Artikler og notater av Aanund Hylland på norsk og engelsk - Articles and notes by Aanund Hylland in Norwegian and English

Allotment methods – Procedures for proportional distribution of indivisible entities (1978)
In various contexts, it is necessary to divide a set of indivisible entities among given units in proportion to a certain criterion. Perfectly proportional distribution cannot be guaranteed, since the units are indivisible. One must look for criteria for making approximately proportional distribution. Allotment methods, which are studied in this paper, are procedures for making such division.
Allotment methods are used in connection with political elections. In party-list systems of proportional representation, such methods are used to distribute the seats among the parties, on the basis of their votes. In any electoral system, similar methods can be used to apportion the seats in an elected assembly among geographical districts, according to their population.
Properties of allotments methods are discussed in great detail. The style is mainly mathematical and abstract.
The paper was written in 1978, when I was a doctoral student at John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. It has also been cirulated as Working Paper 1990/11 from the Norwegian School of Management (Handelshøyskolen BI).

A note on finite differences and additive separability (1979)
The note contains proof of a mathematical result used in «Strategy proofness of voting procedures with lotteries as outcomes and infinite sets of strategies».

Strategy proofness of voting procedures with lotteries as outcomes and infinite sets of strategies (1980)
A decision procedure is strategy proof if reporting one's preferences truthfully is always an optimal action. In the procedures discussed here, the final outcome may partly be determined by chance; hence people's voting determines a lottery (on a finite set of basic alternatives). Individual preferences are represented by (von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility functions. If a strategy-proof procedure satisfies the ex post-Pareto condition (the final, non-random outcome is Pareto optimal), it is a «random dictatorship». If the ex ante Pareto condition holds (the chosen lottery is Pareto optimal), the procedure is dictatorial.
This is part III of my doctoral dissertation «Collective decisions and individual incentives».

Proportionality in two dimensions (2000)
A given amount of a certain good shall be distributed among a number of entities. The entities are characterized by two attributes and can be arranged in a two-dimensional matrix. Each entity has a certain claim on the good, represented by a number. The good shall, as far as possible, be distributed in proportion to these claims, under the condition that the total allocation to entities that share one of the attributes (that is, the entities that make up a row or a column in the matrix) is predetermined. The problem has a continuous version, where the good is perfectly divisible, and a discrete one, in which each entity must receive a whole number of units of the good.
The problem is studied theoretically. In addition, it is applied to the representation of Cantons and Constituent Peoples in the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hence the two dimensions are geography (Cantons) and ethnicity (Constituent Peoples).

Stortingets geografiske sammensetning (2001)
Notatet inneholder en historisk gjennomgang av reglene for Stortingets geografiske sammensetning fra 1814 til 2001. Den ordningen som gjaldt i 2001, innført ved grunnlovsendring i 1988, er beskrevet og diskutert. Forslagene fra valglovutvalget, NOU 2001:3 Velgere, valgordning, valgte, er referert og kommentert. (Disse forslagene ble fulgt opp ved grunnlovsendring vedtatt i 2003.)

Parliamentary elections in Northern Cyprus − Aspects of the electoral system (2004)
Certain aspects of the electoral system for parliamentary elections in the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" are discussed, in general and with specific reference to the December 2003 elections. The issues discussed are the rules for how seats are distributed among districts and among political parties, and the rules for selecting persons to fill the seats won by a party. Many important aspects of the electoral system are not discussed, such as the qualifications for being a voter and a candidate, the procedures for registering voters, the rules regulating the campaign, etc.
I was a member of an «election expert team» sent by the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights at the University of Oslo to assess the electoral process at the December 2003 parliamentary elections in Northern Cyprus. The note is an appendix to the report
Northern Cyprus: Parliamentary elections, December 2003

Post-conflict constitutional design: The trade-offs between short-term necessity and long-term optimality (2007)
This is a transcript of a speech I gave at the Workshop on Peace and Accountability in Transitions from Armed Conflict, June 15 – 16, 2007, Bogotá, Colombia.

Post-conflict societies: State structure and electoral system (2007)
The paper was prepared for a seminar at Columbia University, New York. It is based on Part I and Part II Chapters 2, 3, 5 – 7 and 12 – 14 in a report co-authored with Jarrett Blanc and Kåre Vollan:
Blanc, Jarrett, Aanund Hylland and Kåre Vollan (2006): «State Structure and Electoral Systems in Post-Conflict Situations», Washington, D.C.: IFES

Electoral systems as conflict resolution measures (2007)
This is a lecture in the course PECOS4100 − International Negotiations/Conflict Resolution, within the study program Peace and Conflict Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo. The lecture was also given in 2008 and 2009.

Elections in Norway – Notes on the electoral system (2007)
These notes were prepared for a visit by a parliamentary delegation from New Zealand and have been revised and extended after the meeting with the delegation. The notes were also used for a presentation to a visiting delegation from the Central Election Commission of Nepal.

Matematisk karakterisering av mandatfordelingsmetoder (2005)
I mange land, deriblant Norge, foregår politiske valg som forholdstallsvalg basert på (parti)lister. Når stemmene er avgitt, blir partiene tildelt mandater i forhold til den oppslutningen de har blant velgerne. Siden mandater ikke kan deles, kan eksakt proporsjonalitet vanligvis ikke oppnås; det er behov for en metode som på en systematisk måte finner beste tilnærming til forholdsmessig fordeling. Det fins ingen metode som i denne sammenhengen entydig og utvilsomt kan sies å være den beste eller riktigste.
Notatet omtaler tre aktuelle metoder, som alle er eller har vært i bruk i mange land. Det er gitt matematiske karakteriseringer av metodene, som skal tilsvare intuitive eller normative karakteriseringer, altså utsagn om at dersom forholdsmessighet blir forstått på en viss måte, blir dette best realisert ved en bestemt metode.
Stoffet er i hovedsak hentet fra «Allotment methods», nevnt ovenfor.

Normativ aksiomatikk − anvendt på spørsmålet om rettferdig valgordning (2008)
Intuitive oppfatninger om prinsipper for rettferdighet kan ofte formuleres presist, som «normative aksiomer». Man utleder konsekvenser av disse og finner ut hvordan de formulerte prinsippene kan realiseres, eventuelt at prinsippene er uforenelige. I siste tilfelle må de intuitive oppfatningene revideres. Resultatene må også konfronteres med intuitive oppfatninger om hva som er riktig eller rettferdig i konkrete saker.
Presentasjonen inneholder en aksiomatisk karakterisering av delingstallsmetoder.

Implementing majority rule (2009)
Contribution to the conference «Majority Decisions» at Collège de France, Paris, May 13 – 14, 2009.

Stortingsvalgordningen i historisk perspektiv 1814 – 2003 (2009)
Dette er i hovedsak en kondensert utgave av «Stortingets geografiske sammensetning», ført fram til og med grunnlovsendringene i 2003. Andre aspekter av valgordningen, så som stemmerett og regler for politisk mandatfordeling, er også omtalt.

Elections in Norway – Notes on the electoral system (2010)
This is a revised version of the note from 2007 with the same title. In particular, the results of the 2009 parliamentary elections are taken into account..