Oslo Summer School in Comparative Social Science Studies 2013

Regulation and the Regulatory State: Comparative Perspectives

Lecturer: Professor Martin Lodge,
Department of Government and the
Centre for the Analysis of Risk and Regulation,
London School of Economics,
United Kingdom

Main disciplines: Political Science, Law,
Sociology, Institutional Economics

Dates: 22 - 26 July 2013
Course Credits: 10 pts (ECTS)
Limitation: 30 participants


By the end of this course you should be able to

  1. understand and critically review a selected body of literature on Regulation drawn from law, sociology, political science and institutional economics.
  2. give an account of select academic debates
  3. apply concepts, theories and methods used in the study of Regulation for the analysis of regulatory institutions, practices and ideas
  4. appreciate the various disciplinary approaches towards Regulation and therefore come to a differentiated utilisation of concepts in your own research

The course takes a comparative and international perspective on Regulation, and is designed for a multi-national clientele. The general background to the course is the development of what has been called ‘the regulatory state’ emerging in the era of privatisation, and the burgeoning of social science literature about regulation over the past 25 years. Regulation is one of the key themes running across the contemporary social sciences. The financial crisis has further accentuated the importance of regulation in social and economic life and led to a questioning of various orthodoxies that have emerged over the past 25 years.

Course Programme

Day 1
Session 1: What is Regulation?
Session 2: Theories of Regulation
Session 3 & 4: Standard-Setting & Alternatives to Regulation

Day 2
Sessions 5 & 6: Enforcement & Compliance
Session 7: The Regulatory State
Session 8: Reform & the Regulatory State

Day 3
Session 9 & 10: Regulatory Agencies, Independence and Accountability
Session 11 & 12: Risk & the Regulatory State

Day 4
Session 13 & 14: Comparative Regulation of Utilities
Session 15: Financial Market Regulation
Session 16: Development & Regulation

Day 5
Session 17: Regulatory Competition
Session 18: Better Regulation
Sessions 19 & 20: The future of the regulatory state

Essential Reading
An introduction to the key themes of many of the course’s topics can be found in either;

  • Baldwin, R, Cave, M and Lodge, M (2012) Understanding Regulation, Oxford University Press.


  • Lodge, M and K. Wegrich (2012) Managing Regulation, Palgrave.

Either of these books offers an introduction to many of this course’s sessions and it is recommended that students acquaint themselves with one of these texts before the course.

The lecturer
Martin Lodge is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the Department of Government and the Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation at the London School of Economics.


Aim: This session will be concerned with getting to know each other and the different ways we are interested in regulation, and with thinking about the different possible meanings of regulation and justifications for it.


  • Black, J (2002) ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’ CARR discussion paper, number 4. (http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CARR/pdf/Disspaper4.pdf)
  • Black, J (2001) ‘Decentring regulation: understanding the role of regulation and self-regulation in a “post-regulatory” world’ Current Legal Problems, 54: 103-47.

Aim: This session introduces key theories of regulation that will further inform debates in the coming sessions. The session distinguish between interest-group based and institutional approaches towards regulation.


  • Noll, RG (1989) ‘Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation’ in R. Schmalensee and RD Willig (eds) Handbook of Industrial Organisation, pp. 1253-87
  • Peltzman, S (1989) ‘The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation’ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Microeconomics) 1-44.

Further readings:

  • Levy, B. and Spiller, P. (1996) Regulation, Institutions and Commitment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (chapter 1)
  • McCubbins, M, Noll, RG and Weingast, BR (1987) ‘Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control’ Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 3(2): 243-86.
  • Wilson, JQ (1980) ‘The Politics of Regulation’ in JQ Wilson (ed.)The Politics of Regulation.

Aim: This double session looks at the basic trade-offs that affect rule-making and how different standard-setting strategies have evolved and what their implications have been.


  • Coglianese, C and Lazer, D (2003) ‘Management Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals’ Law & Society Review 37: 691-730
  • Gilad, S (2010) 'It runs in the family: meta-regulation and its siblings' Regulation & Governance 4(4): 485-506.
  • Braithwaite, J. (2002), "Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty" . Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, Vol. 27, pp. 47-82. (ejournal)

Further readings:

  • Baldwin, R (1990) ‘Why Rules Don’t Work’ Modern Law Review  53: 321
  • Gunningham, I and Sinclair, D (2009) ‘Organizational Trust and the Limits of Management-based Regulation’ Law & Society Review, 43(4): 865-900.
  • Heritier, A and Lehmkuhl, D (2008) ‘The shadow of hierarchy and new modes of governance’ Journal of Public Policy, 28(1): 1-17.


Aim: This double session looks at different enforcement strategies and the way in which the regulation literature has developed understandings of regulatee motivation and capacity.


  • Gunningham, N (2010) ‘Enforcement and Compliance Strategies’ in R. Baldwin et al (2010) Oxford Handbook of Regulation.
  • Parker, C (2006), ‘The Compliance Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive Regulatory Enforcement’ Law and Society Review 40, 591-622.
  • Ayres, I. and Braithwaite, J. (1992), Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford: OUP), chapter 2
  • McAllister, L (2010) ‘Dimensions of Enforcement Style’ Law & Policy, 32(1): 61-78.

Further readings:

  • Atlas, M (2007) ‘Enforcement Principles and Environmental Agencies’ Law and Society Review, 41(4): 939-80.
  • Winter, S and May, P (2001), ‘Motivation for Compliance with Environmental Regulations'’   Journal of Policy and Management 20(4): 675;
  • Gunningham, N, Kagan, R. & Thornton, D (2004) ‘Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance’ Law and Social Inquiry 29: 307-341.
  • Van Erp, J (2011) ‘Naming without shaming: the publication of sanctions in the Dutch financial market’ Regulation & Governance 5: 287-308.
  • Baldwin, R and Black, J (2008) ‘Really responsive regulation’ Modern Law Review, 71(1): 59-94.
  • Kagan, R (2000) ‘Introduction: comparing national styles of regulation in Japan and the United States’ Law & Policy 22 (3/4): 225-44.

Aim: This session looks at the claim that the contemporary age is the ‘age of the regulatory state’. We look at different accounts that point to the origins of the ‘regulatory state’, and different institutional expressions of the ‘regulatory state’.


  • Jordana, J, Levi-Faur, D and Fernández i Marin (2011) ‘The global diffusion of regulatory agencies’ Comparative Political Studies, 44(10): 1343-69.
  • Majone, G (1997), ‘From the Positive to the regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance’, Journal of Public Policy, 17(2), 139-68

Further readings:

  • Black, J (2007) ‘Tensions in the regulatory state’ Public Law, Spring, 58-73.
  • Lodge, M and Hood, C (2010) 'Regulation Inside Government' in R. Baldwin, M. Cave and M. Lodge (eds) Oxford Handbook of Regulation, OUP.

Aim: This session looks at theories of regulatory change, in particular in the context of the contemporary regulatory change. Linkages to the earlier ‘theories of regulation’ session will be drawn.


  • Hood, C (1994) Explaining Economic Policy Reversals, chapter 3.
  • Schneuberg, M and Bartley, T (2008) ‘Organizations, regulation and economic behaviour’ Annual Review of Law and Social Science 4: 7.1-7.31

Further readings:

  • Levi-Faur, D (2005) ‘The global diffusion of regulatory capitalism’ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 598: 12-32
  • Vogel, S (1997) ‘International Games with National Rules: How regulation shapes competition in “global markets”’ Journal of Public Policy,17(2): 169-193.
  • Lodge, M (2008) ‘Regulation, the regulation state and European politics’ West European Politics, 31(1/2): 280-301.


Aim: One of the key characteristics of the regulatory state is the ‘regulatory agency’. This session looks at the policy rationale for these emergence of these agencies, and the ways in which different literatures consider the ‘independence’ and ‘accountability’.


  • Maor, M (2010) ‘Organizational Reputation and Jurisdictional Claims’ Governance 23(1): 133-59.
  • Majone, G (1996/ed) Regulating Europe, Routledge, Chapter 3. (alternatively, see aei.pitt.edu/786/)
  • Gilardi, F (2002) ‘Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies’, Journal of European Public Policy 9(6): 873-93
  • Koop, C (2011) 'Explaining the accountability of independent agencies' Journal of Public Policy 31(2): 209-34.

Further readings:

  • May, P (2007) ‘Regulatory Regimes and Accountability’ Regulation & Governance, 1(1): 8-26.
  • Black, J (2008) ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) 2 Regulation and Governance 1-28
  • Curtin, D and Senden, L (2011) 'Public Accountability of Transnational Private Regulation' Journal of Law and Society 38(1): 163-88.
  • Macey, JR (1992) ‘Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies’ Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 8: 93-125.

Aim: This double-session looks at the way in which risk is shaping the politics of the regulatory state. This session will look at different understandings of risk in the theory of regulation and then explore comparative dynamics in risk regulation.


  • Majone, G (1999) ‘The Regulatory State and its Legitimacy Problems’ West European Politics 22(1): 1-24.
  • Kelemen, R.D., Vogel, D (2010) ‘Trading places: the role of the United States and the European Union in international environmental politics’ Comparative Political Studies 43, 427.
  • Vogel, D (2003) ‘The hare and tortoise revisited’ British Journal of Political Science, 33: 557-80.

Further readings:

  • Kagan, R (2007) ‘Globalization and legal change’ Regulation & Governance, 1: 99-120.
  • Wiener, JB and Rodgers, MD (2002) ‘Comparing precaution in the United States and Europe’ Journal of Risk Research, 5(4): 317-49.


Aim: Privatisation and the regulation of utilities has been one of the key themes in the literature on the regulatory state. This double session looks at the motivations, logics and trajectories that account for utility regulation in comparative perspective.


  • Schneider, V, Fink, S and Tenbrücken, M (2005) ‘Buying out the state’ Comparative Political Studies, 38(6): 704-27.
  • Knill, C and Lehmkuhl, D (2002) ‘The national impact of European Union regulatory policy’ European Journal of Political Research, 41(2): 255-80.

Further readings:

  • Thatcher, M and Coen, D (2008) ‘Reshaping European Space’ West European Politics, 31(4): 806-36.
  • Bauby, P and Varone, F (2007) ‘Europeanization of the French electricity policy’ Journal of European Public Policy, 14(7): 1048-60.
  • Humphreys, P and Padgett, S (2006) ‘Globalization, the European Union, and Domestic Governance in Telecoms and Electricity’ Governance, 19(3): 383-406.
  • Bartle, I (2006) ‘Europeans Outside the EU: Telecommunications and Electricity Reform in Norway and Switzerland’ Governance, 19(3): 407-36.
  • Jordana, J, Levi-Faur, D. and Puig, I (2006) ‘The Limits of Europeanization : Regulatory Reforms in the Spanish and Portugese Telecommunications and Electricity Sectors’ Governance 19(3): 437-64

Aim: This session focuses in particular on the way in which financial regulation has responded to the financial crisis.


  • Moloney, N (2010) ‘Financial Services and markets’ in R. Baldwin, M. Cave and M. Lodge (eds) Oxford Handbook of Regulation, pp. 437-61.
  • Perez, S and Westrup, J (2010) ‘Finance and the Macroeconomy’ Journal of European Public Policy, 17(8): 1171-92.
  • Carpenter, D (2010) ‘Institutional strangulation’ Perspectives on Politics 8(3): 825-46.
  • Mayntz, R (2012) ‘Institutional change in financial market regulation’, available here: http://www.mpifg.de/pu/books_wz/2012/wz_rm_2012-2.asp.

Aim: Regulation and regulatory reform have played an important role in the ‘governance’ agenda of international organisations. This session considers institutional theories that have shaped understandings of regulation in the development context.


  • Levy, B and Spiller, PT (1994) ‘The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation’ Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation, 10: 201-246.
  • Estache, A and Wren-Lewis, L (2008) ‘Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries’ Journal of Economic Literature http://www.ecares.org/ecaresdocuments/cbvo/CBVO2008-05.pdf


Aim: One key claim in contemporary politics has been that states are engaging in a process of regulatory competition. This session looks at the foundations of such claims and then assesses the evidence.


  • Tiebout, C (1956) 'A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures' Journal of Political Economy 64 (5): 416-24.
  • Scharpf, FW (1996) ‘Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European Welfare States’ in G Marks et al (1996) Governance in the European Union London, Sage pp. 15-39.

Further readings:

  • Kerber, W and Van den Bergh, R (2008) ‘Mutual recognition revisited: misunderstandings, inconsistencies, and a suggested reinterpretation’ Kyklos, 61: 447-65.
  • Pelkmans, J (2007) ‘Mutual recognition in goods. On promises and disillusions’ Journal of European Public Policy, 14(5): 699-716.
  • Genschel, P and Jachtenfuchs, M (2011) 'How the European Union constrains the state' European Journal of Political Research 50: 293-314.
  • Radaelli, C (2004), ‘The Puzzle of Regulatory Competition’ Journal of Public Policy vol 24(1)

Aim: This session looks at one meta-regulation tool that has enjoyed ‘policy boom’-type attention, namely better regulation tools such as cost-benefit analysis and regulatory impact assessments. Particular attention will be paid to the political logic of such instruments.


  • Baldwin, R (2005) ‘Is Better Regulation Smarter Regulation?’ Public Law 485
  • Radaelli, C and De Francesco, F (2010) ‘Regulatory Impact Assessment’ in R. Baldwin et al (eds) Handbook of Regulation.

Further readings:

  • Dunlop, C, Magetti, M, Radaelli, C and Russel, D (2012) ‘The many uses of regulatory impact assessment ‘ Regulation & Governance, 6(1): 23-45.
  • Rose-Ackerman, S (2011) ‘Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in its Place’ http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1709572

Aim: This concluding double session first looks at different scenarios that may define the future of the regulatory state. In the second part, we consider research agendas that should shape the future study of regulation, especially in comparative perspective.


  • Hood, C (1991) ‘A Public Management for All Seasons’ Public Administration, 69(1): 3-19.
  • Levi-Faur, D (2011) ‘The Odyssey of the Regulatory State’ Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance, number 39,
  • Lodge, M (2008) ‘Regulation and the Regulatory State’ West European Politics 30(1): 280-301


Tags: Institutional Economics, Political Science, Regulation, Law, Economics, Summer School, PhD, Sociology
Published Aug. 30, 2018 8:56 AM - Last modified Aug. 30, 2018 8:56 AM