where workers who seldom get new offers become less attractive in the labour market. A vicious circle can be established where employers discriminate because other employers discriminate. Discrimination as a cause of the gender wage gap has been studied empirically by Barth. Using matched employer-employee data from Norway he finds that female labour supply is less elastic than that of men. The results suggest that the larger share of the gender wage gap for low-educated workers may be attributed to differences in labour market frictions between men and women.

Another important research issue has been the measurement and assessment of inequality. Almås, Cappelen, Lind, Sørensen and Tungodden has developed an "unfairness Lorenz curve" and "unfairness Gini". They use this to study the implications of theories of justice for the evaluation of the income distribution in Norway. They find that both pre-tax income and post-tax income distribution has become less fair in Norway between 1986 to 2005, as women's economic situation has deteriorated and as the tax system has become less progressive.

Institutions and Society Models

ESOP has several important papers that focus on everything from the specific social democratic institutional arrangements in Sweden and Norway, to the role of democracy as such in a broader international setting. One paper that we would like to emphasize is Silje Aslaksen (2010) "Oil and Democracy – More than a Cross-Country Correlation? " forthcoming in Journal of Peace Research. This interdisciplinary research revisits the empirical relationship between oil resources and democratic rule. Contrary to existing studies the paper shows that levels of oil systematically predict both levels and changes in democracy, in a sample of up to 156 countries for the years 1972 to 2002. There is a negative relationship between oil and democracy. This result holds for alternative measures of democracy and alternative measures of oil abundance. The result is also robust when including additional covariates and when removing major oil producers.

Another core part of ESOP's research relates to how the rules and regulations of a country interact by enforcing each other in productive and destructive patterns. One example of this research is carried out by Balland, Moene and Robinson. They discuss how "governance" explains variations in development experiences. Governance is best thought of as a sub-set of institutions, but it is a quite vague category which it is difficult to unbundle. With this starting point Balland, Moene and Robinson emphasize two basic lessons which are discussed theoretically and illustrated by case studies covering a range of countries from Sierra Leone to Scandinavia. The first lesson: Governance is the outcome of a political process and as such closely related to the political economy of development. The second lesson: Improving governance necessitates understanding the nature of the entire political equilibrium. Scandinavian countries experienced economic growth and rising living standards with rather untraditional labour market institutions and welfare policies promoting a radically egalitarian

distribution of income. The reforms in the 1930s changed the political equilibrium and initiated the egalitarian path. In contrast, Sierra Leone is not intrinsically poor. The country has diamonds and great agricultural potential, and it is close to European markets. Better governance may not have led Sierra Leone to become rich like South Korea or Taiwan, but at worst it would have become like Botswana. This development path has so far been blocked by a system of parsimonious relationships.

Several other works strive to understand the finer details of the political equilibrium. In several works, by Moen and Riis, by Torvik and by Høyland, the authors study various aspects of how the political institutions affect the politics implemented. Fiva and Natvig do empirical studies of how the various dimensions of the political decisions play in Norwegian elections. Harstad analyses the issue of delegation. Should a delegate be "conservative" (status quo biased) or instead "progressive" relative to his electorate? Harstad shows that a larger majority requirement leads to conservative delegation. The results could be interpreted as normative recommendations for the EU's future constitution.

Kundu discusses several aspects of the political process. In one work he examines the role of political institutions in facilitating efficient transition. A democracy may fail to implement the optimal policy if the electorate does not take into account the increased benefit from transition in later periods. If there is incomplete information about the population's preferences, a democratic system's ability to aggregate private information increases when the economy is in transition, while a dictatorship is constrained by its ineffectiveness in aggregating private information.

Inspired by Leif Johansen, Moene discusses and criticizes the so called "Bargaining Society." Norway is a typical example. Decisions are taken out of both the market sphere and the sphere of political decisions and moved into bargaining like decisions. The trend does not only include more of well structured and formalized negotiations between well defined parties. It also includes more of informal haggling, rent seeking, influence competition, and routine consultation between the government and the interest organizations. This raises new methodological issues. How can one utilize a noncooperative approach to understand cooperation and coalition formation? Is bargaining like decisions best with postponements and inefficiencies?

Foundational issues

The last category of our research consists of an overarching category that spans all the others. Typically it covers theoretical and empirical method developments, clarifications of concepts and terms, and overviews.

One particular group of research papers relates to experiments that put to a test the common behavioural assumptions in economics. One prominent example of such a contribution is the article Fairness and the Development of Inequality Acceptance published in Science by Almås, Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden in 2010. Fairness considerations fundamentally affect human behaviour, but the understanding of the nature and development of people's fairness preferences is limited. In real life, people often disagree on what is fair because they disagree on whether individual achievements, luck, and efficiency considerations of what maximizes total benefits can justify inequalities. The authors used an experiment with a modified "dictator game" to capture these features. They were able to study how inequality acceptance develops in adolescence. They found that as children enter adolescence, they increasingly view inequalities reflecting differences in individual achievements, but not luck, as fair, whereas efficiency considerations mainly play a role in late adolescence.

Many theoretical developments relevant for ESOP have been carried out by Asheim. In one work he explores the concept of "intergenerational equity". He critically reviews axiomatic analyses of preferences over infinite streams and evaluates different kinds of intergenerational social preferences by comparing their axiomatic basis as well as their performance in simple present-future conflicts. He illustrates his analysis using real-world intergenerational conflicts, such as global warming, as a backdrop. In another work he discusses the question of how to do "Global welfare comparisons" in order to provide a normative foundation for transfers between different economies.

One methodological development relevant for many of ESOP's empirical discussions has been done by Lind and Mehlum. They have devised a statistical test to assess whether there is a nonlinear U-shape or hump shape present in the data. This test is relevant for many of ESOP's questions, as many of the empirical patterns exhibit noncontinuous patterns. A case in point is the question of whether or not there is a trade off between income inequality and income levels.

ESOP'S STAFF AND RESEARCH ACTIVITY IN NUMBERS

Staff in numbers

Staff	2010	
	Person years (årsverk)	Number of people
Professors, associate professors and researchers	7,8	34
Postdoctoral fellows	3,2	5
Research fellows	12,4	19
Administrative staff	1,3	2
Research assistants	1,3	7
Guest researchers	1,5	5
Total	**27,5**	**72**

International Visitors

Year	2007	2008	2009	2010
Number of visitors	6	46	24	40

Research stays abroad

Year	2007	2008	2009	2010
Number of stays longer than one week	8	8	13	15
Number of people	8	7	10	14

Workshops

Year	2007	2008	2009	2010
Number of workshops arranged by ESOP	1	3	4	8

Research activity in numbers

This table represents ESOP's research activity in numbers, according to the categories chosen by The Research Council of Norway. The figures are based on what the ESOP researchers have reported themselves.

Publications and dissipation of results	2007	2008	2009	2010
Articles published in scientific, refereed journals	49	35	35	92
Books published (textbooks, anthologies (ed.), etc.)	7	11	18	14
Presentations published from international meetings/conferences	81	81	107	121
Other reports, lectures and presentations from scholarly fora	37	81	69	66
Dissemination measures aimed at relevant target groups	37	50	71	53
Public-oriented dissemination activity (popular science articles, documents circulated for review, exhibitions, etc.)	29	74	72	51
News publication in the media	266	1038	1162	1306
*Working papers and unrefereed scientific articles	16	21	55	88

*Our own category.

Explanation of categories:

Books published (textbooks, anthologies (ed.), etc.: *Also includes chapters in books, PHD-theses and reports such as NOUs.*

Presentations published from international meetings/conferences: *All presentations at international conferences or seminars at academic institutions abroad.*

Other reports, lectures and presentations from scholarly fora: *Presentations at academic or scholarly fora in Norway.*

Public-oriented dissemination activity (popular science articles, documents circulated for review, exhibitions, etc.): *Media contribution where an ESOP researcher is the author, typically op-ed articles.*

News publication in the media: *The Opoint media monitor tools has been used to count news publications in the media. Numbers were generated on November 29, 2010 between 10 and 11 o'clock.*

EXTENDED LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 2007-2010

Disclaimer: *For all these publications at least one author is part of ESOP's research team. This (these) author(s) are in bold face. Some of the papers below are based on projects with funding from other sources than the Department or ESOP's research grant from the Research Council of Norway.*

Forthcoming articles in 2011

Asheim, Geir B. and Tungodden, Bertil; with Mitra, Tapan (2010): "Sustainable recursive social welfare functions." Forthcoming in *Economic Theory.*

Abstract: Koopmans' axiomatization of discounted utilitarianism is based on seemingly compelling conditions, yet this criterion leads to hard-to-justify outcomes. The present analysis considers a class of sustainable recursive social welfare functions within Koopmans' general framework. This class is axiomatized by means of a weak new equity condition ("Hammond Equity for the Future") and general existence is established. Any member of the class satisfies the key axioms of Chichilnisky's "sustainable preferences." The analysis singles out one of Koopmans' original conditions as particularly questionable from an ethical perspective.

Barth, Erling; with Dale-Olsen, Harald (2010): "Employer Size or Skill Group Size Effect on Wages?" Forthcoming in *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*.

Abstract: It turns out that the employer-size effect on individual wages dwindles away once one control for the number of workers of the same skill-group (educational type) as the observed individual within the establishment. The skill-group size effect on wages is substantial. The main results, a dwindling employer size effect and a significant group size effect, remain after controlling for both individual and establishment specific heterogeneity. This observation rejects most of the proposed explanations for the employer-size effect, while it lends considerable support for the notion that there are frictions in the labor market and that each establishment faces an upward sloping supply curve for each type of labor.

Beyene, Berhe Mekonnen (2010): "How sensitive are Poverty Measures to the Choice of Equivalence Scale and Unit of Analysis? Evidence from Urban Ethiopia." Forthcoming in *Proceedings of the Seventh International Annual Conference on the Ethiopian Economy*, Ethiopian Economic Association.

Abstract: The paper studies the effect of the choice of equivalence scale and unit of analysis on poverty measures using data from urban Ethiopia. Four types of equivalence scales and three different units of analysis were considered. The three commonly used FGT indices namely P_0, P_1 and P_2 were computed for the whole sample and for different sub-samples

based on geography and socio-economic characteristics of household heads. We found an important effect of the choice of equivalence scale on the poverty measures for the whole sample and for the sub- samples. The magnitude of the effect varies across sub-samples and in some cases rank reversal was observed. This suggests that maximum care should be done while choosing the appropriate equivalence scale. It is also advisable to consider more than one method of equivalence scale to check the robustness of poverty measures to the choice of equivalence scale. Using households as units of analysis consistently understates the level of poverty while the choice between individuals and equivalent individuals does not change the result much. Households should not be used as units of analysis as this could give a misleading result.

Brekke, Kjell Arne; with Kverndokk, Snorre (2010): "Inadequate Bivariate Measures of Health Inequality**:** The Impact of Income Distribution." Forthcoming in *Scandinavian Journal of Economics.*

Abstract: Bivariate measures of health inequality are influenced by changes in two variables: health and a socioeconomic variable such as income. For these measures, what is reported as an increase in health inequality may just as well be a reduction in income inequality. In particular, several papers have found that socioeconomic health inequalities in Nordic countries are no less than in other European countries. The correct interpretation may just be that income inequality is no higher in Nordic countries than in the rest of Europe. The problem is especially profound when the causality is running from health to income.

Brekke, Kjell Arne; with Solstad, Jan T. (2010): "Do the existence of a public good enhance cooperation among users of common-pool resources?" Forthcoming in *Land Economics.*

Abstract: Without resorting to the folk theorem or to altruistic preferences, we demonstrate that the problem of overharvesting among individually rational harvesters in a local commons vanishes if the harvesters share, and voluntarily contribute to, some public good. Formulating the model as a two-stage sequential game, the harvesting of a renewable natural resource takes place at the first stage. The observed harvesting surplus is then used for buying private goods and contributing to public goods at the second stage. In this setting, the model shows that the harvesters share an individual objective of maximizing total harvesting surplus.

Cappelen, Alexander W., **Sørensen, Erik and Tungodden, Bertil;** with Hole, Astri Drange (2010): "The importance of moral reflection and self-reported data in a dictator game with production." Forthcoming in *Social Choice and Welfare*.

Abstract: This paper studies how individual behavior is affected by moral reflection in a dictator game with production, and the informational value of self-reported data on fairness. We find that making individuals reflect on fairness before they play the dictator game has a moderate effect on the weight attached to fairness in distributive choices, and a strong effect on what people consider fair. Furthermore, we find that self-reported data have substantial informational value, but still do not add explanatory power to a random utility model

estimated on purely behavioral data. Finally, by studying the behavior of individuals who deviate from their self- reported fairness ideal, we do not find much support for the hypothesis that people are self-serving in their choice of fairness ideal.

Cappelen, Alexander W. and Tungodden, Bertil (2010): "Distributive interdependencies in liberal egalitarianism." Forthcoming in *Social Choice and Welfare*.

Abstract: Liberal egalitarian theories of justice share the egalitarian ideal that inequalities due to factors beyond individual control should be eliminated. This justifies that individuals sometimes receive more (or less) than their marginal productivity, which in turn implies that a change in one individual's effort sometimes will affect the post-tax income of others. What restrictions should we place on such distributive interdependencies? The article provides characterizations of three main classes of redistribution mechanisms on the basis of how this question is answered.

Christiansen, Vidar; with Smith, Stephen (2010): "Externality-Correcting Taxes and Regulation." Forthcoming in *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*.

Abstract: Much of the literature on externalities has considered taxes and direct regulation as alternative policy instruments. Both instruments may in practice be imperfect, reflecting informational deficiencies and other limitations. We analyse the use of taxes and regulation in combination, to control externalities arising from individual consumption behaviour. We consider cases where taxes are either imperfectly differentiated to reflect individual differences in externalities, or where some consumption escapes taxation. In both cases we characterise the optimal instrument mix, and show how changing the level of direct regulation alters the optimal externality tax.

Fiva, Jon H.; with Kirkebøen, Lars J. (2010): "Information Shocks and the Dynamics of the Housing Market." Forthcoming in *Scandinavian Journal of Economics.*

Abstract: This paper analyses housing market reactions to the release of previously unpublished
information on school quality. Using high quality housing data that precisely bracket the timing of the information shock; we investigate housing price dynamics within school catchment areas. We find a robust short-term housing market reaction to publication of school quality indicators, suggesting that this information was new to the households, and that households are willing to pay for better schools. The publication effect does not seem to be permanent as prices revert to prepublication levels after two to three months.

Harstad, Bård; with Svensson, Jakob (2010): "Bribes, Lobbying and Development." Forthcoming in *American Political Science Review.*

Abstract: When faced with a regulatory constraint, firms can either comply, bribe the regulator to get around the rule, or lobby the government to relax it. We analyze this choice, and its consequences, in a simple dynamic model. In equilibrium, when the level of

development is low, firms are more inclined to bend the rule through bribing but they tend to switch to lobbying when the level of development is sufficiently high. Bribing, however, is associated with hold-up problems, which discourage firms from
investing. If the hold-up problems are severe, firms will never invest enough to make lobbying worthwhile. The country may then be stuck in a poverty trap with bribing forever. The model can account for the common perception that bribing is relatively more common in poor countries while lobbying is relatively more common in rich ones.

Havnes, Tarjei and Mogstad, Magne (2010): "No Child Left Behind: Subsidized Child Care and Children's Long-Run Outcomes." Forthcoming in *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*.

Abstract: There is a heated debate in the US, Canada and many European countries about introducing universally accessible child care. However, studies on universal child care and child development are scarce and only consider short-run outcomes. We analyze the introduction of universal child care in Norway, addressing the impact on children's long-run outcomes. Our precise and robust difference-in-difference estimates show that child care had strong positive effects on children's educational attainment and labor market participation, and also reduced welfare dependency. Subsample analysis indicates that children with low educated mothers and girls benefit the most from child care.

Knutsen, Carl Henrik; with Asmund Rygh and Helge Hveem (2010): "Does State Ownership Matter? Institutions' Effect on Foreign Direct Investment Revisited." Forthcoming in *Business and Politics.*

Knutsen, Carl Henrik (2010): "Which Democracies Prosper? Electoral Rules, Form of Government and Economic Growth". Forthcoming in *Electoral Studies.*

Abstract: Electoral rules and form of government have important economic effects, for example on
taxation and public spending. However, there are no robust results in the literature when it comes to their effect on economic growth. This paper investigates whether electoral rules and form of government affects economic growth by applying panel data techniques on a very extensive dataset. There is no robust effect of presidentialism or parliamentarism on growth. However, there is very robust evidence for a positive, and quite substantial, effect of Proportional Representation (PR) electoral rules on economic growth. This is partly due to PR systems' propensity to generate broad-interest policies, like universal education spending, property rights protection and free-trade, rather than special interest economic policies. Also semi-proportional systems seem to enhance growth relative to pluralmajoritarian
systems.

Lind, Jo Thori and Moene, Kalle (2010): "Miserly Developments." Forthcoming in *Journal of Development Studies*.

Abstract: We measure the level of poverty in the midst of affluence using what we denote the miser index. We calculate the index of poverty-induced polarization for a number of countries. The most miserly countries are in Southern Africa and Latin America. Miserly countries tend to be socially fractionalized, bureaucratically inefficient, and politically corrupt. They provide low levels of health care and education. Considering the world as a single entity, we find a dramatic rise in global miserliness over the last 30 years going from the level of Colombia to that of South Africa.

Mehlum, Halvor (2010): "The Academic Publication Industry, Open Access and Efficiency." Forthcoming in *International Studies Perspectives*.

Abstract: This contribution contains a discussion of some of the core issues related to the economics of open access journal publishing. By open access I simply mean that published academic articles are available for download over the internet, free of charge.. In this limited space I primarily cover issues where I think I have something to say. The article contains a mix of my personal views as an academic, as an economist, and as an editor of a minor open access journal. These issues relate to economic efficiency, distribution, access in poor countries, and general benefits of open access. I base the discussion on my own experience with publishing an open access journal. I end the discussion by some thoughts on the realism and feasibility of a general transition to open access. My experience is primarily from economics, but I expect that it has some relevance for other social science disciplines as well as for the humanities. I think, however, that the issue of open access in disciplines where commercial interests are much more important has to be approached differently. For readers who want to go deeper into the various aspects of the economics of open access publishing, I recommend the two symposia in *Economic Analysis & Policy* (2009) and in *Nature* (2004), and a report on the costs and benefits of open access publishing (Houghton et al. 2009) . All these are appropriately available on-line, free of charge.

Mogstad, Magne; with Aaberge, Rolf and Peragine, Vitorocco (2010): "Measuring Long-Term Inequality of Opportunity." Forthcoming in *Journal of Public Economics*.

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce and apply a general framework for evaluating *long-term* income
distributions according to the Equality of Opportunity principle. Our framework allows for both an ex-ante and an ex-post approach to EOp. Our ex-post approach relies on a permanent income measure defined as the minimum annual expenditure an individual would need in order to be as well off as he could be by undertaking inter-period income transfers. There is long-term ex-post inequality of opportunity if individuals who exert the same effort have different permanent incomes. In comparison, the ex-ante approach focuses on the expected permanent income for individuals with identical circumstances. Hence, the ex-ante approach pays attention to inequalities in expected permanent income between different types of individuals. To demonstrate the empirical relevance of a long-run perspective on EOp, we exploit a unique panel data from Norway on individuals' incomes over their working lifespan.

Mogstad, Magne; with Aaberge, Rolf (2010): "Robust Inequality Comparisons." Forthcoming in *Journal of Economic Inequality*.

Abstract: This paper is concerned with the problem of ranking Lorenz curves in situations where the
Lorenz curves intersect and no unambiguous ranking can be attained without introducing weaker ranking criteria than first-degree Lorenz dominance. To deal with such situations Aaberge (2009) introduced two alternative sequences of nested dominance criteria for Lorenz curves which was proved to characterize two separate systems of nested subfamilies of inequality measures. This paper uses the obtained characterization results to arrange the members of two different generalized Gini families of inequality measures into subfamilies according to their relationship to Lorenz dominance of various degrees. Since the various criteria of higher degree Lorenz dominance provide convenient computational methods, these results can be used to identify the largest subfamily of the generalized Gini families and thus the least restrictive social preferences required to reach unambiguous ranking of a set of Lorenz curves.

Mogstad, Magne and Rege, Mari; with Kalil, Ariel and Votruba, Mark (2010): "Divorced Fathers' Proximity and Children's Long Run Outcomes: Evidence from Norwegian Registry Data." Forthcoming in *Demography*.

Abstract: This study examines the link between divorced nonresident fathers' proximity and children's long-run outcomes using high-quality data from Norwegian population registers. We follow
(from birth to young adulthood) 15,992 children born into married households in Norway in the years 1975-1979 whose parents divorce during his or her childhood. We observe the proximity of the child to his or her father in each year following the divorce and link proximity to children's educational and economic outcomes in young adulthood, controlling for a wide range of observable characteristics of the parents and the child. Our results show that closer proximity to the father following a divorce has, on average, a modest negative association with offspring's young-adult outcomes. The negative associations are stronger among children of highly-educated fathers. Complementary Norwegian survey data show that highlyeducated fathers report more post-divorce conflict with their ex-wives as well as more contact with their children (measured in terms of the number of nights that the child spends at the fathers' house). Consequently, the father's relocation to a more distant location following the divorce may shelter the child from disruptions in the structure of the child's life as they split time between households and/or from post-divorce interparental conflict.

Nilssen, Tore (2010): "Risk Externalities in a Payments Oligopoly." In *Portuguese Economic Journal*, forthcoming.

Abstract: I discuss the role to be played by central banks in payment systems by way of an oligopoly model of a payments market where firms exert negative risk externalities upon each

other. A central bank participating actively in this market is modelled as benign in two ways: exerting less externalities than other banks and maximizing welfare rather than pro.t. Because other banks react strategically to the central bank.s presence due to its low externalities, there is a risk that it back.res, with these other banks.taking more risky positions than if the central bank were not there. The proper role of the central bank may actually be to stay out.

Rege, Mari; with Telle, Kjetil and Votruba, Mark (2010): "Parental Job Loss and Children's School Performance." Forthcoming in *The Review of Economic Studies.*

Abstract: Using Norwegian register data we estimate how children's school performance is affected by their parents' exposure to plant closure. Fathers' exposure leads to a substantial decline in children's graduation-year grade point average, but only in municipalities with mediocre-performing job markets. The negative effect does not appear to be driven by a reduction in father's income and employment, an increase in parental divorce, or the trauma of relocating. In contrast, mothers' exposure leads to improved school performance. Our findings appear to be consistent with sociological "role theories," with parents unable to fully shield their children from the stress caused by threats to the father's traditional role as breadwinner, and mothers responding to job loss by allocating greater attention towards child rearing.

Rege, Mari; with Cooper, David (2010): "Social Interaction Effects and Choice Under Uncertainty: An Experimental Study." Forthcoming in *Games and Economic Behavior.*

Abstract: Extensive field evidence shows individuals' decisions in settings involving choice under uncertainty depend on the decisions of their peers. These peer group effects lead to cultures of risk taking and/or avoidance as well as magnifying the effect of policy interventions. One hypothesized cause of peer group effects is social interaction effects: an individual's utility from an action is enhanced by others taking the same action. We employ a series of controlled laboratory experiments to study the causes and possible effects of peer effects in choice under uncertainty. We find strong peer group effects in the laboratory. Allowing feedback about others' choices increases group polarization and, on average, reduces the likelihood that subjects will choose risky or ambiguous gambles. Our design allows us to eliminate social learning, social norms, group affiliation, and complementarities as possible causes for the observed peer group effects. We develop a model of social loss aversion which yields a form of social interaction effect and captures major features of the data.

Røed, Knut; with Westlie, Lars (2010): "Unemployment Insurance in Welfare States: The Impacts of Soft Duration Constraints." Forthcoming in *Journal of the European Economic Association.*

Abstract: Based on a sequence of reforms in the Norwegian unemployment insurance (UI) system, we show that soft duration constraints and mild sanction practices significantly increase UI claimants' job hazard rates. Soft duration constraints appear to have almost the

same behavioral impacts as hard constraints. In particular, the spikes at benefit exhaustion are of similar magnitude, irrespective of the kind of services and benefits that are offered after exhaustion, e.g., in terms of follow-on benefits and access to paid labor market programs. We find that extensive use of activity requirements backed up by mild sanctions effectively speed up the job search process and cut unemployment duration.

Torvik, Ragnar; with Chacon, Mario and Robinson, James A. (2010): When is Democracy an Equilibrium? Theory and Evidence from Colombia's La Violencia. Forthcoming in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

Abstract: The conventional wisdom in political science is that for a democracy to be consolidated, all groups must have a chance to attain power. If they do not then they will subvert democracy and choose to fight for power. In this paper we show that this wisdom is, if not totally incorrect, seriously incomplete. This is so because although the probability of winning an election increases with the size of a group, so does the probability of winning a fight. Thus in a situation where all groups have a high chance of winning an election, they may also have a high chance of winning a fight. Indeed, in a natural model, we show that democracy may never be consolidated in such a situation. Rather, democracy may only be stable when one group is dominant. We provide a test of a key aspect of our model using data from La Violencia, a political conflict in Colombia during the years 1946-1950 between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Consistent with our results, and contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that fighting between the parties was more intense in municipalities where the support of the parties was more evenly balanced.

Torsvik, Gaute; with Kobbeltvedt, Therese, Molander, Anders and Tjøtta, Sigve (2010): "Anticipated discussions in a social dilemma." Forthcoming in *Rationality and Society*.

Abstract: We study the impact of anticipated face-to-face discussions among group members after they have made an anonymous contribution to a public good in an experimental setting. We find that
the impact of anticipated discussions depends on how we frame the public good game. When framed in non-evaluative language, anticipated ex post discussions lead to a sharp reduction in
contributions to the public good. This effect reversed when evaluative language was used to underscore normative expectations. In contrast, there was no framing in the no-discussion baseline version of our game. We offer an explanation that centres on the idea that the announcement of ex post discussions reinforces both normative and predictive expectations.

Zilibotti, Fabrizio; with Acemoglu, Daron and Gancia, Gino (2010): "Competing Engines of Growth: Innovation and Standardization." Forthcoming in *Journal of Economic Theory*.

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes the form of the introduction new goods, whose production requires skilled workers. Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these new goods are adapted to be produced

using unskilled labor. Our framework highlights a number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth and a potential barrier to it. As a result, growth in an inverse U-shaped function of the standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we characterize the growth and welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We show how optimal IPR policies a¤ecting the cost of standardization vary with the skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other parameters. Third, we show that the interplay between innovation and standardization may lead to multiple equilibria. Finally, we study the implications of our model for the skill-premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking North-South trade to intellectual property rights protection.

Forthcoming books and chapters in books

Asheim, Geir B. (2010): "The relationship between welfare measures and indicators of sustainable development." Forthcoming in *Handbook of Environmental Accounting.* T. Aronsson, K.-G. Löfgren (eds.). Edvard Elgar, 2010.

Cappelen, Alexander W. (2010): "Pension Funds and Intergenerational Justice." Forthcoming in *Environmental Justice, Sustainable Development and Future Generations*, Springer.

Høyland, Bjørn with Hix, Simon (2010): *The Political System of the European Union*. Forthcoming 3rd edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Moene, Karl Ove (2010): "Are Good Policies Good Politics?" Forthcoming in *Governing the Global Economy: Politics, Institutions and Development*.

Publications 2010

Almås, Ingvild, Cappelen, Alexander W., Sørensen, Erik and Tungodden, Bertil (2010): "Fairness and the Development of Inequality Acceptance." In Science 328(5982), 2010, pages 1176-1178.

Abstract: Fairness considerations fundamentally affect human behavior, but our understanding of the nature and development of people's fairness preferences is limited. The dictator game has been the standard experimental design for studying fairness preferences, but it only captures a situation where there is broad agreement that fairness requires equality. In real life, people often disagree on what is fair because they disagree on whether individual achievements, luck, and efficiency considerations of what maximizes total benefits can justify inequalities. We modified the dictator game to capture these features and studied how inequality acceptance develops in adolescence. We found that as children enter adolescence, they increasingly view inequalities reflecting differences in individual achievements, but not luck, as fair, whereas efficiency considerations mainly play a role in late adolescence.

Asheim, Geir B. (2010): "Global welfare comparisons." In *Canadian Journal of Economics* 43, 2010, pages 1412–1432.

Abstract: We present a new version of the overtaking criterion, which we call generalized time-invariant overtaking. The generalized time-invariant overtaking criterion (on the space of infinite utility streams) is defined by extending proliferating sequences of complete and transitive binary relations defined on finite dimensional spaces. The paper presents a general approach that can be specialized to at least two, extensively researched examples, the utilitarian and the leximin orderings on a finite dimensional Euclidean space.

Asheim, Geir B; with d'Aspremont, Claude and Banerjee, Kuntal (2010): "Generalized time-invariant overtaking." In *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 46, 2010, pages 519-533.

Abstract: We present a new version of the overtaking criterion, which we call generalized time-invariant overtaking. The generalized time-invariant overtaking criterion (on the space of infinite utility streams) is defined by extending proliferating sequences of complete and transitive binary relations defined on finite dimensional spaces. The paper presents a general approach that can be specialized to at least two, extensively researched examples, the utilitarian and the leximin orderings on a finite dimensional Euclidean space.

Asheim, Geir B. (2010): "Intergenerational equity." In *Annual Review of Economics* 2, 2010, pages 197-222.

Abstract: Axiomatic analysis of intergenerational social preferences over infinite streams of well-being faces the following dilemma. Equal treatment of generations combined with sensitivity for the interests of each generation rules out explicitly defined preferences that can rank any pair of infinite well-being streams. Hence, either intergenerational social preferences must be incomplete or equal treatment and sensitivity must be compromised. This critical review of axiomatic analyses of preferences over infinite streams evaluates different kinds of intergenerational social preferences by comparing their axiomatic basis as well as their performance in simple present-future conflicts. The scope for application is discussed, using real-world intergenerational conflicts (such as global warming) as a backdrop.

Asheim, Geir B. and Nilssen, Tore; with Emblem, Anne W. (2010): "Health Insurance: Medical Treatment vs. Disability Payment." In *Research in Economics* 64, 2010, pages 137–145.

Abstract: In this paper we integrate health insurance and disability insurance, which have been treated separately so far in the economics literature. We do this by viewing health insurance as a combined hedge against the two consequences of falling ill: treatment expenditures and loss in income due to permanent impairment. We discuss how an individual's (pre-illness) ability affects her decision on health insurance coverage if ill: whether to choose treatment to full recovery or partial treatment combined with cash compensation for the resulting loss in income. We find that a high-ability individual demands

full recovery and equalizes utility across states, while a low-ability individual demands partial treatment and cash compensation and suffers a loss in utility if ill.

Asheim, Geir B. (2010): "Strategic use of environmental information." In *Environmental and Resource Economics* 46, 2010, pages 207–216.

Abstract: Strategic use of environmental information may have as consequence that a benevolent environmental agency will choose not to disclose information leading to reduced moral motivation. Thus, decision makers will not have access to such information, implying that they will not be able to adjust their decisions to available information on the state of the environment. In contrast, if the benevolent environmental agency instead bases its regulation on standard economic instruments, these instruments will incorporate all available information. Keywords and Phrases: Environmental regulation, voluntary contributions, moral motivation, hard information.

Asheim, Geir B.; with Mitra, Tapan (2010): "Sustainability and discounted utilitarianism in models of economic growth." In *Mathematical Social Sciences* 59, 2010, pages 148–169.

Abstract: Discounted utilitarianism treats generations unequally and leads to seemingly unappealing consequences in some models of economic growth. Instead, this paper presents and applies sustainable discounted utilitarianism (SDU). SDU respects the interests of future generations and resolves intergenerational conflicts by imposing on discounted utilitarianism that the evaluation be insensitive to the interests of the present generation if the present is better off than the future. An SDU social welfare function always exists. We provide a convenient sufficient condition to identify SDU optima and apply SDU to two well-known models of economic growth.

Asheim, Geir B.; with Bossert, Walter, Sprumont, Yves and Suzumura, Kotaro (2010): "Infinite-horizon choice functions." In *Economic Theory* 43, 2010, pages 1-21.

Abstract: We analyze infinite-horizon choice functions within the setting of a simple technology. Efficiency and time consistency are characterized by stationary consumption and inheritance functions, as well as a transversality condition. In addition, we consider the equity axioms Suppes-Sen, Pigou-Dalton, and resource monotonicity. We show that Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton imply that the consumption and inheritance functions are monotone with respect to time—thus justifying sustainability— while resource monotonicity implies that the consumption and inheritance functions are monotone with respect to the resource. Examples illustrate the characterization results.

Asheim, Geir B.; with Banerjee, Kuntal (2010): "Fixed-step anonymous overtaking and catching-up." In *International Journal of Economic Theory* 6, 2010, pages 149–165.

Abstract: We investigate criteria for evaluating infinite utility streams that satisfy Fixed-step anonymity and include some notion of overtaking or catching-up. We do so in a generalized

setting which do not require us to specify the underlying finite dimensional criterion (e.g., utilitarianism or leximin). We present axiomatizations that rely on weaker axioms than those in the literature, and which in one case is new. We also provide a complete analysis of the relationships between the symmetric parts of these criteria and likewise for the asymmetric parts.

Aslaksen, Silje (2010): "Oil and Democracy: More than a Cross-Country Correlation?" In *Journal of Peace Research* 47(4), 2010, pages 421-431.

Abstract: This article revisits the empirical relationship between oil and democracy. Existing studies establish a negative cross-country correlation between oil and democracy in a Pooled OLS framework. This insight has recently been challenged by claiming that it suffers from omitted variables, and that including country fixed effects removes the statistical association between oil and democracy. This article argues that because of the high persistence of democracy and oil, the findings of no effect of oil on democracy suffers from weak instrument problems and is not informative. Indeed, this article shows that levels of oil systematically predict both levels and changes in democracy in a sample of up to 156 countries between 1972 and 2002. By considering a different identification assumption for oil and by using additional and more informative moment conditions to instrument the regressors, this article demonstrated that the relationship between oil and democracy is negative also when country fixed effects are taken into account. This result holds for alternative measures of democracy and alternative measures of oil abundance; it is robust when including additional covariates and when removing major oil producers.

Barth, Erling (2010): "Lønnsdannelsen i offentlig sektor og den norske likelønnskommisjonen." In *Samfundsøkonomen* 4, København, pages 38-43.

Abstract: Artikkelen diskuterer bakgrunnen for den norske Likelønnskommisjonens arbeid, med spesiell vekt på lønnsdannelsen i offentlig sektor. Artikkelen tar for seg de senere års utvikling i lønnsstrukturen i offentlig og privat sektor, og de tiltakene som kommisjonen har foreslått for Norge.

Barth, Erling and Moene, Karl Ove (2010): "Små Lønnsforskjeller og Store Velferdsstater." In *Søkelys på Arbeidslivet* 1, 2010.

Abstract: Ved å sammenlikne land fra 1976 til I dag finner vi at små lønnsforskjeller går sammen med store velferdsstater. Grunnen er at økonomi og politikk beveger seg sammen, slik at likhet skaper mer likhet, og ulikhet skaper mer ulikhet. På den ene siden bremser ikke små lønnsforskjeller den politiske oppslutningen om velferdsstaten. Tvert om, små lønnsforskjeller stimulerer til økt oppslutning. På den andre siden motvirker ikke justeringer i arbeidsmarkedet velferdsstatens omfordeling. Tvert om, velferdsstaten forsterker eventuelle tendenser til lønnssammenpressing. Til sammen gir de to effektene en sterk likhetsmultiplikator.

Bratsberg, Bernt, Raaum, Oddbjørn and Røed, Knut (2010): "When Minority Labor Migrants Meet the Welfare State." In *Journal of Labor Economics* 28(3), 2010, pages 633-676.

Abstract: Life cycle employment of minority labor migrants who entered Norway in the early 1970s diverges from that of natives. Immigrant employment was nearly complete during early years but declined to 50% by the year 2000 (compared to 87% for a native comparison group). We find that immigrant employment is particularly sensitive to the business cycle and that economic downturns of the 1980s and 1990s accelerated their labor market exit. We trace part of the decline to migrants being overrepresented in shrinking industries. But we also identify welfare disincentives that contribute to poor life cycle employment performance of immigrants with many dependent family members.

Bratsberg, Bernt; with Ragan, James F., Jr. and Warren, John T. (2010): "Does Raiding Explain the Negative Returns to Faculty Seniority?" In *Economic Inquiry* 48(3), 2010, pages 704-721.

Abstract: We track faculty for 30 years at five PhD-granting departments of economics. Two thirds of faculty who take alternative employment move downward; less than one quarter moves upward. We find a substantial penalty for seniority, even after richly controlling for faculty productivity, and the penalty is little changed when we allow wages and returns to seniority to differ by mobility status. Faculty who end up moving to better or comparable positions were penalized as severely for seniority while they were in our sample as faculty who stay. These results are incompatible with the raiding hypothesis. Faculty from top 10 programs are also punished for seniority but to a lesser degree than
other faculty, which could reflect reduced monopsony power against such faculty if they are more marketable. All results persist when we control for prospective publications and allow lower returns for older publications. Match-quality bias has dissipated in the post-internet period, which may be the consequence of greater availability of information.

Brekke, Kjell Arne and Nyborg, Karine; with Kipperberg, G. (2010): "Social Interaction in Responsibility Ascription: The Case of Household Recycling." In *Land Economics* 86(4), pages 766-784.

Abstract: Several studies have demonstrated that individual contributions to public goods are increasing in others' contributions. The underlying causes for this, however, are not yet fully understood. We present a model of duty-orientation in which moral responsibility is learned through observations of others' behavior. Since, in our model, responsibility is a burden, we hypothesize that individuals will be reluctant to accept responsibility based on uncertain information. Econometric analysis of data from a survey on households' glass recycling indicates that perceived responsibility is a major determinant for reported recycling; that responsibility ascription is influenced by beliefs about others' behavior; and that people are indeed reluctant to accept responsibility based on uncertain information.

Brekke, Kjell Arne and Nyborg, Karine (2010): "Selfish Bakers, Caring Nurses? A Model of Work Motivation." In *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 75, 2010, pages

377-394.

Abstract: Work contributes to people's self-image in important ways. We propose a model in which individuals have a preference for being important to others. This leads to the following predictions: 1) In fully competitive markets with performance pay, behavior coincides with the standard model (bakers). 2) In jobs where effort is not rewarded according to its social marginal value, behavior is more socially beneficial than predicted by the standard model (nurses). 3) Even if unemployment benefits provide full income compensation, many workers' utility strictly decreases when losing their job. 4) Similarly, many workers will prefer to work rather than to live off welfare, even with full income compensation. 5) To keep shirkers out of the public sector, nurses' wages must be strictly lower than private sector income. At this wage level, however, the public sector will be too small. 6) It is possible to attract motivated workers to the public sector, without simultaneously attracting shirkers, through capital input improving nurses' opportunity to do a good job.

Cappelen, Alexander W, **Sørensen, Erik and Tungodden, Bertil** (2010): "Responsibility for what? An experimental approach to responsibility and fairness." In *European Economic Review* 54(3), 2010, pages 429-441.

Abstract: What should individuals be held responsible for? This is a fundamental question in much of the contemporary debate on distributive justice. Different fairness ideals, such as strict egalitarianism, and different versions of equal opportunity ethics and libertarianism give different answers to this question. In order to study the prevalence of these fairness ideals in society, we present the results from a dictator game where the distribution phase is preceded by a production phase. Each participant's contribution is a result of working time, productivity and price. We estimate what factors the participants hold each other responsible for and the weight they attach to fairness. In addition, we discuss how fairness preferences relate to business education and labour market experiences by comparing the estimates for business students at different stages of their education, and by comparing the estimates for final-year business students with the estimates for former business students with some years of work experience.

Cappelen, Alexander W. and Tungodden, Bertil; with Mæstad, Ottar (2010): "Demand for childhood vaccination: Insights from behavioural economics." In *Forum for Development Studies* 37(3), 2010, pages 349-364.

Abstract: Childhood vaccination is a powerful tool for reducing morbidity and premature deaths, and vaccines are usually provided for free. Despite this, several low- and middle-income countries are lagging far behind in terms of their vaccination coverage. This article uses insights from behavioural economics to shed light on the mechanisms at work when people make decisions about childhood vaccination, thus explaining why demand for vaccination may be low. Some of the factors highlighted are the immediacy effect, loss aversion, overestimating and overweighting of small probabilities, and social preferences and

trust. We conclude that these factors have important implications for how incentive mechanisms for vaccination should be designed, how vaccination decisions ought to be framed, who information campaigns should be conducted, as well as for the need to build trust in vaccine providers and health systems more generally.

Cappelen, Alexander W. and Tungodden, Bertil; with Nordheim, Ole F. (2010): "Disability, freedom and responsibility." In *Politics, Philosophy and Economics* 9(4), 2010, pages 411-423.

Abstract: It is a central political goal to secure disabled individuals the same opportunities as others to pursue their conception of a good life. This goal reflects an ambition to combine an egalitarian and a liberal moral intuition. In this article, we analyse how disabled individuals who take part in economic activity should be compensated in order to respect these two intuitions. The article asks how a system of disability compensation should be structured and what the level of such compensation should be. It also analyses how the answers to these questions depend on whether the disabled individuals are held responsible for their choice of work effort.

Cappelen, Alexander W.; with Bjorvatn, Kjetil (2010): "The challenge of a rising skill premium for redistributive taxation." In *International Tax and Public Finance* 17(1), 2010, pages 15-24.

Abstract: The present paper analyzes the challenge to redistribution programs posed by an increase in the skill premium. The skill premium affects both the profitability of education and the profitability of migration. We propose a two country, median voter model, where the equilibrium tax policy is shaped by the desire of the median voter to promote skill formation and to avoid emigration of skilled individuals. Our paper shows that the effect of an increase in the skill premium on redistributive programs depends on the initial level of the skill premium. Below a critical level, an increase in the skill premium is met by an increase in the tax rate. Beyond this level, however, a further rise in the skill premium leads to a fall in the tax rate, and hence a sharp increase in post-tax inequality.

Christiansen, Vidar, Blomquist, Sören and Luca Micheletto (2010): "Public Provision of Private Goods and Nondistortionary Marginal Tax Rates." In *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 2, 2010, pages 1-27.

Abstract: The incidence and efficiency losses of taxes have usually been analyzed in isolation from public expenditures. This negligence of the expenditure side may imply a serious misperception of the effects of marginal tax rates. The reason is that part of the marginal tax may in fact be a payment for publicly provided goods and reflects a cost that the consumers should bear in order to face the proper incentives. Hence, part of the marginal tax may serve the same role as a market price in the sense that it conveys information about a real social cost of working more hours. We develop this idea formally by studying an optimal income tax

model in combination with a type of public provision scheme not analyzed before; the provision level is individualized and positively associated with the individual's labor supply. As examples we discuss child care, elderly care, primary education and health care. We show that there is a potential gain in efficiency where public provision of such services replaces market purchases. We also show that it is necessary for efficiency that, other things equal, marginal income tax rates are higher than in economies where the services are purchased in the market. This is because the optimal tax should be designed so as to face the taxpayers with the real cost of providing the services. Hence, it might very well be that economies with higher marginal tax rates have less severe distortions than economies with lower marginal tax rates.

Christiansen, Solveig and Keilman, Nico (2010): **"**Norwegian Elderly Less Likely to Live Alone in the Future". *European Journal of Population* 2010 ;Volum 26.(1) s. 47-72.

Abstract: We analyse the future household status of elderly men and women in Norway. An important finding is that persons aged 80+ are less likely to live alone in the future, and more often with a partner. The level of mortality, the mortality sex gap, union dissolution at young and intermediate ages, and entry into and exit from institutions for the elderly are possible determinants for this new trend. We use the macro simulation program LIPRO to simulate the household dynamics in Norway to 2032, and investigate the demographic reasons for the increased likelihood of living with a partner among Norwegian elderly. Mortality plays an important role, but part of the trend is already embodied in the household structure of the current population.

Fiva, J. H.; with Hægeland, Torbjørn and Rønning, Marte (2010): "Health Status After Cancer: Does It Matter Which Hospital You Belong To?" In *BMC Health Services Research* 10(204), 2010.

Abstract: Survival rates are widely used to compare quality of cancer care. However, the extent to which cancer-survivors regain full physical or cognitive functioning is not captured by this statistic. To address this concern we introduce post-diagnosis employment as a supplemental measure of quality of cancer care. This study is based on individual level data from the Norwegian Cancer Registry (n=46,720) linked with data on labor market outcomes and socioeconomic status from Statistics Norway. We study variation across Norwegian hospital catchment areas (n=55) with respect to survival and employment five years after cancer diagnosis. To handle the selection problem, we exploit the fact that cancer patients in Norway (until 2001) are allocated to local hospitals based on their place of residence. We document substantial differences across catchment areas with respect to patients' post-diagnosis employment rates. Conventional quality indicators based on survival rates indicate smaller differences. The two sets of indicators are only moderately correlated. Conclusions. This analysis shows that indicators based on survival and post-diagnosis employment may capture different parts of the health status distribution, and that using only one of them to capture quality of care may be insufficient.

Greaker, Mads and Hoel, Michael O.; with Golombek, Rolf (2010): "Carbon Taxes and Innovation without Commitment." *The B.E. Journals in Economic Analysis & Policy* 10(1), 2010.

Abstract. Climate mitigation policy should be imposed over a long period, and spur innovation of new technologies in order to make stabilization of green house gas concentration economically feasible. The government may announce current and future policy packages that stimulate current R&D in climate-friendly technologies. However, once climate-friendly technologies have been developed, the government may have no incentive to implement the pre-announced future policies, that is, there may be a time inconsistency problem. We show that if the government can optimally subsidize R&D today, there is no time inconsistency problem. Thus, lack of commitment is not an argument for higher current R&D subsidies than the first-best subsidy. If the offered R&D subsidy is lower than the optimal subsidy, the current (sub-game perfect) carbon tax rate exceeds the first-best carbon tax rate.

Harstad, Bård; with Eskeland, Gunnar (2010): "Trading for the Future: Signaling in Permit Markets." In *Journal of Public Economics* 94(9-10), 2010, pages 749-60.

Abstract: Permit markets are celebrated as a policy instrument since they allow (i) firms to equalize marginal costs through trade and (ii) the regulator to distribute the burden in a politically desirable way. These two concerns, however, may conflict in a dynamic setting. Anticipating the regulator's future desire to give more permits to firms that appear to need them, firms purchase permits to signal their need. This raises the price above marginal costs and the market becomes inefficient. If the social cost of pollution is high and the overnment intervenes frequently in the market, the distortions are greater than the gains from trade and non-tradable permits are better. The analysis helps to understand permit markets and how they should be designed.

Harstad, Bård (2010): "Strategic Delegation and Voting Rules." In *Journal of Public Economics* 94(1-2), 2010, pages 102-113.

Abstract: The selection of political representatives depends on the political system. Principals, such as voters or districts, may benefit by strategically electing representatives different from themselves. While a status-quo biased delegate may be a better negotiator, an enthusiastic representative has a better chance of being included in the majority coalition. A larger majority requirement leads to conservative" delegation and hence a status quo bias; a poor minority protection does the opposite. Through strategic delegation, the political system also determines whether centralization or decentralization is beneficial.

Havnes, Tarjei (2010): "Sosial mobilitet og offentlige investeringer i barn og ungdom." In *Søkelys på arbeidslivet* 27(1-2), 2010, pages 135-146.

Abstract: Sosial mobilitet anses for et gode i nær alle leire. For å svekke reproduksjonen av klasseskiller står valget grovt sagt mellom kompenserende ordninger i voksen alder og investeringer i barn og ungdom som legger til rette for like muligheter. Nyere forskning indikerer at investeringer i humankapital i tidlig barndom kan gi stort utbytte. I denne artikkelen retter jeg søkelyset mot slike investeringer innenfor det klassiske rammeverket for sosial mobilitet i økonomi fra Becker og Tomes (1979). Når bør innsatsen settes inn, og bør det offentlige målrette tiltak mot mindre priviligerte barn, eller bør vi ta ansvar for investeringer i alle barn? Fra analysen reiser det seg som noe av et paradoks at høyere utdanning i Norge er fullt subsidiert og universelt tilgjengelig, mens foreldre fortsatt betaler en relativt høy pris for barnehage.

Hoel, Michael; with Aart de Zeeuw (2010): "Can a Focus on Breakthrough Technologies Improve the Performance of International Environmental Agreements?" Environmental and Resource Economics, Volume 47, Number 3, Pages 395-406 (2010)

Abstract: In a recent paper, Barrett (2006) reaches the conclusion that in general the answer to the question in the title is no. We show in this paper that a focus on the R&D phase in the development of breakthrough technologies changes the picture. The stability of international treaties improves and thus the possibility of realizing benefits of cooperation.

Holden, Steinar; with Holden, Helge and Holden, Lars (2010): "Contract adjustment under uncertainty." In *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 34(4), pages 657-680.

Abstract: Consider trade in continuous time between two players. The gains from trade are divided according to a contract, and at each point in time, either player may unilaterally induce a costly 38
adjustment of the contract. Players' payoffs from trade under the contract, as well as from trade under an adjusted contract, are exogenous and stochastic. We consider players' choice of whether and when to adjust the contract payment. We show that there exists a Nash equilibrium in thresholds, where each player adjusts the contract whenever the contract payment relative to the outcome of an adjustment passes the threshold. There is strategic substitutability in the choice of thresholds, so that if one player becomes more active by choosing a threshold closer to unity, the other player becomes more passive.

Holden, Steinar (2010): "Pengepolitikken etter finanskrisen." In *Samfunnsøkonomen* 4, 2010, pages 15-23.

Abstract: Hovedårsakene til finanskrisen lå i det finansielle systemets virkemåte, men også globale
ubalanser og lave styringsrenter bidro til krisen. Den økonomiske politikken i ettertid har forhindret at finanskrisen utviklet seg til en global depresjon. Vår forståelse av sammenhengene
i økonomien er bedre enn tidligere. Penge- og finanspolitikken er mye bedre enn den var under
depresjonen i 1929-33. Det er også klare forbedringer i stabiliseringspolitikken i forhold til

20-30-40 år tilbake. Det teoretiske rammeverket for pengepolitikken er imidlertid fortsatt for snevert, noe som også har betydning for praktisk pengepolitikk.

Høyland, Bjørn (2010): "Procedural effects in European Parliament Roll Call Votes", European Union Politics, European Union Politics , 2010, Vol 11(4): 597 - 613.

Abstract: I extend the standard spatial model of legislative voting to account for vote-specific party inducements and procedural differences. Focusing on voting in the 1999—2004 European Parliament, I find evidence of vote-specific party inducements in a large share of the roll call votes. Furthermore, MEPs position themselves differently across procedures. As most roll call votes are taken on non-legislative votes, these estimates may overemphasize voting pattern on these votes and downplay voting pattern on legislative votes. As such, these estimates may be a poorly suited for studying within party heterogeneity on legislative votes.

Høyland, Bjørn; with Hanne Marthe Narud og Helge Hveem (2010): "Gamle konflikter - nye saker? Norske velgeres utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitiske holdninger " (in Norwegian) Internasjonal Politikk, 2010 (3): 334 - 363.

Abstract: Norges utenrikspolitikk har historisk vært konfliktpreget og spilte også en rolle ved valg for noen årtier siden. Dette synes ikke lenger å være tilfelle; selv en radikal endring av Norges forsvar finner sted uten offentlig debatt. Basert på nasjonale opinionsundersøkelser høsten 2008/våren 2009 og sammenliknbare historiske data analyserer artikkelen hvor interessert nordmenn er i utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk, hvilke holdninger og syn de har, og hvordan disse er påvirket av partisympati. Den konkluderer med at folk er mer interessert enn valgkampene indikerer; der er en merkbar økning i nasjonal konsensus om alliansepolitikk og NATO-medlemskap, men deltakelse i Afghanistan-krigen er kontroversiell; opposisjonen mot EU-medlemskap forblir sterk, men denne saken deler opinionen på en annen måte enn sikkerhetspolitikken gjør. Mens valget av Obama bidro til et mer positivt syn på USA, er den tradisjonelle venstre-høyre aksen fortsatt viktig. Sosialistisk Venstreparti og venstrefløyen i Arbeiderpartiet forblir «den utenrikspolitiske opposisjonen».

Høyland, Bjørn; with Jon K. Nilsen, Xing Cai, and Hans Petter Langtangen (2010): "Simplifying Parallelization of Scientific Codes by a Function-Centric Approach in Python," Computational Science & Discovery, 3 (2010).

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to show how existing scientific software can be parallelized using a separate thin layer of Python code where all parallel communication is implemented. We provide specific examples on such layers of code, and these examples may act as templates for parallelizing a wide set of serial scientific codes. The use of Python for parallelization is motivated by the fact that the language is well suited for reusing existing serial codes programmed in other languages. The extreme flexibility of Python with regard to handling functions makes it very easy to wrap up decomposed computational tasks of a serial scientific application as Python functions. Many parallelization-specific components can be implemented as generic Python functions, which may take as input those functions that

perform concrete computational tasks. The overall programming effort needed by this parallelization approach is rather limited, and the resulting parallel Python scripts have a compact and clean structure. The usefulness of the parallelization approach is exemplified by three different classes of applications in natural and social sciences.

Høyland, Bjørn; with Hagemann, Sara (2010): "Bicameral Politics in the European Union." In
Journal of Common Market Studies 48(4), 2010.

Abstract: The literature on legislative decision-making and bargaining in the EU has reached a common conclusion that the European Parliament (Parliament) and the Council of the European Union (Council) are on equal footing in the main decision procedure, the Co-decision procedure. We present theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest that this is not the case: First, our analysis of the formal rules reveals that the Council has conditional agenda-setting power due to a change in the majority thresholds for adopting legislation from the first to the second reading in the Parliament. This change has important implications for the internal dynamics of the Parliament and its institutional powers vis-à-vis the Council. Testing these analytical considerations of the formal decision rules against voting data on all Co-decision legislation adopted in the two institutions since 1999, our empirical findings show that: First, coalition formation in the Council predominantly falls along the traditional left – right political dimension. Second, when disagreement over legislation is recorded in the Council, a strong divide can also be found in the Parliament. Third, when the Parliament is divided along party political lines, it is less likely to be able to meet the absolute majority requirement for amending the proposal adopted by the Council. Lastly, Parliament amendments are most likely to be adopted when a decision by voting is requested by a party group associated with the main ideological contingency in the Council.

Høyland, Bjørn and Sircar, Indraneel (2010): "Get the party started: The Development of Political Party Legislative Dynamics in the Irish Free State Seanad (1922 - 1936)." In *Party Politics* 16(1), pages 89 -110.

Abstract: In this article, we investigate the effect of political parties on legislative behaviour. We compile and analyse a unique dataset of all roll-call votes for all the sessions of the Irish Free State Seanad (the Upper Chamber in the legislature, 1922–36). The development of legislative parties inside the Irish Seanad led to the formation of cohesive voting blocs after 1928. This caused dramatic shifts in the rank-ordering of members and changed the coalition pattern. The establishment of disciplined parties also sealed the fate of the legislature when the Fianna Fáil party, hostile to the Free State Seanad, became an organized force inside the institution.

Høyland, Bjørn, Hix, Simon and Vivyan, Nick (2010): "From Doves to Hawks: A Spatial Analysis of Voting in the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England." In *European Journal of Political Research* 49(6), pages 731 – 758.

Abstract: This article examines the making of monetary policy in the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2008 by analysing voting behaviour in the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). It provides a new set of measures for the monetary policy preferences of individual MPC members by estimating a Bayesian item response model. The article demonstrates the usefulness of these measures by comparing the ideal points of outgoing MPC members with their successors and by looking at changes over time in the median ideal point on the MPC. The analysis indicates that the British Government has been able to move the position of the median voter on the MPC through its appointments to the Committee. This highlights the importance of central bank appointments for monetary policy.

Knutsen, Carl Henrik (2010): "Democracy, Dictatorship and Protection of Property Rights". Forthcoming in *Journal of Development Studies.*

Abstract: This article investigates how political regimes influence property rights. The article reviews arguments for and against the hypothesis that democracy enhances property rights protection, and then conducts empirical tests. Democracy is likely endogenous to property rights protection. The analysis takes this into account by utilising an innovative instrument for democracy. The results, based on data from 1984 to 2004 for over 120 countries, show that democracy enhances property rights protection, even when controlling for endogeneity and country-specific characteristics.

Knutsen, Carl Henrik (2010):"Investigating the Lee thesis: How bad is democracy for Asian economies?" *European Political Science Review* 2(3), pages 451-473.

Abstract: This paper discusses the hypothesis that democracy hurts economic growth and development, also known as the Lee thesis, and discusses why one could expect dictatorship to be particularly beneficial for growth in the Asian context. Three general theoretical arguments in support of the Lee thesis are then presented. However, the empirical results, based on panel data analysis on more than 20 Asian countries, do not support the hypothesis that dictatorship increases economic growth in Asia. There is no significant, average effect of democracy on growth. Asian dictatorships do invest a larger fraction of their GDP than democracies, but they are worse at generating high enrollment ratios in education after primary school

Knutsen, Carl Henrik (2010): "Den rasjonelle diktator" [The rational dictator]. *Internasjonal Politikk* 68(3), pages 404-414.

Abstract: Hvorfor styrer Robert Mugabe Zimbabwe mot økonomisk ruin? Hvorfor invaderte Napoleon III Mexico? Hvorfor bytter ikke Kim Jong Il bort sine atomvåpen mot penger fra andre land? Mer generelt, hvorfor fører mange diktaturer en politikk som går på tvers av interessene til brede befolkningslag? Ofte er svaret at diktatorer kalkulert fører en politikk som, til tross for negative virkninger for befolkningen, leder til politiske, økonomiske eller andre typer gevinster for diktatoren selv. Det beste utgangspunktet for å forstå politikk i diktaturer er derfor ikke en redegjørelse for «de nasjonale interesser», hva nå det måtte bety,

eller interessene til brede befolkningslag. For å forstå politikkutforming i diktaturer må vi heller stille, og finne svar på, spørsmål av følgende karakter: Hvor mye makt er samlet i diktatorens hender? Hvilke grupper trenger regimet støtte fra for å overleve? Og ikke minst, hva er de viktigste interessene til diktatoren og regimets støttespillere? Disse spørsmålene leder mot en analyse av politikk i diktaturer der diktatoren og hans støttespillere betraktes som rasjonelle aktører, og der politikk i stor grad utformes på bakgrunn av disse aktørenes egeninteresse

Knutsen, Carl Henrik (2010): "Measuring Effective Democracy". *International Political Science Review* 31(2), pages 109-128.

Abstract: This article discusses methodological problems related to operationalizing substantive definitions of democracy. The article argues that index-constructors need to be particularly conscious of measurement level issues. If not, their indexes may face severe reliability and validity problems, which in turn may bias empirical analyses utilizing the indexes. The article focuses particularly on the "effective democracy" measure developed by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. The measure has been used by Inglehart and Welzel in several studies, particularly for empirically testing hypotheses deduced from their version of modernization theory. These tests have generated very strong results in favor of the theory. The article is sympathetic to Inglehart and Welzel's goal of capturing "substantive" rather than "formal" democracy, but is critical of the specific measure proposed.The measure has several unfortunate theoretical and distributional properties; the empirical scores generated by the measure are often highly misleading. Empirical analysis suggests the index is biased, and that rich, Western countries are particularly favored. Utilization of the measure in statistical analysis may therefore lead to false inferences.

Kravdal, Øystein (2010): "The Importance of Community Education for Individual Mortality: A Fixed-Effects Analysis of Longitudinal Multilevel Data on 1.7 Million Norwegian Women and Men." Journal of *Epidemiology and Community Health, 64:1029-1035.*

Abstract: According to the simplest models, a high average education in the municipality is associated with increased mortality. Control for population size (time-averaged) reversed the effects. Inclusion of municipality dummies instead of population size, to control also for additional unobserved time-invariant municipality characteristics, gave very different results: the effects were even stronger for men, while those for women were no longer significant. The results were quite robust to alternative specifications, including the use of a lagged average-education variable. The study supports the idea that community socio-economic resources may affect mortality and suggests that sex differentials may deserve more attention. It also illustrates the importance of controlling for time-invariant community factors. Unless these can be easily measured, in future investigations one may consider establishing longitudinal data and using a fixed-effects approach such as that used here.

Kravdal, Øystein (2010): "Demographers' interest in fertility trends and determinants in developed countries: Is it warranted?" In *Demographic Research* 22, 2010, pages 663-690.

Abstract: Studies of fertility trends and determinants in developed countries are high on demographers' research agenda. The interest in this subject is probably, to a large extent, motivated by a notion about low fertility being problematic, but demographers have not been much engaged in efforts to find out whether that is actually the case, at least as judged from the contents of the major demography journals. In this paper, the possibility of various individual- and societal-level effects of low fertility is briefly reviewed. Some of the harmful effects may be foreseen and considered an acceptable disadvantage by couples making fertility decisions, while others more rightly can be considered social problems. It is argued that knowledge about fertility trends and determinants may help us learn more about the consequences of low fertility and see clearer whether interventions may be justified and what specific steps one might take. Further efforts to expand this knowledge should therefore be welcome, and it is possible that demographers can make an important contribution by applying this knowledge in studies of consequences of fertility. A higher priority to forecasting might also be worthwhile.

Kravdal, Øystein; with Grundy, E. (2010): "Fertility history and cause-specific mortality: a register-based analysis of complete cohorts of Norwegian women and men." In *Social Science & Medicine* 70, 2010, pages 1847-1857.

Abstract: The relationship between women's reproductive histories and later all-cause mortality has been investigated in several studies, with mixed results. Some studies have also considered cause-specific mortality and some have included men, but none has done both. We analyse associations between parity and age of first birth for women and men across 11 cause-of-death groupings using Norwegian register data for complete cohorts born 1935-1968 whose mortality was observed 1980-2003 (i.e. at ages 45-68). Age, period, educational level, marital status, region of residence and population size of municipality were included as co-variates. In total, there were 63,000 deaths. Results showed that relative to parents of two children, childless men and women and those with one child had higher mortality risks for nearly all cause of death groupings. High parity (4+ children) was associated with raised male mortality from accidents and violence and higher mortality from cancer of the cervix among women. For other cause and gender groupings there was either little difference between those with two children and those of higher parities or an overall negative association between parity and mortality. Among men with the lowest level of education, however, high parity was positively associated with mortality from circulatory diseases. For all causes except female breast cancer, there was an inverse association between age at first birth and mortality risk. Similarities observed across cause groups and for women and men suggest that much of the fertility-mortality relationship is a result of selection or effects of reproductive behaviour on lifestyle. The latter may include both beneficial effects and harmful stress responses. However, physiological mechanisms are most probably important for some causes of death for women. Research on associations between parenting histories, health related behaviours,

social support exchanges and reported or measured stress is needed to clarify mechanisms underlying the associations reported here.

Kravdal, Øystein; with Guilkey, D. Morgan S.P and Rindfuss R., (2010): "Child care availability and fertility: Norway." *Population and Development Review* 36: 725-748.

Abstract: The child-care and fertility hypothesis has been in the literature for a long time and is straightforward: As child care becomes more available, affordable, and acceptable, the antinatalist effects of increased female educational attainment and work opportunities decrease. As an increasing number of countries express concern about low fertility, the child-care and fertility hypothesis takes on increased importance. Yet data and statistical limitations have heretofore limited empirical tests of the hypothesis. Using rich longitudinal data and appropriate statistical methodology, We show that increased availability of child care increases completed fertility. Moreover, this positive effect of child-care availability is found at every parity transition. We discuss the generalizability of these results to other settings and their broader importance for understanding variation and trends in low fertility.

Kundu, Tapas; with Klibanoff, Peter (2010): "Monopoly pricing under a Medicaid-style most favored customer clause and its welfare implication." In *BE journal of Economic Analysis and Policy* 10(1), 2010.

Abstract: To control Medicaid's expenditure on prescription drugs, 1990 legislation established a rebate program guaranteeing Medicaid a rebate on each unit purchased by Medicaid participants. The
rebate is the difference between the minimum price and the average manufacturer price (minimum
price rule) or a proportion of the average manufacturer price (average price rule). We characterize
the optimal pricing strategy of a third-degree price discriminating monopolist under these rules.
Under the minimum price rule, the minimum price gross of rebate always increases whereas prices
gross of rebate in at least some of the markets always decrease. In contrast, under the average price rule, these prices may move in the same direction in all markets, with all increasing in some
circumstances and all decreasing in others. We also examine the effects of such provisions on social welfare. We analyze a modified version of our minimum price rule model suitable for applications beyond Medicaid.

Kundu, Tapas; with Biswas, B., Burt, M., Emanuel, N., Emanuel, L., Khemka, V., Rajagopal, M. Joseph, A., Simon, M. and Sreekumar, N. (2010): "Economic Impact of Terminal Illness and the Willingness to Change It."*Journal of Palliative Medicine* 13(8), 2010, pages 941-944.

Abstract: *Objective:* To gather pilot data on the economic impact of terminal illness on families and on the feasibility of training caregivers as a method of stemming illness-related poverty.
Setting: Pallium India Palliative Care Clinic in Trivandrum, Kerala, India.
Participants: Eleven patient-caregiver dyads (22 individual participants) visiting Pallium India in 2008. *Methods:* Trained interviewers conducted face-to-face interviews consisting of 114 questions with the patient and caregiver separately. Questions covered topics of economic impact of illness on household, family, and individual. Questions included if the illness had so impacted families that they needed to sell assets or significantly reduce work and/or schooling. *Results:* All families reported that patients were obliged to give up work as a result of illness. In seven families, the caregiver also had to change work habits. All respondents stated illness had forced them to sell assets. Ten households reported that their children were obliged to miss school due to the illness. All respondents indicated they would use trained caregivers to help with the care burden if available. Nine respondents thought that use of trained caregivers would have reduced or prevented some of the household's illness-related change. Nine caregivers said they would be interested in becoming a trained caregiver. *Conclusion:* These data indicate that a definitive study would be feasible and would reveal how much assistance caregiver training could lend to household socio-economic resilience.

Lind, Jo Thori (2010): "Do the Rich Vote Conservative Because They Are Rich?" In *Review of*
Economics and Institutions 1(2) 5, 2010.

Abstract: Political economics predicts that the rich oppose redistribution and vote for conservative parties. Although this seemingly fits the data well in most countries, I show that the relationship breaks down when we control for unobservable characteristics. Using Norwegian survey data, I study to what extent voting is caused by income. Although a positive association between income and conservative voting persists when controlling for unobservables, the magnitude of the effect is reduced by a factor of five. To correct for measurement error, I instrument income with average income by profession. The magnitude of the coeffcients becomes higher, but the main conclusion remains.

Lind, Jo Thori and Mehlum, Halvor (2010): "With or Without U? The Appropriate Test for a U-Shaped Relationship." In *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 72(1), 2010, pages 109-18.

Abstract: Nonlinear relationships are common in economic theory, and such relationships are also frequently tested empirically. We argue that the usual test of nonlinear relationships is flawed and derive the appropriate test for a U-shaped relationship. Our test gives the exact necessary and sufficient conditions for the test of a U shape in finite samples in a large class of models.

Moen, Espen and Riis, Christian (2010): "Policy Reversal." In *American Economic Review* 100(3), 2010, pages 1261–68.

Abstract: We analyze the existence of policy reversal, the phenomenon sometimes observed that a certain policy (say extreme left-wing) is implemented by the "unlikely" (right-wing) party. We formulate a Downsian signaling model where the incumbent government, through its choice of policy, reveals information both regarding own preferences and external circumstances that may call for a particular policy. We show that policy reversal may indeed exist as an equilibrium phenomenon. This is partly because the incumbent party has superior opportunities to reveal information, and partly because its reputation protects a left-wing incumbent when advertising a right-wing policy.

Moen, Espen; with Garibaldi, Pietro (2010): "Job-to-Job Movements in a Simple Search Model." In *American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings*, 2010, 100(2), pages 343–347.

Abstract: On the job search is a key feature of real life labor markets. In this paper we present a tractable search model, closely related to the competitive model, in which on-the-job search and wage differentials for identical workers are an optimal response to search frictions and heterogeneous firms. Our model is laid out in detail in ongoing research by Garibaldi and Moen (2009).

Moen, Espen; with Menzio, Guido (2010): "Worker Replacement." *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2010, 57, 623-636 (Lead article).

Abstract: We consider a frictional labor market in which firms want to insure their senior employees against income fluctuations and, at the same time, want to recruit new employees to fill their vacant positions. Firms can commit to a wage schedule, i.e. a schedule that specifies the wage paid by the firm to its employees as function of their tenure and other observables. However, firms cannot commit to the employment relationship with any of their workers, i.e. firms can dismiss workers at will. We find that, because of the firm's limited commitment, the optimal schedule prescribes not only a rigid wage for senior employees, but also a downward rigid wage for new hires. Moreover, we find that, while the rigidity of the wage of senior workers does not affect the allocation of labor, the rigidity of the wage of new hires magnifies the response of unemployment and vacancies to negative shocks to the aggregate productivity of labor.

Moene, Kalle (2010): "The Moral Sentiments of Wealth of Nations." In *Adam Smith Review* 6, 2010.

Abstract: Unequal power, unequal opportunities, and unequal pay are closely related according to Adam Smith. The disparities may lead to a low wage trap. More balanced power in the labor market would induce higher economic growth to the benefit of the majority, resembling the North European growth experience. Smith's commitment to progress through equity is the real moral sentiment of Wealth of Nations.

Mogstad, Magne; with Aaberge R., Bhuller, M. and Langørgen, A. (2010): "The Distributional Impact of Public Services When Needs Differ." In *Journal of Public Economics* 94, 2010, pages 549-562.

Abstract: Despite a broad consensus on the need to take into account the value of public services in distributional analysis, there is little reliable evidence on how inclusion of such non-cash income actually affects poverty and inequality estimates. In particular, the equivalence scales applied to cash income are not necessarily appropriate when including non-cash income, because the receipt of public services is likely to be associated with particular needs. In this paper, we propose a theory-based framework designed to provide a coherent evaluation of the distributional impact of local public services. The valuation of public services, identification of target groups, allocation of expenditures to target groups, and adjustment for differences in needs are derived from a model of local government spending behaviour. Using Norwegian data from municipal accounts and administrative registers we find that the inclusion of non-cash income reduces income inequality by about 15% and poverty rates by almost one-third. However, adjusting for differences in needs for public services across population subgroups offsets about half the inequality reduction and some of the poverty decrease.

Nilssen, Tore (2010): "The Television Industry As a Market of Attention." In *Nordicom Review* 31(1), 2010, pages 115-123.

Abstract: In this article, I present an economist's perspective on the TV industry and view it as a so-called two-sided market, with advertisers on the one side benefiting from the presence of TV viewers and TV viewers on the other side having a dislike for advertising on TV. I use this framework to discuss the likely future development of pay TV, in particular how a future increase in competition in the TV industry will affect the prevalence of pay TV over advertising-financed TV.

Nyborg, Karine (2010): "Will Green Taxes Undermine Moral Motivation?" In *Public Finance and Management* 10(2) (special issue on Public Finance and the Environment), pages 331-351.

Abstract: Both phychologists and economists have shown that under certain circumstances, economic incentives seem to undermine intrinsic or moral motivation. If such crowding-out effects are sufficiently strong, the effect of green taxes might even be counterproductive and increase, rather than decrease, environmental problems. However, moral motivation can also be reinforced by economic incentives, a fact which has received surprisingly little attention in the literature. I argue that in particular, reciprocal preferences and conditional cooperation provide strong reasons to expect green taxes to support, rather than undermine, individuals' moral motivation to contribute to a better environment.

Nyborg, Karine (2010): "Rådgiver – ikke portvakt." In *Samfunnsøkonomen* 3, 2010, pages 35-41.

Abstract: Hvem vokter porten til sykelønnsordningen? Her er et mulig svar: Ingen. Fastlegen kan ikke forventes å være portvakt i tradisjonell forstand – og er det neppe heller. Hovedpoenget i min artikkel har vært at legene ikke kan forventes å fungere som portvakter i klassisk forstand.
Tiltak for å få legene til å "skjerpe seg" overfor skulkere vil dermed neppe ha mye for seg. Dette betyr imidlertid ikke at legene er uten betydning for omfanget av sykefravær, eller at tiltak overfor legene er fånyttes. Selv om legene knapt kan stanse smarte skulkere, er det langt fra opplagt at skulkere utgjør noen stor andel av pasientpopulasjonen. For andre pasienter enn disse er legen primært en medisinfaglig rådgiver. Tiltak som gjør legene til bedre rådgivere vil derfor kunne redusere omfanget av unødige og uheldige sykemeldinger. Dette gjelder selv om det i siste instans skulle være pasienten som tar beslutningen, mens legen først og fremst gir råd – og altså ikke strengt tatt fungerer som portvakt.

Riis, Christian (2010): " Efficient Contests." In *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy* 19(3), 2010, pages 645-665.

Abstact: In their seminal contribution, Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that wages based upon rank induce the same efficient effort as incentive-based reward schemes. They also show that this equivalence result is not robust toward heterogeneity in worker ability, as long as ability is private information because it is not possible to structure contests to simultaneously satisfy self-selection constraints and first-best incentives.This paper demonstrates that efficiency can be achieved by a simple modification of the prize scheme in a mixed (heterogenous) contest where contestants learn their type after entry. If contestants know their type before entering the contest, rent extraction becomes an issue. Implications for optimal contest design are also explored. Finally, the relationship between effort maximizing contests and profit maximizing contests are discussed.

Røed, Knut (2010): "Ja til sykenærvær!" In *Samfunnsøkonomen* 3, 2010, pages 13-17.

Storesletten, Kjetil; with Heathcote, Jonathan and Violante, Giovanni L. (2010): "The Macroeconomic Implication of Rising Wage Inequality in the United States." In *Journal of Political Economy* 118(4), 2010, pages 681-722.

Abstract: In recent decades, the US wage structure has been transformed by a rising college premium, a narrowing gender gap, and increasing persistent and transitory residual wage dispersion. This paper explores the implications of these changes for cross-sectional inequality in hours worked, earnings and consumption, and for welfare. The framework for the analysis is an incomplete-markets overlapping-generations model in which individuals choose education and form households, and households choose consumption and intra-family time allocation. An explicit production technology underlies equilibrium prices for labor inputs differentiated by gender and education. The model is parameterized using micro data

from the PSID, the CPS and the CEX. With the changing wage structure as the only primitive force, the model can account for the key trends in cross-sectional US data. We also assess the role played by education, labor supply, and saving in providing insurance against shocks, and in exploiting opportunities presented by changes in the relative prices of different types of labor.

Storesletten, Kjetil and Zilibotti, Fabrizio; with Song, Zheng (2011): "Growing Like China." *American Economic Review*, 101 (1), 2011, pages 202-242.

Abstract: We construct a growth model consistent with China's economic transition: high output growth, sustained returns on capital, reallocation within the manufacturing sector, and a large trade surplus. Entrepreneurial firms use more productive technologies, but due to financial imperfections they must finance investments through internal savings. State-owned firms have low productivity but survive because of better access to credit markets. High-productivity firms outgrow low-productivity firms if entrepreneurs have sufficiently high savings. The downsizing of financially integrated firms forces domestic savings to be invested abroad, generating a foreign surplus. A calibrated version of the theory accounts quantitatively for China's economic transition.

Torsvik, Gaute; with Ellingsen, Tore, Johannesson, Magnus and Tjøtte, Sigve (2010): "Testing Guilt Aversion." In *Games and Economic Behavior* 68(1), 2010, pages 95-107.

Abstract: Guilt averse individuals experience a utility loss if they believe they let someone down. In particular, generosity depends on what the donor believes that the recipient expects to receive. In experimental work, several authors have identified a positive correlation between such second-order donor beliefs and generous behavior, as predicted by the guilt aversion hypothesis. However, the correlation could alternatively be due to a "false consensus effect," i.e., the tendency of people to believe others to think like themselves. In order to test the guilt aversion hypothesis more rigorously, we conduct three separate experiments: a dictator game experiment, a complete information trust game experiment, and a hidden action trust game experiment. In the experiments we inform donors about the beliefs of their respective recipients, while eliciting these beliefs so as to maximize recipient honesty. The correlation between generous behavior and donors' second-order beliefs is close to zero in all three experiments.

Torsvik, Gaute; with Mæstad, Ottar and Aakvik, Arild (2010): "Overworked? On the Relationship Between Workload and Health Worker Performance". In *Journal of Health Economics* 29, 2010, pages 686-698.

Abstract: The shortage of health workers in many low-income countries poses a threat to the quality of health services. When the number of patients per health worker grows sufficiently high, there will be insufficient time to diagnose and treat all patients adequately. This paper tests the hypothesis that high caseload reduces the level of effort per patient in the diagnostic process. We observed 159 clinicians in 2095 outpatient consultations at 126 health facilities in

rural Tanzania. Surprisingly, we find no association between caseload and the level of effort per patient. Clinicians appear to have ample amounts of idle time. We conclude that health workers are not overworked and that scaling up the number of health workers is unlikely to raise the quality of health services. Training has a positive effect on quality but is not in itself sufficient to raise quality to adequate levels.

Torsvik, Gaute; with Iversen, Vegard (2010): "Networks, Middlemen and Other (Urban) Labor Market Mysteries." In *Indian Growth and Development Review* 3(1), 2010, pages 62-80.

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to explore the roles of social networks and intermediares in recruitment and as instruments to control the workforce in lower end urban labour markets in developing countries. The existing literature favours explanations where networks and middlemen are vehicles to disburse information about vacant jobs or screening mechanisms that improve worker-job matches. Intermediaries may also enable employers to evade labour regulations. This paper highlights instead their roles as incentive providers or mechanisms that alleviate behavioural risks in work relations. A novel aspect of this approach is that behavioural risks on both sides of the work relation are considered. After reviewing the literature, a simple agency model is introduced to suggest new ways to identify whether networks and middlemen alleviate incentive problems in labour relations. Studies of disparities in labour market access and outcomes are usually anchored in ideas of discrimination. A key insight is that the access to and performance of urban labour markets depend critically on the specific "services" networks and intermediaries extend to workers and employers. This adds an important complication to the evaluation of opportunities for income diversification through rural-urban migration. Under some circumstances, both "institutions" may give rise to strong and persistent exclusion that is likely to vary systematically across sectors of the urban economy. In other circumstances, access restrictions can be remedied through simple policy interventions. This paper introduces a new and important dimension to the study of urban labour markets as level playing fields.

Zilibotti, Fabrizio; with Doepke, Matthias (2010): "Do International Labor Standards Contribute to the Persistence of the Child Labor Problem?" In *Journal of Economic Growth* 15(1), 2010, pages 1-37.

Abstract: In recent years, a number of governments and consumer groups in rich countries have tried to discourage the use of child labor in poor countries through measures such as product boycotts and the imposition of international labor standards. The purported objective of such measures is to reduce the incidence of child labor in developing countries and thereby improve children's welfare. In this paper, we examine the effects of such policies from a political-economy perspective. We show that these types of international action on child labor tend to lower domestic political support within developing countries for banning child labor. Hence, international labor standards and product boycotts may delay the ultimate eradication of child labor.

Zilibotti, Fabrizio; with Acemoglu, Daron, Aghion, Philippe and Griffith, Rachel (2010): "Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence." In *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8(5), 2010.

Abstract: This paper investigates the determinants of vertical integration using data from the UK manufacturing sector. We find that the relationship between a downstream (producer) industry and an upstream (supplier) industry is more likely to be vertically integrated when the producing industry is more technology intensive and the supplying industry is less technology intensive. Moreover, both of these effects are stronger when the supplying industry accounts for a large fraction of the producer's costs. These results are generally robust and hold with alternative measures of technology intensity, with alternative estimation strategies, and with or without controlling for a number of firm and industry-level characteristics. They are consistent with the incomplete contract theories of the firm that emphasize both the potential costs and benefits of vertical integration in terms of investment incentives.

Publications 2009

Asheim, Geir B.; with Holtsmark, Bjart (2009): "Pareto-efficient climate agreements can always be renegotiation-proof." In *Environmental and Resource Economics* 43, 2009, vol. 43, pages 519–533.

Abstract: Recent contributions show that climate agreements with broad participation can be implemented as weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria in simple models of greenhouse gas abatement where each country has a binary choice between cooperating (i.e., abate emissions) or defecting (no abatement). Here we show that this result carries over to a model where countries have a continuum of emission choices. Indeed, a Pareto-efficient climate agreement can always be implemented as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, for a sufficiently high discount factor. This means that one need not trade-off a "narrow but deep" treaty with a "broad but shallow" treaty.

Asheim, Geir B. with Wei, Taoyuan (2009): "Sectoral income." In *Environmental and Resource Economics* 42, 2009, pages 65-87.

Abstract: What is the income of each sector of an economy? E.g., in the case of a country endowed with petroleum resources, what is the income of its petroleum sector? Here we present a definition of sectoral income, which is compatible with an important line of theoretical literature on comprehensive national accounting. We do so first by splitting national income into individual income and then defining sectoral income by considering the contributions to individual income that the sectors give rise to.

Barth, Erling, with Dale-Olsen, Harald (2009): "Monopsonistic Discrimination, Worker Turnover and the Gender Wage Gap." In *Labour Economics* 16, 2009, pages 589-597.

Abstract: Motivated by models of worker flows, we argue in this paper that monopsonistic discrimination may be a substantial factor behind the overall gender wage gap. On matched employer-employee data from Norway, we estimate establishment-specific wage premiums separately for men and women, conditioning on fixed individual effects. Regressions of worker turnover on the wage premium identify less wage elastic labour supply facing each establishment of women than that of men. Workforce gender composition is strongly related to employers' wage policies. The results suggest that 70-90 percent of the gender wage gap for low-educated workers may be attributed to differences in labour market frictions between men and women, while the similar figures for high-educated workers ranges from 20 to 70 percent.

Cappelen, Alexander W. and Tungodden, Bertil (2009): "Rewarding Effort." In *Economic Theory* 39(3), 2009, pages 425-441.

Abstract: According to liberal egalitarian ethics, individuals should be rewarded for factors under their control (the principle of responsibility), but not for factors outside their control (the principle of equalization). The paper analyses the effects of two requirements on how to reward effort within a liberal egalitarian framework: the requirement of equal reward and the requirement of solidarity. We show that it is impossible to establish a framework that satisfies the principle of equalization in all respects, and that a generalized version of the egalitarian equivalent mechanism is a very plausible liberal egalitarian approach.

Fernández, Raquel; with Fogli, Alessandra (2009): "Culture: An Empirical Investigation of Beliefs, Work, and Fertility." In *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 1(1), 2009, pages 146-177.

Abstract: We study the effect of culture on important economic outcomes by using the 1970 Census to examine the work and fertility behavior of women 30-40 years old, born in the U.S., but whose parents were born elsewhere. We use past female labor force participation and total fertility rates from the country of ancestry as our cultural proxies. These variables should capture, in addition to past economic and institutional conditions, the beliefs commonly held about the role of women in society, i.e. culture. Given the different time and place, only the beliefs embodied in the cultural proxies should be potentially relevant to women's behavior in the US in 1970. We show that these cultural proxies have positive and significant explanatory power for individual work and fertility outcomes, even after controlling for possible indirect effects of culture (e.g., education and spousal characteristics). We examine alternative hypotheses for these positive correlations and show that neither unobserved human capital nor networks are likely to be responsible. We also show that the effect of these cultural proxies is amplified the greater is the tendency for ethnic groups to cluster in the same neighborhoods.

Fiva, J. H. (2009): "Does welfare policy affect residential choices? An empirical investigation accounting for policy endogeneity." In *Journal of Public Economics* 93(3-4), 2009, pages 529-540.

Abstract: This paper studies how changes in welfare policy affect welfare recipients' residential choices. Although several empirical studies have stressed that welfare policy may affect residential choices of welfare recipients, few studies have simultaneously taken into account that residential choices of welfare recipients are also likely to affect welfare policy. This paper utilizes a policy reform to address this policy endogeneity. The results show that welfare policy exerts a substantial effect on residential choices of welfare recipients.

Hoel, Michael Olaf; with Bye, Torstein (2009): "Grønne sertifikater dyr og formålsløs fornybar moro." I *Samfunnsøkonomen* 63(7), 2009, pages 34-37.

Abstract: Den norske regjeringen har inngått en avtale med den svenske regjeringen om et felles grønt sertifikatmarked for elektrisitet, og de politiske partiene i Norge kappes om å fremheve et
slikt marked som redningen for energi- og klimaproblemene. Det synes som man i iveren har glemt helt banale økonomiske poenger. Ved å studere markedseffektene av slike sertifikater vil man raskt finne at virkningen slett ikke vil være slik man synes å tro, verken for energimarkedet eller klima.

Hoel, Michael Olaf; with Holtsmark, Bjart (2009): "Utviklingslandene bestemmer klimautviklingen." I *Samfunnsøkonomen* 63(7), 2009, pages 38-48.

Abstract: Økonomiske analyser tyder på at betydelige reduksjoner i globale klimagassutslipp er fornuftig. Spørsmålet er likevel om det er mulig å samle verden til å gjennomføre dette. Enkeltlands incentiver til å foreta utslippsreduksjoner er svært små, og gevinstene kommer i hovedsak først i andre halvdel av dette århundret og enda senere. Skal man i vesentlig grad påvirke klimautviklingen, vil det kreve meget omfattende utslippsreduksjoner i hele verden, inkludert alle u-landene.

Hoel, Michael Olaf; with Strøm, Steinar (2009): "Klimapolitikk for en liten, åpen og rik økonomi." I *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift* 03-04, 2009, pages 496-502.

Abstract: Norge er ett av verdens rikeste land og med et ganske høyt utslipp av klimagasser per innbygger. Det ser ut til å være en utbredt oppfatning blant politikere at Norge derfor har en moralsk plikt til å gjøre mer enn hva en internasjonal avtale om klimagassreduksjoner skulle innebære. I norsk klimadebatt ser mange ut til å mene at en ambisiøs norsk klimapolitikk er ensbetydende med strenge mål for norske utslipp samt gjennomføring av en rekke konkrete tiltak i Norge som vil redusere norske utslipp, men som også vil være svært kostbare. Strenge tiltak mot norske utslipp er imidlertid ikke god klimapolitikk dersom en ønsker å bidra til så store globale utslippsreduksjoner som mulig. En ambisiøs norsk klimapolitikk tilsier at det er politisk vilje i Norge til å påta seg betydelige kostnader for å

redusere utslipp av klimagasser i Norge og utlandet. Det virker rimelig at en ønsker å oppnå en maksimal reduksjon i utslipp av klimagasser, gitt den kostnad som Norge er villig til å påta seg for å redusere verdens klimagassutslipages Det beste Norge da kan gjøre er å gjennomføre de utslippsreduserende tiltak i Norge som ikke koster mer enn tiltak for å redusere utslipp i utlandet.

Holden, Steinar with Wulfsberg, Fredrik (2009): "How strong is the macroeconomic case for downward real wage rigidity?" In *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2009, vol. 56(4), pages 605-615.

Abstract: We explore the existence of downward real wage rigidity (DRWR) at the industry level, based on data from 19 OECD countries for the period 1973–1999. The results show that DRWR compresses the distributions of industry wage changes overall, as well as for specific geographical regions and time periods, but there are not many real wage cuts that are prevented. More important, however, DRWR attenuates larger real wage cuts, thus leading to higher real wages. There is stronger evidence for downward nominal wage rigidity than for DRWR. Real wage cuts are less prevalent in countries with strict employment protection legislation and high union density.

Holden, Steinar (2009): "Finanskrisen - årsaker og mekanismer." I *Samfunnsøkonomen* 4, 2009, pages 4-10.

Abstract: Finanskrisen skyldes et samspill av ulike faktorer. Lave renter, høy økonomisk vekst og ubalanser i verdenshandelen har lagt grunnlaget for sterk økning i kredittgivningen og rask vekst i boligprisene. Drevet av innovasjonsaktivitet og sterk profittvilje har finansmarkedene ekspandert kraftig, uten at en har hatt særlig forståelse for, eller tatt tilstrekkelig hensyn til, den risikoen dette har innebåret. Reguleringen av finansmarkedene har vært mangelfull, ved at store deler av finansmarkedene har stått utenfor tilsyn og kapitalkrav.

Holden, Steinar (2009): "Finanskrisen - hvordan kunne det skje?" I *Søkelys på arbeidslivet* 1(26), 2009, pages 125-133.

Abstract: Finanskrisen skyldes et samspill av flere faktorer. Finansmarkedene har vært preget av kraftig vekst, rask innovasjon og et sterkt ønske om profitt. En har tatt betydelig risiko, samtidig som man har undervurdert hvor stor risikoen egentlig var. Den makroøkonomiske utviklingen, med god vekst og lave renter, har også bidratt til kraftig økning i opplåning og boligpriser i mange land. Samtidig har tilsyn og regulering av finansmarkedene vært mangelfulle.

Høyland, Bjørn; with Franchino, Fabio (2009): "Legislative Involvement in Parliamentary Systems." In *American Political Science Review* 103(4), 2009, pages 607-621.

Abstract: In parliamentary systems, the need to preserve the political agreement that sustains the executive often motivates legislative involvement in policymaking. Institutional

arrangements regulating executive–legislative relations and ministerial autonomy also structure parliamentary participation. However, empirical evidence of these effects remains limited to a few policies and countries. European Union legislation provides the opportunity to test expectations about legislative involvement for different types of measure across various institutional arrangements, across multiple policy areas, and across time. In this article, we investigate legislative involvement in the transposition of 724 directives in 15 member states from 1978 to 2004. Our results confirm that involvement increases as conflict between the responsible minister and her coalition partners intensifies. The discretionary scope embedded in the directive further inflates this effect. Additionally, parliamentary involvement decreases as the government's institutional advantage over the legislature increases, especially if intracoalitional conflict deepens.

Høyland, Bjørn with Sircar, Indraneel and Hix, Simon (2009): "An Automated Database of the European Parliament." In *European Union Politics*, 2009, vol. 10(1), pages 143- 153.

Abstract: We present an automatically updatable database of background information about Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from 1979 until the present. Although his information is already directly accessible through the European Parliament's web page, it is presented in a manner that makes it ideal only for those interested in finding information about individual MEPs, but difficult for anyone interested in doing large-N analysis. We provide an online 'live' source of background information about MEPs that is tailored towards the need of the latter group. Our web page allows researchers to specify the time period in which they are interested and to obtain data on committee, party group and delegation membership, as well as leadership positions within seconds. As the collection of the data is fully automated, we are able to keep the data updated as long as the European Parliament (EP) continues its current practice of making background information about members available online. Researchers will be able to combine this information with other data sources at a substantively lower cost than is currently the case. As such, we hope to encourage a new generation of research into the EP.

Kravdal, Øystein (2009): "Mortality effects of average education: a multilevel study of small neighbourhoods in rural and urban areas in Norway". In *International Journal for Equity in Health* 8 2009.

Abstract: The intention was to find out whether there was an association between the socio-economic resources in a small neighbourhood ("basic statistical unit"; BSU) and individual mortality, net of individual resources, and whether this association differed between municipalities including a quite large city and others. The possibility of a rural-urban difference in the health effect of community resources has not been checked earlier. Discrete-time hazard models for mortality at age 60-89 were estimated for 1990-1992 and 2000-2002, using register data that cover the entire Norwegian population. For each person, the educational level and the municipality and BSU of residence in 1990 and 2000 were known. Average education was computed by aggregating over the individual data. In total, there were about 200000 deaths in more than 13000 BSUs during 5 million person-years of observation.

There was a significant relationship between average education in the BSU and individual mortality, but only in the medium-sized and largest municipalities. The sharpest relationship was seen in the latter, where for example OR per year of education was 0.908 (95% CI 0.887-0.929) in the 1990-92 period. The findings were robust to various alternative specifications. These results from a large data set are consistent with the idea that neighbourhood socio-economic resources may affect individual mortality, but suggest that distinctions according to population size or density be made in future research and that one should be careful, if focusing on cities, to generalize beyond that setting. With these data, one can only speculate about the reasons for the rural-urban difference. A stronger higher-level spatial segregation in urban areas may be one explanation.

Kravdal, Øystein (2009): "Mortality effects of average education in current and earlier municipality of residence among internal migrants, net of their own education." In *Social Science and Medicine* 69(10), 2009, pages 1484-1492.

Abstract: Many researchers have shown an association between a person's health or mortality and the socio-economic resources in the community, net of the person's own resources. The focus has typically been on the current community of residence or one where the person lived a few years earlier. Only a few authors have tried to establish whether there is an additional effect of earlier community exposures, and they have not made a distinction between migrants and non-migrants, which there are good reasons to do. The results from these earlier investigations have been rather mixed. In the present study, a discrete-time hazard model for mortality between ages of 60–89 over the period 1991–2002 was estimated from register data that included the entire Norwegian population. For each person, and for each of these years, municipalities of residence during the previous 20 years were known. There was also information on each person's educational level. For the relevant years and each of the 433 municipalities, measures of average education in the population were constructed by aggregating over the individual data. The analysis was focused on the subgroup who had moved across a municipality border only once during the previous 20 years, among whom there were 29,843 deaths during 839,113 person-years of follow-up. The population sizes of the municipalities were included as control variables. Among those who had moved within the last 10 years, the current socio-economic context was not important for mortality. The earlier context had an effect, but this was restricted to men. Those who had lived longer in the current municipality of residence were influenced only by the average education in that municipality. The findings support the idea that neighbourhood socio-economic effects need some time to build up, and that they do not dissipate soon after the person has moved to a new environment.

Kravdal, Øystein; with Steele, Fiona and Sigle-Rushton, Wendy (2009): "Consequences of Family Disruption on children's educational outcomes in Norway". In *Demography* 46(3), 2009, pages 553-574.

Abstract: Using high-quality data from Norwegian population registers, we examine the relationship between family disruption and children's educational outcomes. We distinguish

between disruptions caused by parental divorce and paternal death and, using a simultaneous equation model, pay particular attention to selection bias in the effect of divorce. We also allow for the possibility that disruption may have different effects at different stages of a child's educational career. Our results suggest that selection on time-invariant maternal characteristics is important and works to overstate the effects of divorce on a child's chances of continuing in education. Nevertheless, the experience of marital breakdown during childhood is associated with lower levels of education, and the effect weakens with the child's age at disruption. The effects of divorce are most pronounced for the transitions during or just beyond the high school level. In models that do not allow for selection, children who experienced a father's death appear less disadvantaged than children whose parents divorced. After we control for selection, however, differences in the educational qualifications of children from divorced and bereaved families narrow substantially and, at mean ages of divorce, are almost non-existent.

Kravdal, Øystein; with Syse, Astri and Tretli, Steinar; (2009): "The Impact of Cancer on Spouses' Labor Earnings A Population-Based Study". *Cancer* 115(S18), 2009, pages 4350-4361.

Abstract: Cancer affects patients' incomes, but to the authors' knowledge few studies to date have examined how the income of the patients' spouses may be influenced. In this population-based study from Norway, the effects of cancer on both partners' earnings are analyzed. The difference between labor earnings the year before the cancer diagnosis and that 2, 5, or 8 years later was compared with the difference in earnings over a corresponding period for similar persons without cancer, applying linear regression models to national registry data. Approximately 1.1 million married persons ages 35 to 59 years were included, among them 17,250 persons diagnosed with cancer during 1991 through 1999. Two and 5 years after a cancer diagnosis, married men experienced lower earnings than they would have absent the illness. Cancer in wives, however, did not affect men's earnings. Women's earnings were adversely influenced to the same extent by their own as by their spouses' cancer. Brain, lung, and colorectal cancer in male spouses produced the most adverse effects on women's earnings. All effects were most pronounced for women no longer married. Women's earnings are lower after both their own and their spouses' cancer illness, and divorced and widowed women experience the most pronounced reduction after spousal cancer. Men's earnings are lower only if they are diagnosed themselves. This may reflect traditional sex roles, with men as main breadwinners and women as caregivers. For family households, cancer in men may result in greater financial difficulties than cancer among women, although the effect will depend on breadwinner roles before diagnosis.

Lind, Jo Thori and Mehlum, Halvor (2009): "UTEST: Stata module to test for a U-shaped relationship." Programme expansion for Stata, available at http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456874.html

Mehlum, Halvor (2009): ”The Island Problem Revisited.” In *American Statistician* 63(3), 2009, pages 269-273.

Abstract: Here I revisit the so-called “island problem” in forensic statistics. The problem is how to properly update the probability of guilt when a suspect is found that has the same characteristics as a culprit. In particular, how should the search protocol be accounted for? I present the established results of the literature and extend them by considering the selection effect resulting from a protocol in which only cases with a suspect reach the court. I find that the updated probability of guilt is shifted when properly accounting for the selection effect. Which way this shift goes depends on the exact distribution of all potential characteristics in the population. The shift is only marginal in numerical examples that have any resemblance to real-world forensic cases. The island problem illustrates the general point that the exact protocol through which data are generated is an essential part of the information set that should be used when analyzing nonexperimental data.

Mehlum, Halvor (2009): “On the Geometry of the Instrumental Variable Estimator.” In *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 71(3), 2009, pages 427-435.

Abstract: I derive the exact distribution of the exact determined instrumental variable estimator using a geometric approach. The approach provides a decomposition of the exact estimator. The results show that by geometric reasoning one may efficiently derive the distribution of the estimation error. The often striking non-normal shape of the instrumental variable estimator, in the case of weak instruments and small samples, follows intuitively by the geometry of the problem. The method allows for intuitive interpretations of how the shape of the distribution is determined by instrument quality and endogeneity. The approach can also be used when deriving the exact distribution of any ratio of stochastic variables.

Moene, Karl Ove; with Baland, Jean Marie and Andersson, Siwan (2009): ”Enforcement in Informal Saving Groups.” In *Journal of Development Economics* 90(1), 2009, pages 14-23.

Abstract: Informal groups cannot rely on external enforcement to insure that members abide by their obligations. It is generally assumed that these problems are solved by [`]social sanctions' and reputational effects. The present paper focuses on roscas, one of the most commonly found informal financial institutions in the developing world. We first show that, in the absence of an external (social) sanctioning mechanism, roscas are never sustainable, even if the defecting member is excluded from all future roscas. We then argue that the organizational structure of the rosca itself can be designed so as to address enforcement issues. The implications of our analysis are consistent with first-hand evidence from rosca groups in a Kenyan slum.

Mogstad, Magne and Rege, Mari (2009): ”Tidlig læring og sosial mobilitet: Norske barns muligheter til å lykkes i utdanningsløpet og arbeidslivet.” In *Samfunnsøkonomen* 5, 2009.

Mogstad, Magne and Rege, Mari (2009): ”Jo rikere jo bedre? Betydningen av familieinntekt for barns utvikling.” In *Søkelys på arbeidslivet* 3, 2009.

Abstract: Familiebakgrunn har stor betydning for barns utvikling. Flere studier fra USA og Europa demonstrerer at skoleprestasjoner, utdanningsnivå, arbeidsmarkedstilknytning og inntekt er avhengig av familiebakgrunn. Spesielt viser studiene at barn av foreldre med lav utdanning eller lav inntekt har dårligere muligheter til å lykkes som voksne.

Nilssen, Tore; with Kind, Hans Jarle and Sørgard, Lars (2009): “Business Models for Media Firms: Does Competition Matter for How They Raise Revenue?” In *Marketing Science* 28(6), pages 1112-1128.

Abstract: The purpose of this article is to analyze how competitive forces may influence the way media firms like TV channels raise revenue. A media firm can either be financed by advertising revenue, by direct payment from the viewers (or the readers, if we consider newspapers), or by both. We show that the scope for raising revenues from consumer payment is constrained by other media firms offering close substitutes. This implies that the less differentiated the media firms' content, the larger is the fraction of their revenue coming from advertising. A media firm's scope for raising revenues from ads, on the other hand, is constrained by how many competitors it faces. We should thus expect that direct payment from the media consumers becomes more important the larger the number of competing media products.

Raaum, Oddbjørn and Røed, Knut; with Nordberg, Morten, Rogstad, Jon and Westlie, Lars (2009): “Young and Out: An Application of a Prospects-Based Concept of Social Exclusion.” *Journal of Socio-Economics* 38, 2009, pages 173–187.

Abstract: We develop a forward-looking empirical concept of social exclusion based on the estimated transition probabilities from a random effects multinominal Logit-model. Youths are considered socially excluded if they are currently outside school/work and have a low predicted probability of re-entering in the near future. Implemented on extraordinary rich event-history data of compulsory school graduates, we estimate social exclusion among Norwegian youths and find that social exclusion propensity is (i) non-cyclical; (ii) much more prevalent among young adults in their early twenties than among teenagers; (iii) strongly dependent on family background; and (iv) independent of gender.

Rege, Mari; with Telle, Kjetil and Votruba, Mark (2009): “The Effect of Plant Downsizing on Disability Pension Utilization.” In *Journal of the European Economic Association* 7(4), 2009, pages 754-785.

Abstract: We investigate the impact of plant downsizing on disability pension utilization in Norway. Plant downsizing substantially increases the disability entry rate of workers in affected plants. Workers originally employed in plants that closed between 1993 and 1998 were 27.9 percent more likely to utilize disability pensions in 1999 than comparable workers

in non-downsizing plants. The effect of downsizing is non-linear, with workers originally employed in plants downsizing 65-95 percent of their workforce more likely to enter disability than workers in fully closing plants. This is consistent with the signaling story of Gibbons and Katz (1991). We also estimate significant effects of downsizing on future earnings and mortality, suggesting the increase in disability participation could be driven by an adverse effect of downsizing on the economic opportunities or health of affected workers.

Røed, Knut; with Nordberg, Morten (2009): "Economic Incentives, Business Cycles, and Long-Term Sickness Absence." *Industrial Relations* 48(2), 2009, pages 203-230.

Abstract: We investigate long-term absenteeism in Norway, on the basis of register data covering 8 years and more than 2 million absence spells. Key findings are that: i) a tighter labor market yields lower work resumption rates for persons who are absent, and higher relapse rates for persons who have already resumed work; and ii) the work resumption rates increase when sickness benefits are exhausted, but work resumptions at this stage tend to be short-lived.

Røed, Knut; with Fevang, Elisabeth and Kverndokk, Snorre (2009): "Omsorg for foreldre – hvordan påvirkes yrkesaktiviteten?" In *Søkelys på Arbeidslivet* 26(1), 2009, pages 113-123.

Abstract: I denne artikkelen ser vi på hva som skjer med yrkesaktiviteten til personer som har enslige foreldre i livets sluttfase. Analysene viser at dette påvirker barnas arbeidsmarkedsaktivitet og deres bruk av trygdeytelser. Alt annet likt vil det å ha en enslig mor eller far i sluttfasen av livet forårsake et fall i barnas sysselsettingsrater på henholdsvis 1 prosentpoeng for sønnene og 2 prosentpoeng for døtrene. I tillegg øker avhengigheten av trygdeytelser betraktelig. Sannsynligheten for å være langtids trygdemottaker øker med så mye som fire prosentpoeng for sønnene og to prosentpoeng for døtrene. Analysene indikerer også en viss forskjell mellom kommuner som har satset sterkt på hjemmetjenester, sammenliknet med kommuner som satser mer på institusjonsbasert omsorg: Barn av foreldre som bor i hjemmetjenesteorienterte kommuner, ser ut til å ha større problemer med å kombinere jobb og omsorg.

Storesletten, Kjetil; with Heathcote, Jonathan and Violante, Giovanni (2009): "Quantitative Macroeconomics with Heterogeneous Households." In *Annual Review of Economics* 1, 2009, pages 319-354.

Abstract: Macroeconomics is evolving from the study of aggregate dynamics to the study of the dynamics of the entire equilibrium distribution of allocations across individual economic actors. This article reviews the quantitative macroeconomic literature that focuses on household heterogeneity, with a special emphasis on the "standard" incomplete markets model. We organize the vast literature according to three themes that are central to understanding how inequality matters for macroeconomics. First, what are the most important sources of individual risk and cross-sectional heterogeneity? Second, what are individuals' key channels of insurance? Third, how does idiosyncratic risk interact with aggregate risk?

Torvik, Ragnar (2009): ”Why do some resource-abundant countries succeed while others do not?” In *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 25, 2009, pages 241-256.

Abstract: On average, resource-abundant countries have experienced lower growth over the last four decades than their resource-poor counterparts. But the most interesting aspect of the paradox of plenty is not the average effect of natural resources, but its variation. For every Nigeria or Venezuela there is a Norway or a Botswana. Why do natural resources induce prosperity in some countries but stagnation in others? This paper gives an overview of the dimensions along which resource-abundant winners and losers differ. In light of this, it then discusses different theory models of the resource curse, with a particular emphasis on recent developments in political economy.

Torvik, Ragnar; with Robinson, James A. (2009): “A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint.” In *European Economic Review* 53(7), 2009, pages 786-798.

Abstract: Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop a political economy model where politicians cannot commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to vote for them. Though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency, it may be politically rational because it influences the outcomes of elections. In consequence, even when information is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future.

Torvik, Ragnar; with Robinson, James A. (2009): “The real swing voter's curse.” In *American Economic Review P&P* 99(2), 2009, pages 310-315.

Abstract: A central idea in political economy is that voters who are not ideologically attached to a political party, so-called ‘swing voters,’ attract policy favors and redistribution because they become the focus of electoral competition. In many parts of the world, however, politicians do not just use carrots to win elections, they also use sticks - coercion and violence. In this paper we show that expanding the ‘policy space’ to incorporate this can completely overturn the predictions of the standard model. The reason for this is simple. With all groups of voters at play, political competition does indeed lead to a chase for the support of swing voters. In equilibrium this enables such voters to extract a large amount of rent from politicians. Anticipating this, politicians have an incentive to use violence to effectively disenfranchise swing voters. Indeed, and surprisingly, we show that it can be more attractive for an incumbent to disenfranchise the swing voters than the core supporters of the opposition. Swing voters are not blessed but cursed.

Ulltveit-Moe, Karen Helene (2009): ”Statsbudsjettet 2010.” In *Samfunnsøkonomen* 63(8), 2009, pages 26-30.

Zilibotti, Fabrizio; with Gancia, Gino (2009): “Technological Change and the Wealth of Nations.*”* In *Annual Review of Economics* 1, 2009, pages 93-120.

Abstract: We discuss a unified theory of directed technological change and technology adoption that can shed light on the causes of persistent productivity differences across countries. In our model, new technologies are designed in advanced countries and diffuse endogenously to less developed countries. Our framework is rich enough to highlight three broad reasons for productivity differences: inappropriate technologies, policy-induced barriers to technology adoption, and within-country misallocations across sectors due to policy distortions. We also discuss the effects of two aspects of globalization, trade in goods and migration, on the wealth of nations through their impact on the direction of technical progress. By doing so, we illustrate some of the equalizing and unequalizing forces of globalization.

Zilibotti, Fabrizio; with Doepke, Matthias (2009): “International Labor Standards and the Political Economy of Child Labor Regulation.” In *Journal of the European Economic Association* 7(2-3), pages 508-518.

Abstract: The paper uses an overlapping generations model to examine the effects of an increase in a household's land ownership on child labor. Consistent with previous studies, it found that small increases in land lead to increased child labor. However, as land continues to increase child labor declines. Further, even when an increase in land ownership causes an immediate rise in child labor, there are contexts where long-run child labor (that is aggregated over progenies) declines.

Publications 2008

Asheim, Geir B.; with Han Yoo, Seung (2008): “Coordinating under incomplete information.” *Review of Economic Design* 12, 2008, pages 293-313.

Abstract: We show that, in a minimum effort game with incomplete information where player types are independently drawn, there is a largest and smallest Bayesian equilibrium, leading to the set of equilibrium payoffs (as evaluated at the interim stage) having a lattice structure. Furthermore, the range of equilibrium payoffs converges to those of the deterministic complete information version of the game, in the limit as the incomplete information vanishes. This entails that such incomplete information alone cannot explain the equilibrium selection suggested by experimental evidence.

Asheim, Geir B. (2008): "Paradoxical Consumption Behavior When Economic Activity Has Environmental Effects." *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 65, 2008, pages 529-546.

Abstract: In a model where enhanced economic activity (accumulation of produced capital) leads to environmental effects (depletion of natural capital), competitive steady states corresponding to different discount rates are compared. For positive discount rates, the steady state stock of produced capital may exceed the size maximizing sustainable consumption. This implies *paradoxical consumption behavior*; that is, a lower discount rate may be associated with lower steady state consumption. The theoretical significance of this phenomenon for intergenerational equity is discussed, and examples indicating the empirical relevance of the underlying assumptions are presented.

Aslaksen, Silje; with Andersen, J.J. (2008): "Constitutions and the Resource Curse." In *Journal of Development Economics* 87(2), 2008, pages 227-246.

Abstract: Utilizing the fact that natural resources are randomly distributed among countries, we investigate how public income shocks have different long run economic effects dependent on constitutional arrangements. We find that (i) the so-called 'resource curse' is present in democratic presidential countries—but not in democratic parliamentary countries, (ii) being parliamentary or presidential matters more for the growth effects of natural resources than being democratic or autocratic, and (iii) natural resources are more likely to reduce growth when proportional electoral systems are in place than when the electoral systems are majoritarian. The two first effects appear very robust, the last effect less so.

Barth, Erling and Moene, Kalle (2008): "Likhet og åpenhet." I *Tidsskrift for Velferdsforskning* 11(1), 2008, pages 5-16.

Abstract: Kan vi opprettholde en stor grad av likhet, en sjenerøs velferdsstat og et inkluderende arbeidsliv i ett land i en globalisert verden? Både globaliseringspessimister og velferdspessimister svarer nei. Denne artikkelen viser at det er nettopp de åpne økonomiene som har en høy grad av lønnslikhet før skatt og en sjenerøs sosialforsikring. Den argumenterer for at koordinering i lønnsdannelsen og sterke velferdsstater kan ses på som komplementære frihandelsinstitusjoner. Disse institusjonene generer en kombinasjon av lønnslikhet og høy sysselsetting også blant de som har lavere kvalifikasjoner.

Barth, Erling, Bratsberg, Bernt; and Raaum, Oddbjørn with Hægeland, Torbjørn (2008): "Who Pays for Performance?" In *International Journal of Manpower* 29(1), 2008, pages 8-29.

Abstract: Using Norwegian establishment surveys from 1997 and 2003, we show that performance-related pay is more prevalent in firms where workers of the main occupation have a high degree of autonomy in how to organize their work. This observation supports an interpretation of incentive pay as motivated by agency problems. Performance-related pay is also more widespread in large firms. Traditionally, wage setting in the Norwegian labor

market has been dominated by negotiations between trade unions and employer associations at the central and local levels, with a fixed hourly wage as a predominant element of the wage scheme. Our results show that performance-related pay is less common in highly unionized firms and in firms where wages are determined through centralized bargaining. Nevertheless, the evidence presented in this paper reveals that performance pay is on the rise in Norway, even after accounting for changes in industry structure, bargaining regime, and union density. Finally, we find that the incidence of performance-related pay relates positively to product-market competition and foreign ownership.

Bratsberg, Bernt, Raaum, Oddbjørn and Røed, Knut (2008): "Må arbeid lønne seg i et inkluderende arbeidsliv?" *Tidsskrift for velferdsforskning* 11(1), 2008, pages 49-61.

Abstract: Et inkluderende arbeidsliv fordrer ikke bare at alle har mulighet til å delta, men også at arbeid premieres. Fravær av merkbar økonomisk gevinst ved overgang fra trygd til arbeid kan virke demotiverende og utstøtende for personer som må streve seg tilbake til arbeidslivet. I noen grad er det en uunngåelig målkonflikt mellom hensynet til trygghet og likhet på den ene siden, og hensynet til at arbeid skal lønne seg på den andre. Men vi tror målkonflikten kan reduseres ved en sterkere aktivitetsorientering av våre sosiale forsikringsordninger.

Brekke, Kjell Arne (2008): "En adferdsøkonoms hyllest til Homo oeconomicus." I *Samfunnsøkonomen* 5, 2008, pages 36-42.

Abstract: Jeg har flere ganger opplevd at noen synes å tro at adferdsøkonomer har et like lite hjertelig forhold til Homo Oeconomicus som ekstreme muslimer har til Muhammed-tegnere. Da er det på tide å skrive en hyllest til Homo Oeconomicus.

Brekke, Kjell A. and Nyborg, Karine (2008): "Attracting responsible employees: Green production as labor market screening." *Resource and Energy Economics* 30, pages 509-526.

Abstract: Corporate social responsibility can improve firms' ability to recruit highly motivated employees. This can secure socially responsible firms' survival even in a highly competitive environment. We show that if both socially responsible (green) and non-responsible (brown) firms exist in equilibrium, workers with high moral motivation, who shirk less than others, will self-select into the green firms. If unobservable effort is sufficiently important for firm productivity, this can drive every brown firm out of business—even in the case where many workers have no moral motivation whatsoever.

Brekke, Kjell A.; with Johansson-Stenman, O. (2008): "The Behavioral Economics of Climate Change." In *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 24(2), 2008, pages 280-297.

Abstract: This paper attempts to bring some central insights from behavioural economics into the economics of climate change. In particular, it discusses (i) implications of prospect theory, the equity premium puzzle, and time-inconsistent preferences in the choice of discount rate

used in climate-change cost assessments, and (ii) the implications of various kinds of social preferences for the outcome of climate negotiations. Several reasons are presented for why it appears advisable to choose a substantially lower social discount rate than the average return on investments. It also seems likely that taking social preferences into account increases the possibilities of obtaining international agreements, compared to the standard model. However, there are also effects going in the opposite direction, and the importance of sanctions is emphasized.

Cappelen, Alexander and Tungodden, Bertil; with Norheim, Ole F. (2008): "Genomics and Equal Opportunity Ethics." In *Journal of Medical Ethics* 34, 2008, pages 361-364.

Abstract: Genomics provides information on genetic susceptibility to diseases and new possibilities for interventions which can fundamentally alter the design of fair health policies. The aim
of this paper is to explore implications of genomics from the perspective of equal opportunity ethics. The ideal of equal opportunity requires that individuals are held responsible for some, but not all, factors that affect their health. Informational problems, however, often make it difficult to
implement the ideal of equal opportunity in the context of healthcare. In this paper, examples are considered of how new genetic information may affect the way individual responsibility for choice is assigned. It is also argued that genomics may result in relocation of the responsibility cut by
providing both new information and new technology. Finally, how genomics may affect healthcare policies and the market for health insurance is discussed.

Christiansen, Vidar with Sandmo, Agnar (2008): "Skatter og skattepolitikk gjennom 100 år." I *Samfunnsøkonomen* 6-7, 2008.

Abstract: I løpet av 100 år har Norge gått fra et skattesystem der toll var hovedfinansieringskilden for et relativt beskjedent offentlig utgiftsnivå, til et høyt sakttenivå som er basert på en rekke direkte og indirekte skatter. I løpet av hundreårsperioden har det også vært en kraftig vekst i overføringene, noe som stiller skjerpende krav til skattesystemet. Målet for skattepolitikken har forskjøvet seg fra en rekke spesifikke hensyn til mer allmenne effektivitets- og fordelingsmål – parallelt med og trolig påvirket av utviklingen i skatteteori og empirisk skatteforskning.

Christiansen, Vidar with Smith, Stephen (2008): "Optimal Commodity Taxation with Duty-Free Shopping." In *International Tax and Public Finance* 15(3), 2008, pages 274-296.

Abstract: International travellers are frequently offered the opportunity to purchase a certain quantity of goods duty-free. Individuals differ in their opportunities to benefit from duty-free shopping, and we focus on the implications of these differences for optimal commodity taxation within a version of the optimal tax model of Mirrlees (Review of Economic Studies,

38, 175–208, 1971). We show how duty-free alters the constraints on the use of commodity taxes to reduce the distortionary costs of income taxation or to reflect externalities. Beyond characterising optimal taxes in the duty-free regime, we discuss conditions under which allowing duty-free would increase or reduce social welfare.

Christiansen, Vidar with Tuomala, Matti (2008): "On taxing capital income with income shifting." In *International Tax and Public Finance* 15(4), 2008, pages 527-545.

Abstract: We examine a linear capital income tax and a nonlinear labor income tax in a two-type model where individuals live for two periods. We assume that taxes are paid only in the second period in which the agents receive both labor and capital income and may shift income from labor to capital. The two types of individuals may differ with respect to wage rate and initial resource endowments. In the absence of income shifting, endowment variation motivates a capital income tax which would not exist where there is pure wage rate variation. In the latter circumstance, income shifting would indeed establish a case for a capital income tax while adding variation in resource endowments would ambiguously affect the case. The asymmetric information case for a capital income tax must be traded off against distortionary effects not only on savings, but also on labor as an agent may earn labor income which is reported and taxed as capital income.

Christiansen, Vidar; with Blomquist, Sören (2008): "Taxation and Heterogeneous Preferences." In *FinanzArchiv* 64(2), 2008.

Abstract: Nonlinear income taxes and linear commodity taxes are analyzed when people differ with respect to ability, high-skill agents have heterogeneous preferences, and neither individual abilities nor preferences are observable. We characterize pure income tax optima, which may be bunching or separating optima. In particular, the income tax may not be able to distinguish between those low-income people who are low-skill and those who have a strong preference for leisure. As is shown, there may still be an effect on the optimum income tax schedule, as it will depend on the composition of the population with respect to types of individuals. Finally, the paper addresses what can be achieved by commodity taxes when preferences are heterogeneous - in particular, with respect to targeting groups that the income tax is incapable of discriminating between.

Christiansen, Vidar (2008): "Comments on Sijbren Cnossen: Do Drinkers Pay Their Way in the European Union?" In *FinanzArchiv* 64(4), 2008.

Fernández, Raquel; with Levy, Gilat (2008): "Diversity and Redistribution." In *Journal of Public Economics* 92, 2008, pages 925-943.

Abstract: This paper examines how preference heterogeneity affects the ability of the poor to extract resources from the rich. We study the equilibrium of a game in which coalitions of individuals form parties, parties propose platforms, and all individuals vote, with the winning policy chosen by plurality. Political parties are restricted to offering platforms that are

credible (in that they belong to the Pareto set of their members). The platforms specify the values of two policy tools: a general redistributive tax which is lumpsum rebated and a series of taxes whose revenue is used to fund specific (targeted) goods. We show that taste conflict first dilutes but later reinforces class interests. When the degree of taste diversity is low, the equilibrium policy is characterized by some amount of general income redistribution and some targeted transfers. As taste diversity increases in society, the set of equilibrium policies becomes more and more tilted towards special interest groups and against general redistribution. As diversity increases further, however, only general redistribution survives.

Fiva, Jon H.; with Rønning, Marte (2008): "The Incentive Effects of Property Taxation: Evidence from Norwegian School Districts." In *Regional Science and Urban Economics* 38(1), 2008, pages 49-62.

Abstract: Recent theoretical contributions indicate favorable incentive effects of property taxation on public service providers. The object of this paper is to confront these theories with data from Norwegian school districts. The institutional setting in Norway is well suited for analyzing the effects of property taxation because one can compare school districts with and without property taxation. To take into account potential endogeneity of the choice of implementing property taxation, we rely on instrumental variable techniques. The empirical results indicate that, conditional on resource use, property taxation improves school quality measured as students' result on the national examination.

Hoel, Michael O.; with Dalen, Dag M. and Strøm, Steinar (2008): "Kalkulasjonsrenten på lang sikt i en usikker verden." In *Samfunnsøkonomen* 62(8), 2008, pages 52-60.

Hoel, Michael O.; with Golombek, Rolf (2008): "Endogenous technology and tradable emission quotas." In *Resources and Energy Economics* 30, 2008, pages 197-208.

Abstract: We study an international climate agreement that assigns emission quotas to each participating country. Unlike the simplest models in the literature, we assume that abatement costs are affected by R&D activities undertaken in all firms in all countries, i.e. abatement technologies are endogenous. In line with the Kyoto agreement we assume that the international climate agreement does not include R&D policies. We show that for a second-best agreement with heterogeneous countries, marginal costs of abatement differ across countries. In other words, the second-best outcome cannot be achieved if emission quotas are tradable.

Hoel, Michael O. (2008): "Økonomiske analyser av klimaproblemet." In *Samfunnsøkonomen* 62(6-7) 2008, pages 50-61.

Holden, Steinar with Wulfsberg, Fredrik (2008): "Downward nominal wage rigidity in the OECD." In *The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics* 8(1) (Advances), Article 15.

Abstract: Recent microeconomic studies have documented extensive downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) for job stayers in many OECD countries, but critics argue that the effect might be undone by compositional changes and flexibility in wages of new entrants. Using data for hourly nominal wages at industry level, we explore the existence of DNWR on industry wages in 19 OECD countries, over the period 1973-1999. We propose a novel method to detect DNWR. We reject the hypothesis of no DNWR in the overall sample. The fraction of wage cuts prevented due to DNWR has fallen over time, from 61 percent in the 1970s to 16 percent in the late 1990s, but the number of industries affected by DNWR has increased. DNWR is more prevalent when unemployment is low and union density is high. Strict employment protection legislation also leads to fewer wage cuts.

Kravdal, Øystein (2008): "Does income inequality really influence individual mortality? Results from a 'fixed effects analysis' where constant unobserved municipality characteristics are controlled." In *Demographic Research* 18, 2008.

Abstract: There is still much uncertainty about the impact of income inequality on health and mortality. Some studies have supported the original hypothesis about adverse effects, while others have shown no effects. One problem in these investigations is that there are many factors that may affect both income inequality and individual mortality but that cannot be adequately controlled for. The longitudinal Norwegian register data available for this study allowed municipality dummies to be included in the models to pick up timeinvariant unobserved factors at that level. The results were compared with those from similar models without such dummies. The focus was on mortality in men and women aged 30-79 in the years 1980-2002, and the data included about 500000 deaths within 50 million person-years of exposure. While the models without municipality dummies
suggested that income inequality in the municipality of residence, as measured by the Gini coefficient, had an adverse effect on mortality net of individual income, the results from the models that included such dummies were more mixed. Adverse effects appeared among the youngest, while among older men, there even seemed to be beneficial effects. In addition to illustrating the potential importance of controlling for unobserved factors by adding community dummies (doing a 'fixed-effects analysis' according to common terminology in econometrics), the findings should add to the scepticism about the existence of harmful health effects of income inequality, at least in the Nordic context.

Kravdal, Øystein; with Rindfuss, Ron (2008): "Changing Relationships between Education and Fertility: A Study of Women and Men Born 1940 to 1964." In *American Sociological Review* 73(5), 2008, pages 854-873.

Abstract: Education and fertility (including childrearing) are foundational processes in societal metabolism, and the relationship between them can have profound, long-term effects on a variety of institutions, including the labor market, the family (especially care for the elderly), and educational institutions themselves. In postindustrial countries, conventional wisdom holds that there is a strong inverse relationship between education and completed fertility, but this has not been carefully examined in recent decades, and the topic has been

almost completely neglected for men. In this article, we address these core questions and relations, drawing on the Norwegian population registers for cohorts born 1940 to 1964. Among women, the relationship between completed fertility and educational level attained at age 39 has become substantially less negative. In all cohorts, better-educated women have later first births and remain childless more often than do the less educated. The negative effect of education on higher-order birth rates net of the impact of later motherhood has, however, disappeared. Family-friendly ideologies and policies, including better access to high-quality daycare, are likely the engine behind this shift. Among men, a positive relationship has emerged: the better educated become fathers later than others, but fewer remain childless, and there has been an increasingly stimulating effect of education on second- and third-birth rates. We discuss these sex differences in light of the persistent differences between mothers' and fathers' roles.

Kravdal, Øystein, and Grundy, E (2008): "Reproductive history and mortality in late middle age among Norwegian men and women". *American Journal of Epidemiology* 2008 ;Volum 167.

Abstract: There is growing recognition that reproductive patterns may have long-term health implications, although most evidence is restricted to women. The authors used register data to derive fertility histories for all Norwegian men and women born in 1935-1958. Discrete-time hazard modeling was used to analyze later-life mortality by aspects of reproductive history. A total of 63,312 deaths were observed during 14.5 million person-years of follow-up in 1980-2003, when subjects were aged 45-68 years. Models included detailed information on educational qualifications and marital status. Odds of death relative to those for subjects with two children were highest for the childless (women: odds ratio (OR) = 1.50, 95% confidence interval (CI): 1.43, 1.57; men: OR = 1.35, 95% CI: 1.30, 1.40) and next highest for those with only one child (women: OR = 1.31, 95% CI: 1.26, 1.37; men: OR = 1.20, 95% CI: 1.16, 1.24). Results for the parous showed a positive association between earlier parenthood and later mortality, a reverse association with late age at last birth, and an overall negative association between higher parity and mortality. The similarity of results for women and men suggests biosocial pathways underlying associations between reproductive history and health. The lack of any high-parity disadvantage suggests that in the "family friendly" Norwegian environment, the health benefits of having several children may outweigh the costs.

Kravdal, Øystein (2008): "A broader perspective on education and mortality: Are we influenced by other people's education?" In *Social Science and Medicine* 66, 2008.

Abstract: The objective of this study was to find out whether the educational achievements of family members and people in the municipality have an impact on a person's mortality, net of the well-known strong influence of his or her own education. Using register data, discrete-time hazard models for all-cause mortality in 1980-2003 were estimated for all Norwegian men and women born between 1950 and 1973 (i.e. age 30-53). There were 23,692 deaths during the 19.1 million person-years of follow-up. The education of a former or current spouse had the clearest beneficial effect, although own education was more important.

Mortality was also negatively associated with the education of the oldest sibling and to a lesser extent with that of the sibling-in-law and father-in-law. The average education in the municipality was not generally related to mortality, but a beneficial effect was seen among men with college education. In contrast to this, parents' education affected mortality adversely, especially among women. The data did not allow causal pathways to be identified, but possible mechanisms were discussed. For example, it was argued that others' education may affect mortality favourably through transmission of knowledge, imitation of behaviour, economic support, and the quality of health services. In some societies, childhood health might also be an issue. On the other hand, having better-educated family members or living in a community with many better-educated people, who typically also have higher incomes, may trigger psychosocial stress. However, one should be careful to interpret the observed relationships as reflecting purely causal effects. Various unobserved factors may influence the person's choice of spouse and place of residence as well as mortality, and having parents with higher (lower) education may signal that the person has had special problems (resources) during childhood or adolescence, which also may have implications for later health.

Kravdal, Øystein; with Syse, Astri and Tretli, Steinar (2008): "Cancer's impact on employment and earnings – a population-based study from Norway." *Journal of cancer survivorship* 2, 2008, pages 149-158.

Abstract: Increased attention is being paid to the long-term health and well-being of people living with a history of cancer. Of particular concern is cancer's effect on productivity and work ability, which in turn is important for persons' financial situation, life satisfaction, and social relationships. We explored the extent to which Norwegian cancer survivors stay affiliated to working life compared to the cancer-free population, and quantified cancer-associated earning declines.
Methods and results: Logistic regression models were estimated to explore the impact of cancer on employment using register data covering the entire Norwegian population in 2001, 567,000 men and 549,300 women 40–59 years old, of whom 34,000 were diagnosed with cancer. These analyses revealed that a cancer diagnosis was strongly associated with not being employed. Log-linear regression models were used to estimate the effect of cancer on labor earnings in 2001 for those employed. Cancer was associated with a 12% decline in earnings overall. Leukemia, lymphomas, lung, brain, bone, colorectal, and head-and-neck cancer resulted in the largest reductions in employment and earnings. Earning declines were strongly associated with educational level. In addition, linear regression models were used to estimate differentials in earnings before and after cancer. These results accorded well with those from cross-sectional models.
Conclusion and implications for cancer survivors: Cancer survivors are less likely to be employed than the cancer-free population, and undertake modifications in their employment, e.g. reduce work-hours or hold lower-wage jobs, which result in reduced earnings. A social class gradient is present and must be addressed to accommodate appropriate intervention from welfare societies.

Markussen, Simen (2008): "How the left prospers from prosperity." In *European Journal of Political Economy* 24(2), 2008, pages 329-342.

Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between fluctuations in economic growth, unemployment, and voting along a left-right axis. I estimate a model that explains how political fluctuations are caused by economic fluctuations in the OECD countries. I find that higher economic growth causes a shift to the left of policy sentiments. I hold the provision of social insurance by the welfare state to be the key to understanding this relationship. I also find that the relationship changes over the sample period. I hold the tax increase needed to finance the expansion of the welfare state to be the reason for this.

Moene, Kalle (2008): "Tilbake til Democracy in America?" In *Samfunnsøkonomen* 6-7, 2008.

Abstract: Jeg markerer økonomiforeningens hundreårsjubileum med å trekke fram en bok som knapt nevner ordet økonomi. Boken er Alexis de Tocquevilles to-binds verk, *Democracy in America*, publisert i 1835 og i 1840. Det er egentlig en reisekildring. Tocqueville skrev boken etter ni måneders rundreise i USA i 1830. Formålet med Amerika-reisen var å finne ut "what a great republic is." og hvordan demokratiske samfunnsforhold med tilnærmet like muligheter virker i kontrast til de aristokratiske samfunnsforhold i Tocquevilles hjemland Frankrike. Jeg trekker frem boken fordi temaet fortsatt er viktig, fordi metoden er så forskjellig fra den som dominerer dagens politiske økonomi og fordi konklusjonene kanskje kan lære oss noe om den nordiske modellen.

Røed, Knut; with Jensen, Peter and Thoursie, Anna (2008): "Unemployment Duration and Unemployment Insurance - A Comparative Analysis Based on Scandinavian Micro Data." In *Oxford Economic Papers* 60(2), 2008, pages 254-274.

Abstract: Based on pooled register data from Norway and Sweden, we find that differences in unemployment duration patterns reflect dissimilarities in unemployment insurance (UI) systems in a way that convincingly establishes the link between economic incen-tives and job search behaviour. Specifically, UI benefits are relatively more generous for low-income workers in Sweden than in Norway, leading to relatively longer un-employment spells for low-income workers in Sweden. Based on the between-countries variation in replacement ratios, we find that the elasticity of the outflow rate from insured unemployment with respect to the replacement ratio is approximately 1 in Norway and 0.5 in Sweden.

Storesletten, Kjetil and Zilibotti, Fabrizio; with Hassler, John and Krussel, Per (2008): "On the Optimal Timing of Capital Taxation." In *Journal of Monetary Economics* 55(4), 2008, pages 692-709.

Abstract: For many kinds of capital, depreciation rates change systematically with the age of the capital. Consider an example that captures essential aspects of human capital, both regarding its accumulation and its depreciation: a worker obtains knowledge in period 0, then

uses this knowledge in production in periods 1 and 2, and thereafter retires. Here, depreciation accelerates: it occurs at a 100% rate after period 2, and at a lower (perhaps zero) rate before that. The present paper analyzes the implications of non-constant depreciation rates for the optimal timing of taxes on capital income. The main finding is that under natural assumptions, the path of tax rates over time must be oscillatory. Oscillatory tax rates are optimal when depreciation rates accelerate with the age of the capital (as in the above example), and provided that the government can commit to the path of future tax rates but cannot apply different tax rates in a given year to different vintages of capital.

Storesletten, Kjetil; with Heathcote, Jonathan and Violante, Giovanni L. (2008): "Insurance and Opportunities: A Welfare Analysis of Labor Market Risk." In *Journal of Monetary Economics* 55(3), 2008, pages 501-525.

Abstract: Using a model with constant relative risk-aversion preferences, endogenous labor supply and partial insurance against idiosyncratic wage risk, the paper provides an analytical characterization of three welfare effects: (a) the welfare effect of a rise in wage dispersion, (b) the welfare gain from completing markets, and (c) the welfare effect from eliminating risk. Our analysis reveals an important trade-off for these welfare calculations. On the one hand, higher wage uncertainty increases the cost associated with missing insurance markets. On the other hand, greater wage dispersion presents opportunities to raise aggregate productivity by concentrating market work among more productive workers. Our welfare effects can be expressed in terms of the underlying parameters defining preferences and wage risk or, alternatively, in terms of changes in observable second moments of the joint distribution over individual wages, consumption and hours.

Storesletten, Kjetil; with Henriksen, Espen and Backus, David (2008): "Taxes and the Global Allocation of Capital." In *Journal of Monetary Economics* 55(1), 2008, pages 48-61.

Abstract: Despite enormous growth in international capital flows, capital-output ratios continue to exhibit substantial heterogeneity across countries. We explore the possibility that taxes, particularly corporate taxes, are a significant source of this heterogeneity. The evidence is mixed. Tax rates computed from tax revenue are inversely correlated with capital-output ratios, as we might expect. However, effective tax rates constructed from official tax rates show little relation to capital - or to revenue-based tax measures. The stark difference between these two tax measures remains an open issue.

Ulltveit-Moe, Karen Helene; with Norman, Victor D. (2008): "Globalisering og omstilling. Holder den norske modellen mål?" I *Samfunnsøkonomen* 62(6-7), 2008, pages 62-74.

Abstract: Denne artikkelen gir en kritisk vurdering av hvor godt Norge har utnyttet de mulighetene globaliseringsbølgen har gitt oss. Det hevdes ofte at vi, takket være fordelingspolitikken og trygdesystemet , har bedre tilpasningsevne enn andre land. Vi finner at der er riktig i den forstand at de som er negativt berørt av globalisering og omstilling stort sett er holdt økonomisk skadeløse, og også i den forstand at globaliseringen ikke har ført til en

vesentlig større inntektsulikhet. Vi synes imidlertid å ha sløst bort betydelig deler av globaliseringsgevinsten. Mye av omstillingene har bestått i å skyve berørte arbeidsgivere ut av arbeidslivet, og et gjennomgående trekk ved tilpasningen er en kraftig sentralisering av økonomisk aktivitet. Dette gir tap som kan være så stort at det representerer en betydelig del av den gevinsten vi har høstet. Vi føler oss ikke overbevist om at utstøting og sentralisering er uavvendelig konsekvenser av globalisering, og stiller derfor spørsmålet om det er nødvendig med en kritisk revurdering av den norske modellen for tilpassning og omstilling.

Zilibotti, Fabrizio; with Doepke, Matthias (2008): "Occupational Choice and the Spirit of Capitalism." In *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(2), 2008, pages 747-793.

Abstract: The British Industrial Revolution triggered a socioeconomic transformation whereby the landowning aristocracy was replaced by industrial capitalists rising from the middle classes as the economically dominant group. We propose a theory of preference formation under financial market imperfections that can account for this pattern. Parents shape their children's preferences in response to economic incentives. Middle-class families in occupations requiring effort, skill, and experience develop patience and a work ethic, whereas upper-class families relying on rental income cultivate a refined taste for leisure. These class-specific attitudes, which are rooted in the nature of preindustrial professions, become key determinants of success once industrialization transforms the economic landscape. (c) 2008 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Zilibotti, Fabrizio; with Aghion, Philippe, Burgess, Robin and Redding, Stephen (2008): "Unequal Effects of Liberalization: Evidence from Dismantling the License Raj in India." In *American Economic Review* 98(4), 2008, pages 1397-1412.

Abstract: This paper investigates whether the effects, on registered manufacturing out-put, employment, entry and investment, of dismantling the 'license raj' - a system of central controls regulating entry and production activity in this sector - vary across Indian states with different labor market regulations. The effects are found to be unequal depending on the institutional environment in which industries are embedded. In particular, following delicensing, industries located in states with pro-employer labor market institutions grew more quickly than those in pro-worker environments. Our results emphasize how local institutions matter for whether industry in a region benefits or is harmed by the nationwide delicensing reform.

Zilibotti, Fabrizio (2008): "Economic Growth through the Development Process." In *CESifo Economic Studies* 54(3), 2008, pages 325-357.

Abstract: In this article, I discuss some recent research in the area of economic growth and development emphasizing the endogenous dynamics of policies and organizational forms in a world characterized by credit-market and labor-market imperfections. I present a simple model of technological convergence featuring an endogenous evolution of contractual

arrangements. The key assumption is that economic growth is associated with investments as well as with the adoption and imitation of existing technologies in economies lying far from the technology frontier. In contrast, growth is increasingly driven by innovation as economies approach the technological frontier. The theory predicts that contractual arrangements evolve and adapt spontaneously to the changing needs of technological progress. However, this evolution is neither necessary nor serendipitous. Economies that fail to introduce economic reforms as they advance may become stuck in non-convergence traps. I discuss a number of empirical applications, including the wave of reforms of industrial policy in India in the 1980s and 1990s.

Zilibotti, Fabrizio; with Saez-Marti, Maria (2008): "Preferences as Human Capital: Rational Choice Theories of Endogenous Preferences and Socioeconomic Changes." In *Finnish Economic Papers* 21(2), 2008, pages 81-94.

Abstract: We discuss the theoretical and empirical foundations of modern economic theories of cultural transmission. The importance of cultural factors in shaping economic and social transformations has been the focus of a long-standing debate in social sciences since the XIXth Century. Neoclassical economics has remained at the marging of this debate. However, there has been a recent surge of interest among economists for cultural factors. The economic models of cultural transmission borrow the main ideas from the anthropological literature, but endogeneize the efforts parents exert to transmit specific cultural variants or preference parameters. We distinguish between paternalistic models where parents use their own values to evaluate their children's utility, and non-paternalistic or utilitarian models in which parents choose their children's preferences to maximize the children's well-being. We discuss recent examples, focusing in particular on corruption, patience, and work ethic.

Publications 2007

Asheim, Geir B.; with Buchholz, W., Harwick, J.M., Mitra, T., and Withagen, C. (2007): "Constant savings rates and quasiarithmetic population growth under exhaustible resource constraints." *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* 53, 2007, pages 213–229.

Abstract: In the Dasgupta–Heal–Solow–Stiglitz (DHSS) model of capital accumulation and resource depletion we show the following equivalence: if an efficient path has constant (gross and net of population growth) savings rates, then population growth must be quasi-arithmetic and the path is a maximin or a classical utilitarian optimum. Conversely, if a path is optimal according to maximin or classical utilitarianism (with constant elasticity of marginal utility) under quasi-arithmetic population growth, then the (gross and net of population growth) savings rates converge asymptotically to constants.

Asheim, Geir B. (2007): "Can NNP be Used for Welfare Comparisons." *Environment and Development Economics* 12, 2007, pages 11–31.

Abstract: This paper contains a critical assessment of the claim that NNP can be used for welfare comparisons. The analysis assumes that national accounts are comprehensive (in particular 'greened' by taking into account environmental amenities and natural resource depletion), but does not assume optimal resource allocation. The general conclusion is that greater NNP corresponds to welfare enhancement only if net investment flows are revalued. Real utility-NNP and real measurable NNP made comparable across time by means of a consumer price index allow for such revaluation, and thus indicate welfare improvement.

Barth, Erling and Schøne, Pål (2007): "Monopsoni i arbeidsmarkedet." *Søkelys på Arbeidsmarkedet* 24(1), 2007, pages 113-118.

Abstract: Under overskriften "forskningstema" tar vi opp problemstillinger fra den internasjonale forskningslitteraturen. Formålet er ikke å være fullstendig, men å formidle noen hovedideer og knytte forbindelse til norsk forskning og norsk virkelighet. I dette nummeret tar vi for oss monopsoni i arbeidsmarkedet.

Bratsberg, Bernt, Raaum, Oddbjørn and Røed, Knut; with Eriksson, Tor, Jäntti, Markus, Naylor, Robin A. and Österbacka, Eva (2007): "Nonlinearities in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility: Consequences for Cross-Country Comparisons." In *The Economic Journal* 117(519), 2007.

Abstract: We show that the patterns of intergenerational earnings mobility in Denmark, Finland, and Norway, unlike those for the US and the UK, are highly nonlinear. The Nordic relationship between log earnings of sons and fathers is flat in the lower segments of the fathers' earnings distribution – sons growing up in the poorest households have the same adult earnings prospects as sons in moderately poor households – and is increasingly positive in middle and upper segments. This convex pattern contrasts sharply with our findings for the United States and the United Kingdom, where the relationship is much closer to being linear. As a result, cross-country comparisons of intergenerational earnings elasticities may be misleading with respect to transmission mechanisms in the central parts of the earnings distribution, and uninformative in the tails of the distribution.

Bratsberg, Bernt, Raaum, Oddbjørn and Røed, Knut; with Eriksson, Tor, Jäntti, Markus, Naylor, Robin A. and Österbacka, Eva (2007): "Marital Sorting, Household Labor Supply, and Intergenerational Earnings Mobility across Countries." In *The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (Advances)* 7(2), 2007.

Abstract: We present comparable evidence on intergenerational earnings mobility for Denmark, Finland, Norway, the UK and the US, with a focus on the role of gender and marital status. We confirm that earnings mobility in the Nordic countries is typically greater than in the US and in the UK, but find that, in contrast to all other groups, for married women

mobility is approximately uniform across countries when estimates are based on women's own earnings. Defining offspring outcomes in terms of family earnings, on the other hand, leads to estimates of intergenerational mobility in the Nordic countries which exceed those for the US and the UK for both men and women, single and married. Unlike in the Nordic countries, we find that married women with children and with husbands from affluent backgrounds tend to exhibit reduced labor supply in the US and the UK. In these countries, it is the combination of assortative mating and labor supply responses which weakens the association between married women's own earnings and their parents' earnings.

Bratsberg, Bernt and Raaum, Oddbjørn; with Björklund, Anders, Eriksson, Tor and Jäntti, Markus (2007): "Interindustry Wage Differentials and Unobserved Ability: Siblings Evidence from Five Countries." In *Industrial Relations* 46(1), 2007, pages 171-202.

Abstract: We examine the role of unobserved ability in explaining interindustry wage differentials. By using data on brothers, we account for unmeasured abilities shared by siblings. The data came from four Nordic countries and the United States. In the Nordic countries, only a moderate proportion of the variability in industry wages can be attributed to unobserved ability, while unmeasured factors explain as much as half of the U.S. industry-wage variation. Accounting for such differences, we show that the U.S. interindustry wage dispersion is similar with that in the Nordic countries.

Brekke, Kjell Arne, Nyborg, Karine and Rege, Mari (2007): "The Fear of Exclusion: Individual Effort when Group Formation is Endogenous." In *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 109 (3), 2007, pages 531-550.

Abstract: To secure their membership in a popular group, individuals may contribute more to the group's local public good than they would if group formation were exogenous. Those in the most unpopular group do not have this incentive to contribute to their group. Substantial differences in individual effort levels between groups may be the result. A principal may prefer either exogenous or endogenous group formation, depending on whether an increase in contributions to the local public good coincides with the principal's interests. We analyze two examples: Social interaction in schools, and multiple-task teamwork.

Brekke, Kjell Arne; with Stenseth, Nils C. and Øksendal, Bernt (2007): "The effect of climate variations on the dynamics of pasture-livestock interactions under cooperative and noncooperative management." In *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America 104*, 2007, pages 14730-14734.

Abstract: It is well known from Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" [Hardin G (1968) Science 162:1243-1248] that, if open access is allowed, overgrazing typically results. Hardin, and most authors of the subsequent literature, adopted a static view of the underlying ecosystem. Here we extend this tragedy of the commons to consider the dynamics of the involved ecosystem as well. We consider a general model that allows for a variable carrying capacity of the pastures (due to variation in precipitation) and a stimulating effect on plant

growth due to grazing. Our analysis further emphasizes the tragedy; in addition to overgrazing, the ecosystem may approach limit cycles. Thus, unless the pastoralists are able to coordinate themselves, the human capability of longterm planning will generally not stabilize the system. Although numerical optimization shows that a cooperative optimum would yield a high and stable harvest, the open-access system may produce limit cycles, in which even the peak harvest may be below the stable cooperative optimal harvest. Such fluctuations cause both losses in biomass production and utility losses. Our dynamic analysis also demonstrates that, in the absence of cooperation between herders, too much rain in an otherwise dry area might (temporally) destabilize the ecological grazing system through overstocking, subsequently leading to further overgrazing (which will be observed in, but not caused by, the typically dry conditions of landscapes where pastoralism is practiced). In short, through this study we have brought time (and temporal dynamics) into the Hardin's tragedy of the commons and show that the tragedy might be profoundly worsened.

Cappelen, Alexander W. and Tungodden, Bertil with Hagen, Rune J. (2007): "National responsibility and the just distribution of debt relief." In *Ethics and International Affairs* 21, 2007.

Abstract: The Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative is the largest multilateral effort aimed at providing debt relief. In this essay, we address the question of whether this program is consistent with a view of justice commonly known as liberal egalitarianism. We argue that the HIPC initiative violates two basic liberal egalitarian principles. More generally, we show why the debate on debt relief must move beyond a discussion of whether or not countries should be held responsible for their sovereign debt. We urge a more careful and broader classification of which of the factors affecting a country's situation it should be held responsible for and which it should not. While there are good arguments for sometimes not holding poor countries responsible for their sovereign debt, it is hard to see why the same arguments should not also apply to many other factors that affect a country's net disposable income.

Cappelen, Alexander W., Sørensen, Erik Ø. and Tungodden, Bertil with Hole, Astri D. (2007): "The Pluralism of Fairness Ideals: An Experimental Approach." In *American Economic Review* 97(3), 2007, pages 818-827.

Abstract: A core question in the contemporary debate on distributive justice is how to understand fairness in situations involving production. Important theories of distributive justice, such as strict egalitarianism, liberal egalitarianism, and libertarianism, provide different answers to this question. This paper presents the results from a dictator game where the distribution phase is preceded by a production phase. Each player's contribution is a result of a freely chosen investment level and an exogenously given rate of return. We estimate simultaneously the prevalence of three principles of distributive justice among the players and the distribution of the weight they attach to fairness.

Cappelen, Alexander W. and Tungodden, Bertil (2007): "Redistribution and marginal productivity reward." In *Research on Economic Inequality* 15, 2007, pages 1-6.

Abstract: We look at how one should reward effort without rewarding talent. One way to approach this issue is to ask how an increase in one individual's effort should be allowed to affect the post-tax income of others. The article provides characterizations of three main classes of redistribution mechanism on the basis of how these answer this question.

Cappelen, Alexander W. and Tungodden, Bertil (2007): "Local autonomy and interregional equality." In *Social Choice and Welfare* 28(3), 2007, pages 443-460.

Abstract: This paper shows how two important interregional transfer schemes, the foundation grant and the power equalization grant scheme, can be seen as two different interpretations of equal opportunity ethics. It provides characterizations of both transfer schemes by the use of basic liberal egalitarian principles. Both the foundation grant and the power equalization grant scheme make use of specific reference levels. The paper also shows how reasonable requirements on the transfer schemes restrict the set of possible reference levels.

Christiansen, Vidar (2007): "Two approaches to determine public good provision under distortionary
Taxation." *National Tax Journal* 60(1), 2007.

Abstract: The paper argues that the appropriate approach to determine public good provision financed by distortionary taxes should depend on the available tax regime. Ira sufficiently rich tax regime exists, one could rely on the Pareto criterion, which would be less information-demanding than a social welfare approach requiring access to social welfare weights assigned to various groups. The discussion is related to a number of representative tax regimes and cost-benefit approaches in the literature. It is also argued that, whatever the available tax regime, cost-benefit analysis runs into problems unless one can assume that taxes are set optimally.

Christiansen, Vidar (2007): "Public finance: fifty years of the second best - and beyond - A selection of papers presented at the 62nd Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, held in Paphos, Cyprus." *International Tax and Public Finance* 14, 2007.

Fernández, Raquel (2007): "Women, Work and Culture." In *Journal of the European Economic Association* 5(2-3), 2007, pages 305-332.

Abstract: This paper discusses some recent advances in the area of culture and economics and examines the effect of culture on a key economic outcome: female labor supply. To separate the effect of market variables and institutions from culture, I use an epidemiological approach, studying second-generation American women. I use both female LFP and attitudes in the women's country of ancestry as cultural proxies and show that both cultural proxies

have quantitatively significant effects on women's work outcomes. The paper concludes with some suggestions for future empirical and theoretical research topics in this area.

Fiva, Jon (2007): ”Sentral finansiering av lokal offentlig tjenesteproduksjon: Bailout-problemet.” In *Økonomisk forum* 2/2007.

Abstract: (In Norwegian) Viktige velferdstjenester er i de fleste land desentralisert til et lokalt styringsnivå og delvis finansiert gjennom overføringer fra sentrale myndigheter. Sterk avhengighet av overføringer fra sentrale myndigheter kan imidlertid være uheldig siden insentivene til fiskal disiplin på det lokale nivå svekkes. Konsekvensen kan bli strategisk underskuddsbudsjettering fra lokale myndigheter i håp om at de på et senere tidspunkt vil bli reddet fra finansielle vanskeligheter av sentrale myndigheter i form av en bailout. I valg av institusjoner blir utfordringen å finne løsninger som i minst mulig grad gir insentiver til opportunistisk atferd fra lokale myndigheter. I denne artikkelen beskriver jeg bailout-spillet og med utgangspunkt i litteraturen om tidsinkonsistens i økonomisk politikk diskuterer jeg mekanismer som kan redusere sannsynligheten for at et slikt spill oppstår.

Fiva, Jon; with Rattsø, Jørn (2007): ”Local Choice of Property Taxation: Evidence from Norway.” In *Public Choice* 132(3-4), 2007, pages 457-470.

Abstract: Fiscal competition may influence the design of tax systems. The tax competition literature has concentrated on the mobility of tax base and tax levels while we turn the attention to the political decision-making system and the determination of tax structure. In the Norwegian setting local governments make a discrete choice whether to have property tax. The local choice is investigated in an econometric model allowing for yardstick competition. Our results indicate that yardstick competition explains the distinct geographic pattern in local property taxation observed. Grants have no effect on the propensity to have property taxation, consistent with the flypaper effect. The main methodological challenge handled concerns spatial interaction with discrete choice.

Havnes, Tarjei and Willumsen, Fredrik (2007): ”På kino uten kontroll. Kommentar til Christer Trane.” In *Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning* 48, 2007, pages 409-420.

Abstract: I denne artikkelen viser vi at det er helt nødvendig å kontrollere for filmens kvalitet, dersom man skal kunne forklare effekten av terningkast på en films inntjening. Når kvalitet utelates fra analysen, blir ikke estimatene konsistente, og fortolkning av dem er umulig. Vi har også rettet søkelyset mot problemet med å identifisere effekten av distribusjon, når denne er avhengig av så vel forventede som faktiske inntekter. Til slutt foretok vi en enkel empirisk analyse av kritikernes innvirkning på filmenes økonomiske suksess, kontrollert for kvalitet. Her fant vi at terningkast har en beskjeden og statistisk ikke signifikant effekt på en films inntjening. Ett øye mer på terningen forventes å øke inntektene med sju prosent. Kvaliteten er imidlertid enda viktigere, selv om det selvsagt er vanskeligere å få et intuitivt tak på hva et gitt kvalitetsnivå innebærer, eller hvordan kvalitetsforskjeller skal måles ex ante.

Hoel, Michael (2007): ”What should (public) health insurance cover?” In *Journal of Health Economics* 26, 2007, pages 251–262.

Abstract: In any system of health insurance, a decision must be made about what treatments the insurance should cover. One way to make this decision is to rank treatments by their ratios of health benefits to treatment costs. If treatments that are not offered by the health insurance can be purchased out of pocket, the socially optimal ranking of treatments to be included in the health insurance is different from this standard cost-effectiveness rule. It is no longer necessarily true that treatments should be ranked higher the lower are treatment costs (for given health benefits). Moreover, the larger are the costs per treatment for a given benefit–cost ratio, the higher priority should the treatment be given. If the health budget in a public health system does not exceed the socially optimal size, treatments with sufficiently low costs should not be performed by the public health system if treatment may be purchased privately out of pocket.

Hoel, Michael; with Barrett, S. (2007): ”Optimal Disease Eradication.” In *Environment and Development Economics* 12(5), 2007, pages 627–652.

Abstract: Using a dynamic model of the control of an infectious disease, we derive the conditions under which eradication will be optimal. When eradication is feasible, the optimal program requires either a low vaccination rate or eradication. A high vaccination rate is never optimal. Under special conditions, the results are especially stark: the optimal policy is either not to vaccinate at all or to eradicate. Our analysis yields a cost benefit rule for eradication, which we apply to the current initiative to eradicate polio.

Hoel, Michael; with Bye, Torstein (2007): ”Klimabidrag fra Norge.” In *Økonomisk forum* 5, 2007, pages 31–34.

Hoel, Michael; with Sterner, T. (2007): ”Discounting and Relative Prices.” In *Climatic Change* 84, 2007.

Abstract: Environmentalists are often upset at the effect of discounting costs of future environmental damage, e.g., due to climate change. An often-overlooked message is that we should discount costs but also take into account the increase in the relative price of the ecosystem service endangered. The effect of discounting would thus be counteracted, and if the rate of price rise of the item was fast enough, it might even be reversed. The scarcity that leads to rising relative prices for the environmental good will also have direct effects on the discount rate itself. The magnitude of these effects depends on properties of the economy’s technology and on social preferences. We develop a simple model of the economy that illustrates how changes in crucial technology and preference parameters may affect both the discount rate and the rate of change of values of environmental goods. The combined effect of discounting and the change of values of environmental goods is more likely to be low – or even negative – the lower the growth rate of environmental quality (or

the larger its decline rate), and the lower the elasticity of substitution between environmental quality and produced goods.

Holden, Steinar; with Dickens, William T., Götte, Lorenz, Groshen, Erica L., Messina, Julián, Schweitzer, Mark E., Turunen, Jarkko and Ward-Warmedinger, Melanie (2007): "How wages change: Micro Evidence from the International Wage Flexibility Project." In *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 21(2), 2007, pages 195-214.

Abstract: How do the complex institutions involved in wage setting affect wage changes? The
International Wage Flexibility Project provides new microeconomic evidence on how wages change for continuing workers. We analyze individuals' earnings in thirty-one different data sets from sixteen countries, from which we obtain a total of 360 wage change distributions. We find a remarkable amount of variation in wage changes across workers. Wage changes have a notably non-normal distribution; they are tightly clustered around the median and also have many extreme values. Furthermore, nearly all countries show asymmetry in their wage distributions below the median. Indeed, we find evidence of both downward nominal and real wage rigidities. We also find that the extent of both these rigidities varies substantially across countries. Our results suggest that variations
in the extent of union presence in wage bargaining play a role in explaining differing degrees of rigidities among countries.

Holden, Steinar (2007): "Nobels minnepris i økonomi - Edmund S. Phelps. *Økonomisk Forum* 4, 2007, pages 23-30.

Abstract: Edmund Phelps fikk Nobels minnepris i økonomi for sine bidrag om arbeidsledighet og
inflasjon, og om økonomisk vekst. Særlig bidraget om arbeidsledighet og inflasjon var banebrytende.
Phelps utarbeidet makroøkonomiske teorier med ordentlig mikroøkonomisk fundament, og viste at dette hadde vidtrekkende konsekvenser. Bl.a. påpekte han at Phillipskurven på kort sikt måtte avhenge av inflasjonsforventningene, og at dette innebar at Phillips-kurven på lang sikt var loddrett, dvs. at det ikke er noe bytteforhold mellom inflasjon og arbeidsledighet på lang sikt.

Høyland, Bjørn; with Benedetto, Giacomo (2007): "The EU Annual Budgetary Procedure the Existing Rules and Proposed Reforms of the Convention and Intergovernmental Conference, 2002-2004." In *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45(3), pages 565-87.

Abstract: This article analyses the proposed reform of the annual budgetary procedure of the European Union (EU) during the 2002–04 Convention and Intergovernmental Conference (IGC).We offer two findings. First, the European Parliament already has the power to reduce agricultural and fisheries spending subject to support from a blocking minority in the Council. Hence, a reduction of the Union's spending on agriculture and other areas of compulsory

expenditure is not dependent on a reform of the budgetary procedure. Second, the proposal from the Convention would have increased EP budgetary powers while the procedure adopted by the IGC strengthens the hand of the Council, removing Parliament's right to overrule it. In constitutional bargaining, we see that Parliament gains in a deliberative forum where unanimity is not required, while it loses in a closed IGC.

Kravdal, Øystein; with Derose, LF. (2007): "Educational reversals and first-birth timing in sub-Saharan Africa: A dynamic multilevel approach." In *Demography* 44, 2007.

Abstract: In many areas throughout sub-Saharan Africa, young adult cohorts are less educated than their predecessors because of declines in school enrollments during the 1980s and 1990s. Because a woman with little education typically becomes a mother earlier and has more children than one with better education, and because of a similar well-established relationship between current education and current fertility at the societal level, one might expect such education reversals to raise fertility. However, if there is an additional negative effect of low educational level among currently young women compared with that in the past, which would accord with ideas about the impact of relative deprivation, the total effect of an education reversal may run in either direction. This possibility has not been explored in earlier studies, which have taken a more static approach. We focus on the initiation of childbearing. Using Demographic and Health Survey data from 16 sub-Saharan African countries with multiple surveys, we estimate a fixed-effects multilevel model for first births that includes the woman's own education, community education, and community education relative to the past. There are negative effects of individual and community education, but no effect of relative education. Thus we conclude that education reversals do seem to speed up entry into parenthood.

Kravdal, Øystein (2007): "A fixed-effects multilevel analysis of how community family structure affects individual mortality in Norway". In *Demography* 44, 2007.

Abstract: By using register data for the entire Norwegian population aged 50-89 in the period 1980-1999, during which there were about 720,000 deaths, I estimate how the proportions of persons who were divorced or never married in the municipality affected all-cause mortality, net of individual marital status. The data include individual histories of changes in marital status and places of residence, providing a rare opportunity to enter municipality fixed effects into the model, thereby capturing the time-invariant unobserved factors at that level. The positive health externality of marriage that is suggested in the literature is supported by some of the estimates for women. Other estimates--especially those for men--point in the opposite direction. One possible interpretation of these findings is that social cohesion is perhaps not as beneficial for people's health as often claimed, at least not for both sexes. Alternatively, the results may reflect that marriage perhaps undermines rather than strengthens social cohesion, or that other mechanisms are involved-for example, those that are related to people 's perceptions of their health relative to the health of others. Estimates from models without such municipality fixed effects are markedly different, but these also shed doubt on the notion that a high proportion of unmarried persons generally increases individual mortality.

Kravdal, Øystein (2007): "Effects of current education on second- and third-birth rates among Norwegian women and men born in 1964: Substantive interpretations and methodological issues." In *Demographic Research* 17, 2007, pages 211-246.

Abstract: A variety of approaches have been employed to assess the importance of womenŠs education for their second- or third-birth rates. Some researchers have included the educational
level measured at a relatively high age in their models, whereas others have included current education. A few have taken selection into account by modelling first-, second-, and higher-order birth rates jointly, with a common unobserved factor. The corresponding education-fertility relationships among men, however, has not attracted any attention. In this study, based on Norwegian register data for the 1964 cohort, a high current educational level for a woman is found to stimulate her second- and third-birth rates. Controlling for selection through joint modelling turns out to be quite unimportant, but the results are very different if the educational level attained by age 39 is included instead
of current education. It is important to be aware of such sensitivity to the specification of education. The corresponding effects for men are also positive, but not more strongly positive than those for women. These results may suggest that we should not take for granted that womenŠs education generally reduces fertility, and that it does so because of higher opportunity costs for the better educated. However, it is also possible that a high current educational level is linked with modest aspirations for further schooling, which would tend to stimulate subsequent fertility, that it is partly caused by some individual, family or community characteristics that also lead to high fertility, or that it even to some extent is a result of plans to have a child fairly soon. These alternative interpretations are discussed.

Kravdal, Øystein; with Rindfuss, Ron, Guilkey, David, Morgan, Phil and Guzzo, Karen (2007):
"Child care availability and first-birth timing in Norway". In *Demography* 44(2), 2007, pages 345-372.

Abstract: Both sociological and economic theories posit that widely available, high-quality, and affordable child care should have pronatalist effects. Yet to date, the empirical evidence has not consistently supported this hypothesis. We argue that this previous empirical work has been plagued by the inability to control for endogenous placement of day care centers and the possibility that people migrate to take advantage of the availability of child care facilities. Using Norwegian register data and a statistically defensible fixed-effects model, we find strong positive effects of day care availability on the transition to motherhood.

Kravdal, Øystein; with Syse, Astri (2007): "Does cancer affect the divorce rate?" *Demographic Research* 16, 2007, pages 469-492.

Abstract: Discrete-time hazard regression models were employed to register and census data on 1.4 million Norwegian married couples from 1974-2001 to explore the probability of

divorce following cancer illness. Divorce rates for around 215 000 persons diagnosed with cancer were compared to divorce rates for persons for whom all the other observed variables were the same. No overall harmful influence of a cancer diagnosis was observed. Most cancer forms resulted in small, immediate declines in divorce rates the first years following diagnosis. Exceptions were significant increases in the divorce rates for persons diagnosed with cervical and testicular cancer.

Kravdal, Øystein; with Syse, Astri and Tretli, Steinar (2007): "Parenthood after cancer - A popultion-based study." In *Psycho-Oncology* 16, 2007, pages 920-927.

Abstract: Many cancer forms today have good prognosis, and parenthood after cancer diagnosis and treatment has become a central research topic. Previous research has mainly focused on reproductive cancers, and few population-based studies exist. The effect of several cancer forms on fertility at a population level was explored. Discrete-time hazard regression models were used to analyse register and census data for complete Norwegian birth cohorts. Men and women 17-44 years in the period 1965-2001 were included. Models for first- and higher-order birth rates, for men and women, were estimated.Overall, first-birth rates among persons with cancer were reduced by only about 25% when compared with the general population. Male cancer survivors' second- and third-birth rates were similarly reduced, whereas higher-order birth rates for females were 36% below those of the general population. Significant decreases in cancer survivors' fertility disadvantage relative to the general population were seen from 1965 to 2001. Reductions in fertility were most pronounced for reproductive cancer forms, presumably related to subfecundity. However, also cancer forms unrelated to reproductive function led to reduced fertility, perhaps suggesting underlying social mechanisms. This is further supported by the difference in probability between first and subsequent births observed for women.

Lind, Jo Thori (2007): "Does permanent income determine the vote?" In *B.E. Journals of Macroeconomics* 7(1), 2007, Article 19.

Abstract: The relationship between income and voting is usually studied using current income. Instead, I estimate how permanent income affects voting and to what extent voters are forward looking. A proxy for permanent income is constructed from stated expectations about one's future economic situation. Using panel data from the Norwegian Election Study I estimate the effect of stated expectations on realized future income to compute the effect of expectations. This is then linked to voting behaviour. Contrasting permanent and transitory income, the former has a large impact and the latter has little explanatory power on voting. This supports the hypothesis of forward looking voting. A high expected permanent income increases the propensity to vote Conservative.

Lind, Jo Thori (2007): "Fractionalization and inter-group differences." In *Kyklos* 60, 2007, pages 123-139.

Abstract: Fractionalization is usually defined as the probability that two randomly chosen persons belong to different groups, be it ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other groups. High fractionalization leads to more corruption (Mauro 1995), low growth rates and bad policies in general (Easterly and Levine 1997), low provision of public goods (Alesina et al. 1999), less redistribution (Alesina et al. 2001,Lind 2006), less social mixing and activity (Alesina and LaFerrara 2000), lower voluntary contributions to schools (Miguel 2004, Miguel and Gugerty 2005), and higher prevalence of civil war (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, Reynal-Querol 2002)1. There are two major problems with the measure of fractionalization used in virtually all studies on the effects of fractionalization. First, the choice of which groups to consider is often done in a more pragmatic than rigorous way. Second, the measure implies that two persons are either identical (belong to the same group) or totally different (belong to different groups). This misses the important point that some groups may be closer to each other than others. The objective of this paper is to develop a method to construct correct measures of fractionalization that takes these two objections into account.

Lind, Jo Thori (2007): ”Fractionalization and the size of government.” In *Journal of Public Economics* 91, 2007, pages 15-76.

Abstract: I study the effect of voters with a group-based social conscience. Voters care more about the well-being of those belonging to their own group than the rest of the population. Within a model of political tax determination, both fractionalization and group antagonism reduce the support for redistribution. Whereas within group inequality increases support for redistribution, inequality between groups has the opposite effect. These results hold even if a poor group forms a majority. Using a panel constructed from US micro data, I find support for the hypothesis that within race inequality increases redistribution while between race inequality decreases redistribution.

Lind, Jo Thori (2007): ”Religion, welfare politics, and church-state separation.” In *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 42 (1), 2007, pages 42-52.

Abstract: How moral and religious beliefs interact with market forces is a subject of much debate. Can economic incentives explain why people believe what they believe? Some of our other work has looked at the impact of economic forces on religious intensity and at how incentives influence the impact of certain moral beliefs on gender-based violence. This essay uses market forces to explain why fiscal and social conservatism and fiscal and social liberalism go hand in hand. Religious intensity as social insurance provides a simple explanation. The religious right may be against welfare because it competes against their constituency.

Markussen, Simen (2007): ”Økonomisk sykefraværsforskning: Hva vet vi, og hvor bør vi gå?” In *Søkelys på arbeidslivet* 24(1), 2007, pages 63-81.

Abstract: Høsten 2006 ble sykefraværet debattert mer enn noen gang. Men hva vet vi egentlig om sykefravær? I denne artikkelen vil jeg presentere relevant litteratur, forsøke å avkle to myter samt skissere noen spørsmål for videre forskning på feltet.

Mogstad, Magne; with Aaberge, R. and Langørgen, A. (2007): "Region-specific versus Country-specific Poverty Lines in Analysis of Poverty". In *Journal of Economic Inequality* 5, 2007, pages 115-122.

Abstract: An analysis of poverty based on a country-specific income poverty line suffers from disregarding regional differences in prices and needs within a country and may, therefore, produce results that give a misleading picture of the extent of poverty as well as the geographic and demographic composition of the poor. To account for differences in prices and needs, this paper introduces an alternative method for identifying the poor based on a set of region-specific poverty lines. Applying Norwegian household register data for 2001 we find that the national level of poverty is only slightly affected by the change in definition of poverty line. However, the geographic as well as the demographic poverty profiles are shown to depend heavily on whether the method for identifying the poor relies on region- or country-specific thresholds. As expected, the results demonstrate that an analysis of poverty based on a country-specific threshold produces downward biased poverty rates in urban areas and upward biased poverty rates in rural areas. Moreover, when region-specific poverty thresholds form the basis of the poverty analysis, we find that the poverty rates among young singles and non-western immigrants are significantly higher than what is suggested by previous empirical evidence based on a joint country-specific poverty line.

Nilssen, Tore (2007): "Opsjoner til bedriftsledere - har vi noe valg?" I *Søkelys på arbeidslivet* 24(3), 2007, pages 303-314.

Abstract: Regjeringen skriver i eierskapsmeldingen at den ikke ønsker bruk av aksjeopsjoner som lønn til bedriftsledere. Denne skepsisen til opsjoner er det all mulig grunn til å slutte seg til. En bedriftseier er avhengig av en dyktig leder som gjør en innsats. Men den beste måten å gå fram på er ikke å etablere et opsjonsprogram.

Nilssen, Tore; with Kind, Hans J. and Sørgard, Lars (2007): "Competition for Viewers and Advertisers in a TV Oligopoly." *Journal of Media Economics* 20, 2007.

Abstract: Plutselig snakker alle om klima – og samtidig kjennes det, for mange av oss, viktigere enn før å gjøre noe selv. Hvorfor det? Skyldes det bare nye opplysninger om hvor alvorlige klimaproblemene er? Eller har det noe med sosial interaksjon å gjøre – blir vi rett og slett mer miljøvennlige når vi tror andre er miljøvennlige?

Røed, Knut; with Fevang, Elisabeth (2007): "Organizational Change, Absenteeism and Welfare Dependency." *Journal of Human Resources* 42(1), 2007, pages 156–193.

Abstract: Based on Norwegian register data, we set up a multivariate mixed proportional hazard model (MPPH) to analyze nurses' pattern of work, sickness absence, non-employment, and social insurance dependency from 1992 to 2000, and how that pattern was affected by workplace characteristics. The model is estimated by means of the non-parametric maximum-likelihood estimator (NPMLE). We find that downsizing processes involve a significant increase in the level of sickness absence among still-employed nurses. They also cause a significant increase in the probability of entering into more long-lasting health-related social insurance dependency.

Røed, Knut; with Gaure, Simen and Zhang, Tao (2007): "Time and Causality: A Monte Carlo Assessment of the Timing-of-Events Approach." *Journal of Econometrics* 141, 2007, pages 1159–1195.

Abstract: We present new Monte Carlo evidence regarding the feasibility of separating causality from selection within non-experimental duration data, by means of the non-parametric maximum likelihood estimator (NPMLE). Key findings are: (i) the NPMLE is extremely reliable, and it accurately separates the causal effects of treatment and duration dependence from sorting effects, almost regardless of the true unobserved heterogeneity distribution; (ii) the NPMLE is normally distributed, and standard errors can be computed directly from the optimally selected model; and (iii) unjustified restrictions on the heterogeneity distribution, e.g., in terms of a pre-specified number of support points, may cause substantial bias.

Røed, Knut; with Gaure, Simen (2007): "How Tight is the Labour Market? Sources of Changes in the Aggregate Exit Rate from Unemployment across the Business Cycle." *Journal of Business Cycle Measurement and Analysis* 3(2), 2007.

Abstract: We decompose variations in the aggregate exit rate from unemployment to employment into two factors: i) Changes in the arrival rate of acceptable job offers; and ii) changes in the composition of the unemployment pool in terms of average employability. We argue that the former of these factors provides the basis for an informative labour market tightness indicator, while the latter yields valuable information regarding the design of optimal labour market policies across the cycle. Based on Norwegian register data, we find that individual monthly exit rates tend to double from a cyclical trough to a cyclical peak, ceteris paribus, but that crosssectional heterogeneity nevertheless explains 88 per cent of the overall variation in individual monthly exit probabilities during the period from 1989 to 2002.

Røed, Knut (2007): "Welfare Reform: The US Experience. Comment on Robert Moffitt." *In Swedish Economic Policy Review* 14(2), pages 49-54.

Røed, Knut (2007): "Hele folket i arbeid?" In *Økonomisk Forum* 3, 2007.

Storesletten, Kjetil, Hassler and Zilibotti (2007): "Democratic Public Good Provision." In *Journal of Economic Theory* 133(1), pages 127-151.

Abstract: This paper analyzes an overlapping generation model of redistribution and public good provision under repeated voting. Expenditures are financed through age-dependent taxation that distorts human capital investment. Taxes redistribute income both across skill groups and across generations.We focus on politicoeconomic Markov equilibria and contrast these with the Ramsey allocation under commitment. The model features indeterminate equilibria, with a key role of forward-looking strategic voting. Due to the lack of commitment to future policies, the tax burden may be on the wrong side of the dynamic Laffer curve. Moreover, restrictions on government policies can in some cases be welfare improving.

Storesletten, Kjetil, Telmer and Yaron (2007): "Asset pricing with idiosyncratic risk and overlapping generations." In *Review of Economic Dynamics* (4), pages 519-548.

Abstract: What is the effect of non-tradeable idiosyncratic risk on asset-market risk premiums? Constantinides and Duffie (1996) and Mankiw (1986) have shown that risk premiums will increase if the idiosyncratic shocks become more volatile during economic contractions. We add two important ingredients to this relationship: (i) the life cycle, and (ii) capital accumulation. We show that in a realistically-calibrated life-cycle economy with production these ingredients mitigate the ability of idiosyncratic risk to account for the observed Sharpe ratio on U.S. equity. While the Constantinides-Duffie model can account for the U.S. value of 41% with a risk-aversion coefficient of 8, our model generates a Sharpe ratio of 33%, which is roughly half-way to the complete-markets value of 25%. Almost all of this reduction is due to capital accumulation. Life-cycle effects are important in our model - we demonstrate that idiosyncratic risk matters for asset pricing because it inhibits the intergenerational sharing of aggregate risk - but their net effect on the Sharpe ratio is small

Storesletten, Kjetil (2007): "Comments on: Hong and Ríos-Rull's 'Social security, life insurance and annuities for families." In *Journal of Monetary Economics* 54 (1), pages 141-143.
Torvik, Ragnar; with Matsen, Egil and Sveen, Tommy (2007): "Savers, spenders and fiscal policy in a small open economy." In *B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics* 7(1), article 22 (topics), 2007.

Abstract: This paper extends the savers-spenders theory of Mankiw (2000) to analyze fiscal policy in a small open economy with endogenous labor supply. It is first shown that tax cuts have a short-run contractionary effect on domestic production, and increased public spending has a short-run expansionary effect. Although consistent with recent empirical work, this result contrasts with those of most other theoretical models. Transitory changes in demand have permanent real effects in our model, and we discuss the implications for real exchange rate dynamics. We also show how ``rational'' agents may magnify or dampen the responses of ``irrational'' agents, and discuss how, unlike in previous contributions, this is in our model purely a result of the shape of rational agents' utility functions.

Zilibotti, Fabrizio; with Acemoglu, Daron; Aghion, Philippe; Lelarge, Claire and Van Reenen, John (2007): "Technology, Information and the Decentralization of the firm." In *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122(4), 2007, pages 1759-1799.

Abstract: This paper analyzes the relationship between the diffusion of new technologies and the decentralization of firms. Centralized control relies on the information of the principal, which we equate with publicly available information. Decentralized control, on the other hand, delegates authority to a manager with superior information. However, the manager can use his informational advantage to make choices that are not in the best interest of the principal. As the available public information about the specific technology increases, the tradeoff shifts in favor of centralization. We show that firms closer to the technological frontier, firms in more heterogeneous environments, and younger firms are more likely to choose decentralization. Using three data sets on French and British firms in the 1990s, we report robust correlations consistent with these predictions.

Ulltveit-Moe, Karen Helene (2007): "Regional policy design: An analysis of relocation, efficiency and equity." In *European Economic Review* 51, 2007.

Abstract: This paper analyzes the relationship between the diffusion of new technologies and the decentralization of firms. Centralized control relies on the information of the principal, which we equate with publicly available information. Decentralized control, on the other hand, delegates authority to a manager with superior information. However, the manager can use his informational advantage to make choices that are not in the best interest of the principal. As the available public information about the specific technology increases, the tradeoff shifts in favor of centralization. We show that firms closer to the technological frontier, firms in more heterogeneous environments, and younger firms are more likely to choose decentralization. Using three data sets on French and British firms in the 1990s, we report robust correlations consistent with these predictions.

Books or chapters in books 2010

Barth, Erling (2010): "Ligeløn: Analyser og tiltag." In *Hvorfor har vi lønsforskelle mellem kvinder og mænd?* Deding, Mette and Holt, Helle (eds.) København: SFI – Det nationale forskningscenter for velfærd, 2010.

Havnes, Tarjei and Mogstad, Magne (2010): "Eldre eller rikere? En aldersjustering av tidstrenden i inntektsulikhet." In *Økonomiske analyser* 2, 2010.

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Knutsen, Carl Henrik (2011): “Research” in Helge Hveem and Lelio Iapadre [Eds.] *The Global Governance of Knowledge: Education, Research, Innovation and International Cooperation.* London: Routledge.

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Holden, Steinar (2009): ”The three outsiders and the monetary union.” Chapter in *EMU at ten. Should Denmark, Sweden and the UK join?* SNS Förlag. Chapter 6 in the report by SNS Economic Policy Group, consisting of Flam, Harry (chairman), Fatas, Antonio, Holden, Steinar, Jappeli, Tullio, Mihov, Ilian, Pagano, Marco and Wyplosz, Charles.

Høyland, Bjørn; with Hagemann, Sara (2009): “Parties in the Council?” In *The Role of Political Parties in the European Union*. Bjorn Lindberg, Anne Rasmussen and Andreas

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Røed, Knut; with Gaure, Simen and Westlie, Lars (2008): *The Impact of Labor Market Policies on Job Search Behavior and Post-Unemployment Job Quality*. IZA Discussion Paper 3802 and Memorandum 22/2008, Department of Economics, University of Oslo.

Røed, Knut; with Fevang, Elisabeth and Kverndokk, Snorre (2008): *Informal Care and Labor Supply*. IZA Discussion Paper 3717 and HERO Working Paper 8/2008.

Røed, Knut; with Fevang, Elisabeth and Kverndokk, Snorre (2008): *A Model for Supply of Informal Care to Elderly Parents*. HERO Working Paper 12/2008.

Torsvik, Gaute; with Mæstad, Ottar (2008): *Improving the Quality of Health Care When Health Workers are in Short Supply*. CMI Working Paper 12/2008.

Ulltveit-Moe, Karen H. with Moxnes, Andreas and Ekholm, Karolina (2008): *Manufacturing Restructuring and the Role of Real Exchange Rate Shocks: A Firm Level Analysis.* CEPR Discussion Papers 6904, 2008.

Working Papers 2007

Cappelen, Alexander W. and Tungodden, Bertil (2007): *Fairness and the proportional principle*. NHH Discussion paper 31/07.

Fernández, Raquel (2007): *Culture as Learning: The Evolution of Female Labor Force Participation over a Century.*

Kravdal, Øystein, Rindfuss, Ron (2007): *Changig relationships between education and fertility - a study of women and men born 1940-64* : Økonomisk institutt 2007 ;Volum 2007.40 s. Working Paper in Economics(11).

Kundu, Tapas (2007): *Can Democracy always lead to Efficient Economic Transitions?*

Kundu, Tapas; with Reitschuler, Eva and Emanuel, Linda (2007): *Alleviating poverty: A proposal to mitigate the economic cost of disease.*

Lind, Jo Thori; with Rohner, Dominic (2007): *Income, Information and the Extent of Redistribution.*

Lind, Jo Thori; with Chen, Daniel L. (2007): *The Political Economy of Beliefs: Why Fiscal and Social Conservatives and Liberals Come Hand-in-Hand.*

Markussen, Simen (2007): *Why more generosity may reduce absenteeism.*

Moen, Espen R.; with Dalen, Dag M. (2007): *The proper scope of government with cost-sharing contracts.* CEPR working paper, revise and resubmit, Australian Journal of Economics.

Moene, Kalle (2007): *Den nordiske modellen.*

Moene, Kalle (2007): *Labor and the Nordic Model of Social Democracy.*

Rendall, Michelle (2007): *Brain versus Brawn: The Realization of Women's Comparative Advantage.*

Rendall, Michelle (2007): *Accounting for Divorce, Marriage and Savings Trends.*

Torsvik, Gaute; with Hagen, Rune J. (2007): *Irreversible Investments, Dynamic Inconsistency, and Policy Convergence*. University of Bergen Working Papers in Economics 2, 2007.

Ulltveit-Moe, Karen Helene; with Ekholm, Karolina (2007): *A New Look at Offshoring and Inequality: Specialization versus Competition.* CEPR Discussion Papers 6402, 2007.

Zilibotti, Fabrizio; with Aghion, Philippe; Burgess, Robin and Redding, Stephen (2007): *The Unequal Effects of Liberalization: Evidence from Dismantling the License Raj in India.*

Master Theses 2010

Hernæs, Øystein Marianssønn (2010): *Models of Conflict,* Department of Economics, University of Oslo.

Sandsør, Astrid Marie Jorde: *The Rotating Savings and Credit Association - An Economic, Social and Cultural Institution,* Department of Economics, University of Oslo.

Østenstad, Gry Tengmark (2010): *Capital accumulation and coordinated wage bargaining,* Department of Economics, University of Oslo.

Master Theses 2009

Andreassen, Einar (2009): Why do Employees Voluntarily Participate in Centralised Wage Bargaining? An Investigation of the Scandivanian Model using an Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach, Department of Economics, University of Oslo.

Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2009): A woman‘s touch. The impact of gender on political priorities, Department of Economics, University of Oslo.

Korneliussen, Kristine (2009): Corruption and government spending - the role of decentralization, Department of Economics, University of Oslo.

Walberg, Maria S. (2009): Allmenn minstelønn - Effekter av allmenngjøring av tariffavtalt minstelønn, Department of Economics, University of Oslo.

Master Theses 2008

Bø, Erlend Eide (2008): Transition in the Baltic countries: the economic effects of institutions and uncertainty. Master thesis, Dept. of Economics, Aug 18, 2008.

Haatvedt, Jens Christian (2008): The Norwegian pension system: the economic effects of funded pension benefits. Master thesis, Dept. of Economics, Aug 18, 2008.

Krüger, Ingrid (2008): Crime and Poverty in the Kingdom of Bavaria during the Period 1835/36 - 60/61. Master thesis, Dept. of Economics, May 2, 2008.

Lillelien, Nina (2008): The effect of openness on welfare state generosity. Master thesis, Dept. of Economics, Nov. 2008.

Østli, Marius B. (2008): Risky business. Theoretical approaches to housing in the household portfolio. Master thesis, Dept. of Economics, May 2, 2008.

Master Theses 2007

Hole, Vegard (2007): Re-examined: "Wage Dispersion and Productive Efficiency: Evidence for Sweden." Master thesis, Dept. of Economics, Nov. 2007.

Lectures and presentations 2010

Almås, Ingvild
"Fairness and the development of inequality acceptance." The American Economic Association meeting, Atlanta, USA, January 2010.

"Poverty in India - A structural Approach." Conference on Price indexes, Oxford University, UK, April 2010.

"International Income Inequality: Measuring PPP bias by estimating Engel curves for food." Nominert til pris, CESIfo, Conference on Emplyment and Social Protection, Munchen, May 2010.

"Poverty in India - A structural Approach." Seminar, FUNDP, Namur, Belgium, June 2010.

"Measuring unfair (in)equality." Arbeidsdepartementet, August 2010.

"Geary Allen World Account." Conference International Association of Review of Income and Wealth, St Gallen, Switzerland, August 2010.

Yale University, December 01 2010.

Asheim, Geir
"Klimaforandringene og rettferdighet mellom generasjonene." Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademis seminar "Klimaforskning og forskningsformidling." January 20 2010.

"Climate change and intergenerational equity." Workshop on Distribution and Climate Change, Stanford University, USA, April 09 2010.

"Strategic use of environmental information." SURED Conference, Ascona, June 07-10 2010.

"Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games." Workshop on Solution Concepts for Extensive Games, Århus, Denmark, June 22-25 2010.

"Global welfare comparisons." WCERE Montréal, Canada, June 28-July 02 2010.

"Climate change and intergenerational equity." 10th International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Moskva, Russia, July 21-24 2010.

"Epistemically stable strategy sets." 10th SAET Conference on Current Trends in Economics, Singapore, August 12-15 2010.

"Justifying social discounting: the rank-discounted utilitarian approach." ved Université Montpellier, October 07 2010.

"A complete and strongly anonymous leximin relation on infinite streams." CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, September 20 2010.

Aslaksen, Silje
"Oil and Political Survival." Department Seminar, Economics Department NTNU, Trondheim, February 02 2010.

"Oil and Political Survival." Workshop on Social Conflict, Dehli, India, April 07-11 2010.

"Oil and Political Survival." 1st Mineral Policy Forum, Ulaan Baatar, Mongolia, May 05 2010.

"Corruption and Oil: Evidence from Panel Data." IIPF Annual Conference, Uppsala, Sweden, August 23-26 2010.

Barth, Erling
"Et arbeidsliv i endring, -utdanningens betydning." Faglig seminar for programmene VAM, UTD2020 og PRUF, Norges forskningsråd, Oslo 13. October 2010

"Ufordringer for den nordiske modellen." Jubileumskonferanse for Hovedavtalen 75 år, NHO/LO, Oslo 9. October 2010.

"The Equality Multiplier." RWE workshop, Essen, Germany, October 2010.

"The Contribution of Earnings Dispersion across Plants." Sandbjerg Conference, Sønderborg, Danmark, October 2010.

"The Contribution of Earnings Dispersion across Plants." CAED Conference, London, September 2010.

"The Contribution of Earnings Dispersion across Plants." NBER summer institute, Cambridge, MA, July 2010.

Bratsberg, Bernt
"On the labor market outcomes naturalized citizens." European Commission and OECD seminar on "Naturalisation and the socio-economic integration of immigrants and their children." Brussels, October 14 2010.

"Limited access to ACME ltd? Immigrant wage profiles within and between establishments." University College London, September 24 2010.

"Immigration and Wages: Evidence from Construction." Free University of Amsterdam, March 29 2010.

Brinch, Christian Nicolay
"Non-parametric identification of the mixed proportional hazards model with interval-censored durations." Det nasjonal forskermøtet for økonomer, Universitetet i Agder, January 5 2010.

"Optimal skattlegging av arbeidsinntekt." Skatteøkonomisk avdeling, Finansdepartementet, February 22 2010.

"Non-parametric identification of the mixed proportional hazards model with interval-censored durations." Seminar Frischsenteret, UiO, April 21 2010.

"Maximum likelihood estimation in nonlinear fisheries models using survey and catch-at-age data." Seminar at Matematisk institutt, UiO, April 27 2010.

"The effects of benefits on disability pension uptake." Seminar at Institutt for samfunnsforskning, May 19 2010.

"Optimal labour income taxation in the dual income tax regime." Skatteforum (Forskningsrådet, Skatteforskningsprogrammet), June 09 2010.

Børsum, Øystein
"Contagious Mortgage Default." NORMAC conference in Mustio, Finland, August 2010.

Dapi, Bjorn
"Earnings profiles of natives and newly arrived immigrants." Internal Ph.D. lunch seminar, University of Oslo, June 3, 2010.

"Self-Employment and Peer Effects." Internal Ph.D. breakfast seminar, University of Oslo, November 11, 2010.

"Wage Procyclicality in Norway" (co-authored with S. Holden). Ph.D. Workshop at Department of Economics, University of Oslo, September 14, 2010.

Fiva, Jon H.
"Voting When the Stakes are High." (co-authors Andersen, J. J. and Natvik, G. J.), Department seminar, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, February 2010.

"Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public Investment?" (co-author Natvik, G. J.), Department seminar, Frisch Centre, March 2010.

"Voting When the Stakes are High." (co-authors Andersen, J. J. and Natvik, G. J.), CESifo Conference on Public Sector Economics, April 2010.

"Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public Investment?" (co-author Natvik, G. J.), Department seminar, BI Norwegian School of Management, May 2010.

"Voting When the Stakes are High." (co-authors Andersen, J. J. and Natvik, G. J.), LSE-NYU political economy workshop May 2010.

"Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public Investment?" (co-author Natvik, G. J.), Department seminar ZEW, University of Mannheim, July 2010.

"Voting When the Stakes are High." (co-authors Andersen, J. J. and Natvik, G. J.), Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, August 25 2010.

"Disentangling Duverger's Mechanical and Psychological Effects." (co-author Folke, O.), Department seminar, Uppsala University, October 2010.

Harstad, Bård
"The Dynamics of Climate Agreements." Columbia University, April 2010.

“The Dynamics of Climate Agreements.” Yale University, April 2010.

“Buy coal? Deposit markets prevent carbon leakage.” CIRPEE Workshop in Political Economy, Quebec city, April 2010.

“Buy coal? Deposit markets prevent carbon leakage.” Northwestern University, April 2010.

“Incomplete contracts in dynamic games.” Stanford GSB - Econ, April 2010.

“The Dynamics of Climate Agreements.” FEEM Workshop: Institutions for Climate Governance, May 2010.

“The Dynamics of Climate Agreements.” Toulouse School of Economics, May 2010.

“The Dynamics of Climate Agreements.” World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists, June 2010.

“Buy coal? Deposit markets prevent carbon leakage.” World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists, June 2010.

“The Dynamics of Climate Agreements.” University of Montreal, October 2010.

“Incomplete contracts in dynamic games.” University of Pennsylvania, September 2010.

Havnes, Tarjei
“Likere muligheter gjennom barnehagen?” Faglig-pedagogisk dag, University of Oslo, January 08 2010.

“Is Universal Child Leveling the Playing Field? Evidence from Non-Linear Difference-in-Differences.” Research Seminar, Frisch Centre, January 21 2010.

“Is Universal Child Leveling the Playing Field? Evidence from Non-Linear Difference-in-Differences.” Research Seminar, Insitutt for Samfunnsforskning, March 08 2010.

“Is Universal Child Leveling the Playing Field? Evidence from Non-Linear Difference-in-Differences.” FHI Psykoforum, Folkehelseinstituttet, Oslo, April 08 2010.

“Sibling Rivalry over Parental Care. Intra-Household Conflict and Child Investment.” Research Seminar, SOFI, April 22 2010.

“Is Child Care Good for Children? Long-run Evidence from Norway.” Norad Conference on Early childhood care and education - Investing in the future, November 18 2010.

Hoel, Michael O.

“Climate change and carbon tax expectations.” Helsinki Center of Economic Research, February 26.

“Økonomiske virkemidler i klimapolitikken.” Vitenskapsakademiet, June 18.

Holden, Steinar
“Wage inflation.” Department of Economics seminar, Geilo, January 14.

“Finanskrise og stabiliseringspolitikk.” Faglig-pedagogisk dag, January 8.

”Finanskrisen og pengepolitikken.” Foredrag for finanskomiteen m.fl. ØI, January 12.

”Økonomifaget og finanskrisen.” Foredrag Statsøkonomisk forening January 25.

”Makroøkonomisk teori etter finanskrisen.” Foredrag for lærere videregående skole, Oslo, February 10.

Innlegg på Samråd med økonomer – Statsministerboligen, February 15.

Innlegg og paneldebatt. ”Økonomiske utfordringer.” Det Norske Studentersamfunnet, Oslo, February 17.

Innlegg og paneldebatt. ”Økonomifaget i krise?” U1, SV-fakultetet, March 10.

Arrangert konferanse. Fiscal implications of the crises. København 22. March (i forbindelse med Nordic Economic Policy Review)

“Wage rigidity, inflation and institutions.” University of Zurich, March 24.

“Discrimination and employment protection.” Umeå universitet, April 14.

”Finanskrise og gjeldskrise.” Hamar Katedralskole June 1.

”Utviklingen i økonomisk teori.” Foredrag Finansdepartementet June 2.

”Europas gjeldskrise.” PriceWaterHouseCoopers, Oslo, June 15.

”Gjeldskrisen.” Frisch Centre, June 16.

Møte med Erik Solheim m.fl om den nordiske modellen. July 2.

“Discrimination and employment protection.” Econometric Society World Congress, Shanghai, August 21.

Comment on paper by Vanhala m.fl. Workshop in Sveriges Riksbank, September 2.

"Gjeldskrisen." Samfunnsøkonomenes forening, September 8.

"Krise i økonomifaget?" Finanskriseutvalget, September 9.

"The Financial crisis – a Nordic perspective." Kommentar, IREC konferanse, FAFO, September 10.

"Norsk økonomi – utfordringer i lys av gjeldskrisen i Europa." Prognosesenteret, September 22.

Høyland, Bjørn
"The Tyranny of International Index Rankings" (co-authors Kalle Moene and Fredrik Willumsen), London School of Economics, 2nd Political Science and Political Economy Conference.

Kravdal, Øystein
"Effects of income variation over the life course on mortality." European Population Conference, Wien.

"Effects of income variation over the life course on mortality." Workshop on register data, Stockholm.

"Community socioeconomic resources and mortality." Seminar, Statistics Norway.

"Community socioeconomic resources and mortality." Seminar, Department of Demography, Stockholm University.

Krüger, Ingrid
"Oljeinntekter og bensinprispolitikk i Gulfregionen." Gulf Research Unit Seminar, June 01.

"Oil Revenues and Gasoline Subsidization." European Development Research Network PhD Workshop, Toulouse, France, June 24-25.

"Does resource wealth really hurt democracy?" PhD Workshop, Department of Economics, University of Oslo, September 14-15.

"Gasoline Subsidization as a Political Tool." Panel member at the Middle East Studies Association Conference, San Diego, November 18-21.

Kundu, Tapas
"Conflict and mobility: Resource sharing among groups." Conference on social conflict at the Delhi School of Economics, April 08-09.

“Conflict and mobility: Resource sharing among groups.” Seminar presentation at Indian statistical institute, Kolkata, April 14.

“Conflict and mobility: Resource sharing among groups.” NHH, Bergen, April 26.

”Microempowerment.” Studentersamfunnet in Bergen, April 27.

“Conflict and mobility: Resource sharing among groups.” Conference on Game theory and application at UECE, Lisbon, November 04-05.

“Resistance to outside investment: A rational model of surplus destruction.” Conference on Game theory and application at UECE, Lisbon, November 04-05.

“Conflict and mobility: Resource sharing among groups.” Frisch Centre, December 01.

“Conflict and mobility: Resource sharing among groups.” Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development, Delhi, India, December 16-18.

Lind, Jo Thori

“Norwegian experiences with the European Economic Area.” Workshop Kyiv, Ukraine.

“Opium for the masses? Conflict-induced narcotics production in Afghanistan” (co-authors Moene, K. and Willumsen, F.) ISSDP Conference, Los Angeles, USA.

“Income, Information and the Extent of Redistribution” (co-author Rohner, D.), Workshop, Munich, Germany.

“The welfare system and economic development in light of the financial crisis– a Norwegian perspective.” South China University of Technology, Guangzhou, China.

“The welfare system and economic development in light of the financial crisis– a Norwegian perspective.” Sun Yat Sen University, Guangzhou, China.

“The welfare system and economic development in light of the financial crisis– a Norwegian perspective.” Guangdong Academy of Social Sciences, Guangzhou, China.

“Gnierindeksen - et mål på verdens gjerrighet.” HiVe.

“Gnierindeksen - et mål på verdens gjerrighet.” Åpen dag (UiO).

“FNs tusenårsmål til tross - verden blir mer gjerrig. Hvordan gjøre fattigdomsbekjempelse mer effektiv?.” NUPI.

Mehlum, Halvor
”Den nykapitalistiske tenkningen. Om ideene og virkningene av det nykapitalistiske systemet.” Bjørnsonprisutdeling, August 30 2010.

“Exotic savings products and the financial crisis.” Research seminar, Department of Economics, November 05 2010.

“Open Access Publications.” ISA convention, February 18 2010.

”Ressursrikdom og økonomisk utvikling.” Foredrag for Vitenskapsakademiets pensjonister, March 15 2010.

Presentasjon for Zimbabwes finansminister, Nordfund, September 30.

Modalsli, Jørgen
”Incomplete Markets, Indivisible Labor and Social Class.” Department of Economics seminar, Geilo, January 2010.

”Incomplete Markets, Indivisible Labor and Social Class.” Forskermøte, Kristiansand, January 04-05 2010.

”Incomplete Markets, Indivisible Labor and Social Class.” IZA/World Bank Conference: Employment and Development, Cape Town, May 03-04 2010.

”Incomplete Markets, Indivisible Labor and Social Class.” EEA Congress, Glasgow, August 23-26 2010.

Moen, Espen
”Job-to-Job Movements in a Simple Search Model.” American economic association annual meeting, Atlanta, January 2010.

”Competitive on-the-job search”. July 2010, Invited session, Society for Economic Dynamics**.**

Moene, Kalle
”Finanskrisen og den nordiske modellen.” Lecture for Finanskomiteen, UiO, January 12.

”Nordiske erfaringer.” Foredrag om nordiske erfaringer for alle departementsrådene, Statsministerens kontor, February 10.

”Om ESOP.” Foredrag for delegasjon fra Venstre ledet av partileder, February 25.

”Sosiale reformer i Latin Amerika.” Latinamerikagruppene, Oslo, March 05.

”Gnierindeksen.” Etikkseminaret UiO, March 11.

”Finanskrise, velferdsstat og økonomisk teori.” Foredrag i regi av Fagutvalget ved ØI, UiO, March 12.

”Velferdsstaten og økonomisk teori.” NHH, March 16.

”Utviklingen i Norge og Sverige fra 1930 til i dag.” Foredrag for utlenandske gjester, vert Olle Tornquist, Institutt for Statsvitenskap, March 23.

“From class wars to class collaboration.” Konferanse i Dehli, April 07-09.

“Bargaining Societies.” Leif Johansen symposium, UiO, May 20.

“Polarization, mobility and redistribution.” Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica, CSIC, Barcelona, May 31.

ESOP: Presentasjon for en større politisk delegasjon fra El Salvador, June 1.

”Likhet.” Finansdepartementet, June 2.

”Familiepolitikk og lønnet husarbeid.” Presentasjonsdebatt Nytt norsk tidsskrift, June 03.

’How equality magnifies.” Universite Decartes, Paris, June 04.

”Utviklingen innenfor økonomisk teori.” Minneseminar for Geir Høgsnes, Sosiologisk institutt, UiO, June 09.

Rundebordskonferanse om den Nordiske modellen. World Economic Forum, Geneve, August 30.

Presentasjon for Zimbabwes finansminister, Nordfund, September 30.

”Responsibility and redistribution.” CSNM, UiO, October 15.

PAXs seminar om Einar Lies bok ”Over evne – Finansdepartementets historie 1965-91.” Forberedt diskusjonsinnlegg til boka, November 15.

Mogstad, Magne
”Internet Pornography: Catharsis or Catalyst for Sexual Crime?.” Invited Seminar, Frisch Centre for Economic Research, May 2010.

”Is Universal Child Care Levelling the Playing Field? Evidence from Non-Linear Difference-in-Differences.” Society of Labor Economics Conference, London, June 2010.

”Is Universal Child Care Levelling the Playing Field? Evidence from Non-Linear Difference-in-Differences.” Workshop on Family Economics, University of Stavanger, June 2010.

”Internet Pornography: Catharsis or Catalyst for Sexual Crime?.” Invited Seminar, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, September 2010.

”What Linear Estimators Miss: Re-Examining the Effects of Family Income on Child Outcome.” Invited Seminar, Tinbergen Institute, University of Amsterdam, September 2010.

”What Linear Estimators Miss: Re-Examining the Effects of Family Income on Child Outcome.” Invited Seminar, Paris School of Economics, October 2010.

”Linearity in Instrumental Variables Estimation: Problems and Solutions.” Invited Seminar, Center of Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST), Paris, October 2010.

”Linearity in Instrumental Variables Estimation: Problems and Solutions.” Invited Seminar, Economics Department, University of Aarhus, October 2010.

”Is Universal Child Care Levelling the Playing Field? Evidence from Non-Linear Difference-in-Differences.” Invited Seminar, Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University, November 2010.

”No Child Left Behind: Universal Child Care and Children's Long-Run Outcomes.” Invited Seminar, Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago, November 2010.

”Internet Pornography: Catharsis or Catalyst for Sexual Crime?.” Invited Seminar, Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago, November 2010.

”Internet Pornography: Catharsis or Catalyst for Sexual Crime?.” Invited Seminar, Workshop on Child Development, University of Chicago, November 2010.

Nilssen, Tore
”Price Coordination in Two-Sided Markets: Competition in the TV Industry.” European Economic Association, Glasgow, August 2010.

”Business Models for Media Firms: Does Competition Matter for How They Raise Revenue?.” BI, Institutt for markedsføring, March 2010.

Nyborg, Karine
“The Gate is Open – Primary Care Physicians as Social Security Gatekeepers.” Det nasjonale forskermøte for økonomer, Universitetet i Agder, January 05.

”Nobelprisen til Elinor Ostrom.” Det nasjonale forskermøte for økonomer, Universitetet i Agder, January 05.

”Anstendighetens økonomi.” Faglig-pedagogisk dag, UiO, January 08.

”Anstendighetens økonomi.” Seminar Skatteøkonomisk avdeling, Finansdepartementet, Kleivstua January 19.

”Anstendighetens økonomi.” Foredrag for Etikkprogrammets PhD-studenter, UiO, January 21.

”Om rasjonalitet.” Innledning og deltakelse i paneldebatt, statsvitenskapsstudentenes aktualitetsuke (fagutvalget), UiO, February 04.

”Penger er ikke alt: Samfunnsansvar som rekrutterings- og motivasjonstiltak.” Åpen dag, UiO, March 04.03.10.

”Anstendighet, arbeidsmotivasjon og eksperimenter. Om økonomisk analyse av sosiale og moralske normer.” gjesteforelesning ved forskerskolen i utdanningsforskning, NTNU, Trondheim, March 05.

”Anstendighetens økonomi.” Finansdepartementet, Oslo, March 08.

”Psykologi versus økonomi.” Innledning og deltakelse i debatt med Joar Vittersø. samfunnsøkonomistudentenes aktualitetsuke (fagutvalget), UiO March 08.

”I Don’t Want to Hear About it. Rational Ignorance among Duty-Oriented Consumers.” CRETA/Marie Curie Symposium in Honor of Peter Hammond, Warwick University March 26.

“Porten er åpen. Om fastlegenes portvaktrolle.” Institutt for Samfunnsforskning, Oslo, April 19.

“Veien framover for norsk klimapolitikk - om økonomenes bidrag.” Konferanse i forbindelse med CICEROs 20-årsjubileum, Grand Hotel, Oslo, April 27.

“Is corporate social responsibility associated with lower wages?” 4th World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists, Montreal, Canada, June 28 - July 2.

“The Bargaining Society: Comment.” The Leif Johansen Symposium, Oslo, May 20-21.

”Gir samfunnsøkonomiske analyser det rette beslutningsgrunnlaget?” Workshop om *Langsiktige klimahensyn i beslutningsprosesser*, Klima- og forurensningsdirektoratet, Oslo, September 29.

“Reluctantly learned responsibility. On social interaction in the welfare state.” Third CSMN – conference on the Nature of Social and Moral Norms in Intentional Action Title: Responsibility: Normative Conceptions and Empirical Findings. Oslo, October 14-15.

“Comment on: *Credible Commitments, Focal Points, and Tipping in Climate Treaties* by Scott Barrett.” Conference in honor of Thomas Schelling, October 21-22, Sustainable Consumption Institute, University of Manchester.

“Corporate Social Responsibility as Labor Market Screening: Theory and Evidence.” NHH, Bergen, October 27.

“Playing with the good guys: A public good game with endogenous group formation.” Freie Universität, Berlin, November 11.

“Anstendighetens økonomi. Seminaret i analytisk, kvantitativ sosiologi, Institutt for sosiologi og samfunnsgeografi, UiO, November 30.

“Corporate Social Responsibility as Labor Market Screening: Theory and Evidence.” Umeå universitet, December 16.

Ognedal, Tone
“High taxes, shadow work and minimum wages.” The research Forum on Taxation (Skatteforum) 2010, Son, June 07-09 2010.

“High taxes, shadow work and minimum wages.” International Institute of Public Finance (IIPF) Annual Congress 2010, Uppsala, Sweden, August 23-26 2010.

“High taxes, shadow work and minimum wages.” European Association of Law and Economics, 2010 Annual Conference, Paris, September 23-25 2010.

“Shadow work and the regular labour market” (co-author Barth, E.), European Association of Law and Economics, 2010 Annual Conference, Paris, September 23-25 2010.

Rege, Mari
“The Impact of Paternity Leave on Long-Term Father Involvement.” Norges Handelshøgskole, January 2010.

Raaum, Oddbjørn
”Immigration and Wages; Evidence from Construction.” Staff seminar, SOFI, Stockholm. February 26.

”Immigration and Wages; Evidence from Construction.” Lunsjseminar, AID, May 12.

”Immigration and Wages Evidence from Construction.” EALE-SOLE congress, London, June 2010.

“Comments on studies of drivers of intergenerational mobility.” CRITA meeting, Russel Sage Foundation, London, June 16-17 2010.

”Immigration and Wages; Evidence from Construction.” Østforum, September 08.

”Immigrant wage profiles within and between establishments.” IFAU Conference on Immigration and Labour Market Integration, Rånäs Slott, October 19-20 2010.

”Immigration and Wages; Evidence from Construction.” Seminar Tekniske Beregningsutvalget for Inntektsoppgjørene, November 10.

Røed, Knut
”Sykefravær i Norge.” Foredrag for Arbeiderpartiets stortingsgruppe, Stortinget, Oslo, January 06.

”Om økonomiske insentiver og hvordan de virker.” Foredrag på Forskningsrådets avslutningskonferanse for arbeidslivsforskningsprogrammet, Oslo, January 27.

”Drivkrefter bak veksten i langtidssykefraværet 1993-2005.” Innledning på Forskningsrådets sykefraværsforskningskonferanse, Holmen fjordhotell, February 02.

”Kan arbeid erstatte trygd?” Foredrag på Samfunnsøkonomisk forenings Valutaseminar, Lysebu, Oslo, February 04.

”Entrepreneurship: Origins and Returns.” Paperpresentasjon på entreprenørskaps-forskningskonferanse i regi av Handelshøgskolen i København, København, February 11.

”Tiltak for reduksjon i sykefravær: Aktiviserings- og nærværsreform.” Foredrag for offentlig utvalg som utreder sykefravær i helse- og omsorgssektoren, February 23.

”Uføretrygden – hvor står vi, og hvor går vi?” Foredrag i ”Pensjonsforum.” Fafo, Oslo, March 12.

”Sykefraværet i Norge – Hva kan gjøres?” Foredrag for Centre for Monetary Economics, BI, Oslo, March 16.

”Sykefravær i Norge.” Lunsjseminar, Riksrevisjonen, Oslo, March 22.

”Sykefraværet i Norge – Hva kan gjøres?” Foredrag på Samfunnsøkonomisk forenings frokostseminar, Aker brygge, Oslo, March 25.

”Sykefravær og arbeidsmoral.” Innlegg på faglunsj i regi av studentforeningen, senter for helseledelse UiO, Oslo, April 19.

”Konkurser og utstøtning fra arbeidsmarkedet.” Foredrag på lunsjseminar i Næringsdepartementet, April 23.

”Creative unemployment.” Presentasjon på Oslo-Århus konferanse om vekst og entreprenørskap, Oslo, April 08.

”Unemployment insurance in welfare states – how can we contain the moral hazard problem?” Presentasjon på workshop i regi av Ghent University og UC Louvain om “Monitoring, Counseling and Sanctions: Structural and Reduced Form Evaluation.” Ghent, Belgia, April 29.

”Konkurser og utstøtning fra arbeidsmarkedet.” Foredrag på møte i Arbeids- og velferdsdirektoratet. Oslo, May 27.

“Economic and Social Incentives for Viable Age Policies.” Keynote address på konferansen “Older workers in a sustainable society.” Oslo, June 10.

”Er uførtrygd skjult arbeidsledighet?” Foredrag på møte i Arbeids- og velferdsdirektoratet. Oslo, June 17.

” Den nordiske velferdsmodellen og utenforskapet.” Foredrag på seminar i Arbeidsdepartementet, August 12.

”Disability in the Welfare State – and Unemployment Problem in Disguise.” Presentasjon på faglig seminar i Norges Bank, August 18.

”Barrierer i arbeidslivet.” Innledning på seminar i Arbeidsdepartementet, August 24.

”Push eller pull? Hvem faller ut av arbeidslivet og hvorfor? Kan de komme tilbake til arbeidslivet? Hvordan?” Foredrag på NHO-konferanse. Losby, September 10.

”The case for presenteeism.” Presentasjon på faglig seminar på Universitetet i Utrecht, Nederland, September 29.

”The case for presenteeism.” Presentasjon på faglig seminar, NHH, Bergen, October 27.

Storesletten, Kjetil
“Growing Like China.” Workshop on China, Toronto Universtity, January 25.

“Redistributive Taxation in a Partial-Insurance Economy.” Toronto Universtity, Department of Economics, January 26.

“Growing Like China.” Northwestern University, April 05.

“Growing Like China.” Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada, April 23.

“Growing Like China.” University of Iowa, May 05.

“Growing Like China.” Carnegie Mellon University, June 11.

“Growing Like China.” Norges Bank, June 27.

“Redistributive Taxation in a Partial-Insurance Economy.” Helsinki School of Economics, August 12.

“Growing Like China.” International Monetary Fund, August 26.

“Growing Like China.” University of Chicago, October 04.

“Chinese Pension Reform in the Face of Financial Frictions.” Brown University, October 15.

“From wages to welfare: Decomposing gains and losses from rising inequality.” Colombia University, November 02.

“Chinese Pension Reform in the Face of Financial Frictions.” Conference on China, Zurich University, November 10.

“Chinese Pension Reform in the Face of Financial Frictions.” University of Pennsylvania, November 17.

“From wages to welfare: Decomposing gains and losses from rising inequality.” University of Texas, Austin, November 22.

“From wages to welfare: Decomposing gains and losses from rising inequality.”

Sørensen, Erik
”Perspectives on the state-of-the-art: Is Experimental Economics a Topic or a Method?.” Conference on Experiments in the Social Sciences, Universitetet i Bergen, January 19 2010.

” Just Luck: An Experimental Study of Risk Taking and Fairness.” Economic Science Association World Meeting, Copenhagen, July 11 2010.

Ulltveit-Moe, Karen Helene
"Krise og industriell utviking." Conference arranged by The Department of Economics for Finanskomiteen, UiO, January 12 2010.

Samråd med 5 økonomer hos Statsministeren med Finansministeren og Regjeringens Underutvalg for å diskutere Norges økonomiske situasjon et år etter Finanskrisen, February 2010.

"Heterogeneous firms or heterogeneous workers? Implications for Exporter premia and the gains from trade" (co-authored by Alfonso Irrarazabal and Andreas Moxnes), Politics, Economics and Global Governance: The European Dimensions (Research Workshop on International Trade organised by HEI, Geneva), Villars (Switzerland), March 2010.

"Heterogeneous firms or heterogeneous workers? Implications for Exporter premia and the gains from trade" (co-authored by Alfonso Irrarazabal and Andreas Moxnes), LSE Staff seminar, London, UK, March 2010.

Zilibotti, Fabrizio
"Structural Development Accounting." Keynote presentation at ESEM World Conference, Shanghai, August 2010. (co-authors Gancia, Gino and Müller, Andreas)

Lectures and presentations 2009

Almås, Ingvild
"The Development of Inequality Acceptance." The Economic Child Conference, Milano, Italy, January 2009.

"Measuring unfair (in)equality." Fordelingsutvalget, Finansdepartementet, Oslo, January 2009.

"International Income Inequalitites: Measuring PPP bias by estimating Engel curves for food." Christian Michelsens Institute seminar, Bergen, February 2009.

"International Income Inequalitites: Measuring PPP bias by estimating Engel curves for food." Department Seminar, University of Bergen, February 2009.

"Convergence? Cost of living indices for measuring World Inequality and Poverty." Workshop Davis, Davis, USA, April 2009.

"International Income Inequalitites: Measuring PPP bias by estimating Engel curves for food." World Social Science Forum, Bergen, May 2009.

”Measuring unfair (in)equality.” Workshop Marcheille, France, May 2009.

”Measuring unfair (in)equality.” Skatteforum, Bergen, June 2009.

”Convergence? Cost of living indices for measuring World Inequality and Poverty.” Nordic Symposium of Macroeconomics, Smögen, Sweden, August 2009.

”Measuring unfair (in)equality.” Nærings- og Handelsdepartementet, Son, September 2009.

”Older or Wealthier? The Impact of Age Adjustments on the Wealth Inequality Ranking of Countries.” Inequality: New Directions conference, Cornell University, September 2009.

“Measuring unfair (in)equality.” Whose Opportunities? A Critique of Equality, Conference presentation, Lisbon, Portugal, October 2009.

“International Income Inequality: Measuring PPP bias by estimating Engel curves for food.” Conference on Growth and Development, ISI, Dehli, India, December 2009.

Asheim, Geir

“Intergenerational Equity - Combining sensitivity for the interests of the present with respect for the interests of the future.” University of California, Riverside, April 01 2009.

“Strategic use of environmental information. Voluntary Approaches to Environmental Protection.” April 24-25 2009.

“Procrastination, partial naivete and behavioral welfare analysis.” University of California, Santa Barbara, May 01 2009.

“Generalized time-invariant overtaking.” 9th International Meeting of Intergenerational Equity - Combining sensitivity for the interests of the present with respect for the interests of the future. University of California, San Diego, May 18 2009.

“Strategic use of environmental information.” CBE Conference on Behavioral Economics, June 04-06 2009.

“Intergenerational Equity - Combining sensitivity for the interests of the present with respect for the interests of the future.” 7th Toulouse Conference on Environmental and Resource Economics, June 18-19 2009.

“Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games.” Conference on Economic Design, June 22-24 2009.

“Procrastination, partial naivete, and behavioral welfare analysis.” Workshop on Behavioral Game Theory, July 20-23 2009.

"Generalized time-invariant overtaking." 24th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association/ 64th European Meeting of the Econometric Society, August 23-27 2009.

Aslaksen, Silje
"Oil and Political Survival: The role of Institutions." (co-author Andersen, Jørgen J.) Seminar Frischsenteret, UiO, October 28 2009.

"The Resource Curse." Gjesteforeleser NHH UiO, February 16 2009.

"Corruption and Oil: Evidence from Panel Data." 3rd OxCarre Annual Conference, UiO, December 09-10 2009.

Barth, Erling
"The Equality Multiplier." Inequality Seminar, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, March 09 2009.

Beyene, Berhe Mekonnen
"How sensitive are Poverty Measures to the Choice of Equivalence Scale and Unit of Analysis? Evidence from Urban Ethiopia." The Seventh International Annual Conference on the Ethiopian Economy, June 25-27 2009.

Bratsberg, Bernt
"Immigration and the Labor Market: Inflows, Integration, and Impacts." Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion, February 2009.

"Labor Market Research in Norway." Testimony for the OECD Review Team on the Labour Market Integration of Immigrants and Their Children, February 2009.

"Skills and labor market participation across time and space." Annual Frisch Centre Seminar, Staur, April 2009.

"Wage Effects of Immigration: Lessons from Construction." FAFO Østforum, September 2009.

"Immigration and Wages: Evidence from Construction." Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, November 2009.

"Arbeidsinnvandring og lønnsstruktur: Erfaringer fra bygg og anlegg." Norges forskningsråd, November 2009.

Brekke, Kjell Arne
"Playing with the Good Guys." Warwick, IAREP/SABE 2008 Conference at LUISS in Rome, September 03-06 2009.

"Conditionality of Cooperation and the impact on environmental norms." Workshop on The Role of Social Norms in Building a Low Carbon Society, Warwick University, July 09 2009.

"Playing with the Good Guys." EEA-ESEM 2009, Barcelona, August 23-27 2009.

"Hvordan lønn og rettferdighet påvirker arbeidsmotivasjon." Invitert foredrag på OU-kurs for Forskerforbundets medlemmer i Statped: "Betydning av lønn, med fokus på lokal lønnspolitikk i relasjon til arbeidsmiljø og motivasjon," 2009.

Christiansen, Vidar
Discussant on "Marginal Cost of Public Funds, Optimal Public Goods Provision and Second-best Policy Analysis." presented by Bas Jacobs, Workshop on Taxation, Public Provision and the Future of the Nordic Welfare Model, Organized by Empirical Labor Economics, Helsinki, June 15-16 2009.

Clarhäll, Jenny
"Gender occupational segregation and wages." Workshop in relation to course on "Labour and the Family." Økonomisk institutt, University of Oslo, September 17 2009.

"Gender occupational segregation and wages." Frischsenteret, Oslo, November 25 2009.

Cools, Sara
"Parenthood penalties and household specialization." II Workshop on Gender Economics, Granada, Spain, June 29-30 2009.

Fiva, Jon H.
"Health status after Cancer. Does it Matter Which Hospital You Belong To?" (co-author Rønning, Marte) HERO seminar, University of Oslo, January 2009.

"Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public Investment?" (co-author **Natvik, Gisle J.)** NTNU, February 2009.

"Health status after Cancer. Does it Matter Which Hospital You Belong To?" (co-author Rønning, Marte) Internal seminar, Department of Economics, University of Oslo, March 2009.

"Do Re-Election Probabilities Influence Public Investment?." CESifo Area Conference on Public Sector Economics, April 24-26 2009.

"Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public Investment?." WZB workshop on Reflections on Fiscal Federalism: Elaborating the Research Agenda, October 30-31 2009.

“Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?.” North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, June 04-07 2009.

“Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?.” Department Seminar University of Barcelona, October 02 2009.

“Do Re-election Probalities Influence Public Investment?.” Fredagsseminar Handelshøyskolen BI, November 13 2009.

Havnes, Tarjei

“Is universal child care leveling the playing field? Evidence from non-linear difference-in-differences.” Nordic research in the field of early childhood education and care: Quality and relevance for policymaking, November 18-20 2009.

“Is universal child care leveling the playing field? Evidence from non-linear difference-in-differences.” Research Seminar, SFI2, November 25 2009.

“Is Universal Child Care Levelling the Playing Field? Evidence from Non-linear Difference-in-Differences.” Research Seminar, Department of Economics, University of Oslo, September 25 2009.

“Money for Nothing? Universal Child Care and Maternal Employment.” EALE, Annual Meeting, September 10-12 2009.

“Money for Nothing? Universal Child Care and Maternal Employment.” Taxation, Public Provision and the Future of the Nordic Welfare Model, June 15-16 2009.

“Money for Nothing? Universal Child Care and Maternal Employment.” 15th Conference on Panel Data, July 03-05 2009.

“Money for Nothing? Universal Child Care and Maternal Employment.” Econometric Society European Meeting, August 23-27 2009.

“No Child Left Behind: Universal Child Care and Children's Long-run Outcomes.” European Economic Association, Annual Meeting, August 23-27 2009.

“No Child Left Behind: Universal Child Care and Children's Long-run Outcomes.” Research Seminar, Department of Economics, March 12 2009.

“Social mobility and universal child care: Theory and evidence.” Prøveforelesning for phd-graden i samfunnsøkonomi, October 27 2009.

"The Irrelevance of Subsidized Child Care for Maternal Employment." Forskermøtet. January 05-06 2009.

"Is universal child care leveling the playing field? Evidence from non-linear difference-in-differences." Varieties of inequality, June 17 2009.

"The Irrelevance of Subsidized Child Care for Maternal Employment." Spring Meeting of Young Economists, April 23-25 2009.

Hoel, Michael Olaf

"Bush meets Hotelling: Effects of improved renewable energy technology on greenhouse gas emissions." 17th Annual Conference of the European Association og Enviro, Amsterdam, June 24-27 2009.

"Bush meets Hotelling: Effects of improved renewable energy technology on greenhouse gas emissions." European Economic Association 2009 meeting Barcelona, August 23-27 2009.

"Bør klimapolitikken være kostnadseffektiv?" Seminar at BI Norwegian School of Management, October 09 2009.

"Can a focus on breakthrough technologies improve the performance of international environmental agreements?" Coalitions for climate cooperation. A game-theoretical analysis of post 2012 climate policy Fagmesse, FFEM og ETH, Venice, June 15 2009.

Climate change and carbon tax expectations. CESifo area conference on energy and climate economics Munchen, October 16-17 2009.

Climate policy for the world and for the EU. Climate policy for the world and for the EU University of Oldenburg, June 16 2009.

Economic Analysis of the Climate Problem. Presentasjon for Arbeidsgruppen for Miljø og Økonomi, Nordisk Ministerråd, March 12 2009.

Forberedt innlegg på seminar arrangert av SSB om utviklingen av prisen på CO2-kvoter. SSB: om utviklingen av prisen på CO2-kvoter, January 16 2009.

Innlegg på "Presentation av Swedish Economic Forum Report". Entreprenörskap och innovationer för hållbar utveckling, November 10 2009.

"Klimapolitikk i en liten økonomi." Innlegg på Fagdagen Finansdepartementet, June 04 2009.

"Kvoter, grønne sertifikater og andre klimapolitiske virkemidler." Gimle Rotary, November 25 2009.

”Kvoter, grønne sertifikater og andre klimapolitiske virkemidler.” Foredrag for klima- og energiseksjonen i SFT samt kjernegruppen for KLIMAKUR2020, December 15 2009.

“Norwegian climate policy – some reflections.” Presentasjon for OECD fact finding mission, September 01 2009.

Holden, Steinar
”Hva er god pengepolitikk?” Foredrag for finanskomiteen m.fl. ØI, January 14 2009.

”Denmark, Sweden, the UK and EMU.” Pressekonferanse, SNS Stockholm, January 27 2009.

”Denmark, Sweden, the UK and EMU.” Foredrag, SNS Stockholm, January 28 2009.

”Finanskrise og tiltakspakke.” Foredrag for finanskomiteen, høring i Stortinget, January 29 2009.

”Finanskrise og finanspolitikk.” Foredrag Sandvika videregående skole, January 30 2009.

”Finanskrisen – årsaker og konsekvenser.” Foredrag, Norske selskap, February 10 2009.

”Renter og finanskrise.” Foredrag Aktuarforeningen, Holmenkollen Park, February 12 2009.

Innledning, ”Finanskrise og ideologi.” Oslo Høyres Ideologigruppe, February 26 2009.

”Kan inntektsoppgjøret stimulere økonomien?” Unios tariffkonferanse, March 04 2009.

”Finanskrise- kommentar til George Cooper.” Civita, March 06 2009.

”Finanskrisen – årsaker og konsekvenser.” Pensjonistuniversitetet, March 12 2009.

Debattmøte, karrieredagene UiO, April 01 2009.

Foredrag polyteknisk forening Oslo, ”Finanskrisen – kan vi regulere oss ut av kommende kriser?” April 23 2009.

Intervju om nobelprisvinner E. Phelps, Snøball produksjonsselskap – sendes til høsten, April 23 2009.

Kommentar. Finanspolitiska rådets rapport, May 12 2009.

”Motkonjunkturpolitikk.” Rådmannslandsmøtet, May 13 2009.

”Trenger vi et nytt Solidaritetsalternativ?” Foredrag. Finansdepartementet, May 28 2009.

”Hvordan kunne en hel verden ta feil? Finanskrisen.” Kommuneøkonomikonferansen, June 17 2009.

Debattleder – debatt for studentene på SV-fakultetet om formueskatt, September 08 2009.

”Finanskrisen og norsk økonomi.” Finanskriseutvalget, September 09 2009.

”Finanskrisen og norsk økonomi.” Maskingrossistenes Landsforening, September 19 2009.

”Lønn og arbeidsledighet.” Finansdepartementet, December 08 2009.

”Lønn og arbeidsledighet.” Finansdepartementet, December 15 2009.

”Lønn og arbeidsledighet.” Finansdepartementet, December 22 2009.

”Aggregate demand, investment and unemployment.” Workshop, SOFI, Universitetet i Stockholm, February 11 2009.

Comment on Anna Larsson “Pattern Bargaining, wage leadership and inflation targeting.” SOFI, Universitetet i Stockholm, February 11 2009.

“Discrimination and employment protection.” ETH, Zurich, February 23 2009.

“Wage rigidity, institutions, and inflation.” Uppsala universitet, March 02 2009.

“Discrimination and employment protection.” BI, March 18 2009.

“Discrimination and employment protection.” NHH, Geilo, March 25 2009.

Comment on S. Cecchetti. Inflation forecast dispersion, Norges Bank, June 12 2009.

“Discrimination and employment protection.” Workshop. CEPR/IZA. München, September 18 2009.

Kundu, Tapas

“Resistance to outside investment: A rational model of surplus destruction.” Invited presentation at the workshop ‘Market Evolution and Public Decision’, organized by European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics in Brussels, Belgium, June 12 2009.

“Resistance to outside investment: A rational model of surplus destruction.” Nordic conference on development economics, organized in Oscarborg, Norway, June 18 2009.

"Monopoly pricing under a Medicaid-style most favored customer clause and its welfare implication." 24th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association in Barcelona, August 23-27 2009.

Lind, Jo Thori
"Miserly Developments." Dinâmicas da Pobreza e Padrões de Acumulação Económica em Moçambique Maputo, Mosambik, April 22-23 2009.

"Income, Information and the Extent of Redistribution." Forskermøtet for økonomer Bergen, January 05-06 2009.

"Opium for the Masses? Conflict-induced narcotics production in Afghanistan." The 5th SFB/TR15 workshop for young researchers Berlin, Tyskland. Invitert presentasjon, May 15-16 2009.

"Den skandinaviske modellen og rekruttering til høyere utdanning." Lektorlagets landsmøte, November 13 2009.

"A Critical View on the Use of Indicators for Labour Relations in the Doing Business-Report." Development with Responsibility and Accountability: A Dialogue with the World Bank Group NORAD, Oslo, June 11 2009.

"Gnierindeksen." Presentasjon på Norges ambassade, Maputo, Mosambik, April 28 2009.

"Gniene land." Forelesning på Åpen dag, UiO, March 05 2009.

Mehlum, Halvor
Presentation of ESOP for Japanese delegation UiO, November 13 2009.

Presentasjon av ESOP UiO, November 25 2009.

"Om finanskrisen." Foredrag om finanskrisen for Valler gymnas UiO, November 11 2009.

"Finanskrisen." Foredrag om finanskrisen UiO, February 03 2009.

"Finanskrisen og internasjonal økonomi." Foredrag ved Åpen dag UiO, March 05 2009.

Modalsli, Jørgen
"Factor-augmenting technical change and the British Industrial Revolution." (with J. Anchorena) Economic and Business Historical Society Conference, Grand Rapids, Michigan, April 23-24 2009.

"Factor-augmenting technical change and the British Industrial Revolution." (with J. Anchorena) Macro student lunch seminar, New York University, April 2009.

Moen, Espen
"Worker matching and firm value." Society for economic Dynamics (SED), Istanbul, July 2009.

Moene, Kalle
Presentasjon for Nepals statsminister, Continental, Oslo, January 19 2009.

Presentasjon for Arbeiderpartiets sentralstyre, Oslo, January 21 2009.

"Varige konsekvenser av finanskrisen" på Tim Greves Symposium, Jæløya, February 06 2009.

"Rettferdighet og økonomisk teori." Culcom Workshop, Oslo, February 06 2009.

"Nordiske modellen." UDs aspirantkurs, Oslo, February 18 2009.

"Conflict and Opium Cultivation in Afghanistan." University of Namur, March 04 2009.

"Velferdsstaten." Studentersamfunnets fagdebatt. Oslo, March 18 2009.

"Den skandinaviske modellen og økonomisk ulikhet." Ulikhetsutvalget. Oslo, March 25 2009.

Debattmøte DU. Oslo, March 30 2009.

Seminar om Media og SFF med ledende representanter for Forskningsrådet og UiO, Oslo, April 21 2009.

"Hva vil Norge med IMF." Presentasjon på debattmøte om IMF, Bristol. Oslo, April 28 2009.

"Equality and Development." Presentasjon på World Social Science Forum i Bergen, May 09 2009.

"Darwin og økonomene." Presentasjon på Forskningsrådets møte, May 14 2009.

"Den nordiske modellen og konkurransepolitikken." Foredrag: Konkurransetilsynets konferanse i Bergen, June 02 2009.

Presentasjon på Forskningsrådets konferanse, June 03-04.

"Finanskrisen og utviklingslandene." Foredrag, Petrosams konferanse, Oslo, June 08 2009.

"Misplaced Emphasis, Misplaced Sympathy, and Misplaced Methodology - Development studies on trial." Foredrag, CMI and UiBs utviklingskonferanse, June 11 2009.

”Finanskrisen, fattigdom og utvikling.” Foredrag, Norsk Folkehjelps seminar, June 25 2009.

”Økonomisk krise og krise i økonomisk teori.” Foredrag, Synnovates konferanse, Oslo, August 27 2009.

Presentasjon av ESOP for Kåre Willoch og rektor ved Universitetet i Oslo, September 08 2009.

”Den nordiske modellen.” Foredrag, Etikkseminaret, NTNU, September 22 2009.

’’Likhet, institusjoner og økonomisk adferd’’. Presentasjon, kriminologi og juss, UiO, September 23 2009.

”Hva er god bistand?” Foredrag, debattmøte om utviklingshjelp, Radikalt økonominettverk, September 26 2009.

”New Deal, eller stø kurs – hva har Norge lært av finanskrisen?” Innledning på debattmøte om økonomisk teori. Polyteknisk forening, Litteraturhuset, October 20 2009.

”Equality and growth.” Presentasjon, University of Paris, Paris, November 24 2009.

”Keynes, finansielle kriser og velferdsstaten.” Foredrag, Nordisk Administrativt forbund, Oslo, December 01 2009.

”The equality multiplier.” Presentasjon: conference, Indian Statistical Institute, New Dehli, December 16 2009.

Mogstad, Magne
“Is Universal Child Care Levelling the Playing Field? Evidence from Non-Linear Difference-in-Differences.” Seminar, DIW, Berlin, November 2009.

“Is Universal Child Care Levelling the Playing Field? Evidence from Non-Linear Difference-in-Differences.” IFAU, University of Uppsala, November 2009.

“Is Universal Child Care Levelling the Playing Field? Evidence from Non-Linear Difference-in-Differences.” Seminar, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, November 2009.

“On the Measurement of Long-run Inequality and Income Mobility.” Workshop on Inequality, Cornell University, September 2009.

“Is Universal Child Care Levelling the Playing Field? Evidence from Non-Linear Difference-in-Differences.” Research Seminar, New York University, September, September 2009.

"Is Universal Child Care Levelling the Playing Field? Evidence from Non-Linear Difference-in-Differences." Workshop on Family Economics, Svolvær, August 2009.

"No Child Left Behind: Universal Child Care and Children's Long-run Outcomes." CEPR Workshop on Families and Child Development, Univ. of Stavanger, June 2009.

"Money for Nothing? Universal Child Care and Maternal Employment." Workshop on the Nordic Welfare Model, Helsinki, June 2009.

"Family Size and Children's Education: How Linear Models can Mask a Non-Linear Causal Relationship." Research Seminar, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, February 2009.

"Family Size and Children's Education:: How Linear Models can Mask a Non-Linear Causal Relationship." Research Seminar, Annual Meeting of Norwegian Economists, January 2009.

Nilssen, Tore with Nævdal, Erik
"Green entry." Frischseminaret, Frischsenteret, Oslo, December 09 2009.

Nyborg, Karine
"I Don't Want to Hear About it: Rational Ignorance among Duty-Oriented Consumers." Workshop on Voluntary Approaches to Environmental Protection, Donald Bren School of Environmental Science and Management, UCLA, Santa Barbara, April 24-25 2009.

"The Gate is Open: Primary Care Physicians as Social Security Gatekeepers." HERO/HEBs workshop i helseøkonomi, Lysebu, May 08-09 2009.

"Playing with the Good Guys: a Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation." 17th Annual Conference of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Amsterdam, June 24-27 2009.

"Playing with the Good Guys: a Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation." Institutt for økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen, September 18 2009.

"Samfunnsansvar og lønn." (with Zhang, Tao) Frischsenteret, December 16 2009.

"Står Homo Oeconomicus for fall? Nye perspektiver på økonomisk atferd." Samfunnsøkonomenes forenings kandidattreff, Bristol, Oslo, February 06 2009.

"Undergraver miljøavgifter moralsk motivasjon?" Faglunsj i Miljøverndepartmentet, February 25 2009.

"Penger er ikke alt: Bedrifters samfunnsansvar som rekrutterings- og motivasjonstiltak." Åpen dag, Økonomisk institutt, UiO, March 05 2009.

”Penger er ikke alt: Bedrifters samfunnsansvar som rekrutterings- og motivasjonstiltak.” Foredrag for klasse fra Askim vgs. Økonomisk institutt, UiO, April 28 2009.

”Anstendighetens økonomi.” Tiltredelsesforelesning, UiO, May 12 2009.

“Homo Oeconomicus versus Homo Politicus.” Foredrag på symposium i anledning Aanund Hyllands 60årsdag, Nobelinstituttet, Oslo, June 16 2009.

“Porten er åpen – om fastlegenes portvaktrolle.” Velferdspolitisk avdeling, AID, December 10 2009.

Rege, Mari
”Blir vi syke av å miste jobben?” Konferanse NFR, September 2009.

“Home with Mom: The effects of Stay-at-Home Moms on Childrens Long-Run Educational Outcomes.” Workshop Universitet i Stavanger, June 2009.

”Finanskrise og nedbemanning - kvinner takler det bedre enn menn.” Stavanger og Bergen/Skagenfondene, April 2009.

Rosén, Åsa
“Discrimination and Employment Protection.” Meeting of the Society for Economic Dynamics, Istanbul, July 2009.

“Discrimination and Employment Protection.” Meeting of the European Association of Labour Economics, Tallin, September 2009.

Røed, Knut
”Hvorfor heller syk enn på jobb?” Foredrag på stabsseminar Institutt for Samfunnsforskning, Oslo, February 06 2009.

“The Anatomy of Absenteeism.” SOFI, Stockholm, March 26 2009.

“The Anatomy of Absenteeism.” Presentasjon på Ruhrgas-konferansen “Demographic Change and Public Policy.” Dresden, Germany, April 24 2009.

“Arbeidsmarkedspolitikkens virkninger - empiriske funn og metodiske utfordringer.” Foredrag på avslutningskonferanse for det strategiske instituttprogrammet for arbeidsmarkeds- og trygdeforskning (arrangert av AID, Oslo) , February 24 2009.

”Tjenestepensjoner i offentlig sektor.” Innledning i ”Pensjonsforum.” FAFO, Oslo, March 20 2009.

”2/3 av sluttlønna i pensjon - for godt til å vare? Kan pensjonsordningene i offentlig sektor forenes med pensjonsreformen?” Foredrag på medlemsmøte i NTL, Utenriksdepartementet, April 16 2009.

”Økonomisk krise – Konsekvenser for velferdspolitikken rettet mot utsatte grupper og migrasjonen. Hva vet vi, hva har utviklingen det siste året lært oss?” Foredrag på AID’s virksomhetslederkonferanse, Oslo, August 31 2009.

”Virker arbeidsmarkedspolitikken?” Foredrag holdt i forbindelse med markering av Tor Sagli’s 60-års dag, Arbeids- og velferdsdirektoratet, Oslo, September 11 2009.

”Entreprenørskap i Norge.” Foredrag på Forskningsrådets vekstforsknings-seminar, Oslo, September 22 2009.

”Hvordan virker økonomiske insentiver inn på deltakelsen i arbeidslivet?” Innledning på konferanse i arbeidslivsforskningsprogrammet, Oslo, November 16 2009.

”De første arbeidsinnvandrerne og velferdsstaten. Hva kan vi lære av historien?” Foredrag for referansegruppe for Brochman-utvalget, Oslo, December 02 2009.

”Økonomisk nedgangstid, sykefravær og uførhet.” Foredrag for ansatte ved Statens arbeidsmiljøinstitutt (STAMI), Oslo, December 09 2009.

Storesletten, Kjetil
“Growing Like China.” University of Venezia, March 23 2009.

“Growing Like China.” London Business School, March 24 2009.

“Growing Like China.” University of Cambridge, April 20 2009.

“Growing Like China.” London School of Economics, June 16 2009.

“Growing Like China.” Tsinghua University, Beijing, July 06 2009.

“Growing Like China.” Minnesota Workshop in Macroeconomic Theory, Minneapolis, July 29 2009.

“Growing Like China.” University of Rochester, September 21 2009.

“Growing Like China.” Yale University, September 22 2009.

“Growing Like China.” Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis, October 15 2009.

“Growing Like China.” MIT, November 10 2009.

"Growing Like China." Wharton, December 08 2009.

"Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt": Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, December 03 2009.

"Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt": IIES (Stockholm University), June 02 2009.

"Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt": University of Copenhagen, June 18 2009.

"Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt": Society for Economic Dynamics Annual Meeting (Istanbul), July 03 2009.

"Den Nordiske Modellen." Åpningsforedrag REASSESS konferanse, Oslo, May 18 2009.

"Rikdommens dilemma." Nittedal Rotary, January 22 2009.

"Rikdommens dilemma." Finansdepartementet (Skattepolitisk avd.), June 11 2009.

Strøm, Marte
"How Husbands and Wife Vote." Department seminar, Geilo, January 2009.

Sørensen, Erik
"Reflections on apples and oranges." Forskermøtet, Bergen, January 2009.

"Wages And Seniority When Coworkers Matter." 4th Nordic Summer Institute in Labor Economics, Bergen, June 2009.

Modeling Individual Choices in Experiment, 4th Nordic Conference on Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Oslo, October 2009.

"Kunnskapssamfunnet og arbeidslivet". Grunnlaget for ny vekst (Akademikernes lønnspolitiske konferanse). Prize acceptance talk, February 2009.

Ulltveit-Moe, Karen Helene
"Bevaringsverdig? Omstilling og vekst i krisetider." Høstkonferansen 2009, November 18 2009.

"En gjentakelse av 30-årene, eller har vi lært?" Aulaforum, Justivalens faggruppe i samarbeid med Advokatfirmaet BA-HR, September 01 2009.

”Hva sviktet? Lærdommer for politikk og regulering.” Vårkonferansen 2009, May 27 2009.

”Live and let die – næringspolitikk i en globalisert verden.” Nordic Venture Capital Annual Conference, May 25 2009.

“Manufacturing restructuring and the role of real exchange rate shocks.” European Research Workshop in International Trade Center for Economic Policy Research, Madrid, June 01-03 2009.

“Manufacturing restructuring and the role of real exchange rate shocks.” External adjustment: the macroeconomic and microeconomic dimensions European Commission, Brussel, December 04 2009.

“Regjeringens tiltakspakke 2009: Kommentarer.” Stortingets Finanskomite, January 29 2009.

”Råvarelykke! Hvorfor det ikke er flaut å leve av naturressurser.” Departementenes seminarserie, September 17 2009.

”Skattereformen 2006: Hva trengte vi og hva fikk vi?” Skattebetalerforeningens årsmiddag Skattebetalerforeningens årsmiddag, March 25 2009.

Willumsen, Fredrik
“Opium for the masses? Conflict-induced narcotics production in Afghanistan.” 24th Congress of the European Economic Association (EEA), Barcelona, August 23-27 2009.

“Opium for the masses? Conflict-induced narcotics production in Afghanistan.” Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Trondheim, April 02 2009.

Zilibotti, Fabrizio
Fudan University, six Invited Lectures on Economic Growth, January 2009.

“Growing like China.” Seminar at CERGE-EI, Prague, January 16 2009.

“Growing like China.” Seminar IMT Lucca, February 09 2009.

“Growing like China.” Forth Annual Workshop on Global Interdependence, Florence, March 06-07 2009.

“Growing like China.” Seminar at University of Bocconi, April 06 2009.

“Corporate social rules.” Seminar Avenir Suisse, “Quale etica nel libero mercato?” April 04 2009.

“Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt.” Workshop on Incentives, Efficiency, and Redistribution in Public Economics, Bonn, May 22-23 2009.

“Growing like China.” Key note lecture, Conference on Macroeconomic Analysis and International Finance at the University Campus of the University of Crete in Rethymno, May 28-30 2009.

“Come Recuperare il Terreno Perduto.” Quarto Festival dell’Economia, Trento, May 29-June 01 2009.

“Growing like China.” Joint Vienna Macroeconomics Seminar Academic Year 2009 Organized jointly with the Joint Vienna Institute, HSII, June 25 2009.

“Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politicao-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt.” Tsinghua Workshop in Macroeconomics, July 06-08 2009.

“Dynamic Fiscal Policy and Pension Systems”Keynote Lecture 3rd Nordic Summer Symposium in Macroeconomics, Smögen, Sweden, August 05-08 2009.

“Growing like China.” Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, August 23-27 2009.

“Growing like China.” Research Seminar of the Department of Economics at the University of St.Gallen, November 11 2009.

Lectures and presentations 2008

Almås, Ingvild

“International Income Inequalities: Measuring PPP bias by Estimating Engel curves for food.” Nordic Symposium in Macroeconomics, Sandbjerg, Denmark, August 2008.

”The Development of Inequality Acceptance.” CSMN workshop, Oslo, October 2008.

”Convergence? Cost of living indices for measuring World Inequality and Poverty.” Oxford, England, October 2008.

”The Development of Inequality Acceptance.” Nordic conference on behavioral economics, Copenhagen, Denmark, November 2008.

Asheim, Geir B.

"Sustainability and discounted utilitarianism in models of economic growth." Conference on Sustainable Resource Use and Economic Dynamics June 02-05 2008.

"Generalized time-invariant overtaking." 9th International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare June 19-22 2008.

"Procrastination, partial naivete, and behavioral welfare analysis." Third World Congress of the Game Theory Society July 13-17 2008.

"Generalized time-invariant overtaking." Economic Theory Conference in honor of Professor Tapan Mitra on his 60th birthday July 19-20 2008.

"Sustainability and discounted utilitarianism in models of economic growth." 23rd Annual Congress of the European Economic Association/ 63rd European Meeting of the Econometric Society August 27-31 2008.

"Global welfare comparisons." 23rd Annual Congress of the European Economic Association/ 63rd European Meeting of the Econometric Society August 27-31 2008.

"Generalized time-invariant overtaking." International Symposium on Choice, Rationality and Intergenerational Equity September 09-10 2008.

"Sustainable intergenerational preferences." International Conference on Science and Technology for Sustainability September 12-13 2008

Barth, Erling
"The Equality Multiplier" det nasjonale forskermøte for økonomer, Oslo, January0 3.

"The Equality Multiplier" Nordic Workshop on Welfare Reform and Economic Challenges, Nova, Oslo January 16.

"The Equality Multiplier" foredrag for koordineringskommiteen for Network of excellence on the reassessment of the Nordic Welfare State, Soria Moria February 17.

"The Equality Multiplier" Forskningsseminar Center for Comparative Welfare Studies, Aalborg Universitet, April 24.

"Conditions for success for the Nordic model." paneldeltaker Embracing Globalisation in the 21st Century: A Dialogue on the Nordic Approach OECD, Paris, May 21.

"The Equality Multiplier" Økonometri seminar, Økonomisk Institutt, Universitetet i Oslo, June 10.

”The Equality Multiplier” Comparative Politics, Department of Government, Harvard University, November 24.

Bratsberg, Bernt
“Research on Immigrants in the Norwegian Labor Market.” Testimony OECD Mission, Economic Survey, Norway: Labour Market and Immigration, January 2008.

“Immigration and Wages: Evidence from the Norwegian Construction Sector.” ISF Workshop on The Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market, Oslo, May 2008.

“The Impact of Immigration on Wages and Employment of Natives.” Annual Frisch Centre Seminar, Oscarsborg, May 2008.

“Report to the Storting on Labor Immigration (St.meld. nr. 18, 2007-2008): Comments.” Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion, June 2008.

“When Minority Labor Migrants Meet the Welfare State.” QMSS2 Seminar on Labour Market Changes and Social Exclusion in the Life Course, Oslo, October 2008.

Brekke, Kjell A. and Nilssen, Tore
Playing with the Good Guys. IAREP/SABE 2008 Conference at LUISS in Rome, September 03-06.

”The Market for Fake Observations.” Frisch Centre, Oslo, October 10 2008.

Børsum, Øystein
“Hva skal vi gjøre med oljepengene? Hva gjør de med oss?” Åpen dag, Universitetet i Oslo, March 06.

Christiansen, Vidar
”Externality-correcting taxes and regulation.” 64th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, Maastricht University, August 22-25.

”Externality-correcting Taxes and Regulation “, Area conference on Public Sector Economics, CESifo München, April 26-27.

Discussant on ”General income taxation, public goods and decentralized leadership” by T. Aronsson. Nordic Workshop on Tax Policy and Public Economics, Uppsala Universitet, October 23-24.

”Externality-correcting taxes and regulation.” Nordic Workshop on Tax Policy and Public Economics, Uppsala Universitet, October 23-24.

”Valet mellan enhetlig och differentierad varubeskatning.” Skattevetenskapliga Forskningsrådets Seminarium, Skattevetenskapliga Forskningsråd, Stockholm, October 30-31.

Discussant on ”Inducing Progress in Environmental Technology: The Role of Standards and Prices” by Alfred Endres and ”The Efficiency of Voluntary Pollution Abatement when Countries can Commit” by J. Tremblay at 64th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, Maastricht University. August 22 -25.

Discussant on ”The Value Added Tax: its Causes and Consequenses” by Ben Lockwood, The Research Forum on Taxation - SKATTEFORUM 2008, June 08-09.

Fiva, Jon H.
“Does the Housing Market React to New Information on School Quality?.” Insitutet för arbeidsmarknadspolitisk futvärdering, Uppsala, April 2008.

“Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? An Empirical Investigation Accounting for Policy Endogeneity.” Uppsala Universitet, April 2008.

“Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?” Nordic Workshop on Tax Policy and Public Economics, Uppsala, October 23-24 2008.

“Does the housing market react to new information on school quality?” National Economist Meeting, Oslo, January 07-08 2008.

“Does the housing market react to new information on school quality?” European Public Choice Society Meeting, Jena, March 27-30 2008.

“Does the housing market react to new information on school quality?” Congress of the European Economic Association, Milano August 27-31 2008.

Hauge, Karen E.
“Playing with the Good Guys. A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation.” Third Nordic Conference in Behavioral and Experimental Economics, University of Copenhagen.

“Playing with the Good Guys. A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation.” IAREP/SABE, Rome.

“Playing with the Good Guys. A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation.” Frisch Centre, Oslo.

“Playing with the Good Guys. A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation.” Research seminar, Department of Economics, University of Oslo.

"Normative Reflection in a Public Good Experiment." Forskermøtet 2008, Oslo.

Havnes, Tarjei
"The formation of overambitions in conflict." Eastern Economics Association Annual Meeting, Boston, March 06-08 2008.

"The irrelevance of subsidized child care for maternal employment: The Norwegian experience." Research seminar, Department of Economics, University of Oslo, December 18 2008.

Hoel, Michael O.
"Discounting in the evaluation of climate policy and other long-run investments." Skatteforum 2008, June 09-10.

Forberedt innlegg om nasjonal klimapolitikk. Lansering av OECDs: Environmental Outlook to 2030; March 05.

Forberedt innlegg om rapport: "Social Cost Benefit Analysis for Enviromental Policy-Making." RMNO-Konferanse, January 17.

"Gode og dårlige virkemidler i klimapolitikken." Konferanse Økonomisk Institutt; January 22.

"Klimapolitikk og prisen på CO2-utslipp." Valutaseminaret; January 31.

"Kvotehandel og internasjonale klimaavtaler." Vitenskapsakademiet, September 04.

"Kvotepriser i dag og i fremtiden." Miniseminar for statsminister og miljøvernminister, May 14.

"The role of technology development in international climate policy." Miljøøkonomi og klimapolitikk, September 01.

"Virkemidler i klimapolitikken." Seminar NVE, February 15.

"Økonomiske analyser av klimaproblemet." Samfunnsøkonomenes jubileumskonferanse, September 16.

"Can a focus on breakthrough technologies improve the performance of international environmental agreements?" (co-author Zeeuw, A. De) Monte Verità Conference on Sustainable Resource Use and Economic Dynamics; June 02-05.

“Can a focus on breakthrough technologies improve the performance of international environmental agreements?” Lysebu-konferanse, May 22-23.

“Can a focus on breakthrough technologies improve the performance of international environmental agreements?” 16th EAERE Annual Conference, June 25-28.

Holden, Steinar

”Utfordringer for finanspolitikken.” Faglig pedagogisk dag, January 3.

”Discrimination and Empolyment Protection.” Frisch Centre, January 23.

“Lønnsdannelse og megling.” Riksmeklingsmannen, March 6.

“Downward wage rigidity and optimal monetary policy” - comments on papers by S Fahr & F Smets, and G. Fagan and J. Messina. Wage Dynamics in Europe: Findings from the Wage Dynamics Network, Frankfurt am Mayn, June 24-25.

“Discrimination and employment protection.” Konferanse Jeløy – arbeidsmarked, August 18-19.

“Testing for cognitive dissonance – evidence from children.” Psykologisk institutt, December 4.

“Financial crisis - a comment.” Kommentar til foredrag av Avinash Persaud, Norges Bank, Oslo 2008-12-03 - 2008-12-03

”Finanskrisen.” Presentasjon for universitetsledelsen ved UiO, Oslo 2008-12-18 - 2008-12-18

”Finanskrisen.” Foredrag for student- og lærergruppe, Høyskolen i Vestfold 2008-11-14 - 2008-11-14

”Finanskrisen.” Foredrag for elevgruppe fra Valler videregående skole 19 nov.

”Handlingsregelen – hvor lenge vil vi ha bruk for den?.” Medlemsmøte, Det nordiske administrative forbundet, Den norske avdeling, Oslo 2008-11-13 - 2008-11-13

”Kommentarer til Kva gjer vi med alle pengane? Avmakt eller allmakt?” (av Øystein Noreng, BI). Frokostmøte, BI, Oslo , February 12.

Holden, Steinar and Rosen, Åsa Maria.
“Discrimination and employment protection.” Labour and Education, Refsnes Gods, Jeløya (Moss) August 18-19.

Høyland, Bjørn.
"Be careful when Doing Business. A desk-study of the Doing Business report from the World Bank to the Multilateral Bank and Finance Section," Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Kundu, Tapas.
"Political institution and economic transition." Third Congress of the Game Theory Society, July 13-17.

Lind, Jo Thori.
"Income, information, and redistribution." Annual Congress of the European Economic Association (EEA), Milano, August 27-31.

"The political Economy of Beliefs." Silvaplana Workshop on political Economy, Silvaplana, July 23-17.

Kundu, Tapas
"Political Institution and Economic Transition." Nordic Conference on Development Economics, Stockholm, June 17.

"Political Institution and Economic Transition." 3rd World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Evanston, Illinois, July 17.

"Resistance to Outside Investment: A Rational Model of Surplus Destruction." Institute for Financial Management and Research (IFMR), Chennai, December 18.

Mehlum, Halvor.
"Ulikhet og omstillingsevne." Partnerforum, the Research Council of Norway, Oslo January 23.

"Talk about the ESOP centre." Partnerforum, Norwegian School of Management (BI), Oslo March 06.

"Inequality, Social Conflict, and Development." Development Paths in the South Conference (Utviklingsveier i Sør, UTISOR) of the Norwegian Resourch Council of Norway, Oslo March 10.

"Samfunnsøkonomen Schweigaard." Academic conference, Oslo April 10.

"Mineral Rents and Social Dimensions of Petroleum in Norway." United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Geneve April 24.

"The Resource Curse." The Norwegian Experience Workshop of the African Development Bank, Tunis June 04.

"China's Foreign Reserves." Open lecture, University of Oslo August 15 2008.

"Development Economics." Guest lecturer, University of Oslo August 26 2008.

"Samfunnsøkonomen Schweigaard." Friday seminar, University of Oslo September 26 2008.

"The financial crisis." Open lunch seminar, University of Oslo October 13 2008.

"Consequences of the Financial Crisis on Development and the Environment." Meeting with the Norwegian Minister Erik Solheim, Oslo October 22 2008.

Contribution to Opening Conference of the 'Gulf Research Unit', November 17 2008.

"The financial crisis." Interview session, NRK Oslo November 27 2008.

"The Financial Crisis and the Poor." The International Peace Research Institute, Oslo December 03 2008.

"The Financial Crisis." Statistics Norway, Oslo December 11 2008.

"The Financial Crisis." Lecture for Upper Secondary School Students, Oslo December 11 2008.

Modalsli, Jørgen
"Growth, Inequality and Schooling." NHH-UiO Workshop on Macroeconomic Dynamics, Oslo, April 10-11 2008.

"Growth, Inequality and Schooling." Nordic Conference in Development Economics, Stockholm, April 16-17 2008.

Moen, Espen
"Industry dynamics and search in the labor market." Invited session, Society for labor economists annual meeting, SOLE, New York, May 2008.

"Industry dynamics and search in the labor market." Society for Economic Dynamics (SED), Boston, July 2008.

"Industry dynamics and search in the labor market." NBER, Boston, July 2008.

Moene, Karl Ove

“The Nordic Model.” A presentation for an OECD delegation, January 18 2008.

“Social and Economic Development: The case of Afghanistan.” The Norwegian school of economic and business administration (Norges Handelshøyskole, NHH) Seminar, Geilo. February 06 2008.

“Nordiske utfordringer.” Presentation at the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, February 11 2008.

“The Resource Curse.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Seminar, Oslo, February 14 2008.

“Inequality and Development.” Course for foreign students visiting the University of Oslo, February 19 2008.

“Miserly Developments.” Centre for Development and the Environment (Senter for Utvikling og Miljø, SUM) Seminar, University of Oslo March 26 2008.

“Rich meets Poor.” Ethics Seminar, University of Oslo, March 27 2008.

“Miserly Deveopment.” Save the Children (Redd Barna), Oslo, April 07 2008.

”Ulikhet og økonomisk teori.” The Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters (Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi, DNVA), Oslo, May 05 2008.

”Den nordiske modellen.” Arbeidsmarkedsinstituttene, Oslo, May 15 2008.

“Nordic Equality.” European Network, Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration (Samfunns- og Næringslivsforsikring AS, SNF), Oslo, June 13 2008.

“Gender, equality, and performance.” Ph.D Course at the Norwegian school of economic and business administration (Norges Handelshøyskole, NHH), Bergen, August 09 2008.

“Hva er vitsen med samfunnsfag?.” Faculty of Social Science, University of Oslo, August 26 2008.

“Cross Disciplinary Research.” Norwegian University of Science and Technology’s (Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, NTNU) Ostrom Conference, Trondheim September 12 2008.

”ESOPs visjoner.” The Research Council of Norway’s gala night, Oslo September 23 2008.

“Markets and Incentives and John Roemer.” Conference on Motivation, Center for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN), University of Oslo October 11 2008.

"Finanskrisen." Ministry of Foreign Affairs Seminar, Oslo October 22 2008.

"Miserly Developments." Norwegian Church Aid (Kirkens Nødhjelp), Oslo Norway October 23 2008.

"Økonomisk likhet og økonomisk teori." Breakfast Seminar, Oslo University College October 24 2008.

"ESOPs forskning." LO Norway's Research Conferance, Oslo October 31 2008.

"Ledelseutfordringer i den nordiske modellen." HR Conferance, Oslo November 12 2008.

"Finanskrisens konsekvenser for Norge". Debate, Litteraturhuset, Oslo November 17 2008.

"Ulikhet og utvikling i globalt perspektiv." Guest lecturer, University of Bergen November 19 2008.

"Equality Multiplier." Guest Seminar, University of Bergen November 21 2008.

"The Financial Crisis and the market (Finanskrisen og markedet, innlegg på norsk)." Syse Seminar, Conservative Party, Oslo. November 25 2008.

"Politisk økonomi." Partnerforum, Norwegian School of Management (BI), Oslo November 28 2008.

"The fables of ESOP." University of Columbia's Stiglitz Conference: Protection without Protectionism. New York, November 30 2008.

"ESOP og økonomisk teori." Government Agency for Financial Management (Senter for statlig styring, SFSO), Oslo December 12 2008.

Nilssen, Tore
"Waiting to Merge." EEA-ESEM Conference, Milano, August 28-29 2008.

"Waiting to Merge." Research seminar, Department of Economics, October 2008.

"The Television Industry as a Market of Attention." Conference on the Cultural Economy's New Frontiers, Paris, October 02-03 2008.

Discussant on "Dynamic Merger Review" by Volker Nocke and Michael Whinston, 16th WZB Conference on Markets and Politics – Deterrence in Competition Policy, Berlin, October 17-18 2008.

”Comparing Scandinavian Economics Research.” Research seminar, Department of Economics, December 12 2008.

Nyborg, Karine
”Penger er ikke alt: Samfunnsansvar som motivasjonsfaktor.” Faglig-pedagogisk dag, Universitetet i Oslo, January 04 2008.

”Undergraver miljøavgifter moralsk motivasjon?” Konferanse for Stortingets finans- og miljøkomiteer om virkemidler i klimapolitikken, January 22 2008, Universitetet i Oslo.

”Samfunnsansvar som motivasjonsfaktor.” Energibedriftenes Landsforenings HR-konferanse 2008 *Grønn HR: Klima og energi som motivasjon og rekrutteringsstrategi*, Gardermoen, February 05 2008.

”Penger er ikke alt: Samfunnsansvar som motivasjonsfaktor.” Syslabkonferansen 2008 *Etikk og lønnsomhet*, Nydalen, Oslo, February 06 2008.

”Internasjonale klimaavtaler og den moralske konsument.” Foredrag for SVs økonomiutvalg, Stortinget, April 28 2008.

“Do environmental taxes undermine moral motivation?” The Research Forum on Taxation - Skatteforum 2008, Oscarsborg, Drøbak, June 10 2008.

“Selfish Bakers, Caring Nurses: A Model of Work Motivation.” Finansdepartmentet, Oslo, June 16 2008.

”Penger er ikke alt: Bedrifters samfunnsansvar som rekrutterings- og motivasjonstiltak.” Foredrag for nye studenter (Oppstartuka), Økonomisk institutt, UiO, August 15 2008.

“Står Homo Oeconomicus for fall? Nye perspektiver på økonomisk atferd.” Samfunnsøkonomenes forenings 100års-jubileum, Bristol, Oslo, September 16 2008.

“Law, Morality and Norms: A New Approach to Law and Economics: Comments to Kaushik Basu’s paper.” Conference on The Nature and Development of Moral Norms: Second Workshop on Social and Moral Norms in Intentional, Oslo, November 08-09 2008.

“Playing with the Good Guys, A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation.” European ESA Meeting, Lyon, September 11-14 2008.

“The Gate is Open: General Practice Physicians as Social Security Gatekeepers.” 3rd Nordic Conference in Behavioral and Experimental Economics, København, November 14-15 2008.

”Om samfunnsansvar, motivasjon og marked. Resultater fra prosjektet *Self-image and sustainability*.” Åpningskonferanse for Norges Forskningsråds forskningsprogram Miljø2015, Lillestrøm, November 18-19 2008.

Raaum, Oddbjørn
”I foreldrenes fotspor? Sosial mobilitet.” Foredrag Gardermoen for Fordelingsutvalget, October 15 2008.

”Immigration and Wages; Evidence from Construction.” Nasjonalt forskerforum arbeidsmarked og utdanningsøkonomi, Refsnes, August 18 2008.

”Immigration and Wages; Evidence from Construction.” Nordic Migration Workshop, Helsinki, August 21 2008.

Røed, Knut
”Forsker og formidler? Mulig å kombinere?” Panelinnlegg på Norges Forskningsråds seminar for stipendiater, Soria Moria, Oslo, January 16.

”AFP” Foredrag på tariffkonferansen til Næringsmiddelbedriftenes Landsforening, Gardermoen, February 27.

“Entrepreneurship - The establishment of new firms and their short and medium term success.” Presentasjon på Århus-Oslo seminar om vekstforskning, BI, Oslo, February 29.

”Hva skjer på arbeidsmarkedet” Foredrag på konferanse for Stortingets finansfraksjoner fra AP, SV, og SP (”storfraksjonen”), April 08.

“Experiences with activation and rehabilitation in Norway” Foredrag for OECD-delegasjon, AID, Oslo, May 16.

”Omsorg for eldre – i hvilken grad påvirkes yrkesaktiviteten?” Foredrag på Helseøkonomikonferansen 2008, Holmen fjordhotell (med Snorre Kverndokk), May 20.

”Effekter av ”arbeidslinja” på jobbsøking og jobbkvalitet.” Foredrag for Velferdsavdelingen, AID, Oslo, May 22.

”Virker arbeidslinja?” Foredrag på NHO-konferanse, Oslo, June 03.

”Sykefraværets anatomi i Norge” Foredrag på Forskningsrådets søkerkonferanse (sykefraværsforskningsprogrammet), Gardermoen, June 06.

”Entreprenørskap og FoU” Foredrag på Forskningsrådets ”vekstforsk-konferanse.” Oslo, June 09.

“The Impacts of Labor Market Policies on Job Search Behavior and Post-Unemployment Job Quality- An empirical analysis.” Presentasjon på forskerkonferanse for arbeidsmarkeds- og utdanningsforskning, Refsnes Gods, August 18.

”Trenger vi et nytt solidaritetsalternativ?” Innledning på lunsjseminar i Arbeids- og inkluderingsdepartementet, Oslo, August 25.

”Informal Care and Labor Supply.” Presentasjon på årskonferansen til the European Association of Labour Economists (EALE), Amsterdam, September 20.

“Recent European developments and lessons learned from conducting non-experimental research” Foredrag holdt på the second Nordic Centre of Excellence REASSESS workshop, Høgskolen i Oslo, September 26.

“The Impacts of Labor Market Policies on Job Search Behavior and Post-Unemployment Job Quality.” Presentasjon på “Second Joint IZA/IFAU Conference on Labor market Policy Evaluation, Bonn, October 11.

“The Impacts of Labor Market Policies on Job Search Behavior and Post-Unemployment Job Quality.” Presentasjon på QMSS (Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences, European Science foundation)-konferanse i Oslo, October 23.

”Hva er det med ungdommen i Norge?” Foredrag på Trygdeforskningsseminaret 2008, Oslo, November 27.

“Entrepreneurship in Norway.” Presentasjon på Conference on Future Demand for Educated Labor, Compenhagen, December 4.

Storesletten, Kjetil
“Kan innvandring redde Norge?” Civita, Oslo, January 15.

“Kan innvandring redde Norge?” Arbeids- og inkluderingsdepartementet, Oslo, January 17.

”The case for active fiscal policies.” Finanspolitiska Rådet, Stockholm, January 29.

“The Macroeconomic Implications of Rising Wage Inequality in the United States.” BI , January 30.

“Growing Like China.” CORE, Belgium, February 02.

“Rikdommens dilemma.” Kommunedagene, Kommunenes Sentralforbund, February 04.

“Consumption and Labor Supply with Partial Insurance: An Analytical Framework.” Warwick University, February 5.

“Rikdommens dilemma.” NRK, February 13.

“Rikdommens dilemma.” Det Norske Arbeiderparti, March 12.

“Rikdommens dilemma.” Storfraksjon Finans, Soria Moria, April 07.

“The Macroeconomic Implications of Rising Wage Inequality in the United States.” New York University, April 10.

“Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt.” Political Economy Conference, Princeton University, April 11.

“The Macroeconomic Implications of Rising Wage Inequality in the United States.” Bank of Portugal, April 14.

“The Macroeconomic Implications of Rising Wage Inequality in the United States.” Tinbergen Institute, April 15.

“The Macroeconomic Implications of Rising Wage Inequality in the United States.” European Central Bank, April 16.

“The Macroeconomic Implications of Rising Wage Inequality in the United States.” Conference: Heterogeneity in Macroeconomics, Paris School of Economics, Paris, April 17.

“Rikdommens dilemma.” Det Norske Arbeiderparti, May 20.

“Rikdommens dilemma.” Senter for statlig økonomistyring, June 12.

“The Macroeconomic Implications of Rising Wage Inequality in the United States.” Arbeidsmarkedskonferanse, Refsnes Gods, August 18.

“Growing Like China.” Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona, October 02.

“Rikdommens dilemma.” Fremskrittspartiet, October 11.

“The Macroeconomic Implications of Rising Wage Inequality in the United States.” Collegio Carlo Alberto , November 5.

“The Macroeconomic Implications of Rising Wage Inequality in the United States.” IFS/ University College of London, November 6.

“Growing Like China.” Colombia University, November 18.

"Growing Like China." University of Stavanger, November 26.

"Growing Like China." BI, December 17.

Ulltveit-Moe, Karen Helene
"Adjustment to real exchange rate shocks." NOITS 11th Annual Workshop, April 17-18 2008.

Willumsen, Fredrik
"Opium for the masses? Afghanistan as a drug state." Forskermøtet/University of Oslo, Oslo, January 17.

"Opium for the masses? How conflict stimulate poppy cultivation in Afghanistan." PhD lunch seminar, Department of Economics, University of Oslo, April 10.

"Opium for the masses? How conflict stimulate poppy cultivation in Afghanistan." Nordic Conference in Development Economics/Stockholm University, Stockholm, June 16.

"Opium for the masses? Conflict-induced narcotics production in Afghanistan." 4th Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development/Indian. Statistical Institute, New Delhi, December 17.

"The Tyranny of International Index Rankings." PhD lunch seminar, Department of Economics, University of Oslo, December 04.

Zilibotti, Fabrizio
"Political Economy of Public Expenditure and Debt." Seminar EUI, Florence, January 11.

"Preferences as Human Capital", Plenary Speaker at the Annual Meeting of the Finnish Society for Economic Research, Jyväskylä, February 13.

"Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt." Seminar Cambridge, February 22.

"Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt." Seminar Glasgow, March 6.

"Distance to Technology frontier and European Economic Growth." Internationale Konferenz des Forums für Universität und Gesellschaft, Bern, May 16.

"Economic Growth and Economic Policy through the Development Process." Key note speaker Conference des Committee for Development Economics der German Economic Association, Zurich, May 31.

"Trade Sanctions, Labor Standards, and the Political Economy of Child Labor." Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, Milan, August 29.

"Growing like China." A CEPR and CREI conference, Rags to Riches: Fertility, Culture and Education in the Transition to Self-Sustaining Growth, Barcelona, December 11.

Lectures and presentations 2007

Almås, Ingvild
"Measuring Unfair Inequality - evidence from Norwegian data" Forskermøtet, Tromsø, January 2007.

"International Income Inequalities: Measuring PPP bias by estimating Engel curves for food." Spring Meeting of Young Economists, Hamburg, May 2007.

"Measuring and comparing unfair inequality across countries." ECINEQ conference, Berlin, July 2007.

"International Income Inequalities: Measuring PPP bias by estimating Engel curves for food." Seminar, Minneapolis Fed, Minneapolis, USA, November 2007.

Asheim, Geir Bjarne
"Sectoral Income." 14th Ulvön Conference on Environmental Economics, June 19-21 2007.

"Sustainable recursive social welfare functions." 15th Annual Meeting of EAERE, June 27-30 2007.

"Procrastination, Partial Naivete and Behavioral Welfare Analysis." 22nd Annual Congress of the European Economic Association/ 62nd European Meeting of the Econometric Society, August 27-31 2007.

"Sustainability and Discounted Utilitarianism." Toulouse School of Economics November 27 2007.

Barth, Erling
"En bærekraftig velferdsstat?." AID, Skjærhalden, June 14 2007.

"Hva skjer med den Nordiske modellen? Betyr flexicurity mer fleksibilitet enn sikkerhet?." YS-Conference, Oslo Plaza, October 16 2007.

"Sjenerøsitet og effektivitet, motstridende hensyn i den Nordiske modellen?." European Institute of Social Security, ISF, Oslo, December 14 2007.

”Lønnsforskjeller mellom kvinner og menn, hvor er det skoen trykker?” seminar om Kvinner og penger, Senter for kvinne og kjønnsforskning, Universitetet i Oslo, March 8 2007.

”Resultatlønn” gjesteforelesning, Norges Handelshøyskole, Bergen, February 12 2007.

”Lønnsforskjeller mellom kvinner og menn” Fagpedagogisk dag, Universitetet i Oslo. January 3 07.

Bratsberg, Bernt
“Naturalization and Labor Market Outcomes.” Workshop on “The socioeconomic implications of naturalizations.” Hamburgisches WeltWirtschaftsInstitut gemeinnützige GmbH (HWWI), Germany, November 2007.

“Immigrant Employment and Welfare Participation over the Lifecycle.” Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion, January 2007.

Cappelen, Alexander
“Fairness and Poverty? An International Experiment.” Harvard University, Program for Ethics and Health.

Christiansen, Vidar
“Public Provision of Private Goods and Nondistortionary Marginal Tax Rates.” 63rd Congress of International Institute of Public Finance, Warwick, August 27-30 2007.

Comment on Michael Hoel (UiO):”Environmental taxes in an economy with distortionary taxes.” Skatteforum 2007, Norges Forskningsråd, Hotel Refsnes Gods, Jeløya. June 11 -13 2007.

Comment on Sjibren Cnossen, University of Maastricht and CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis:”Taxation and Regulation of Alcohol.” Taxation and Regulation of Alcohol, Tobacco and Gambling, University of Maastricht in collaboration with EC and CPB, September 20-21 2007.

“On taxing capital income with income shifting.” 63rd Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, Warwick, August 27-30 2007.

“Public Provision of Private Goods and Nondistortionary Marginal Tax Rates.” 63rd Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, Warwick, August 27-30 2007.

Fernandez, Raquel
Invited Session, LACEA, Bogota.

"Culture and Economics." University of Oslo, Department of Economics, 75th Anniversary.

Invited lecturer, Netherlands Network of Economics (NAKE).

"Symposium on Culture and Economics." Festival of Economics, Trento, Italy.

Fiva, Jon
"Does the Housing Market React to New Information on School Quality?." New Perspectives on Fiscal Federalism: Intergovernmental Relations, Competition and Accountability, October 18-20 2007.

"Does the Housing Market React to New Information on School Quality?." NTNU, September 2007.

"Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? An Empirical Investigation Accounting for Policy Endogeneity." Annual Conference EALE, September 22-24 2007.

"Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? An Empirical Investigation Accounting for Policy Endogeneity." 2nd Workshop on Fiscal Federalism, June 25-28 2007.

"Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? An Empirical Investigation Accounting for Policy Endogeneity." First World Meeting of the Public Choice Society, March 29-April 01 2007.

Hauge, Karen E.
"Normative Reflection in a Public Good Experiment." Economics Science Association (ESA) World Meeting, Rome.

"Normative Reflection in a Public Good Experiment." Second Nordic Workshop in Behavioral and Experimantal Economics, Gotenburg.

Hoel, Michael O.
"Climate change and climate policy." 15th Annual Conference of EAERE; June 27-30 2007.

"Effektiv Klimapolitikk." Klimaseminar, January 15 2007.

Innlegg om rapporten "Vetenskapligt underlag för klimapolitiken". Hearing om rapport fra det Vetenskapliga rådet för klimatfrågor, September 03 2007.

"Klimaavtaler og norsk klimapolitikk." Seminar om klimakvoter, February 16 2007.

"Klimautfordringene og norsk klimapolitikk." Klimaseminar, April 24 2007.

Holden, Steinar

”Om topplederlønninger.” Arbeids- og inkluderingsdepartementet.

Faglig pedagogisk dag, January 3.

Foredrag Forskermøtet i Tromsø, January 4.

Foredrag Formidlingskonferansen UiO, January 23.

Foredrag Finansdepartementet, Tore Eriksen 60 år, May 22.

Foredrag SE-banken 7 June.

Foredrag på seminar AID, Oslo, (lederlønn) 21 June.

Foredrag lederlønn Finansdepartementet 17 August.

Presentasjon av bok i Stavanger 17 April, Bergen 23 April, Trondheim 24 April, Oslo 11 May.

NHH seminar, 12 April.

Paris, National bank of France, 9-10 October.

Kløve, Eva
”Social Protection and the Right to Food”. World Food Day, December 12.

Kundu, Tapas
“Alleviating Poverty: A Proposal to Mitigate the Economic Cost of Disease.” Institute for Financial Management and Research (IFMR), Chennai, October 22.

“Monopoly Pricing Under a Medicaid-style Most Favoured Customer Clause and its Welfare Implication.” Research seminar, University of Oslo, November 30.

Lind, Jo Thori
“The optimal number of organizations.” First World Meeting of the Public Choice Society.

“The political economy of beliefs: Why do fiscal and social conservatives/liberals come hand-in-hand?.”TU Dresden.

“The political economy of beliefs: Why do fiscal and social conservatives/liberals come hand-in-hand?.” CES Munchen.

“The political economy of beliefs: Why do fiscal and social conservatives/liberals come hand-in-hand?.” University of York.

“The optimal number of organizations.” EEA, Budapest.

”Kommentarer til Nasjonalbudsjettet.” Samfunnsøkonomenes Høstkonferanse.

Mehlum, Halvor
“Resources and Conflict.” WG3 CSCW PRIO December 12-13 2007.

“King of the Hill.” Kellog North Western, April 23 2007.

“King of the Hill.” EUDN Paris, December 05-07 2007.

Moen, Espen
“Industry dynamics and search in the labor market.” University of Århus.

“Industry dynamics and search in the labor market.” University of Helsinki.

“Industry dynamics and search in the labor market.” University of Torino/Collegio Carlos Alberto.

“Industry dynamics and search in the labor market.” University of Southampton.

“Labor market dynamics and growth.” Conference.

Moene, Kalle
”Milton Friedman.” Civita, Oslo.

”Kunnskapsutvikling og den skandinaviske modellen.” Kunnskapsdepartmentets internkonferanse.

”Sosial Bærekraft.” Finansdepartementet.

“The Scandinavian Model as a Development Strategy.” NIBRs konferanse for delegasjoner fra Sør Afrika, Kina.

”Mikrofinans.” BI, Oslo.

”Foredrag for Brasils delegasjon om likhet, utvikling og nordiske erfaringer.” UD, Oslo.

“Conflicts.” IIES.

“Development and Inequality.” Namur, Belgia.

”Rettferdighet, likhet og utvikling.” To foredrag, PhD kurs i Bergen.

”Den nordiske modellen.” BI, Oslo.

”The Scandinavian Model.” Frischsenteret.

Keynote-speaker, EALE konderansen i Oslo.

”Lønn, belønning og innovasjon.” LO, Gardermoen.

”What are the fables of ESOP.” Statsvitenskap, Gøteborgs Universitet.

”Perspektiver på den nordiske modellen.” Polyteknisk forening.

”Making Institutions.” Work NUFU, Bergen.

”Diskusjon av Kleins bok.” Litteratur huset.

”Om sosialpolitikk. Social Politics in Poor Countries.” NORADs konferanse.

”Miserly Developments.” Det norske forskermøte.

”Statssekretærutvalget: Utfordringer for den nordiske modellen.” Finansdepartementet.

”ESOP presentasjon for Kristin Halvorsen og kompani.” Finansdepartementet.

”Sosialkapital.” NHOs konferanse.

”Afghanistan som narkostat.” NHHs Geiloseminar.

”NHHs forskning sett utenfra.” NHHs Geiloseminar.

”Hankøkonferansen.” Finansdepartementet.

”Sosialt Demokrati.” Arbeids og Administrasjonsdepartementet.

Nilssen, Tore
”Sequential Mergers Between Asymmetric Firms.” Stabsseminar, BI, March 23 2007.

”Keeping Both Eyes Wide Open: A Multi-Tasking Approach to Competition-Authority Attention.” Stabsseminar, University of Tromsø, April 2007.

”Keeping Both Eyes Wide Open: A Multi-Tasking Approach to Competition-Authority Attention.” European Association for Research in Industrial Economics Conference, Valencia, September 06-09 2007.

”Waiting to Merge.” Stabsseminar, University of Bergen, September 14 2007.

”Opsjoner til bedriftsledere: har vi noe valg?” SPA-seminar, Institutt for samfunnsforskning, Oslo December 12 2007.

Nyborg, Karine
”Samfunnsansvar og rekruttering.” HR Norge, *Rekrutteringsdagene,* Oslo, March 07.

”Penger er ikke alt: Samfunnsansvar som motivasjonsfaktor.” HR Norge, Belønningsdagene *Motivasjon i medvind,* Oslo, October 17-18.

”Legen som portvakt: Hvorfor en god portvakt er en dårlig helbreder.” Ragnar Frisch Centre of Economic Research, October 24.

“I Don’t Want to Hear About it: Rational Ignorance among Duty-Oriented Consumers.” Nordic workshop, Gøteborg, November.

“Attracting Responsible Employees: Green Production as Labor Market Screening.” Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Paris, April 05.

“Attracting Responsible Employees: Green Production as Labor Market Screening.” 6th IDEI-LERNA Conference on Environment and Resources Economics: Environment, Finance and Corporate Behavior, May 31 - June 02, 2007, Toulouse, France.

“I Don’t Want to Hear About it: Rational Ignorance among Duty-Oriented Consumers.” Annual Conference of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Thessaloniki, Greece, June 2007.

Raaum, Oddbjørn
“Marital Sorting, Household Labor Supply, and Intergenerational Earnings Mobility across Countries.” IZA Workshop, Bonn, October 2007.

”Yrkesdeltaking over livsløpet for framtidige arbeidsinnvandrere – Hva kan vi lære av historien?.” Seminar, AID, May 2007.

“When Minority Labor Migrants Meet the Welfare State.” Seminar, Aarhus University, June 2007.

Rosén, Åsa
“Discrimination and Employment Protection.” International Conference 2007 of the German Association of Political Economy in Nueremberg.

”Small Markets.”European Economic Association Meeting, Budapest, 2007. Co-author: Espen Moen.

Røed, Knut
”Omstilling, sykefravær og utstøting i helse- og omsorgssektoren.” Foredrag på brukerseminar i det strategiske instituttprogram for arbeidsmarkeds- og trygdeforskning, Oslo, January 16.

”Hvor stor er arbeidskraftreserven? Og hvordan kan den mobiliseres?” Foredrag på konferansen ” Arbeidsmarked, lønn og økonomisk politikk.” Økonomisk institutt, Universitetet i Oslo, January 23.

”Arbeidsinnvandring og press på velferdsytelser, fortid og fremtid.” Foredrag for Høyres Stortingsgruppe, Oslo, February 2.

”Samfunnet trenger arbeidskraft. Hvor finner vi den?” Foredrag på NAV-konferanse, SAS-hotellet Oslo, February 23.

”Hvor stor er arbeidskraftreserven? Og hvordan kan den mobiliseres?” Foredrag på seminar i Finansdepartementet, February 26.

“Unemployment insurance in welfare states: Soft constraints and mild sanctions.” Stabsseminar Økonomisk institutt, Universitetet i Bergen, April 13.

“Welfare reform: The US experience. Comments to Robert Moffitt.” Konferanse i regi av det Ekonomiska Rådet, Stockholm, May 07.

“Unemployment insurance in welfare states: Soft constraints and mild sanctions.” Innledning på Fudan-Frisch workshop. Fudan universitet, Shanghai, Kina, May 13.

”Veien til uføretrygd i Norge.” Fordrag for ”Pensjonsforum.” Forskningsparken, Oslo, June 04.

”Bruk av arbeidsinnvandring for å møte arbeidskraftbehovet – Dilemmaer.” Foredrag på fagseminar i forbindelse med NAVOs XIV generalforsamling. Gamle Logen, Oslo, June 06.

”Inkludering og utstøting. Empiriske funn og metodiske problemer.” Innledning på Forskerseminaret 2007 for Arbeidslivsforskningsprogrammet. Voksenåsen, Oslo, June 08.

”Ny uførestønad og ny alderspensjon til uføre.” Foredrag på YS Stats Pensjonsseminar, Oslo, September 04.

”AFP – Fleksibel pensjon i Norge: En AFP-ordning som motiverer til arbeid?”NHO’s tariffseminar, Oslo, September 25.

”Samfunnsøkonomenes rolle i velferdsforskningen.” Seminar om velferdsforskning, FAFO, Oslo, November 08.

”Bruk av arbeidsinnvandring for å møte arbeidskraftbehovet.” Foredrag for Fremskrittsparptiets stortingsgruppe, Stortinget, Oslo, December 05.

”Foreldre med omsorgsbehov – i hvor stor grad påvirkes egen yrkesdeltakelse og inntekt?” Foredrag for Stortingets helse- og omsorgskomité (med Snorre Kverndokk), December 06.

Storesletten, Kjetil
”Kalibrering.” The Frisch Centre Annual Conference (Klækken).

”Arbeidsmarked og ulikhet i Norge.” Mandagmorgen, Oslo.

”Arbeidsmarked og ulikhet i Norge.” Civita, Oslo.

”Styringsutfordringer i en oljeøkonomi.” NHO, Oslo, December 12.

“Consumption and Labor Supply with Partial Insurance: An Analytical Framework.” Queen Mary University, London, February 05.

“Consumption and Labor Supply with Partial Insurance: An Analytical Framework.” BI, Oslo, February 28.

“Consumption and Labor Supply with Partial Insurance: An Analytical Framework.” Conference: The International Workshop on Consumption.

“Consumption and Labor Supply with Partial Insurance: An Analytical Framework.” Bank of Japan Conference, Tokyo, March 19-20.

“Consumption and Labor Supply with Partial Insurance: An Analytical Framework.” IIES Stockholms universitet, April 24.

Keynote Speaker at the “Conference on Macroeconomics and Finance.” IEW University of Zurich Workshop, October 31.

“Consumption and Labor Supply with Partial Insurance: An Analytical Framework.” Minnesota Workshop in Macroeconomic Theory, Minneapolis, July 31-August 03.

“Consumption and Labor Supply with Partial Insurance: An Analytical Framework.” IFS/UCL Workshop on Consumption Inequality and Income Dynamics: Micro-Macro Links and Measurement, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, September 11-12.

“Consumption and Labor Supply with Partial Insurance: An Analytical Framework.” IGER, Bocconi University, Milano, November 15.

“Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt.” Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Washington DC, November 29.

“The Macroeconomic Implications of Rising Wage Inequality in the United States.” CEPREMAP Conference, August 31-September 02.

“The Macroeconomic Implications of Rising Wage Inequality in the United States.” Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, November 28.

Strøm, Marte
” Voting and Social Background.” Forskermøtet, January 2007.

Sørensen, Erik Ø.
“Fairness and Poverty? An International Experiment.” Development Studies Association, Brighton.

“Fairness and Poverty? An International Experiment.” 5th RTN Microdata Meeting, Amsterdam.

Tungodden, Bertil
“Fairness and Poverty ? An International Experiment.” University of Aberdeen.

“Fairness and Poverty? An International Experiment.” University of St. Andrews

“Fairness and Poverty? An International Experiment.” CMI, Bergen.

Ulltveit-Moe, Karen Helene
”Næringsutvikling og næringspolitikk i en globalisert verden.” Faglig-pedagogisk dag UiO, January 03 2007.

”Offshoring, Outsourcing and the Skill Premium Puzzle.” Research Seminar UiB, May 11 2007.

”Globalisering og pengepolitikk.” Shipping Klubben, September 03 2007.

”Hva skal vi leve av i Norge?” Plenumsmøte/ -Seminar, November 13 2007.

Zilibotti, Fabrizio
”Occupational Choice and the Spirit of Capitalism.” Seminar Konstanz, January 31.

”Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt.” Seminar Penn, February 28.

”Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt.” Seminar Georgetown, March 2.

”Occupational Choice and the Spirit of Capitalism.” Seminar Lausanne, April 25.

”Patience Capital, Occupational Choice and the Spirit of Capitalism: A Rational-Choice Theory of the Socio-Economic Transformations during the British Industrial Revolution.” San Domenico di Fiesole, Conference: ”Max Weber in the 21st Century: Transdisciplinarity within the Social Sciences.” April 27-28.

”Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt.” Seminar Venezia, April 30.

Two invited lectures on Economic Growth and Distance to Frontier, Seminar Moncalieri, May 3-4.

”Occupational Choice and the Spirit of Capitalism.” Seminar Paris, May 24.

“Economic Growth through the Process of Development.” key note lecture, Cesifo Munich, June 22-23.

“Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt.” SED Annual Meeting Prague, June 28.

“The Spirit of Capitalism. Cultural and Economic Changes in the Process of Growth.” Plenary lecture, Aix-en-Provence Conference, July 2.

“Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt.” NBER Boston, July 16-19.

”Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt.” EEA Conference, August 29.

“Occupational Choice and the Spirit of Capitalism.” IZA Bonn Workshop “Intergenerational Transmission of Socioeconomic Outcomes: Identifying the Underlying Mechanism.” October 5.

“Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt.” Seminar Bocconi, Milan October 24.

“Occupational Choice and the Spirit of Capitalism.” Seminar Luiss, Rome, October 25.

Munich, Laudatio for the award of the ”Distinguished CES Fellowship 2007” to Philippe Aghion, November 13, 2007.

“Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt.” Seminar ECB, Frankfurt, November 19 2007.

“Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt.” Seminar ETH, Zurich, December 3 2007.

WORKSHOPS

ESOP Workshop on Conflict, Trade and Cooperation

Time: January 22 2010
Papers presented:

Halvor Mehlum and Kalle Moene: *Conflicts and Cooperation.*

Fabrizio Zilibotti: *War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict.* (co-authors: Dominic Rohner and Mathias Thoenig)

Dominic Rohner: *Strategic Mass Killings.* (co-authors: Joan Esteban and Massimo Morelli)

Scott Gates: *Violence and Property Rights.*

ESOP/CSCW Workshop on Social Conflict, in cooperation with the Dehli School of Economics

Time: April 9-10 2010
Papers presented:

Steve Wilkinson (co-author: Saumitra Jha): *Veterans and Ethnic Cleansing in the Partition of India.*

Roma Chatterjee: *Collective Violence, Rehabilitation and Community in Dharavi, Mumbai.*

Deepak Mehta: *Words that Wound: Archiving Hate in the Making of Hindu and Muslim Publics in Bombay.*

Debraj Ray (co-author: Anirban Mitra): *Uneven Growth: The Economics of Hindu-Muslim Conflict.*

Tapas Kundu: *Conflic and Mobility: Resource Sharing Between Groups.*

Silje Aslaksen: *Oil and Political Survival: The roles of Institutions and Appropriability.*

Nandini Sundar: *Counterinsurgency and Regrouping: Experiences from India.*

Oendrila Dube (co-author: Suresh Naidu): *Maoists, Minerals and Environmental Change.*

Joan Esteban (co-authors: Dominic Rohner and Massimo Morelli): *Strategic Mass Killings.*

Elisabeth Wood: *Sexual Violence during War: Explaning Variation*.

Amita Baviskar: *Extraordinary Violence and Everyday Welfare: The State and Development in Rural and Urban India*.

Bhaskar Dutta: *Development and Land Acquisition*.

Zoya Hassan: *Defining Social Inequalities in India: The Politics of State Response.*

Rohini Somanathan: *Caste Hierarchies and Social Mobility in India.* (co-author: Rajeev Sethi)

Halvor Mehlum: *Conflict, Peace and Poverty.* (co-author: Kalle Moene)

Kalle Moene: *From Class Conflict to Collaboration.* (co-author: Halvor Mehlum)

ESOP Workshop on Global and Local Perspectives on Economic Inequality

Time: May 7 2010
Papers presented:

Branko Milanovic: *Measuring Ancient Inequality.*

Erik Sørensen: *Convergence? Cost-of-living indices for measuring global trends in inequality and poverty.*

Paul Segal: *Resource Rents, Redistribution, and Halving Global Poverty: The Resource Dividend.*

Alain Trannoy: *Detecting a change in wealth concentration without knowledge og wealth distribution.*

Erik Thorbecke*: The Foster-Greer-Thorbecke Class of Poverty Measures Twenty Five Years Later*

Magne Mogstad: *Robust Inequality Comparison.*

ESOP fabler: Equality, Social Organization and Performance – A research seminar on ESOP's research topics and in celebration of Kalle Moene's 60th birthday

Time: June 12 2010
Papers presented:

John Roemer: *A Dynamic Analysis of Human Welfare in a Warming Planet.*

Jean-Marie Baland: *Repayment Incentives and the Design of Microfinance Institutions.*

Torben Andersen: *Rationalizing the Coexistence of Public and Private Investments in Health.*

Gaute Torsvik: *Beliefs, Attitudes and Productivity. Evidence From a Customer Service Centre.*

Ragnar Torvik: *Conditional Comparative Statics*.

Workshop on Climate Change and Distribution

Time: June 22-23 2010
Co-organizer: CSMN and Stanford Center for Ethics in Society
Papers presented:

Jon Elster: *The fair allocation of emission rights*

Stéphane Zuber: *Justifying social discounting*

Johannes Emmerling: *Discounting and intragenerational equity.*

Rick van der Ploeg: *Cautious discounting of CO2 damages and optimal redistribution.*

David Anthoff: *Optimal global dynamic carbon taxation.*

Stephen M. Gardiner: *Climate change and geo-engineering: Is 'Arming the Future' with Geoengineering Really the Lesser Evil?*
(Joint session with Confronting Environmental Values)

Christian Gollier: *Socially efficient discounting under ambiguity aversion.*

Christian Traeger: *The social discount rate under intertemporal risk aversion and ambiguity.*

Stephen M. Gardiner: *The tyranny of the contemporary.*

Adam Rose: *Distributional Impacts of the Kerry-Lieberman Bill.*

Armon Rezai: *Climate Policy and Intergenerational Welfare.*

Richard Tol: *Climate policy under fat-tailed risk.*

Workshop on Gender, labor market, and the family - lessons from empirical analysis of reforms

Time: October 25 2010
Papers presented:

Sara Cools: *Effects of Paternity Leave on Parents and Children* (Co-authors Jon Fiva and Lars Kirkebøen)

Shorter workshop contributions made by Jon Fiva, Tarjei Havnes, Jo Lind, Mari Rege, Oddbjørn Raaum (TBC), Pål Schøne, and Erik Sørensen. Discussion chaired by Halvor Mehlum.

ESOP Workshop on Poverty and Equality

Time: November 2 2010
Co-organizer: Norad
Papers presented:

Martin Ravallion: *Why Don't We See Poverty Convergence?* Discussant: Kalle Moene

Stephen Nickell: *Patterns of Work Across the OECD.*

Ingvild Almås: *International Income Inequality and Poverty: Measurement Challenges.* Discussant: Magne Mogstad

ESOP Workshop on Culture, Behavior and Distribution

Time: November 19 2010
Papers presented:

Jo Thori Lind: *Knowledge is Power. A Theory of Information, Income and Welfare Spending.*

Gianluca Grimalda: *The Culture of Redistribution in Norway, Italy and the US – an experiment.*

Alexander Cappelen: *Immoral Criminals? An experimental study of social preferences among prisoners.*

Karine Van Der Straeten: *Laboratory experiments on voting rules.*

Marte Strøm: *How husbands and wives vote*.

Carl-Johan Dalgaard: *Religious Orders and Growth through Cultural Change in Pre-Industrial England.*

Erling Barth/Kalle Moene/Kjersti Misje Nilsen: *Social Insurance or Redistribution Motives? Behaviors and Beliefs in the Welfare State.*

ESOP FABLER IN 2010

ESOP fabler is an informal debate forum organized by ESOP. The ambition of *ESOP fabler* is to highlight current economic topics of interest which are a part of ESOP's research fields. The debate starts with introductions and comments from invited speakers, before we invite the audience to join in. The intention of the debate is to create a multidisciplinary arena where everyone is able to contribute. *ESOP fabler* is a unique occasion to spread the knowledge of some of the centre's research results. While most other seminars organized by ESOP are held in English and require an understanding of mathematical models, *ESOP fabler* is held in Norwegian and the critical questions, scholarly reflections and debate are available for fields outside of Economics as well.

Syk eller "syk"? Sykelønn - når ideologi møter forskning

Participants: Knut Røed, Roger Bjørnstad, Kristin Clemet, Magnus Marsdal, Silje Aslaksen.
Time: May 10 2010 (ESOP fabler)

The Financial Crisis - a revenge for Keynes?

Participants: Halvor Mehlum, Assar Lindbeck, Hilde Bjørnland and Lance Taylor.
Time: May 19 2010 (ESOP fabler)

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Miriam Golden, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)
Emily Haisley, Carnegie Mellon University (CMU)
Jonathan Heathcote, The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Ethan Kaplan, Stockholm University (SU)
James Konow, Loyola Marymount University (LMU)
Eliana La Ferrara, Bocconi University
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Andres Solimano, CEPAL, Chile
Giovanni Violante, New York University
Elisabeth Wood, Yale University
Amir Yaron, Wharton
Fabrizio Zilibotti, University of Zurich

ACCOUNTS AND REVISED BUDGET

Funding NOK 1000	**Accounts 2007**	**Accounts 2008**	**Accounts 2009**	**Accounts 2010**	**Budget 2011**	**Budget 2012-16**	**Total budget**
CoE funding							
Host institution (UiO)	1 000	2 110	2 100	8 386	6 655	49 176	**69 427**
Norw. Research Council - CoE	9 000	6 000	12 400	1 644	9 595	53 221	**91 860**
Active partner							**0**
International funding				1 065	376	752	**2 193**
Other public			562	1 130	2 977	285	**4 854**
Other private							**0**
Total income	**10 000**	**8 110**	**15 062**	**12 225**	**18 603**	**103 434**	**167 434**
Other funding, excl. CoE grants							
Active partner A							**0**
Active partner B							**0**
Host institution (UiO)	**4 792**	**5 899**	**5 711**			**0**	**16 402**
Others							**0**
Total funding excl. CoE grants	**4 792**	**5 899**	**5 711**			**0**	**16 402**
Total funding	**14 792**	**14 009**	**20 773**	**12 225**	**18 603**	**103 434**	**174 088**
Funding estimated in contract	9913	15802	17 306				**164 152**
Deviation	4 879	-1 793	3 467	12 225	18 603	103 434	**139 378**
Transferred (+/-)	0	5 689	5 258	9 732	1 999	1 940	
Total funding and transfers	**14 792**	**19 698**	**26 031**	**21 957**	**21 491**	**105 374**	**208 454**

Expenditures NOK 1000	**Accounts 2007**	**Accounts 2008**	**Accounts 2009**	**Accounts 2010**	**Budget 2011**	**Budget 2013-17**	**Totalt budget**
CoE costs							
Personnel, housing	**2 560**	**5 739**	**7 900**	**17 418**	**9 779**	**46 870**	**81 212**
(Salaries and personnel costs)			(7 810)	(12 481)	(9 689)	(46 330)	(81 858)
(Premises, overhead)			(90)	(4 937)	(90)	(540)	(810)
Purchase of R&D services	414	371	740	1 219	927	5 181	**8 406**
Scientific equipment	207	182	0	380	287	181	**1 057**
Workshops/conferences							
Individual running costs							
Other running costs	858	2 249	1 948	941	3 831	8 109	**20 571**
Total CoE costs	**4 039**	**8 541**	**10 588**	**19 958**	**14 824**	**60 341**	**112 702**
Other costs excl. CoE costs							
Personnel, housing	**5 064**	**5 899**	**5 711**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**16 674**
(Salaries and personnel costs)			(5 143)				16 106
(Premises, overhead)			(568)				568
Purchase of R&D services							**0**
Scientific equipment							**0**
Other running costs							**0**
Total costs excl. CoE costs	**5 064**	**5 899**	**5 711**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**16 674**
Total costs	**9 103**	**14 440**	**16 299**	**19 651**	**20 683**	**104 404**	**183 836**
Transferred (+/-)	**5 689**	**5 258**	**9 732**	**1 999**	**970**	**970**	**24 618**

Comments to the account and budget

Because of delays in recruitment when the centre started, the costs were lower than expected the first year. As a result we had an amount of more than 5,5 MNOK which had to be transferred from one year to the next, every year. From 2010 we also integrated the money from the host institution into ESOP's accounting. We then had accumulated an amount almost equal to one year's running budget. In 2010 we therefore made some foundational changes:

1. Instead of transferring the money from one year to next, we asked the RCN to withhold a substantial part of the payment for 2010. The strategy was to spend the accumulated money, so the amount transferred from year to year would come down to a more normal level. We came to an agreement with RCN that we could ask for the withheld money when we needed it in the future. From 2010 we have removed the numbers in the line "funding estimated in contract", because we have to make a new estimate and a new contract.

2. For the year 2010, and the years to come, the University of Oslo has decided to post the income from the host institution into ESOP's budget and accounting. We are quite happy for this decision: Firstly it gives a better picture of the amount spent on the centre's research activity. Secondly it makes it easier to account for all the contributions from the host institution. In the future we therefore have to post the funding from the Department under the label "Host institution (UiO)".

3. The largest change to the original plan is that from 2010 the host institution is contributing with more than originally budgeted. The major reasons for this change is firstly because the Department contributes with several more PhD students than planned, and secondly because a few more professors at the Department has joined the ESOP staff.

4. If the RCN renews our contract for another five year period, we plan to divide the withheld money over the last five years.

RESOURCES – PERSONNEL 2010

Scientific possitions

Professors, Ass. professors, researchers, ass			**People:**	41	**Man-year:**	9,1
Name	Sex	Country of employment	Academic degree	Employment	Place of work/ employer	Months worked at the centre
Almås, Ingvild	F	Norway	Researcher	01.02.09-31.01.12	ESOP/NHH	2,4
Asheim, Geir	M	Norway	Professor	01.01.07-	ESOP/ØI	2,4
Barth, Erling	M	Norway	Adj.Prof.	01.08.08-31.12.11	ISF/ESOP	4,8
Birkeli, Kenneth	M	Norway	Research.ass.	10.09.09-09.09.11	ESOP	2,4
Bratsberg, Bernt	M	Norway	Adj.Prof.	01.09.07-31.12.11	Frisch/ESOP	1,2
Brinch, Christian N.	M	Norway	Researcher	01.01.10-31.12.11	SSB/ESOP	1,2
Brekke, Kjell Arne	M	Norway	Førsteaman.	01.01.07-	ESOP/ØI	2,4
Bøler, Ester Ann	F	Norway	Research.ass.	23.02.09-13.07.11	ESOP	4
Cappelen, Alexander	M	Norway	Professor	01.01.07-	NHH/ESOP	1,2
Christiansen, Vidar	M	Norway	Professor	01.01.07-	ESOP/ØI	2,4
Eidsvoll,Sunnuva P.	F	Norway	Research.ass.	10.09.09-09.09.11	ESOP	2,4
Engelsrud, Tina V.	F	Norway	Research.ass.	23.08.10-22.08.11	ESOP	2
Fernandez, Raquel	F	USA	Professor	01.09.07-31.12.11	NYU/ESOP	2,4
Harstad, Bård	M	USA	Adj.Prof.	01.01.10-31.12.11	NWUni/ESOP	2,4
Hoel, Michael	M	Norway	Professor	01.01.07-	ESOP/ØI	2,4
Holden, Steinar	M	Norway	Professor	01.01.07-	ESOP/ØI	2,4
Johnsen, Åshild A.	F	Norway	Research.ass.	01.10.07-01.03.09	ESOP	1,5
Jonassen, Aksel H.	M	Norway	Research.ass.	01.03.10-20.04.10	ESOP/ØI	1,5
Keilman, Nico	M	Norway	Professor	01.08.10-	ESOP/ØI	1
Kravdal, Øystein	M	Norway	Professor	01.01.10-	ESOP/ØI	2,4
Lind, Jo Thori	M	Norway	Ass. Prof.	01.09.09-	ESOP	12
Mehlum, Halvor	M	Norway	Professor	01.01.07-	ESOP/ØI	9
Moen, Espen	M	Norway	Adj.Prof.	01.09.07-31.12.11	BI/ESOP	1,2
Moene, Karl-Ove	M	Norway	Professor	01.01.07-	ESOP	12
Mogstad, Magne	M	Norway	Researcher	01.04.09-31.12.11	SSB/ESOP	2,4
Nilssen, Tore	M	Norway	Professor	01.01.07-	ESOP/ØI	2,4
Nyborg, Karine	F	Norway	Førsteaman.	01.01.07-	ESOP/ØI	2,4
Ognedal, Tone	F	Norway	Førsteaman.	01.01.07-	ESOP/ØI	2,4
Raaum, Oddbjørn	M	Norway	Adj.Prof.	01.09.07-31.12.11	Frisch/ESOP	1,2
Rege, Mari	F	Norway	Adj.Prof.	01.01.09-29.02.12	UiS/ESOP	1,2
Riis, Christian	M	Norway	Adj.Prof.	01.03.10-31.12.11	BI/ESOP	1
Riekeles, Haakon	M	Norway	Research.ass.	15.01.09-14.01.11	ESOP	2,4
Rosén, Åsa	F	Sweden	Researcher	01.08.08-31.12.11	SOFI/ESOP	0,6
Rødseth, Asbjørn	M	Norway	Professor	01.01.07-	ESOP/ØI	2,4
Røed, Knut	M	Norway	Adj.Prof.	01.09.07-31.12.11	Frisch/ESOP	1,2
Storesletten, Kjetil	M	Norway	Professor	01.01.07-	ESOP/ØI	2,4
Sørensen, Erik	M	Norway	Researcher	01.02.09-31.01.12	NHH/ESOP	2,4
Torvik, Ragnar	M	Norway	Professor	01.01.07-	NTNU/ESOP	1,2
Torsvik, Gaute	M	Norway	Professor	01.01.07-	UiB/ESOP	1,2
Tungodden, Bertil	M	Norway	Professor	01.01.07-	NHH/ESOP	1,2
Ulltveit-Moe, K. H.	F	Norway	Professor	01.01.07-	ESOP/ØI	2,4

PhD students and research fellows

Research fellows				**People:** 19	**Man-year:**	12,4
Name	Sex	Country of employment	Academic degree	Employment	Place of work/ employer	Months worked at the centre
Andresen, Nils August	M	Norway	Ma	05.10.09-04.10.13	ESOP/ØI	9
Beyene, Berhe Mekonen	M	Norway	Ma	04.09.07-03.09.11	ESOP/ØI	9
Børsum, Øystein	M	Norway	Ma	01.07.06-26.02.10	ESOP/ØI	1,5
Christiansen, Solveig	K	Norway	Ma	01.08.10-16.03.14	ESOP/ØI	0,8
Clarhãll, Jenny	K	Norway	Ma	01.10.05-30.09.09	ESOP/ØI	9
Cools, Sara	K	Norway	Ma	13.08.07-12.08.11	ESOP/ØI	12
Dapi, Bjorn	M	Norway	Ma	03.08.09-02.08.12	ESOP/ØI	12
Eika, Lasse	M	Norway	Ma	01.08.10-31.07.13	ESOP/ØI	5
Godøy, Anna Aasen	K	Norway	Ma	01.01.10-31.12.13	ESOP/Frisch	9
Kløve, Eva	K	Norway	Ma	01.12.07-30.11.11	ESOP/ØI	12
Knutsen, Carl Henrik	M	Norway	Ma	22.10.07-21.10.11	ESOP/ISV	9
Krüger, Ingrid	K	Norway	Ma	18.05.09-16.05.12	ESOP/GRU	12
Markussen, Simen	M	Norway	Ma	15.03.06-14.03.10	ESOP/Frish	1,9
Modalsli, Jørgen	M	Norway	Ma	25.06.07-24.06.11	ESOP/ØI	12
Salvanes, Kari V.	K	Norway	Ma	01.08.10-31.01.13	ESOP/ØI	5
Sandsør, Astrid M. J.	K	Norway	Ma	01.08.10-31.07.13	ESOP/ØI	5
Strøm, Marte	K	Norway	Ma	01.07.06-01.10.11	ESOP/ØI	7,5
Willumsen, Fredrik	M	Norway	Ma	19.02.07-28.02.11	ESOP/ØI	12
Østenstad, Gry T.	K	Norway	Ma	01.08.10-31.07.13	ESOP/ØI	5

Postdoctoral fellows

Post doctoral fellows				**People:** 4	**Man-year:**	3,6
Name	Sex	Country of employment	Academic degree	Employment	Place of work/ employer	Months worked at the centre
Aslaksen, Silje	F	Norway	PhD	01.09.08-01.03.13	ESOP/ØI	12
Fiva, Jon H.	M	Norway	Dr.polit	05.08.07-31.12.10	ESOP/ØI	12
Havnes, Tarjei	M	Norway	Dr.oecon	01.11.09-31.12.13	ESOP/ØI	6
Høyland, Bjørn	M	Norway	Dr.polit	01.01.07-01.07.10	ESOP/ISV	1,2

Administration

Administration			**People:** 2	**Man-year:**	1,5
Name	Sex	Academic degree	Employment	Place of work/ employer	Months worked at the centre
Elgvin, Johannes	M	Cand.polit	01.01.09-	ESOP	12
Sandsør, Astrid	F	Bachelor	01.07.09-25.06.10	ØI/ESOP	6

Guest researchers

Guest researchers				**People:** 5		**Man-year:** 1,5
Name	Sex	Country of employment	Academic degree	Guest period	Place of work/ employer	Months worked at the centre
Connolly, Sara	F	UK	PhD	26.04.10-04.06.10	LMU	1
Drange, Nina	F	Norway	Ma	01.08.08-	NHH	2,5
Grangard, Halfdan	M	UK	Ma.	01.02.09-31.12.10	LSE	12
Grimalda, Grianluca	M	Portugal	PhD	09.08.10-03.09.10	LLE	0,9
Grimalda, Grianluca	M	Portugal	PhD	15.11.10-19.11.10	LLE	0,1

Positions displayed in Man-year

Personnel/positions	**Man-year 2 007**	**Man-year 2 008**	**Man-year 2 009**	**Man-year 2 010**	**Man-year 2 011**	**Man-year 2012-16**
Professors, researchers, etc.	3,6	6,3	6,7	9,1		
Research fellows/Ph.D. students	5,5	7,8	9,9	12,4		
Postdocs	1,3	2,9	3,1	3,6		
Technical/adm. Positions	1,1	2,0	1,5	1,5		
Total personnel, man-year	11,5	19,1	21,2	26,6		
Guest researchers				1,5		

Oslo, 31 March 2011