

# MEMORANDUM

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
## **Unemployment Insurance in Welfare States: Soft Constraints and Mild Sanctions**

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# Unemployment Insurance in Welfare States: Soft Constraints and Mild Sanctions

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## Abstract

Based on a sequence of reforms in the Norwegian unemployment insurance (UI) system, we show that activity-oriented UI regimes - i.e., regimes with a high likelihood of required participation in active labor market programs, duration limitations on unconditional UI entitlements, and high sanction probabilities - deliver substantially shorter unemployment spells than pure income-insurance regimes. Soft constraints, in the form of activity requirements or small benefit cuts after a pre-specified UI duration, have many of the same behavioral consequences as threats of complete benefit termination. Early introduction of a soft constraint appears particularly effective; our results show that the expected unemployment duration falls by half a day for each week the soft constraint is moved ahead in the UI spell. Mild sanctions, in the form of temporary benefit terminations in response to inadequate search effort or excess choosiness, cause a significant rise in the job hazard.

Keywords: Competing risks, unemployment insurance, timing-of-events, NPMLE, MMPH

JEL classification: C14, C15, C41, J64, J65, J68

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## 1 Introduction

Welfare states face a dilemma regarding the design of unemployment insurance (UI) systems. On the one hand, the relatively generous replacement ratios that are embedded in these systems call for tight benefit duration limits, strict work-tests, and austere sanction practices in order to offset moral hazard problems. On the other hand, the prevalence of multiple layers in the social security safety net, e.g., in the form of sickness insurance, rehabilitation benefits, housing subsidies, and means-tested welfare assistance, often render threats of complete benefit termination incredible. Given a political obligation of poverty prevention, a more thrifty UI system may simply shift insurance costs over to other social security programs. European policy makers have responded to this dilemma by developing “soft” duration constraints and “mild” sanction practices within their UI systems. For example, rather than setting a definite maximum UI benefit period (which presumably would be recognized by many claimants as a time-inconsistent threat, in the sense that they are confident that some support will be provided if really needed), duration limitations are often confined only to the most generous and unconditional form of income support. When this period expires, benefits may still be maintained, but at a somewhat lower level than before and/or conditional on participation in Active Labor Market Programs (ALMP). Sanctions are imposed (usually at the discretion of case workers) when claimants fail to respond to summons by the employment office, when suitable job offers are rejected, or when job search efforts are deemed inappropriate. But normally, a sanction means that benefits are terminated or reduced for a relatively short period of time only, e.g., 4-8 weeks.

The purpose of the present paper is to evaluate empirically the behavioral effects of soft constraints and mild sanctions within a well-developed welfare state economy, i.e., Norway. We focus on two questions. The first is the extent to which the various policy measures elicit the intended behavioral responses in terms of more vigorous job search and, consequently, higher job finding rates. The second is the extent to which they generate the unintended side effect of benefit shifting. The latter of these topics has so far been virtually ignored in the literature, despite its potential empirical importance (25 percent of the completed unemployment spells in our data end in a transition to another type of benefit). In order to identify the causal effects of interest, we take advantage of the fact that Norway has been through substantial reforms in its UI maximum duration regulations. Our empirical basis is a set of merged administrative register data that track all registered unemployment spells and their outcomes on a monthly basis from November

1993 to October 2001 (1.1 million spells). The data allow us to investigate the impact of UI regimes on the transition rates into employment, to other kinds of publicly provided benefits, to active labor market programs, and to ordinary educational activities. Hence, we explicitly distinguish impacts on the job hazard from impacts on other exit rates out of registered unemployment; see Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) for recent evidence indicating that this distinction is of paramount importance.

As we explain in the next section, there exists a rich, yet inconclusive, literature on the behavioral impact of benefit duration constraints and sanctions in European UI systems. The inconclusiveness emanates from institutional differences and data limitations, as well as from methodological difficulties. An important issue that arises in analyses of benefit exhaustion effects is how to control for other sources of duration dependence in the hazard rates. Unemployment duration may have a direct effect on the escape rates from unemployment for a number of reasons, such as discouragement, loss of general skills, and statistical discrimination against long-term unemployed. For a given individual, one additional month of insured unemployment obviously also implies that the point of exhaustion has come one month closer, hence there is a fundamental colinearity problem associated with these two variables. This is why institutional reforms become important for identification; the existence of regime shifts breaks the perfect correlation between spell duration and benefit exhaustion in the data. There is, however, an important conceptual difference between the role of unemployment duration with respect to discouragement and statistical discrimination, on the one hand, and the role of unemployment duration with respect to exhaustion of benefit entitlements, on the other: While the latter of these duration concepts has a clear-cut interpretation and can be accurately measured (given sufficiently reliable data), the former is both vague and ill-defined. For example, a number of persons move into and out of unemployment several times during a short time interval. While benefit exhaustion rules regulate the conditions under which repeated spells are to be counted as belonging to the same maximum benefit duration period or not, there are no rules that can be called upon to tell us whether they should also be counted as one spell in terms of, e.g., discouragement or discrimination effects.

The standard procedure used by econometricians is to reset the “duration clock” every time a new spell starts, implying that persons moving frequently into and out of unemployment never become “long-term unemployed”. This procedure may be inadequate in terms of capturing

the true pattern of structural duration dependence. And, more seriously in the present context, it may be responsible for inducing a bias in parameters that are identified on the basis of institutional reforms. The reason for this is that since the level of unemployment typically varies over time, it is generally not the case that the unmeasured parts of unemployment durations (from previous spells) are equally distributed between pre and post reform periods. If the analysis controls for the duration of the ongoing spell, but fails to consider the duration of past spells, the estimated spell duration parameters will fail to pick up the true duration dependence effects. And even more seriously, if benefit exhaustion is accurately recorded, this variable will serve as a proxy for past unemployment, hence its impact on the employment hazard will not only reflect a causal exhaustion effect.

In the present paper, we take advantage of the fact that the data contain information on individual unemployment exposure during a four-year period prior to each new unemployment spell, and we control for “lagged” duration (related to previous spells), as well as for “ongoing” duration in our efforts to identify benefit exhaustion effects. Around 65 percent of the entrants into unemployment in our data have been unemployed before during the last four years, and as much as 43 percent of the entrants completed a previous spell less than one year prior to the start of the new one. We analyze repeated spells within a simultaneous modeling framework; hence, “lagged” unemployment duration is treated as related to “current” unemployment duration not only through its causal effect, but also through the persistence of unobserved covariates.<sup>1</sup> We set up a competing risks hazard rate model with six endogenous events. Three of these events, i.e., full employment, a shift to another type of benefit, and a start of ordinary education, are final, in the sense that they terminate the unemployment spell.<sup>2</sup> The other three events, i.e., a start of ALMP participation, a benefit sanction, and access to some part-time work, do not terminate a spell, but are allowed to have causal effects on subsequent hazard rates. Unobserved heterogeneity is modeled in terms of a joint discrete mixture distribution, estimated by means of the non-parametric maximum likelihood estimator (NPMLE); see Lindsay (1983) and Heckman and

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<sup>1</sup> Note that there is an “initial conditions problem” associated with lagged unemployment that was experienced prior to our modeling period. We return to this issue later on.

<sup>2</sup> The term “full employment” is used to denote employment that is combined with termination of the registration as unemployed job seeker. A number of individuals get some (occasional) part-time work while continuing to search for more satisfactory employment. This is defined as a transition to part-time work without terminating the spell.

Singer (1984). In contrast to most existing applications, we impose no a priori restrictions on the number of support points. As a result, we end up with as much as 41 support points for our six-dimensional vector of unobserved heterogeneity.

A main finding of our paper is that an “activity-oriented” UI regime – with a high probability of required ALMP participation, duration-limited unconditional UI entitlements, and high sanction probabilities – delivers substantially shorter unemployment spells than a more “payment-oriented” insurance system, without altering the final outcomes of the spells very much. In line with the existing literature, we find a strong, but myopic, response to UI exhaustion; the job hazard rises significantly during the very last months of the entitlement period. More interestingly, the behavioral response seems to be almost the same regardless of the “harshness” of the duration constraint. A soft constraint offering generous benefit renewal options and/or participation in paid labor market programs generates basically the same responses as a hard constraint offering no further income support from the employment office. A possible interpretation of this finding is that all constraints that have been used in Norway are really soft, given the existence of alternative (means-tested) transfer schemes. However, the predicted fall in average unemployment duration associated with a reduction in the UI period through the imposition of a soft constraint is around half a day for every week’s reduction. This effect is of exactly the same magnitude as that reported by Card and Levine (2000) on the basis of an extended benefit program in New Jersey, USA. We find this similarity intriguing, given that for most job-seekers, the soft constraint imposed in Norway does not really affect the absolute duration limit of UI benefits at all; it only advances the moment at which some form of activity is demanded. The favorable result of “activity-orientation” is obtained despite that *actual* participation in labor market programs is found to contribute to longer unemployment durations, *ceteris paribus*. When both lock-in effects and post-program effects are taken into account, ALMP lengthens the participant’s expected unemployment duration (including the participation period) by approximately five weeks. On the other hand, it also raises the probability that the participant’s spell eventually ends in employment rather than in withdrawal from the labor force by around two percentage points.

In the next section, we briefly review the existing evidence. Section 3 provides a description of the data, the state space, and of the policy reform used to identify the effects of interest. Section 4 presents our econometric method, and Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Previous Research

Existing empirical evidence from the U.S. clearly establishes that the threat of losing UI benefit entitlements within the near future has a significant impact on the claimants' exit and/or job finding rates (Katz and Meyer, 1990; Meyer, 1990; Card and Levine, 2000). Evidence from Europe is less clear-cut. An influential early contribution to this literature is Hunt (1995), who, based on a set of UI duration extensions for elderly workers in West Germany during the 1980's, concludes that the behavioral impact of the maximum benefit duration in Germany is of the same magnitude as in the U.S. Similar, though somewhat weaker, responses are reported for Austria by Winter-Ebmer (1998), also based on a benefit extension for elderly workers. The generality of these findings may be limited, however, since they are based on reforms that to some extent were aimed at coaxing elderly people to leave the labor market, in the hope that this would create jobs for younger folks. Hence, the results may to some extent be driven by the (fully intended) usage of the UI system as an informal route towards early retirement. Indeed, Fitzenberger and Wilke (2004) show that conditional on the job seekers' eventual return to employment the reforms in West Germany had no effect at all on the speed at which this happened.

There is also some quasi-experimental evidence from Denmark, based on a sequence of reforms that imposed stricter activity requirements. The maximum duration of unconditional UI benefits in Denmark has gradually been reduced from four to one year, after which continued income support is conditional on participation in ALMP. The empirical evidence suggests that these reforms had a large positive effect on the transition rate from unemployment to employment, particularly in the period just prior to exhaustion of unconditional benefits (Geerdsen, 2006).<sup>3</sup> Sweden has for a long time practiced a UI system with a relatively short unconditional UI benefit period (60 weeks). After that, continued income support is conditional on participation in ALMP. There is some evidence (Carling *et al.*, 1996; Carling, Holmlund and Vejsiu, 2001, Røed, Jensen, and Thoursie, 2007) indicating that there is a spike in the job hazard rate in the period just prior to exhaustion of unconditional benefits. The findings in Carling Holmlund

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<sup>3</sup> Note that Danish evidence is not based on positively identified job transitions; rather a job transition is inferred from the observation that a person leaves unemployment while at the same time does not show up in other public registers (covering other transfers and/or educational activities). Although this is probably appropriate in most cases, it is clearly a danger that the few "transitions to nowhere" that always occur in a dataset, will be concentrated precisely around the time of benefit exhaustion. Hence, for the purpose of identifying the nature of exhaustion effects properly, directly identified job transitions may be required.



and Vejsiu (2001), however, are challenged by Johansson and Selén (2002) on the ground that the employment concept used includes some forms of subsidized employment, and that the results critically hinges on these outcomes.

In contrast to Denmark and Sweden, the Norwegian UI system has no clearly defined activation period. For most of the 1990's, the benefit period has been divided into two distinct parts, separated by a quarantine period (see next section for details). After 1991, an exemption rule made job seekers entitled to escape the quarantine, insofar as they were not themselves to blame for their continued unemployment. Existing evidence (Røed and Zhang, 2003; 2005) indicate that there was a conspicuous spike in the job finding rate around the time of exhaustion of the first benefit period, despite the generous exemption rules and renewal options. The only reform-based evidence from Norway, however, is provided by Bratberg and Vaage (2000), who evaluate the introduction of the exemption rule from the quarantine, which they argue, in practice, extended the length of the UI period to more than three years. And interestingly, their main conclusion is that the softening of the UI duration constraint did not affect the transition rate into employment at all.

Direct evidence regarding the impact of sanctions is limited. Abbring, Van den Berg, and Van Ours (2005) use the timing of events approach (Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003) to examine the impact of sanction practices for unemployed job seekers in the Netherlands. Their finding is that sanctions, in terms of punitive benefit curtailments in response to inadequate job search, have substantial favorable effects on re-employment rates. There is, to our knowledge, no Scandinavian evidence on this issue.

There is also little evidence regarding the impact of UI benefit exhaustion on the take-up rates of other social security benefits. For Norway (Røed and Zhang, 2005; Henningsen, 2006) and Sweden (Larsson, 2006), there exists some evidence that the take-up rate of sickness benefits increases as the point of UI exhaustion comes closer.

### **3 Data and Policy Reform**

The data that we use comprise all new unemployment spells recorded in Norway during the period from November 1993 to October 2001, with information on past unemployment back to 1989. Throughout this period, a number of different UI regimes have been at work, depending on individual characteristics as well as on time, see Table 1. The Norwegian UI system is compulsory. The requirement for being entitled to UI benefits is (with some exceptions) defined in terms

of earnings in the calendar year directly preceding the year in which the unemployment spell started, or the average of the last three years (see Røed, and Zhang, 2005, for details). These earnings must exceed approximately 8,000 USD. If this condition is satisfied, the UI benefit is set to 62.4 percent of previous earnings, up to a ceiling (in the base earnings) of around 40,000 USD. These basic rules have been stable throughout the period, apart from some minor increases in the minimum income requirements. However, the rules regarding maximum benefit duration, and the way they have been practiced have changed substantially. Until 1997, the standard maximum benefit duration was 80 weeks. But, after a 13-week quarantine period, a new 80-week period could be granted at a benefit level 10 percent lower than in the first period. It was possible to apply for benefits even in the quarantine period (i.e., an exemption). It was also possible to apply for a benefit extension of 13 weeks after exhaustion of the second benefit period. The absolute maximum duration was  $80+13+80+13=186$  weeks. We therefore view this system as having a 186-week absolute duration limit, but with soft constraints imposed after 80 and 173 weeks. In January 1997 this system was replaced by a single maximum benefit period of 156 weeks for most of the job seekers, but only 78 weeks for individuals with low previous earnings (below approximately 15,000 USD per year). However, individuals with the longest UI durations who also had a strong attachment to the labor force prior to the unemployment spell are, according to this new system, also entitled to a so-called “wait-period benefit” after the 156-week benefit period is exhausted.<sup>4</sup> Wait-period benefits pay around two thirds of previous UI benefits, but they have no maximum duration limit. Wait-period benefits are only supposed to be handed out if no suitable ALMP can be offered, and job seekers rejecting ALMP participation will lose their wait-period benefit entitlement.

Throughout the period, there has been a special rule regarding former state-employees, who lost their jobs due to reorganizations within the public sector. These individuals have been entitled to maximum benefit durations from 3 to 17 years, depending on age, without the need to apply for extensions.<sup>5</sup> There have also been separate rules for individuals who have completed

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<sup>4</sup> “Strong attachment” is defined as at least three years of work experience during the four years prior to the year of entry into unemployment.

<sup>5</sup> The benefit level is in these cases calculated as 66% of the wage rate at the time of job loss multiplied by  $\min(\text{tenure}, 30)$  divided by 30; i.e. the replacement ratio is 66% for individuals with at least 30 years tenure in the state sector.

military service, in that they have been exempted from the standard eligibility requirements, but also had shorter maximum benefit duration (26 weeks).

Labor market programs have, throughout the period, been particularly targeted at the long-term unemployed. In the pre-1997 system, the Public Employment Service (PES) also had a

| Regime | Description  | Requirement   | Applies to spells starting   |
|--------|--|---|--|
| I      | Old regime: 80 week UI period, followed by 13 week quarantine (subject to exemption) followed by new 80-week period (on slightly reduced benefits) followed by an additional 13 week period (on application)                               | Satisfying UI income criterion, or has just completed military service  | Before August 1995   |
| II     | New regime, without eligibility for wait-period benefits: 156 week UI period.  | Satisfying the highest of the two UI income criteria  | From January 1997  |
| III    | New regime, with eligibility for wait-period benefits: 156 week UI period, followed by indefinite wait-period benefits (two thirds of UI benefits)   | Satisfying the highest of the two UI income criteria and a requirement of strong labor force attachment during past three years | From January 1997  |
| IV     | New regime for persons with low past income: 78 week UI period.  | Satisfying the lowest of the two UI income criteria   | From January 1997  |
| V      | Intermediate regime: 80 week UI period, followed by the possibility of applying for a new 78-week period (on slightly reduced benefits).   | Satisfying UI income criterion  | August 1995-December 1996  |
| VI     | New regime for individuals completing military service: 24 week UI period.   | Just completed military service   | From January 1997  |
| VII    | Regime for individuals previously employed in the state sector: Long benefit periods, depending on age at the time of job loss:<br><35: 3 years<br>35-39: 5 years<br>40-44: 7 years<br>45-49: 9 years<br>>49: Until retirement at 67 years | Lost a job in the state sector due to reorganization  | Whole period (a reduction was imposed for new entrants after March 2002) |
| VIII   | No benefits  | No requirements   | Whole period   |

practice of using labor market programs as a sort of work-test in relation to applications for exemptions from the 13-week quarantine period and for a second 80-week UI benefit period. An implication of this policy was that many individuals approaching the first 80-week limit could

not count on an automatic extension of the benefit period. A requirement of participation in ALMP in return for continued income support was a real “threat” (or opportunity). Individuals with an active unemployment spell (in the first UI benefit period) at the time of the reform (January 1997) remained in the old benefit regime, and had to apply for a second benefit period. But the 13-week quarantine period was removed for this group.

Benefit claimants have always been obliged to accept job offers deemed (by the case worker) to be appropriate, and rejection of such offers typically lead to a sanction in the form of an 8-week quarantine period without benefits. In practice, such quarantines are rarely imposed during the first months of a job search period.

Table 2 provides an overview of the data. In total, 665,068 individuals experienced some kind of unemployment from November 1993 to October 2001, divided into 1,145,777 spells. An interesting feature of the data is that a number of individuals have experienced repeated unemployment spells in different UI regimes.

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| Number of individuals                                      | 665,068   |
| Number of spells   | 1,145,777 |
| Percent of individuals with more than one spell            | 41.16     |
| Percent of individuals with spells in more than one regime | 24.99     |

The data have point-in-time structure, such that unemployment status is updated by the end of each calendar month. There are four different ways in which an unemployment spell can end during the observation period: a job is obtained, the job search period is terminated and another type of benefit is taken up instead (sickness benefit, rehabilitation benefit, disability benefit, or social assistance), an ordinary education is started, or the job-seeker dies or leaves the country (or we lose track of the individual in question for unknown reasons). There are also three other events of interest that occur, but which do not imply that the spell ends: a labor market program activity is started off, some part-time work is obtained (but not sufficient to terminate the job search) or a benefit sanction is imposed. The latter can of course only happen as long as benefits are claimed. Our data represent a substantial improvement over register data used in previous Norwegian (and other register-based) studies, in that we identify the destination of each transition out of unemployment more accurately. In particular, we believe that the present dataset is the first to identify all forms of benefit shifting, including transfers to social assistance (paid for by the municipalities). In contrast to many previous studies on Scandinavian register data (Røed



Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics

|  | All   | Regime (see Table 1) |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|--|-------|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|  |       | I                    | II    | III   | IV    | V     | VI    | VII   | VIII  |
| the first duration month to:   |       |                      |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Employment   | 12.47 | 10.89                | 18.13 | 19.20 | 14.63 | 14.00 | 16.50 | 6.93  | 8.54  |
| Other benefit  | 5.25  | 2.89                 | 3.58  | 2.42  | 4.50  | 4.24  | 2.62  | 1.99  | 8.98  |
| Education  | 5.08  | 3.13                 | 3.92  | 1.42  | 4.98  | 4.12  | 12.34 | 0.16  | 7.96  |
| Share with unemployment experience in the last four years(percent)                                       | 65.75 | 76.81                | 69.92 | 56.53 | 73.91 | 75.89 | 56.80 | 53.67 | 52.91 |
| Average time since the end of the last unemployment spell, conditional on a previous spell               | 12.39 | 11.33                | 14.03 | 15.27 | 11.90 | 13.69 | 12.60 | 6.39  | 10.85 |
| Average months of unemployment in a four year period prior to the spell, conditional on a previous spell | 11.74 | 13.77                | 10.81 | 7.99  | 12.63 | 12.84 | 6.62  | 18.80 | 10.38 |
| <u>Selected means and fractions (taken over spells)</u>  |       |                      |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Men (percent)  | 51.00 | 53.36                | 48.27 | 54.16 | 39.05 | 53.31 | 97.78 | 49.06 | 44.88 |
| Married (percent)  | 23.14 | 26.56                | 20.50 | 34.84 | 22.88 | 24.14 | 1.00  | 59.39 | 18.71 |
| Fraction of women with dependent children (percent)  | 48.10 | 50.99                | 46.93 | 50.58 | 53.48 | 54.98 | 5.94  | 33.57 | 41.85 |
| Educational attainment (percent)   |       |                      |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Only compulsory education  | 13.32 | 12.74                | 8.76  | 9.35  | 10.05 | 11.31 | 6.40  | 10.02 | 18.23 |
| Lower secondary education  | 49.62 | 50.39                | 45.71 | 42.76 | 49.54 | 48.15 | 55.23 | 55.93 | 52.76 |
| Upper secondary education  | 20.96 | 22.09                | 25.39 | 26.15 | 22.32 | 23.04 | 30.52 | 20.20 | 15.48 |
| Lower university degree  | 10.61 | 10.53                | 12.70 | 13.60 | 12.11 | 12.19 | 6.25  | 9.18  | 8.27  |
| Higher university degree   | 5.48  | 4.25                 | 7.44  | 8.13  | 5.98  | 5.30  | 1.60  | 4.67  | 5.25  |
| Work experience (years)  | 4.54  | 6.19                 | 3.48  | 11.41 | 3.52  | 5.99  | 0.27  | 19.04 | 1.14  |
| Age at spell start   | 29.14 | 30.47                | 28.81 | 36.00 | 28.93 | 30.86 | 21.32 | 45.14 | 25.67 |
| Immigrants from OECD countries (percent)   | 3.19  | 2.32                 | 4.43  | 3.02  | 3.19  | 2.48  | 0.23  | 1.31  | 4.10  |
| Immigrants from Non OECD countries (percent)   | 10.15 | 3.94                 | 11.05 | 5.20  | 9.37  | 5.19  | 1.72  | 2.36  | 19.22 |

#### 4 The Statistical Model

We set up a multivariate mixed proportional hazard rate model (MMPH) with six competing events  $k=1, \dots, 6$ : employment ( $k=1$ ), another benefit ( $k=2$ ), education ( $k=3$ ), ALMP ( $k=4$ ), a benefit sanction (loss of UI benefits before the benefit period has expired) ( $k=5$ ), and part-time

work (while still searching for more work) ( $k=6$ ). The first three events terminate the spell. The three latter events do not terminate the spell, but are assumed to have causal effects on future hazard rates, both during and after the event.<sup>6</sup>

As we observe labor market status by the end of each month only, we set up the statistical model in terms of grouped hazard rates (Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978; Meyer, 1990). We write the integrated period-specific hazard rates  $\varphi_{kit}$  as functions of observed (time-varying) variables and unknown parameters represented by index functions  $w_{kit}$ , and (time-invariant) unobserved individual characteristics  $v_{ki}$ :

$$\varphi_{kit} = \int_{t-1}^t \theta_{kis} ds = \exp(w_{kit} + v_{ki}), \quad k = 1, \dots, 6, \quad (1)$$

where  $\theta_{kis}$  is the underlying continuous-time hazard rate, which is assumed to be constant within each unit time period.

Before we specify the model in more detail, we introduce and discuss some of the key explanatory variables that will be included in the index functions  $w_{kit}$ . Time has two dimensions in our model; *calendar time* and *process time*. The calendar time dimension reflects business cycle and seasonal fluctuations and changes in government priorities (e.g., regarding the ALMP capacity and sanction practices). In the model, the effects of calendar time are represented in the most flexible way possible within the MMPH framework, i.e., by including a separate dummy variable for each calendar month in each hazard rate. These dummy variables are denoted  $s_{it}$ . Process time (time since the spell started) affects the hazard rates through two different channels. First, it affects the cost of continued job search through the depletion of UI entitlements (Mortensen, 1977; Van den Berg, 1990). We label this “UI-generated duration dependence”. The characteristics of this duration dependence obviously depend on the specific properties of the UI regime. Second, unemployment duration may also affect hazard rates directly, through, e.g., discouragement, statistical discrimination, and administrative priorities regarding sanction practices and the allocation of program slots. We label this “intrinsic duration dependence”. A key contri-

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<sup>6</sup> Note that we treat the loss of benefits during the quarantine period of the old UI benefit regime as an endogenous sanction (since a large fraction of the claimants do not lose their benefits at this point), while the loss of benefits after complete UI exhaustion is treated as an exogenous event. It is clear that not all individuals are under risk of experiencing all six events all the time. For example, it is obviously only benefit claimants that can be subject to a sanction. We also assume that only individuals below 35 years of age are under risk of starting ordinary education (very few individuals above this age make a transition to education, but those who do are right-censored).

bution of this paper is to decompose empirically these two sources of duration dependence. Both the UI-generated and the intrinsic duration dependencies are modeled in a semi-parametric fashion, by means of comprehensive sets of dummy variables.

As discussed in the introduction to this paper, intrinsic duration dependence may reflect recent unemployment experiences that do not belong to the current spell. To account for this possibility, we model intrinsic duration dependence as a function of three factors: i) the overall unemployment exposure during the four year period prior to the current spell, ii) the time that elapsed from the end of the last completed spell to the start of the current spell, and iii) the duration of the ongoing spell. These three factors are interacted in a way that we describe in Table 4. The entrants into unemployment are divided into 16 groups defined by total unemployment exposure and elapsed time since the last spell was completed. For each of the 16 groups, we specify piece-wise constant baseline hazards with up to ten steps, as described in the right-hand column of Table 4. In total, the duration baselines are represented by  $16 \times 10 = 160$  dummy variables, denoted  $d_{it}$ .<sup>7</sup> Note that only around one third of all spells in the data are “fresh”, in the sense that the job seeker had no previous unemployment experience during the four year prior to the spell.

| <u>I. Past unemployment</u>  |   | <u>II. Ongoing unemployment</u>  |                    |                    |                    |       |
|--|---|--|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------|
| Definition of groups according to past unemployment during the 48 months just prior to the start of the current spell<br>(fraction of spells belonging to each group in parentheses) |   | Group-specific baseline hazards divided into the following piece-wise constant parts<br>(duration in months) |                    |                    |                    |       |
| Time since last unemployment spell was completed (# months)  | Total unemployment during past 4 years (# months) |  |                    |                    |                    |       |
|  | No previous unemployment                          | 1-6  | 7-12               | 13-24              | >24                |       |
| 0  | Group 1<br>(34.25)                                | -  | -                  | -                  | -                  | 1     |
| 1-6  | -   | Group 2<br>(8.52)  | Group 3<br>(5.69)  | Group 4<br>(7.72)  | Group 5<br>(5.33)  | 2     |
| 7-12   | -   | Group 6<br>(5.68)  | Group 7<br>(3.59)  | Group 8<br>(4.66)  | Group 9<br>(2.18)  | 3     |
| 13-24  | -   | Group 10<br>(5.68)   | Group 11<br>(3.13) | Group 12<br>(3.26) | Group 13<br>(0.80) | 4-6   |
| >24  | -   | Group 14<br>(6.25)   | Group 15<br>(2.26) | Group 16<br>(1.00) | -                  | 7-9   |
|  |   |  |                    |                    |                    | 10-12 |
|  |   |  |                    |                    |                    | 13-15 |
|  |   |  |                    |                    |                    | 16-18 |
|  |   |  |                    |                    |                    | 19-24 |
|  |   |  |                    |                    |                    | >24   |

Note: The spells duration dummy variables represent interaction terms of the 16 groups in part I and the 10 baseline steps in part II; hence, in total, we use  $16 \times 10 = 160$  dummy variables.

<sup>7</sup> In addition to the variables described in Table 4, we also include a single interaction term between spell duration (measured in month) and a variable measuring the cyclical situation at the time of entry. The business cycle variable is collected from Gaure and Røed (2003), and normalized to zero for a “mean” cyclical situation.



Table 5  
Definition of UI Entitlement Dummy Variables ( $b_{it}$ )

|    | Variable description   | Relevant for Regimes, Conf. Table 1 |
|----|--|-------------------------------------|
| 1  | 16-18 months left until potential temporary benefit exhaustion (with or without quarantine), or in the application process (given eligibility)           | I, V                                |
| 2  | 13-15 months left until potential temporary benefit exhaustion (with or without quarantine)  | I, V                                |
| 3  | 7-12 months left until potential temporary benefit exhaustion (with or without quarantine)   | I, V                                |
| 4  | 6 months left until potential temporary benefit exhaustion (with quarantine)   | I                                   |
| 5  | 5 months left until potential temporary benefit exhaustion (with quarantine)   | I                                   |
| 6  | 4 months left until potential temporary benefit exhaustion (with quarantine)   | I                                   |
| 7  | 3 months left until potential temporary benefit exhaustion (with quarantine)   | I                                   |
| 8  | 2 months left until potential temporary benefit exhaustion (with quarantine)   | I                                   |
| 9  | 1 months left until potential temporary benefit exhaustion (with quarantine)   | I                                   |
| 10 | 6 months left until potential temporary benefit exhaustion (without quarantine)  | V                                   |
| 11 | 5 months left until potential temporary benefit exhaustion (without quarantine)  | V                                   |
| 12 | 4 months left until potential temporary benefit exhaustion (without quarantine)  | V                                   |
| 13 | 3 months left until potential temporary benefit exhaustion (without quarantine)  | V                                   |
| 14 | 2 months left until potential temporary benefit exhaustion (without quarantine)  | V                                   |
| 15 | 1 months left until potential temporary benefit exhaustion (without quarantine)  | V                                   |
| 16 | 13 week quarantine imposed (without UI benefits) after 80 weeks  | I                                   |
| 17 | Exempted from 13 week quarantine after 80 weeks  | I                                   |
| 18 | 13 week benefit extension granted after the second 80 week period  | I                                   |
| 19 | >60 months left until final benefit exhaustion or entitled to benefits until retirement age (previous state employees)                                   | VII                                 |
| 20 | 37-60 months left until final benefit exhaustion (previous state employees)  | VII                                 |
| 21 | 34-36 months left until final benefit exhaustion (with or without entitlement to wait-period benefits) or in the application process (given eligibility) | II, III, VII                        |
| 22 | 19-33 months left until final benefit exhaustion (with or without entitlement to wait-period benefits)   | II, III, VII                        |
| 23 | 16-18 months left until final benefit exhaustion (with or without entitlement to wait-period benefits) for those starting on a new period                | IV                                  |
| 24 | 16-18 months left until final benefit exhaustion (with or without entitlement to wait-period benefits) for the rest                                      | I, II, III                          |
| 25 | 13-15 months left until final benefit exhaustion (with or without entitlement to wait-period benefits)   | I, II, III, IV                      |
| 26 | 7-12 months left until final benefit exhaustion (with or without entitlement to wait-period benefits)  | I, II, III, IV                      |
| 27 | 6 months left until final benefit exhaustion (with entitlement to wait-period benefits)  | III                                 |
| 28 | 5 months left until final benefit exhaustion (with entitlement to wait-period benefits)  | III                                 |
| 29 | 4 months left until final benefit exhaustion (with entitlement to wait-period benefits)  | III                                 |
| 30 | 3 months left until final benefit exhaustion (with entitlement to wait-period benefits)  | III                                 |
| 31 | 2 months left until final benefit exhaustion (with entitlement to wait-period benefits)  | III                                 |
| 32 | 1 months left until final benefit exhaustion (with entitlement to wait-period benefits)  | III                                 |
| 33 | 6 months left until final benefit exhaustion (without entitlement to wait-period benefits)   | I, II, IV, V, VI                    |
| 34 | 5 months left until final benefit exhaustion (without entitlement to wait-period benefits)   | I, II, IV, V, VI                    |
| 35 | 4 months left until final benefit exhaustion (without entitlement to wait-period benefits)   | I, II, IV, V, VI                    |
| 36 | 3 months left until final benefit exhaustion (without entitlement to wait-period benefits)   | I, II, IV, V, VI                    |
| 37 | 2 months left until final benefit exhaustion (without entitlement to wait-period benefits)   | I, II, IV, V, VI                    |
| 38 | 1 months left until final benefit exhaustion (without entitlement to wait-period benefits)   | I, II, IV, V, VI                    |
| 39 | Receiving wait-period benefits (after exhaustion of UI benefits)   | III                                 |
| 40 | Has exhausted UI benefits, does not receive wait-period benefits   | I, II, IV, V, VI                    |
| 41 | Not entitled to benefits at all  | VIII                                |

The UI-generated duration dependence is allowed to vary between the different UI regimes that have been in place during our observations window (conf. Table 1). The explanatory variables we use to capture the effects of UI insurance, denoted  $b_{it}$ , are presented in Table 5. These variables essentially take the form of “countdown” dummy variables, reflecting the remaining time until UI exhaustion. A key point is that the impact of the remaining time until exhaustion may depend on what actually happens in the various regimes after exhaustion. Hence, there are separate sets of dummy variables for countdown to the “soft” and the “hard” constraints. We also include separate dummy variables for spells characterized by (almost) indefinite benefits and spells characterized by no UI benefits at all.

Since regime assignment is not randomized (conf. Section 3), the various regime dummy variables cannot in general be assumed exogenous. Hence, some of the estimated parameters will not have a purely causal interpretation. We are going to assume, however, that differences directly associated with system *reform* do reflect causality. In particular, we will interpret the differences in parameter estimates associated with the UI system reform in 1997 as causal, controlled for the individual characteristics that determine the allocation of spells between the various post-reform regimes. Individuals who belonged to regime I prior to the reform were allocated to regimes II, III, or IV after the reform, depending on their previous income and work experience. We control for this sorting by including dummy variables for (hypothetical) regime-assignment in the post 1997 UI system throughout the data period.

We assume that the events of ALMP, a sanction, and the access to part-time work may have causal effects on the other hazard rates both during their occurrences (on-treatment effects) and afterwards (post-treatment effects); see Røed and Raaum (2006). During their occurrences, the effects are allowed to vary with the progressing duration of the events. Afterwards, the effects are allowed to vary with the completed duration of the events. All these effects are allowed for through additional sets of time-varying dummy variables, denoted  $z_{it}$ , which keep track of ongoing as well as completed events; see Table 6. Finally, the model contains observed and unobserved individual characteristics. The former of these, denoted  $x_{it}$ , may be time-varying, and contains information about gender, age, work-experience, educational attainment, family situation, factors that determine regime affiliation, etc.; see Appendix 1 for details.

We can now write the index functions as

$$w_{kit} = \sigma_{kt} s_{it} + \lambda_{kd} d_{it} + \delta_k b_{it} + \alpha_k z_{it} + \beta_k x_{it}, \quad (2)$$

where  $(\sigma_{kt}, \lambda_{kd}, \delta_k, \alpha_k, \beta_k)$ ,  $k = 1, \dots, 6$ , are the parameters to be recovered from the data. Some of the explanatory variables in (2) are clearly endogenous, in the sense that they depend on the outcomes of the statistical process under consideration, and, hence, on unobserved heterogeneity. This is the case for the duration variables  $d_{it}$  (regardless of whether the duration belongs to the current or to previous spells) as well as for the state variables  $z_{it}$  (recording current or completed ALMP, sanctions, and part-time work). Apart from unemployment duration generated prior to our observation window (which we return to below), this endogeneity is taken into account by means of modeling all events simultaneously, with a joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. This procedure has also become known as the “timing-of-events approach”; see Abbring and Van den Berg (2003).

| Table 6  |  |
|--|--|
| Definition of variables describing ongoing and completed events ( $z_{it}$ ) |  |
| Event  | Variable description   |
| <u>Program participation</u>   |  |
| Ongoing  | 10 dummy variables accounting for duration of <i>ongoing</i> program participation: 0 (no ongoing ALMP), 1 month, 2 months, ..., 8 months, >8 months.  |
| Completed  | 10 dummy variables accounting for duration of <i>completed</i> program participation (within the same spell): 0 (no completed ALMP), 1 month, 2 months, ..., 8 months, >8 months. Completed program participation is set to zero upon start of a new ALMP participation. |
| <u>Part time work</u>  |  |
| Ongoing  | 10 dummy variables accounting for duration of <i>ongoing</i> part-time work: 0 (no ongoing part-time work), 1 month, 2 months, ..., 8 months, >8 months.   |
| Completed  | 10 dummy variables accounting for duration of <i>completed</i> part-time work (within the same spell): 0 (no completed part-time work), 1 month, 2 months, ..., 8 months, >8 months. Completed part-time work is set to zero upon start of a new part-time job.          |
| <u>Sanctions</u>   |  |
| Ongoing  | One dummy indicating ongoing UI sanction   |
| Completed  | One dummy indicating completed sanction  |

Unobserved characteristics  $v_i = (v_{1i}, v_{2i}, v_{3i}, v_{4i}, v_{5i}, v_{6i})$  enter into the model as person-specific “intercepts”, designed to reflect variation in hazard rates that is not captured by observed individual characteristics. A key property of the model is that the intercepts are assumed constant across different spells experienced by the same person; hence, we exploit the existence of multiple spells. The purpose of including unobserved heterogeneity in the model is to eliminate bias in the duration dependence parameters and also to avoid bias in parameters attached to truly exogenous covariates; see Gaure, Røed and Zhang (2007). To the extent that unobserved characteristics are correlated to observed covariates, they will “contaminate” the parameters associated with these covariates. Hence, some of the explanatory variables serve a dual purpose in the model;

they both capture the causal effect of these variables and the extent to which they are correlated to unobserved characteristics.

In order to set up the likelihood function for this model, we need to transform the integrated hazard rates into period-specific transition probabilities. The probability that individual  $i$  makes a transition to state  $k$  during period  $t$  is equal to:

$$p_k(w_{kit} + v_{ki}) = \left( 1 - \exp\left(-\sum_{k \in K_{it}} \exp(w_{kit} + v_{ki})\right) \right) \frac{\exp(w_{kit} + v_{ki})}{\sum_{k \in K_{it}} \exp(w_{kit} + v_{ki})}, \quad (3)$$

where  $K_{it}$  is the set of feasible transitions for individual  $i$  in period  $t$ .<sup>8</sup> Let  $y_{kit}$  be an outcome indicator variable, which is equal to 1 if the corresponding observation ended in a transition to state  $k$ , and zero otherwise, and let  $Y_i$  be the complete set of outcome indicators available for individual  $i$  (all periods at which individual  $i$  has been at risk of making a transition of some sort). The contribution to the likelihood function formed by a particular individual, conditional on the vector of unobserved variables  $v_i$  can then be formulated as:

$$L_i(v_i) = \prod_{y_{kit} \in Y_i} \left[ \prod_{k \in K_{it}} \left[ \left( 1 - \exp\left(-\sum_{k \in K_{it}} \exp(w_{kit} + v_{ki})\right) \right) \frac{\exp(w_{kit} + v_{ki})}{\sum_{k \in K_{it}} \exp(w_{kit} + v_{ki})} \right]^{y_{kit}} \right] \times \left[ \exp\left(-\sum_{k \in K_{it}} \exp(w_{kit} + v_{ki})\right) \right]^{1 - \sum_{k \in K_{it}} y_{kit}}. \quad (4)$$

In order to arrive at the marginal likelihood, we need to integrate unobserved heterogeneity  $v_i$  out of Equation (4). The way we do this takes into account that there is a left-truncation problem represented in our data (spells starting and ending in the same month are never recorded), implying that spells are included in the dataset conditional on survival to the first observation point. We use Bayes' theorem to derive the appropriate distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. However, since we do not have information about the exact duration an individual has

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<sup>8</sup> This can be derived from the continuous time hazards - which given the within-period constancy assumption are equal to the unit-interval integrated hazards - as follows:

$$\int_{t-1}^t \exp(w_{kit} + v_{ki}) \exp\left(-\sum_{k \in K} \int_{t-1}^u \exp(w_{kit} + v_{ki}) ds\right) du = \int_{t-1}^t \left( \exp(w_{kit} + v_{ki}) \exp\left(-\sum_{k \in K} (u - (t-1)) \exp(w_{kit} + v_{ki})\right) \right) du \\ = \left( 1 - \exp\left(-\sum_{k \in K} \exp(w_{kit} + v_{ki})\right) \right) \frac{\exp(w_{kit} + v_{ki})}{\sum_k \exp(w_{kit} + v_{ki})}.$$

been at risk at the time of sampling, we need an additional assumption regarding the pattern of inflows. We assume here that the entrances to the origin state are uniformly distributed within each calendar month.<sup>9</sup> Let  $\bar{t}_i$  be the inflow month for individual  $i$  and let  $w_{i\bar{t}_i} = (w_{1i\bar{t}_i}, w_{2i\bar{t}_i}, w_{3i\bar{t}_i}, w_{4i\bar{t}_i}, w_{5i\bar{t}_i}, w_{6i\bar{t}_i})$ . The conditional density of unobserved heterogeneity  $f(v_i | d \geq 1)$  is then related to the unconditional density  $f(v_i)$  by

$$f(v_i | d \geq 1) = \frac{\Pr(\sum_k y_{ki\bar{t}_i} = 0 | w_{i\bar{t}_i} + v_i)}{E_{v_i} \Pr(\sum_k y_{ki\bar{t}_i} = 0 | w_{i\bar{t}_i} + v_i)} f(v_i), \quad (5)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(\sum_k y_{ki\bar{t}_i} = 0 | w_{i\bar{t}_i} + v_i) &= \int_0^1 \exp(-(1-s)) \sum_k \exp(w_{ki\bar{t}_i} + v_{ki}) ds \\ &= \frac{1 - \exp\left(-\sum_k \exp(w_{ki\bar{t}_i} + v_{ki})\right)}{\sum_k \exp(w_{ki\bar{t}_i} + v_{ki})}. \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

We use a non-parametric approach to account for unobserved heterogeneity, to make sure that the results are really driven by the data and not by unjustified restrictions. In practice, this implies that the vectors of unobserved attributes are discretely distributed (Lindsay, 1983) with the number of mass-points chosen by adding points until it is no longer possible to increase the likelihood function (Heckman and Singer, 1984). Let  $Q$  be the (a priori unknown) number of support points in this distribution and let  $\{v_l, q_l\}$ ,  $l = 1, 2, \dots, Q$ , be the associated location vectors and probabilities. In terms of observed variables, the likelihood function is then given as

$$L = \prod_{i=1}^N \sum_{l=1}^Q q_l \frac{\Pr(\sum_k y_{ki\bar{t}_i} = 0 | w_{i\bar{t}_i} + v_i)}{\sum_{l=1}^Q q_l \left[ \Pr(\sum_k y_{ki\bar{t}_i} = 0 | w_{i\bar{t}_i} + v_i) \right]} L_i(v_l), \quad \sum_{l=1}^Q q_l = 1, \quad (7)$$

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<sup>9</sup> Since we never observe exits in the inflow months, we also have to make an assumption regarding the ‘‘duration effect’’ in this month. We assume here that it is equal to the duration effect in the first observed month, i.e.  $\lambda_{kg0} = \lambda_{kg1}$ . A similar assumption has to be made regarding the calendar time effect corresponding to the very first inflow month in the dataset (1993.10), which is assumed to be equal to the subsequent month.

where  $L_i(v_i)$  is given in (4) and  $\Pr(\sum_k y_{ki\bar{i}} = 0 | w_{i\bar{i}} + v_i)$  is given in (6). Our estimation procedure is to maximize (7) with respect to all the model and heterogeneity parameters repeatedly for alternative values of  $Q$ . We start out with  $Q=1$ , and then expand the model with new support points until the likelihood can no longer be improved.<sup>10</sup> The scope for adding additional points is, at all stages of the process evaluated by means of simulated annealing (Goffe, Ferrier, and Rogers, 1994) as well as by full estimation based on randomly selected heterogeneity parameters. Our optimization algorithm is described and assessed in Gaure, Røed and Zhang (2007). Note that the model is non-parametrically identified, not only on the basis of the mixed proportional hazard assumption (Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003), but also on the basis of repeated spells (Van den Berg, 2001; Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003) and time-varying explanatory variables (McCall, 1994; Brinch, 2007). The usage of repeated spells for identification of unobserved heterogeneity is in general a questionable strategy, since it rests on the assumption that, conditional on observed covariates, the unobserved characteristics of individuals do not change between two spells. This is a justifiably restriction only when the potential causal linkages between spells (in terms of, say, lagged duration dependence) are properly modeled. As follows from the discussion above, we believe this to be the case in our model.

For the model estimated in this paper, we ended up with 41 support points in the heterogeneity distribution. However, after the inclusion of around 15-20 support points, there were only minor changes in the parameters of interest (only the heterogeneity distribution itself changed). The selected model contains 2,877 parameters to estimate, out of which 286 characterize the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity ( $6 \times 41 = 246$  location parameters and 40 probabilities).

Before we present the results from this model, we briefly discuss two potential problems with our modeling strategy that have led us to estimate alternative models as part of a sensitivity analysis. The first problem is that of initial conditions regarding lagged unemployment for entrants during the first four years of our data-period. Some of these entrants experienced non-modeled unemployment prior to the start of our observation window in November 1993. According to our model, past unemployment duration has been affected by the same unobserved charac-

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<sup>10</sup> For practical and computational reasons, we consider this to be the case when the log-likelihood increases by less than 0.01.

teristics as current unemployment duration. Consequently, our estimates of the causal effects of past unemployment are in general biased. One way to deal with this problem is to limit the analysis to individuals who started their “unemployment career” in our data-period, i.e., those who did not have any unemployment experiences at all during the four years prior to their first spell in the period from 1993 to 2001. We have estimated such a model. In this exercise we lose 42.1 percent of the individuals and 47.4 percent of the spells in the dataset. As it turns out, most of the results from this estimation are very similar to the results based on the complete dataset, and none of the findings presented in the next section would be modified in any significant way. Unsurprisingly, the only difference of substantive interest is related to the effects of “lagged” unemployment, particularly for individuals with very long lagged spells. Given the large loss in the number of observations (which may also entails some selection problems), we stick to the full dataset as our main source for the presentation of results in the next section. However, we return to the issue of sensitivity when we present the results on intrinsic duration dependence.

The other potential problem with our modeling strategy is that the effects of UI reforms are disentangled from the calendar time dummy variables through a proportionality assumption, i.e., that the calendar time effects are the same for all spells, regardless of which UI regime they belong to. This implies that reform effects are identified on the basis of a sort of difference-in-difference argument; hence, it is of particular importance that the calendar time effects are similar for spells that were affected by the reform (most UI insured spells) and spells that were not affected by the reform (uninsured spells). We have examined this question by estimating a version of the model in which calendar time effects are estimated separately for spells with and without UI benefits. The resultant sets of calendar time effects for the three final-destination hazards and for the ALMP hazard are provided in Appendix 2. Our reading of these estimates is that the calendar time effects are indeed very similar for insured and uninsured spells, with some possible exceptions in the beginning of the data-period (for the other-benefit hazard) and at the end (for the employment hazard and the other-benefit hazard). To assess the impact of these possible violations of the proportionality assumption on estimated reform effects, we have also estimated the model on the subset of UI spells only. For this subset, the foundation for separating reform and time effects is obviously weak, since it rests on a combination of the coexistence of regimes (generated by UI spells that were in progress at the time of reform) in addition to the small number of spells that were unaffected by the 1997-reform. Again, we find that the parameter esti-

mates are largely in accordance with those from the main model. There are, however, some changes in the estimated effects of UI institutions that we return to in the next section.

## 5 Results

This section presents the key results. We first examine the mechanisms of intrinsic and UI-generated duration dependence. We then turn to the direct impact of active labor market programs (ALMP) and part-time work. Finally, we take a brief look at the effects of individual characteristics. Most of the results are illustrated graphically, and, for expository reasons, without confidence intervals. Given our extremely large dataset, statistical uncertainty is not a major issue in this analysis. A more comprehensive list of estimates, with standard errors, is provided in Appendix 1.

### 5.1 *Intrinsic duration dependence*

Figure 1 presents our estimates regarding intrinsic duration dependence in the three final destination hazards for a job seeker embarking on his/hers very first unemployment spell (Group 1 in Table 4). We use the first potential exit month as reference (equal to unity), implying that the curves show the level of the hazard rates relative to the first month ( $\exp(\text{parameter estimates})$ ). The results in Figure 1 indicate that there is strong monotonically negative duration dependence in the employment and education hazards. In the benefit-shift hazard there is weak negative intrinsic duration dependence during the first half year, after which there is weak positive duration dependence, particularly after two years (although these effects are rather small compared to the duration dependence in the other two hazards, they are highly statistically significant).<sup>11</sup>

Figure 2 presents the estimated intrinsic duration dependence for individuals with some previous unemployment experience during the four-year period prior to the start of the current spell. Recall that duration is measured as elapsed time of the *current* spell, so that a causal impact of past spells may affect the hazard level to start with, as well as its duration profile. The reference point is still the first potential exit month for individuals with fresh spells; i.e., the first month in Figure 1. Hence, if a curve starts at a level different from unity, it indicates that the past

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<sup>11</sup> The results presented here refer to individuals becoming unemployed during a “normal” state of the business cycle. The model also includes a linear interaction term between spell duration and the cyclical environment at time of entry; see Section 4. It turns out that the better the cyclical environment the stronger is the negative duration dependence in the job hazard. Apart from that, there are only minor cyclical variations in intrinsic duration dependence.






Figure 1. Estimated intrinsic duration dependence for individuals with no previous unemployment (during the four years prior to the spell)

Note: Parameter estimates (with standard errors) are provided in Appendix 1.

unemployment experience has a causal effect on the starting level of the hazard rate in the current spell. Recall that as we move to the right across the panels in Figure 2, the total volume of unemployment during the past four years (prior to the current spell) increases (1-6 months, 7-12, 13-24, >24), while as we move downwards, the time since the last spell was completed increases (1-6 months, 7-12, 13-24, >24); see Table 4. One of the key messages coming out of Figure 2 is that there is a substantial causal effect of past unemployment spells on current hazard rates. In particular, the employment hazard starts out at a lower level, and the benefit-shift hazard starts out at a higher level, the more a job seeker has been exposed to unemployment during the past four years. For the employment hazard, the effects of unemployment experiences in past spells

are clearly smaller than the effects of unemployment duration within the current spell. For example, looking at group 3 (job seekers with 7-12 months of unemployment during the past four years and the last spell completed less than seven months ago), we find that the employment hazard starts out at a level around 12 percent lower (standard error around 1 percent) than for a completely fresh spell, *ceteris paribus*. This is a significant impact, yet small compared to the 29 percent decline that takes place during the first six months of a fresh spell. For the benefit-shift hazard, it seems to be the other way around; the effects of unemployment from past spells are much stronger (in terms of raising the benefit-shift hazard) than the effects of ongoing spell duration. A natural interpretation of this finding is that recurrent spells may be indicative of failed employment attempts, raising the risk that a case worker will consider other measures (such as vocational rehabilitation or disability) appropriate. A second message coming out of Figure 2 is that time since completion of past unemployment spell (moving downwards in the figure) seems to be virtually irrelevant for its impact on current hazard rates. If the adverse effects of past unemployment reflect stigma and/or discouragement, we must conclude that these mechanisms have a long “memory”.

As explained in Section 4, we have also estimated our model for the subset of individuals with no unemployment exposure during the four-year period prior to their first spell in our data-window. The results from this model are roughly in line with the results presented above. To a certain extent, this also applies to the estimated causal impact of past unemployment duration. For example, looking again at individuals with 7-12 months recent unemployment experience prior to the current spell (group 3), we find this experience reduces the employment hazard by 13 percent, rather than the 12 percent estimated on the full population. For job seeker with a lot of past unemployment, however, we find that the estimated negative causal impact of lagged unemployment becomes somewhat smaller in the reduced model, where the initial conditions problem is eliminated (complete results from this model are available upon request). Although the standard errors become too large to draw any firm conclusions at this point, results from the reduced model seem to indicate that it is the occurrence rather than the quantity of past unemployment that is important for the current employment hazard.

## Total months of unemployment in the past four years




Figure 2. Intrinsic duration dependence for individuals with previous unemployment experience during the four years prior to the start of the current spell.

Note: The panels correspond to the groups defined in Table 4. The figures show estimated hazard rates relative to the first month for an individual with no previous unemployment; see Figure 1.

## 5.2 The impact of UI institutions

We now turn our attention to the impact of UI institutions. In order to make the results directly comparable to those of intrinsic duration dependence, we present the estimated effects of the UI entitlement dummy variables (see Table 5), regime by regime, as functions of spell duration for spells starting with complete UI periods. We start out by presenting in the upper panel of Figure 3 the impact of the simplest of all the regimes, namely Regime II (a three-year benefit period,

after which there are no more benefits to be had from the PES). Recall from Table 5 that the hazards are constrained to be step-wise constant during the initial stages of the spell, after which a completely flexible baseline takes over (with separate dummies for each month) until exhaustion. The effect of actually having exhausted benefits is also assumed constant. The period just after the application process in Regimes II and III (corresponding to months 4-18 in Figure 3) is used as a reference, so that the graphs indicate hazard rates relative to the hazard rates during this phase of the UI period. The point of final UI exhaustion is marked in Figure 3 as a vertical (long-dashed) line.




Figure 3. Estimated UI-generated duration dependence for Regimes II, III, and IV

Note: Hazard rates are displayed relative to the level applying through months 4-18 in Regimes II and III. The regimes are described in Table 5. The estimates used to generate these graphs are presented in Appendix 1 (with standard errors).

Figure 3 reveals that all the final-destination hazards are somewhat higher during the UI application process than they are afterwards. But once this process is completed, little happens to the employment and benefit-shift hazards until the point of UI expiration comes very close, i.e.,

almost three years later. The response towards the approaching exhaustion is strong, but myopic. Compared to the reference phase of the UI period, the employment hazard increases with around 55 percent when only one month is left of the benefit period (there are no clear effects before that). After exhaustion, the hazard remains at this higher level. The benefit-shift hazard also increases in the period just prior to UI exhaustion, and the effect is stronger (and comes slightly earlier) than for the employment hazard. After exhaustion, the benefit-shift hazard remains at a level around 55 percent higher than for the reference phase of the spell. Hence, to some extent, other welfare transfers substitute for the terminated benefits. It is clear from Figure 3 that the education hazard responds much earlier than the other hazards to the prospect of UI exhaustion. The reason for this is probably that educational activities typically start at particular times during a year; hence they cannot be “timed” individually to the same extent as other transitions.

Now, what happens with these baseline hazard rates if UI benefits are not completely removed after exhaustion, but instead replaced by lower (but in principle indefinite) “wait-period benefits”? This is illustrated in the middle panel of Figure 3, where we look at the baseline hazard pattern generated by Regime III. Until the time of UI exhaustion, the two regimes are remarkably similar, only this time the rise in the employment hazard starts somewhat earlier. After exhaustion, however, there are some significant differences. Unsurprisingly, the existence of “wait-period benefits” substantially reduces the hazard rate to other benefits. More surprisingly, perhaps, the rise in the employment hazard is also significantly higher for individuals with wait-period benefits than for individuals with no further benefit entitlements. How can continued benefit entitlements yield higher employment hazard rates? We suspect that this finding does not represent a causal effect, but that it stems from non-random regime assignment. Among job-seekers with waiting benefit entitlement, there are simply more individuals that are really able to find employment when they come under pressure to do so than there are among job-seekers without this entitlement. But this is not revealed until the pressure actually sets in (and therefore not fully captured by our regime eligibility control variables). The lower panel of Figure 3 shows what happens when the UI maximum duration period is reduced by half, as in Regime IV. The spikes in the hazard rates are shifted to the left, in tandem with the reduced maximum duration period.




Figure 4. Estimated UI-generated duration dependence for Regimes I and V

Note: Hazard rates are displayed relative to the level applying through months 4-18 in Regime II/III; see Figure 3. The regimes are described in Table 5. The estimates used to generate these graphs are presented in Appendix 1 (with standard errors).

Figure 4 presents similar graphs for some of the other regimes that have been in operation during the 1990's. The two upper panels show the effects of Regime I, with and without actual imposition of a UI quarantine between the two 80-week benefit periods. The lower panel shows the effects of Regime V. These regimes have in common the existence of a soft duration constraint at 80 weeks, after which a new benefit period was available upon application. The difference between them was that in Regime I, a quarantine was imposed unless the job seeker also applied for (and was granted) exemption, while in Regime V, this quarantine was abolished. We consider the 80-week duration constraint in Regime V as the softest of all the constraints, since all that was required to get an additional UI period (with a 10 percent reduction in the benefit level) was a formal application. It is clear from Figure 4 that the soft duration constraints after 80 weeks had many of the same behavioral consequences as the more harsh constraint associated




Figure 5. Estimated UI-generated duration dependence in ALMP and sanction hazards for Regimes I, II, III, and V

Note: The regimes are described in Table 5. The estimates used to generate these graphs are presented in Appendix 1 (with standard errors).

with final exhaustion. All the hazard rates rise significantly in the run-up to temporary (soft) as well as final (harsh) exhaustion. It also seems to be the case that the final-destination hazard rates were generally higher in Regimes I and V (with a soft constraint in the middle of the three year UI-period) than in Regimes II and III (without any “control posts” in the middle of the period). A possible explanation for this phenomenon is provided by Figure 5, where we show how the main regimes discussed above affected the hazard rates to ALMPs and sanctions. It is evident that the regimes with a soft constraint after 80 weeks also were characterized by higher sanction probabilities as well as higher ALMP probabilities than the regimes without that constraint, particularly in the run-up to temporary benefit exhaustion and in the quarantine period (even for individuals who were exempted from the quarantine). Hence, we may characterize Regime I as being

“activity oriented”, while Regimes II/III (which replaced Regime I in January 1997) are more “income-insurance oriented”.<sup>12</sup>

A particularly interesting regime that we have not commented on so far is Regime VII, with special (generous) treatment of ex state-employees who lost their jobs due to organizational changes. Some of these individuals were subject to a virtually unlimited maximum UI duration (up to 18 years). As expected, these individuals have extremely low employment hazard rates. For persons with a 3-6 year entitlement period, the employment hazard is 43 percent lower than for the reference, and for persons with more than a 6 year entitlement period, it is 70 percent below the reference level; see estimation results in Appendix 1 for details. Although we cannot rule out compositional differences between these and other job seekers (remember that the unobserved covariates in our model are designed to capture heterogeneity which is orthogonal to observed characteristics at the moment of inflow), we have no reason to believe that previous state-employees represent a particularly hard-to-employ group. Unlimited UI entitlement clearly has a damaging effect on job search behavior.

A more surprising result, perhaps, is that individuals with no benefit entitlement at all (Regime VIII) have employment hazard rates approximately equal to the reference level. They have, however, much higher hazard rates into other benefits (twice the reference level) and to education (80 percent higher than the reference level). Again, there may be unobserved differences between UI claimants and non-claimants that render the causal interpretation of these differences questionable.

To sum up our results so far, a key-feature of all the regimes with duration-limited benefits seems to be that they yield a U-shaped pattern of hazard rates, both to employment and education; i.e., high hazards during the application process, followed by low hazards until the next “control post” approaches, at which point the hazards again rise. And, importantly, the rise in the hazards associated with UI benefit exhaustion are of similar magnitude regardless of whether the exhaustion is temporary and negotiable (First UI period in Regime I), followed immediately by a second period (First UI period in Regime V), final and definitive (Second UI period in Regimes I and V, Regimes II, IV, and VI), or just lead into a new type of lower, but permanent, benefit (Re-

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<sup>12</sup> This can also clearly be seen from the descriptive statistics in Table 3; the unconditional ALMP participation probability was more than twice as high in Regime I than it was in Regimes II and III. The sanction probability was more than 50 percent higher in Regime I.



gime III). We interpret this finding as evidence that the nature of the duration constraint is of minor importance; the key point is that it represents a platform for the PES to summon the UI claimants, monitor their search efforts, and (if deemed appropriate) condition future payments on participation in ALMP. It is a very robust finding that all three final-destination hazard rates are at their highest level in periods where active contact is likely to take place between claimants and case-workers; i.e., during the initial UI insurance period (where there is typically face-to-face consultations regarding job opportunities, job-search strategy, eligibility rights etc.), and during periods close to UI exhaustion.

Our model can be used to assess the effects of the major UI reform in 1997, where the activity-oriented 2x80-week (with a possible quarantine period between them) rule was replaced by the more insurance-oriented 1x156 week rule. We have made such an assessment on the basis of a simulation exercise; i.e., we use the estimated model to simulate the progression of insured unemployment spells that actually started after the reform (Regimes II and III) under two alternative assumptions regarding the UI system: i) the correct assumption that the spells belonged to Regimes II and III, and ii) the counterfactual assumption that they belonged to Regime I. In order to obtain confidence intervals for our simulation results, we use a parametric bootstrap procedure, i.e., we draw parameter estimates repeatedly from their joint normal distribution.<sup>13</sup> In total, we make 100 simulations for the correct and counterfactual assumptions, respectively, and calculate 98 percent confidence intervals for the statistics that characterize the impact of the regime change. Some key results are presented in Table 7. The regime-change caused a significant increase in the duration of unemployment spells, from an average of 5.86 to 7.43 months, i.e., by 26.8 percent. Interpreted as a change in the maximum duration period from 80 to 156 weeks, this implies that for every week of maximum UI duration extension, the expected length of an unemployment spell increases by half a day. Interestingly, this effect is of exactly the same magnitude as that found by Card and Levine (2000) on the basis of an extended benefit program in New Jersey (USA). This similarity is somewhat surprising, given that the Norwegian reform did not raise

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<sup>13</sup> Note that we make drawings from the vector of 2,591 parameters attached to observed covariates only, since the parameters describing the unobserved heterogeneity are not normally distributed; see Gaure, Røed and Zhang (2007). We thus condition on the drawings of unobserved heterogeneity. The drawings of parameter estimates are made by means of the Cholesky decomposition; i.e., let  $L$  be a lower triangular matrix, such that the covariance matrix is  $V = LL'$ . Let  $z_s$  be a vector of 2,591 drawings from the standard normal distribution collected for trial  $s$ . Let  $\hat{b}$  be the vector of point-estimates. The parameters drawn for trial  $s$  are then given as  $b_s = \hat{b} + Lz_s$ .

the absolute maximum UI period at all, it only removed a requirement to apply for a second period halfway through it. Nevertheless, the regime change increased the expected duration to all final-destination states. A more detailed illustration of the predicted impacts of the reform are shown in Figure 6, where we plot the cumulated effects as functions of time since the start of the spells. From the upper left-hand panel of the figure, we see, for example, that around half a year after spell-start, the fraction of still uncompleted spells are 7 percentage points higher in the new regime than it would have been if the old regime had been kept (31 instead of 24 percent; see Table 7). This is a substantial effect. And from the upper right-hand panel we see that most of the difference is due to a decline in early transitions to employment. However, the ultimate effects on the final destinations of the spells are rather small. The reform caused a minor increase in the number of transitions to other benefits, and correspondingly minor reductions in the number of transitions to employment and education.

Table 7  
The predicted impacts of the 1997 reform

|   | All      |               | Conditioned on the spell ending in |               |               |               |           |               |
|---|----------|---------------|------------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|-----------|---------------|
|   |          |               | Employment                         |               | Other benefit |               | Education |               |
|   | Regime I | Regime II/III | Regime I                           | Regime II/III | Regime I      | Regime II/III | Regime I  | Regime II/III |
| Mean unemployment duration                        | 5.86     | 7.43          | 5.41                               | 7.02          | 8.72          | 10.25         | 5.26      | 6.52          |
| Duration difference (Regime II/II I-Regime I)     | 1.57     |               | 1.61                               |               | 1.53          |               | 1.25      |               |
| <i>Lower 98%</i>                                  | 1.47     |               | 1.49                               |               | 1.21          |               | 1.06      |               |
| <i>Upper 98%</i>                                  | 1.69     |               | 1.76                               |               | 1.78          |               | 1.43      |               |
| Share of spells with duration >6 months (percent) | 24.38    | 31.46         | 24.43                              | 33.22         | 43.21         | 49.1          | 25.03     | 30.96         |
| Share of spells with duration >12 month (percent) | 11.61    | 17.13         | 10.41                              | 16.67         | 23.22         | 28.79         | 9.78      | 15.16         |

These simulations do not take into account that the pre-reform system (Regime I) also entailed a higher level of ALMP participation in general, as reflected in the calendar time parameters  $\sigma_{3t}$ . As we show in Section 5.4 actual ALMP participation tends to increase unemployment duration somewhat. We therefore repeated the counterfactual simulations discussed above with the post reform calendar time participation effects also adjusted to the pre reform level (implying a general rise in the ALMP participation hazards around 40 percent). But this only caused a 0.1

increase in average unemployment duration. Hence, the favorable incentive (threat) effects associated with ALMP by far exceed the adverse lock-in effects resulting from actual participation.




Figure 6. The predicted impact (with 98 percent confidence interval) of the switch from the old regime (Regime I) to the new regime (Regime II and III).

Note: The graphs show the difference between the two regimes in the fraction of spells that are either still ongoing (upper left-hand panel) or have already ended with a transition to employment, another benefit or education, as a function of time since entry.

As discussed in Section 4, the identification of reform effects hinges on the assumption that calendar time effects are the same for all job seekers, regardless of which UI-regime they belong to; see Section 4. We now discuss the robustness of our findings with respect to this assumption. We have estimated the model on the subset of UI insured spells only. In this case, the identification of the reform effect is primarily driven by spells that were in progress at the time of the reform, in addition to the existence of previous state-employees, who were unaffected by the reform. For most parameter estimates, the exclusion of spells without UI insurance causes only small changes. However, the estimated adverse effects of the 1997 UI reform become somewhat smaller. Based on simulation exercises on this alternative model/dataset, we find that the impact of the 1997-reform on average unemployment duration was 1.27 months, rather than the 1.57 months reported in Table 7. We have also made the same type of simulations based on the model with only individuals with no unemployment exposure during the four-year period

prior to their first spell included; see Section 5.1. Based on these simulations, the impact of the 1997-reform on average unemployment duration was equal to 1.41 months. Hence, all our models and simulations predict an overall impact around 5-6 weeks.

### 5.3 *Discretionary sanctions*

As we showed in Section 3, around two percent of the spells are subject to a discretionary sanction, i.e., a temporary loss of UI benefits due to inappropriate search behavior or unwillingness to accept (suitable) jobs or program offers. The normal duration of a sanction is 8 weeks. Our estimates indicate that a sanction causes an immediate rise in the job hazard of 80 percent, a rise in the ALMP hazard of 22 percent, and a rise in the education hazard as large as 200 percent. The estimated rise in the job hazard is of similar magnitude as that found by Abbring *et al.* (2005), based on the much milder sanctions regime in the Netherlands (the average sanction in the Netherlands amounts to a reduction in the replacement rate of around 20 percentage points for a period of three months). This may indicate that the toughness of the sanction may be of secondary importance, at least within some range. The large effect on the education hazard probably reflects that some individuals collect UI benefits while they wait for a planned education to start, hence they may not really be interested in a job just yet. Sanctions also raise the hazard to part-time work by 42 percent. Only the benefit-shift hazard falls during a sanction, by 34 percent. Most of the effects are short-lived, however. After the sanction is completed (and the job seeker again receives benefits) only the hazards to ALMP and to a new sanction remain at a higher level than before the sanction took place.

### 5.4 *The effects of program participation and part-time work*

Figure 7 displays how program participation and access to part-time work causally affect the three final-destination hazards. Participation in ALMP reduces the employment and education hazards significantly during the first phase of the participation period. As the participation period progresses the negative effects become smaller, and they turn positive after approximately six months. Unsurprisingly, participation in ALMP significantly reduces the probability of taking up another type of benefit. After completion of ALMP, there is a significant rise in the employment hazard compared to the situation prior to ALMP participation. The favorable effect is larger the longer the duration of the completed program. In order to evaluate the overall impact of ALMP participation on unemployment duration and final outcome, we perform a new simulation exer-

cise. This time we compare outcomes and durations based on our estimated model to the outcomes and durations generated when all treatment effect parameters are set equal to zero (but the other parameters are generated from our model).<sup>14</sup> The 100x2 simulations are performed on the basis of drawings from the joint normal distribution of parameter estimates. It is assumed that all the spells started during 1997 (very similar results are obtained for other starting dates). The results are provided in Table 8 and Figure 8. The overall impact of the program effects for individuals who became unemployed in 1997 was to lengthen the average duration of unemployment




Figure 7. Estimated effects on final-destination hazard rates of ALMP-participation and part-time employment.

Note: The effects on the hazard rates are measured relative to no participation. The panels to the left show the effects of ongoing participation/part-time work as functions of ongoing duration. The panels to the right show the effects of completed participation/part-time work as functions of completed duration. The estimates used to generate these graphs are presented in Appendix 1 (with standard errors).

(including the participation period) with approximately 0.3 months. For actual participants, unemployment spells were increased by around 1.2 months, compared to a situation with zero program effects.<sup>15</sup> The fraction of spells ending with employment was raised by around 0.5 percent-

<sup>14</sup> Note that we do not compare a world with programs with a world without programs, since the existence of programs may affect the hazard rates before program starts and even for individuals who never actually participate.

<sup>15</sup> The number of treatments per spell in our simulations was 0.26.

age point as a result of program effects (2 percentage points for actual participants). Hence, the direct program effects seem to imply longer unemployment durations, but slightly more favorable final outcomes.




Figure 8. The predicted impact (with 98 percent confidence interval) of ALMP effects.

Note: The graphs show the difference caused by the treatment effects in the fraction of spells that are either still ongoing (upper left-hand panel) or have already ended with a transition to employment, another benefit or education, as a function of time since entry. Simulations are based on individuals starting in Regime II/III (the results for individuals starting in Regime I are very similar) and individuals without UI benefit entitlement. For simplicity, all spells are assumed to start in 1997.

Access to part-time employment raises the employment hazard somewhat initially; see the lower panels in Figure 7. The effect fades out relatively quickly, however, until the part-time employment relationship has ended. There is a favorable employment-experience effect involved, in that the employment hazard rises afterwards. Part-time employment has only minor effects on the other final-destination hazards.

Table 8  
The predicted impacts of ALMP effects

|   | All         |                | Conditioned on the spell ending in |                |               |                |             |                |
|---|-------------|----------------|------------------------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|-------------|----------------|
|   |             |                | Employment                         |                | Other benefit |                | Education   |                |
|   | With effect | Without effect | With effect                        | Without effect | With effect   | Without effect | With effect | Without effect |
| Mean unemployment duration                        | 5.98        | 5.64           | 5.81                               | 5.42           | 7.17          | 7.02           | 5.98        | 5.64           |
| Duration difference (with -without effects)       | 0.33        |                | 0.39                               |                | 0.16          |                | 0.48        |                |
| <i>Lower 98%</i>                                  | 0.27        |                | 0.31                               |                | 0.029         |                | 0.36        |                |
| <i>Upper 98%</i>                                  | 0.39        |                | 0.46                               |                | 0.30          |                | 0.60        |                |
| Share of spells with duration >6 months (percent) | 28.98       | 26.29          | 27.82                              | 24.71          | 35.36         | 34.27          | 23.56       | 19.50          |
| Share of spells with duration >12 month (percent) | 12.66       | 11.15          | 11.92                              | 10.18          | 17.18         | 16.23          | 8.38        | 6.45           |

Note: Simulations are based on individuals starting in Regime II/III (the results for individuals starting in Regime I are very similar) and individuals without UI benefit entitlement. For simplicity, all spells are assumed to start in 1997.

### 5.5 *The effects of individual characteristics*

For space considerations, we do not discuss results regarding the impact of individual characteristics in any detail. Our model contains a large number of indicator variables describing age and work-experience (these two characteristics are interacted), educational attainment, and gender and family situation. Results show that men have around 10 percent higher job hazards than women, *ceteris paribus*. They also have a 10 percent higher benefit-shift hazard, and a 17 percent higher education hazard. Their ALMP hazard, on the other hand, is 8 percent lower. For men, it turns out that the family situation has a minor impact on all the hazard rates. For women, the family situation has a big impact. In particular, having children below 6 years substantially reduces the employment and education hazards. For example, a single child below 3 years reduces the female employment hazard with 54 percent, while a single child between 3 and 6 reduces it by 35 percent. With more than one child, the employment hazard falls even further. Similar effects apply for the education hazard.

Age generally has a negative impact on the employment hazard, while work-experience has a positive impact on the employment hazard. Unsurprisingly, the importance of work-experience is larger the older is the job seeker. Older job seekers with little work experience have very low employment hazard rates.

## 6 Concluding Remarks

The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows: First, activity-oriented UI regimes - with high “risk” of program participation and/or a UI sanction, and a relatively short initial maximum UI benefit period - reduces unemployment duration substantially with only minor effects on the distribution of final destinations. Second, the harshness of duration-constraints and sanctions is of minor importance; the behavioral impact seems to be almost the same regardless of whether the threat is to terminate the benefit completely or only to reduce it slightly (or to terminate it for only a short period of time). Third, although limitations in (unconditional) UI duration clearly has a substantial impact on job search behavior throughout the unemployment spell, the direct response towards benefit exhaustion is myopic; there are few signs of hazard increases until just before UI exhaustion. Fourth, unemployment duration from the current as well as past spells has a negative causal impact on the employment hazard and a positive causal impact on the benefit-shift hazard.

There seems to be plenty of scope for welfare states to design UI insurance systems so that moral hazard problems are counteracted with “activity requirements” rather than with (incredible) threats of complete benefit termination. However, there is a cost involved in terms of implementing ALMPs and in terms of summoning and counseling the job searchers more frequently. Our results indicate that actual participation in ALMP leads to an increase in overall unemployment duration, but also to slightly more favorable final outcomes. A full analysis of costs and benefits of ALMPs is beyond the scope of this paper, but such an analysis would have to include the value of the human capital investment being made and the value of work being done during program participation, as well as the costs of arranging the programs; see Røed and Raaum (2006).

A more activity-oriented UI system not only raises the hazard rates to employment and ordinary education; it also raises the hazard to other types of benefits (rehabilitation, disability, social assistance). However, it does not seem to increase significantly the overall probability that a spell ends with a transition to another benefit. More (but mild) pressures on UI claimants make things happen faster without altering the final outcome of the search process.



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## Appendix 1

| Table A1   |                      |        |               |        |           |        |          |        |          |        |                 |        |       |
|--|----------------------|--------|---------------|--------|-----------|--------|----------|--------|----------|--------|-----------------|--------|-------|
| Definition of selected variables and associated parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses) |                      |        |               |        |           |        |          |        |          |        |                 |        |       |
| Variable   | Employment           |        | Other benefit |        | Education |        | ALMP     |        | Sanction |        | Part-time empl. |        |       |
|  | Estimate             | S.E.   | Estimate      | S.E.   | Estimate  | S.E.   | Estimate | S.E.   | Estimate | S.E.   | Estimate        | S.E.   |       |
| Intrinsic duration dependence.   |                      |        |               |        |           |        |          |        |          |        |                 |        |       |
| Group  | Spell duration group |        |               |        |           |        |          |        |          |        |                 |        |       |
| 1  | 1                    | Ref    |               |        |           |        |          |        |          |        |                 |        |       |
|  | 2                    | -0.115 | 0.008         | -0.042 | 0.016     | 0.060  | 0.012    | 0.041  | 0.011    | 0.133  | 0.071           | -0.197 | 0.011 |
|  | 3                    | -0.258 | 0.010         | -0.040 | 0.018     | -0.075 | 0.015    | 0.059  | 0.013    | 0.027  | 0.075           | -0.417 | 0.014 |
|  | 4 - 6                | -0.348 | 0.009         | -0.094 | 0.015     | -0.323 | 0.015    | 0.075  | 0.012    | -0.099 | 0.070           | -0.502 | 0.012 |
|  | 7 - 9                | -0.455 | 0.011         | -0.068 | 0.018     | -0.402 | 0.020    | 0.049  | 0.015    | -0.057 | 0.077           | -0.549 | 0.015 |
|  | 10 - 12              | -0.565 | 0.014         | 0.004  | 0.022     | -0.583 | 0.025    | -0.012 | 0.019    | 0.009  | 0.085           | -0.608 | 0.017 |
|  | 13-15                | -0.663 | 0.017         | 0.044  | 0.026     | -0.650 | 0.032    | -0.030 | 0.021    | 0.024  | 0.092           | -0.610 | 0.020 |
|  | 16-18                | -0.746 | 0.020         | 0.011  | 0.031     | -0.843 | 0.044    | -0.009 | 0.026    | 0.192  | 0.095           | -0.519 | 0.022 |
|  | 19-24                | -0.798 | 0.020         | 0.023  | 0.029     | -0.971 | 0.044    | 0.011  | 0.024    | 0.090  | 0.105           | -0.460 | 0.020 |
|  | >24                  | -0.889 | 0.022         | 0.137  | 0.031     | -1.129 | 0.054    | -0.079 | 0.027    | -0.352 | 0.118           | -0.687 | 0.021 |
| 2  | 1                    | -0.039 | 0.011         | 0.566  | 0.016     | -0.234 | 0.018    | 0.237  | 0.014    | -0.026 | 0.100           | 0.306  | 0.013 |
|  | 2                    | -0.161 | 0.015         | 0.438  | 0.022     | -0.278 | 0.027    | 0.177  | 0.019    | -0.026 | 0.102           | 0.027  | 0.019 |
|  | 3                    | -0.348 | 0.017         | 0.440  | 0.024     | -0.393 | 0.030    | 0.114  | 0.023    | 0.004  | 0.107           | -0.181 | 0.022 |
|  | 4 - 6                | -0.402 | 0.013         | 0.326  | 0.020     | -0.547 | 0.025    | 0.056  | 0.019    | 0.021  | 0.089           | -0.269 | 0.018 |
|  | 7 - 9                | -0.503 | 0.017         | 0.334  | 0.026     | -0.587 | 0.031    | 0.019  | 0.025    | 0.060  | 0.103           | -0.349 | 0.022 |
|  | 10 - 12              | -0.741 | 0.023         | 0.333  | 0.032     | -0.742 | 0.043    | -0.030 | 0.032    | 0.229  | 0.118           | -0.520 | 0.027 |
|  | 13-15                | -0.740 | 0.027         | 0.237  | 0.040     | -0.865 | 0.057    | 0.019  | 0.036    | 0.137  | 0.139           | -0.454 | 0.030 |
|  | 16-18                | -0.807 | 0.033         | 0.310  | 0.047     | -1.013 | 0.074    | -0.045 | 0.046    | 0.136  | 0.164           | -0.460 | 0.037 |
|  | 19-24                | -0.907 | 0.033         | 0.372  | 0.045     | -1.166 | 0.074    | -0.059 | 0.043    | 0.117  | 0.165           | -0.517 | 0.034 |
|  | >24                  | -0.978 | 0.035         | 0.324  | 0.049     | -1.370 | 0.091    | -0.090 | 0.046    | 0.079  | 0.169           | -0.686 | 0.034 |
| 3  | 1                    | -0.120 | 0.014         | 0.650  | 0.018     | -0.440 | 0.024    | 0.172  | 0.017    | -0.225 | 0.120           | 0.363  | 0.014 |
|  | 2                    | -0.227 | 0.019         | 0.575  | 0.024     | -0.447 | 0.036    | 0.155  | 0.022    | -0.033 | 0.112           | -0.006 | 0.022 |
|  | 3                    | -0.409 | 0.020         | 0.474  | 0.027     | -0.572 | 0.041    | 0.038  | 0.027    | -0.094 | 0.122           | -0.151 | 0.025 |
|  | 4 - 6                | -0.442 | 0.015         | 0.402  | 0.022     | -0.747 | 0.032    | 0.103  | 0.021    | 0.214  | 0.091           | -0.269 | 0.020 |
|  | 7 - 9                | -0.471 | 0.019         | 0.430  | 0.027     | -0.854 | 0.040    | 0.071  | 0.027    | 0.115  | 0.108           | -0.346 | 0.024 |
|  | 10 - 12              | -0.685 | 0.025         | 0.439  | 0.034     | -0.907 | 0.049    | -0.063 | 0.036    | 0.122  | 0.135           | -0.430 | 0.030 |
|  | 13-15                | -0.798 | 0.031         | 0.411  | 0.042     | -1.044 | 0.065    | -0.094 | 0.041    | 0.154  | 0.154           | -0.469 | 0.034 |
|  | 16-18                | -0.849 | 0.038         | 0.394  | 0.051     | -1.136 | 0.088    | 0.027  | 0.049    | 0.098  | 0.188           | -0.616 | 0.043 |
|  | 19-24                | -0.921 | 0.035         | 0.403  | 0.049     | -1.443 | 0.086    | -0.079 | 0.047    | 0.239  | 0.170           | -0.583 | 0.038 |
|  | >24                  | -1.008 | 0.038         | 0.481  | 0.050     | -1.644 | 0.099    | -0.075 | 0.050    | -0.037 | 0.191           | -0.735 | 0.039 |
| 4  | 1                    | -0.193 | 0.013         | 0.746  | 0.016     | -0.588 | 0.027    | 0.106  | 0.017    | -0.056 | 0.097           | 0.332  | 0.013 |
|  | 2                    | -0.331 | 0.017         | 0.613  | 0.022     | -0.655 | 0.039    | 0.081  | 0.020    | 0.096  | 0.092           | -0.019 | 0.018 |
|  | 3                    | -0.479 | 0.018         | 0.615  | 0.022     | -0.715 | 0.042    | 0.019  | 0.023    | 0.066  | 0.098           | -0.148 | 0.020 |
|  | 4 - 6                | -0.504 | 0.014         | 0.523  | 0.019     | -0.884 | 0.032    | 0.046  | 0.019    | 0.056  | 0.083           | -0.273 | 0.016 |
|  | 7 - 9                | -0.467 | 0.016         | 0.515  | 0.023     | -1.068 | 0.040    | 0.025  | 0.023    | 0.055  | 0.095           | -0.391 | 0.020 |
|  | 10 - 12              | -0.776 | 0.021         | 0.531  | 0.028     | -1.065 | 0.048    | -0.024 | 0.029    | 0.046  | 0.113           | -0.482 | 0.024 |
|  | 13-15                | -0.822 | 0.025         | 0.476  | 0.034     | -1.207 | 0.061    | 0.011  | 0.033    | 0.123  | 0.124           | -0.547 | 0.027 |
|  | 16-18                | -0.941 | 0.031         | 0.506  | 0.039     | -1.411 | 0.080    | 0.024  | 0.039    | 0.190  | 0.135           | -0.558 | 0.031 |
|  | 19-24                | -0.975 | 0.028         | 0.540  | 0.037     | -1.442 | 0.071    | -0.065 | 0.036    | -0.201 | 0.158           | -0.567 | 0.028 |
|  | >24                  | -1.075 | 0.030         | 0.562  | 0.040     | -1.504 | 0.075    | -0.152 | 0.039    | -0.360 | 0.171           | -0.673 | 0.028 |
| 5  | 1                    | -0.410 | 0.017         | 0.758  | 0.019     | -0.973 | 0.045    | 0.066  | 0.020    | -0.231 | 0.119           | 0.078  | 0.016 |
|  | 2                    | -0.610 | 0.022         | 0.638  | 0.024     | -1.089 | 0.062    | 0.023  | 0.024    | -0.318 | 0.117           | -0.206 | 0.022 |
|  | 3                    | -0.717 | 0.024         | 0.585  | 0.026     | -1.052 | 0.064    | 0.012  | 0.027    | -0.130 | 0.115           | -0.344 | 0.024 |
|  | 4 - 6                | -0.683 | 0.016         | 0.565  | 0.020     | -1.326 | 0.049    | 0.013  | 0.020    | -0.169 | 0.091           | -0.429 | 0.018 |
|  | 7 - 9                | -0.613 | 0.018         | 0.579  | 0.024     | -1.420 | 0.056    | 0.033  | 0.024    | -0.023 | 0.099           | -0.486 | 0.021 |
|  | 10 - 12              | -0.936 | 0.024         | 0.546  | 0.029     | -1.482 | 0.066    | 0.050  | 0.029    | 0.140  | 0.110           | -0.609 | 0.025 |
|  | 13-15                | -1.086 | 0.029         | 0.548  | 0.033     | -1.576 | 0.082    | 0.021  | 0.032    | 0.045  | 0.126           | -0.662 | 0.028 |
|  | 16-18                | -1.126 | 0.033         | 0.588  | 0.037     | -1.692 | 0.097    | -0.005 | 0.038    | -0.021 | 0.140           | -0.615 | 0.030 |
|  | 19-24                | -1.160 | 0.030         | 0.625  | 0.035     | -1.752 | 0.084    | -0.004 | 0.034    | 0.205  | 0.132           | -0.673 | 0.028 |
|  | >24                  | -1.286 | 0.030         | 0.616  | 0.037     | -1.838 | 0.083    | -0.238 | 0.036    | -0.058 | 0.137           | -0.848 | 0.027 |
| Business cycle at inflow (BC)  |                      | -0.069 | 0.036         | -0.278 | 0.052     | -0.424 | 0.073    | -0.250 | 0.052    | 0.317  | 0.226           | -0.465 | 0.042 |

| Table A1   |            |       |               |       |           |       |          |       |          |       |                 |       |  |
|--|------------|-------|---------------|-------|-----------|-------|----------|-------|----------|-------|-----------------|-------|--|
| Definition of selected variables and associated parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses) |            |       |               |       |           |       |          |       |          |       |                 |       |  |
| Variable   | Employment |       | Other benefit |       | Education |       | ALMP     |       | Sanction |       | Part-time empl. |       |  |
|  | Estimate   | S.E.  | Estimate      | S.E.  | Estimate  | S.E.  | Estimate | S.E.  | Estimate | S.E.  | Estimate        | S.E.  |  |
| Interaction between BC and spell duration (in months)  | -0.009     | 0.002 | 0.001         | 0.003 | 0.022     | 0.005 | 0.009    | 0.003 | -0.010   | 0.012 | 0.007           | 0.002 |  |
| Effect of UI Entitlement (See table 5 for reference)   |            |       |               |       |           |       |          |       |          |       |                 |       |  |
| UI Entitle-1   | 0.547      | 0.008 | 0.251         | 0.015 | 0.484     | 0.021 | -0.087   | 0.013 | 0.474    | 0.049 | -0.051          | 0.010 |  |
| dummy 2  | 0.415      | 0.009 | 0.293         | 0.016 | 0.443     | 0.023 | 0.031    | 0.014 | 0.463    | 0.049 | -0.128          | 0.010 |  |
| number 3   | 0.267      | 0.009 | 0.316         | 0.015 | 0.448     | 0.023 | 0.040    | 0.014 | 0.470    | 0.045 | -0.172          | 0.009 |  |
| (see table 5) 4  | 0.204      | 0.023 | 0.319         | 0.037 | 0.481     | 0.056 | 0.030    | 0.031 | 0.462    | 0.090 | -0.166          | 0.021 |  |
| 5  | 0.235      | 0.025 | 0.330         | 0.038 | 0.436     | 0.062 | 0.117    | 0.032 | 0.549    | 0.091 | -0.217          | 0.023 |  |
| 6  | 0.223      | 0.026 | 0.376         | 0.040 | 0.547     | 0.063 | 0.131    | 0.033 | 0.567    | 0.093 | -0.227          | 0.024 |  |
| 7  | 0.282      | 0.025 | 0.395         | 0.038 | 0.521     | 0.061 | 0.356    | 0.029 | 0.759    | 0.085 | -0.244          | 0.023 |  |
| 8  | 0.400      | 0.028 | 0.532         | 0.042 | 0.581     | 0.071 | 0.670    | 0.031 | 1.044    | 0.092 | -0.049          | 0.025 |  |
| 9  | 0.628      | 0.026 | 0.803         | 0.037 | 0.765     | 0.070 | 0.948    | 0.029 | 1.566    | 0.087 | 0.518           | 0.020 |  |
| 10   | 0.170      | 0.026 | 0.334         | 0.041 | 0.317     | 0.072 | 0.045    | 0.044 | 0.697    | 0.112 | -0.127          | 0.027 |  |
| 11   | 0.199      | 0.025 | 0.408         | 0.040 | 0.362     | 0.070 | 0.175    | 0.041 | 0.519    | 0.120 | -0.136          | 0.026 |  |
| 12   | 0.155      | 0.027 | 0.388         | 0.039 | 0.470     | 0.071 | 0.061    | 0.044 | 0.624    | 0.112 | -0.154          | 0.027 |  |
| 13   | 0.182      | 0.023 | 0.456         | 0.035 | 0.395     | 0.064 | 0.170    | 0.036 | 0.658    | 0.099 | -0.137          | 0.023 |  |
| 14   | 0.275      | 0.025 | 0.559         | 0.036 | 0.510     | 0.069 | 0.314    | 0.037 | 1.215    | 0.088 | 0.131           | 0.023 |  |
| 15   | 0.642      | 0.021 | 0.893         | 0.031 | 0.838     | 0.058 | 0.542    | 0.035 | 0.370    | 0.140 | 1.088           | 0.016 |  |
| 16   | 0.578      | 0.019 | 0.531         | 0.026 | 0.765     | 0.051 | 0.017    | 0.034 | -        | -     | -0.847          | 0.031 |  |
| 17   | 0.303      | 0.015 | 0.788         | 0.019 | 0.593     | 0.039 | 0.810    | 0.018 | -        | -     | 0.005           | 0.014 |  |
| 18   | 0.429      | 0.027 | 0.642         | 0.036 | 0.675     | 0.060 | 0.920    | 0.028 | -        | -     | 0.301           | 0.023 |  |
| 19   | -1.180     | 0.044 | -1.097        | 0.078 | -         | -     | -1.540   | 0.098 | -        | -     | -0.402          | 0.038 |  |
| 20   | -0.550     | 0.135 | -1.249        | 0.288 | 1.933     | 0.769 | -0.406   | 0.215 | -        | -     | -0.086          | 0.110 |  |
| 21   | 0.341      | 0.007 | 0.114         | 0.014 | 0.298     | 0.021 | -0.222   | 0.014 | -0.216   | 0.044 | 0.118           | 0.008 |  |
| 22   | Ref        |       |               |       |           |       |          |       |          |       |                 |       |  |
| 23   | 0.287      | 0.016 | -0.001        | 0.027 | 0.594     | 0.039 | -0.079   | 0.027 | 0.313    | 0.081 | 0.113           | 0.016 |  |
| 24   | 0.140      | 0.011 | -0.149        | 0.020 | 0.418     | 0.024 | -0.094   | 0.016 | 0.371    | 0.050 | 0.038           | 0.011 |  |
| 25   | 0.063      | 0.012 | -0.067        | 0.020 | 0.400     | 0.027 | -0.062   | 0.017 | 0.353    | 0.051 | 0.022           | 0.012 |  |
| 26   | -0.019     | 0.012 | -0.075        | 0.019 | 0.428     | 0.027 | -0.017   | 0.016 | 0.432    | 0.048 | -0.012          | 0.011 |  |
| 27   | 0.144      | 0.034 | 0.035         | 0.057 | 0.157     | 0.101 | -0.009   | 0.053 | 0.618    | 0.129 | 0.086           | 0.031 |  |
| 28   | 0.200      | 0.036 | -0.005        | 0.063 | 0.466     | 0.097 | 0.029    | 0.056 | 0.335    | 0.159 | 0.076           | 0.034 |  |
| 29   | 0.101      | 0.039 | 0.086         | 0.064 | 0.491     | 0.101 | 0.077    | 0.058 | 0.510    | 0.155 | 0.162           | 0.033 |  |
| 30   | 0.190      | 0.035 | 0.111         | 0.059 | 0.329     | 0.102 | 0.290    | 0.049 | 0.242    | 0.166 | 0.155           | 0.031 |  |
| 31   | 0.356      | 0.038 | 0.244         | 0.064 | 0.459     | 0.111 | 0.430    | 0.055 | 0.958    | 0.146 | 0.176           | 0.036 |  |
| 32   | 0.644      | 0.034 | 0.423         | 0.059 | 0.726     | 0.099 | 0.650    | 0.053 | 0.933    | 0.152 | 0.741           | 0.030 |  |
| 33   | -0.138     | 0.023 | -0.101        | 0.039 | 0.444     | 0.041 | -0.074   | 0.034 | 0.418    | 0.097 | -0.043          | 0.022 |  |
| 34   | -0.044     | 0.024 | -0.086        | 0.042 | 0.476     | 0.043 | -0.019   | 0.036 | 0.518    | 0.095 | -0.034          | 0.024 |  |
| 35   | -0.067     | 0.026 | -0.047        | 0.043 | 0.232     | 0.049 | 0.052    | 0.038 | 0.692    | 0.095 | -0.014          | 0.025 |  |
| 36   | -0.085     | 0.026 | 0.056         | 0.040 | 0.212     | 0.050 | 0.194    | 0.034 | 0.722    | 0.090 | -0.060          | 0.025 |  |
| 37   | 0.020      | 0.029 | 0.301         | 0.041 | 0.393     | 0.053 | 0.401    | 0.037 | 1.099    | 0.088 | 0.178           | 0.026 |  |
| 38   | 0.441      | 0.027 | 0.763         | 0.039 | 0.741     | 0.053 | 0.763    | 0.036 | 0.825    | 0.113 | 0.912           | 0.022 |  |
| 39   | 0.799      | 0.053 | 0.014         | 0.089 | 0.571     | 0.218 | 0.564    | 0.098 | -        | -     | -               | -     |  |
| 40   | 0.445      | 0.015 | 0.444         | 0.023 | 0.706     | 0.037 | 0.504    | 0.023 | -        | -     | -               | -     |  |
| 41   | -0.040     | 0.009 | 0.692         | 0.016 | 0.556     | 0.022 | 0.441    | 0.015 | -        | -     | -               | -     |  |
| Additional dummy for regime IV   | -0.040     | 0.012 | 0.305         | 0.018 | -0.135    | 0.029 | -0.042   | 0.018 | -0.506   | 0.052 | -0.093          | 0.012 |  |
| Additional dummy for regime VI   | 0.206      | 0.018 | -0.148        | 0.030 | 0.024     | 0.034 | -0.410   | 0.027 | -1.454   | 0.101 | -0.027          | 0.021 |  |
| On discretionary sanction effect   | 0.584      | 0.023 | -0.413        | 0.040 | 1.132     | 0.044 | 0.204    | 0.036 | -        | -     | 0.351           | 0.027 |  |
| After discretionary sanction effect  | 0.035      | 0.022 | -0.036        | 0.030 | -0.110    | 0.051 | 0.120    | 0.027 | 0.170    | 0.056 | 0.087           | 0.020 |  |
| Effects of ALMP and part-time work   |            |       |               |       |           |       |          |       |          |       |                 |       |  |
| On-treatment 1   | -1.251     | 0.013 | -0.933        | 0.015 | -1.302    | 0.021 | -        | -     | -        | -     | -1.605          | 0.016 |  |



| Table A1   |         |                |        |               |        |           |        |          |        |          |        |                 |        |       |
|--|---------|----------------|--------|---------------|--------|-----------|--------|----------|--------|----------|--------|-----------------|--------|-------|
| Definition of selected variables and associated parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses) |         |                |        |               |        |           |        |          |        |          |        |                 |        |       |
| Variable   |         | Employment     |        | Other benefit |        | Education |        | ALMP     |        | Sanction |        | Part-time empl. |        |       |
|  |         | Estimate       | S.E.   | Estimate      | S.E.   | Estimate  | S.E.   | Estimate | S.E.   | Estimate | S.E.   | Estimate        | S.E.   |       |
| 30 - 34  | >5      | 0.066          | 0.010  | -0.032        | 0.019  | -0.398    | 0.024  | -0.094   | 0.017  | -0.079   | 0.043  | 0.047           | 0.011  |       |
|  | 0       | -0.456         | 0.015  | -0.004        | 0.019  | -0.309    | 0.025  | 0.093    | 0.017  | -0.047   | 0.075  | -0.111          | 0.020  |       |
|  | 1       | -0.368         | 0.020  | 0.121         | 0.027  | -0.431    | 0.037  | -0.109   | 0.027  | -0.079   | 0.088  | -0.106          | 0.022  |       |
|  | 2 - 5   | -0.276         | 0.011  | 0.108         | 0.018  | -0.450    | 0.023  | -0.147   | 0.017  | -0.049   | 0.049  | -0.078          | 0.012  |       |
|  | 6 - 9   | -0.122         | 0.010  | 0.055         | 0.018  | -0.549    | 0.023  | -0.179   | 0.017  | -0.051   | 0.044  | -0.041          | 0.011  |       |
| 35 - 39  | >9      | 0.017          | 0.010  | -0.011        | 0.020  | -0.866    | 0.029  | -0.164   | 0.018  | -0.105   | 0.046  | 0.003           | 0.012  |       |
|  | 0       | -0.427         | 0.018  | 0.113         | 0.023  | -         | -      | 0.040    | 0.019  | -0.129   | 0.100  | -0.077          | 0.026  |       |
|  | 1       | -0.389         | 0.028  | 0.198         | 0.035  | -         | -      | -0.201   | 0.035  | -0.171   | 0.126  | -0.088          | 0.031  |       |
|  | 2       | -0.286         | 0.028  | 0.195         | 0.038  | -         | -      | -0.262   | 0.037  | -0.290   | 0.134  | -0.021          | 0.029  |       |
|  | 3 - 8   | -0.230         | 0.013  | 0.169         | 0.020  | -         | -      | -0.205   | 0.019  | -0.215   | 0.059  | -0.050          | 0.014  |       |
| 40 - 44  | 9 - 14  | -0.103         | 0.012  | 0.141         | 0.020  | -         | -      | -0.204   | 0.019  | -0.217   | 0.052  | -0.058          | 0.013  |       |
|  | >14     | 0.096          | 0.013  | 0.041         | 0.024  | -         | -      | -0.235   | 0.022  | -0.242   | 0.056  | -0.037          | 0.014  |       |
|  | 0       | -0.596         | 0.023  | 0.057         | 0.028  | -         | -      | -0.016   | 0.022  | -0.295   | 0.133  | -0.106          | 0.032  |       |
|  | 1       | -0.448         | 0.035  | 0.170         | 0.047  | -         | -      | -0.255   | 0.044  | -0.118   | 0.143  | -0.157          | 0.039  |       |
|  | 2 - 3   | -0.390         | 0.026  | 0.128         | 0.038  | -         | -      | -0.326   | 0.035  | -0.225   | 0.123  | -0.074          | 0.028  |       |
| 45 - 49  | 4 - 11  | -0.318         | 0.014  | 0.160         | 0.022  | -         | -      | -0.255   | 0.021  | -0.353   | 0.068  | -0.026          | 0.015  |       |
|  | 12 - 18 | -0.231         | 0.014  | 0.158         | 0.023  | -         | -      | -0.274   | 0.022  | -0.323   | 0.061  | -0.093          | 0.015  |       |
|  | >18     | 0.000          | 0.014  | 0.055         | 0.026  | -         | -      | -0.232   | 0.024  | -0.327   | 0.061  | -0.103          | 0.016  |       |
|  | 0       | -0.699         | 0.030  | 0.034         | 0.035  | -         | -      | -0.212   | 0.029  | -0.556   | 0.191  | -0.149          | 0.040  |       |
|  | 1       | -0.624         | 0.048  | 0.200         | 0.062  | -         | -      | -0.417   | 0.063  | -0.371   | 0.220  | -0.087          | 0.049  |       |
| >49  | 2 - 7   | -0.593         | 0.020  | 0.111         | 0.031  | -         | -      | -0.450   | 0.029  | -0.290   | 0.091  | -0.023          | 0.020  |       |
|  | 8 - 14  | -0.476         | 0.017  | 0.149         | 0.027  | -         | -      | -0.375   | 0.026  | -0.461   | 0.083  | -0.013          | 0.017  |       |
|  | 15 - 23 | -0.302         | 0.014  | 0.159         | 0.024  | -         | -      | -0.289   | 0.022  | -0.415   | 0.063  | -0.135          | 0.015  |       |
|  | >23     | -0.114         | 0.015  | 0.009         | 0.030  | -         | -      | -0.307   | 0.027  | -0.399   | 0.069  | -0.124          | 0.018  |       |
|  | 0       | -1.180         | 0.040  | -0.010        | 0.043  | -         | -      | -0.490   | 0.036  | -0.607   | 0.202  | -0.141          | 0.044  |       |
|  | 1       | -0.978         | 0.062  | -0.034        | 0.084  | -         | -      | -0.759   | 0.084  | -0.735   | 0.337  | -0.255          | 0.064  |       |
|  | 2 - 11  | -0.747         | 0.019  | 0.109         | 0.030  | -         | -      | -0.632   | 0.029  | -0.367   | 0.084  | -0.043          | 0.019  |       |
|  | 12 - 18 | -0.637         | 0.019  | 0.193         | 0.030  | -         | -      | -0.532   | 0.030  | -0.706   | 0.096  | -0.059          | 0.019  |       |
|  | 19 - 26 | -0.483         | 0.015  | 0.145         | 0.026  | -         | -      | -0.418   | 0.024  | -0.704   | 0.069  | -0.190          | 0.016  |       |
|  | >26     | -0.349         | 0.017  | -0.018        | 0.032  | -         | -      | -0.387   | 0.031  | -0.574   | 0.080  | -0.155          | 0.019  |       |
| Family situation (Women only)  |         |                |        |               |        |           |        |          |        |          |        |                 |        |       |
| # Children (Age group)   |         |                |        |               |        |           |        |          |        |          |        |                 |        |       |
| 0  | 1 (0-3) | -0.772         | 0.009  | -0.007        | 0.012  | -0.705    | 0.016  | -0.410   | 0.011  | -0.058   | 0.037  | -0.349          | 0.009  |       |
|  | (4-6)   | -0.434         | 0.013  | -0.062        | 0.017  | -0.237    | 0.024  | -0.145   | 0.017  | -0.151   | 0.076  | -0.200          | 0.015  |       |
|  | (7-12)  | -0.164         | 0.012  | -0.044        | 0.017  | -0.257    | 0.032  | 0.003    | 0.016  | -0.009   | 0.065  | 0.005           | 0.013  |       |
|  | (13-16) | 0.036          | 0.013  | -0.026        | 0.020  | -0.355    | 0.114  | 0.023    | 0.018  | -0.105   | 0.073  | 0.115           | 0.013  |       |
|  | >1      | (0-3)          | -1.028 | 0.018         | -0.255 | 0.026     | -1.154 | 0.040    | -0.515 | 0.022    | -0.017 | 0.061           | -0.460 | 0.016 |
|  |         | (4-6)          | -0.492 | 0.027         | -0.194 | 0.040     | -0.346 | 0.060    | -0.143 | 0.035    | -0.131 | 0.157           | -0.180 | 0.029 |
|  |         | (7-12)         | -0.148 | 0.015         | -0.277 | 0.024     | -0.115 | 0.044    | 0.098  | 0.020    | -0.129 | 0.093           | 0.072  | 0.017 |
|  |         | (13-16)        | 0.059  | 0.027         | -0.023 | 0.041     | -0.034 | 0.193    | 0.083  | 0.035    | -0.074 | 0.157           | 0.108  | 0.028 |
|  |         | (0-3) - (4-6)  | -0.782 | 0.012         | -0.265 | 0.018     | -0.783 | 0.027    | -0.323 | 0.015    | -0.068 | 0.050           | -0.312 | 0.012 |
|  |         | (0-3) - (7-12) | -0.629 | 0.015         | -0.273 | 0.022     | -0.677 | 0.038    | -0.218 | 0.019    | -0.073 | 0.064           | -0.220 | 0.015 |
| (0-3) - (13-16)  |         | -0.557         | 0.039  | -0.196        | 0.051  | -0.771    | 0.168  | -0.179   | 0.050  | 0.095    | 0.147  | -0.150          | 0.033  |       |
| (4-6) - (7-12)   |         | -0.360         | 0.012  | -0.325        | 0.019  | -0.262    | 0.030  | -0.017   | 0.016  | -0.019   | 0.068  | -0.065          | 0.014  |       |
| (4-6) - (13-16)  |         | -0.214         | 0.029  | -0.280        | 0.042  | -0.275    | 0.116  | -0.066   | 0.037  | 0.000    | 0.165  | 0.019           | 0.030  |       |
| (7-12) - (13-16)   |         | -0.004         | 0.013  | -0.181        | 0.020  | -0.220    | 0.058  | 0.093    | 0.017  | -0.065   | 0.074  | 0.142           | 0.014  |       |
| (0-3) - (4-6) - (7-9)  | -0.782  | 0.022          | -0.197 | 0.031         | -0.695 | 0.054     | -0.242 | 0.026    | 0.029  | 0.085    | -0.267 | 0.021           |        |       |
| (0-3) - (7-9) - (13-16)  | -0.518  | 0.034          | -0.168 | 0.045         | -0.470 | 0.114     | -0.106 | 0.039    | 0.043  | 0.139    | -0.109 | 0.032           |        |       |
| (0-3) - (4-6) - (13-16)  | -0.610  | 0.065          | -0.257 | 0.091         | -0.437 | 0.228     | -0.207 | 0.081    | -0.187 | 0.300    | -0.267 | 0.060           |        |       |
| (4-6) - (7-9) - (13-16)  | -0.238  | 0.026          | -0.224 | 0.037         | -0.174 | 0.090     | -0.011 | 0.031    | -0.278 | 0.172    | 0.029  | 0.028           |        |       |
| (0-3) - (4-6) - (7-9) - (13-16)  | -0.634  | 0.072          | -0.282 | 0.085         | -0.848 | 0.262     | -0.187 | 0.074    | -0.243 | 0.345    | -0.199 | 0.067           |        |       |

| Table A1   |            |        |               |        |           |        |          |        |          |        |                 |        |       |
|--|------------|--------|---------------|--------|-----------|--------|----------|--------|----------|--------|-----------------|--------|-------|
| Definition of selected variables and associated parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses) |            |        |               |        |           |        |          |        |          |        |                 |        |       |
| Variable   | Employment |        | Other benefit |        | Education |        | ALMP     |        | Sanction |        | Part-time empl. |        |       |
|  | Estimate   | S.E.   | Estimate      | S.E.   | Estimate  | S.E.   | Estimate | S.E.   | Estimate | S.E.   | Estimate        | S.E.   |       |
| (7-9) – (13-16)  |            |        |               |        |           |        |          |        |          |        |                 |        |       |
| Education  |            |        |               |        |           |        |          |        |          |        |                 |        |       |
| Education (Type)   | Years      |        |               |        |           |        |          |        |          |        |                 |        |       |
| Compulsory school  | 9          | -0.459 | 0.012         | 0.728  | 0.022     | -0.495 | 0.020    | -0.097 | 0.018    | 0.049  | 0.064           | -0.271 | 0.016 |
| High school (ordinary)   | 10 – 11    | -0.110 | 0.012         | 0.045  | 0.023     | 0.158  | 0.019    | -0.109 | 0.018    | -0.011 | 0.065           | -0.065 | 0.016 |
|  | 12         | Ref    |               |        |           |        |          |        |          |        |                 |        |       |
| High school (occupational)   | 10 – 11    | -0.223 | 0.011         | 0.514  | 0.021     | -0.695 | 0.018    | 0.004  | 0.017    | -0.032 | 0.061           | -0.132 | 0.015 |
|  | 12         | 0.108  | 0.012         | 0.082  | 0.022     | -0.424 | 0.019    | 0.081  | 0.018    | -0.003 | 0.062           | -0.052 | 0.015 |
| Ex. Phil   | 13         | -0.275 | 0.018         | -0.392 | 0.036     | 0.924  | 0.024    | -0.291 | 0.027    | 0.046  | 0.087           | -0.148 | 0.022 |
| Higher education (one Year)  | 13         | -0.089 | 0.014         | -0.273 | 0.027     | 0.766  | 0.021    | -0.156 | 0.021    | 0.060  | 0.071           | -0.118 | 0.018 |
| Higher ed. Public sector related 2 Years   | 14         | 0.626  | 0.025         | 0.183  | 0.058     | 0.367  | 0.049    | -0.571 | 0.064    | 0.289  | 0.139           | 0.002  | 0.034 |
| Higher ed. Private sector related  | 14         | 0.169  | 0.020         | -0.529 | 0.048     | 0.328  | 0.033    | 0.032  | 0.032    | -0.086 | 0.102           | -0.183 | 0.026 |
| Higher ed. Public sector related   | 15-16      | 0.441  | 0.025         | 0.085  | 0.054     | 0.460  | 0.055    | -0.319 | 0.051    | 0.181  | 0.134           | 0.020  | 0.032 |
| Higher ed. Private sector related  | 15.16      | 0.285  | 0.017         | -0.468 | 0.038     | 0.468  | 0.026    | -0.031 | 0.027    | -0.020 | 0.089           | -0.076 | 0.022 |
| Higher ed. Without final exam  | 13-15      | 0.357  | 0.021         | -0.464 | 0.049     | -0.004 | 0.039    | -0.245 | 0.038    | -0.030 | 0.109           | -0.095 | 0.027 |
| Cand. Mag  | 16         | -0.112 | 0.022         | -0.985 | 0.052     | 0.813  | 0.030    | -0.481 | 0.036    | -0.018 | 0.114           | -0.066 | 0.027 |
| Higher ed. Public sector related   | 17-18      | 0.330  | 0.025         | -1.026 | 0.070     | 0.450  | 0.047    | -0.589 | 0.050    | -0.138 | 0.132           | 0.088  | 0.029 |
| Higher ed. Private sector related  | 17-18      | 0.025  | 0.016         | 0.099  | 0.028     | 0.074  | 0.031    | -0.104 | 0.023    | -0.059 | 0.079           | -0.192 | 0.020 |
| Ph-d   | >18        | 0.323  | 0.070         | -0.757 | 0.189     | 0.017  | 0.271    | -0.755 | 0.139    | -0.616 | 0.418           | -0.021 | 0.080 |
| Unknown  |            | -0.244 | 0.015         | 0.606  | 0.024     | -0.852 | 0.025    | -0.044 | 0.019    | 0.019  | 0.075           | -0.250 | 0.020 |
| Male   |            | 0.094  | 0.005         | 0.106  | 0.008     | 0.163  | 0.008    | -0.081 | 0.007    | 0.147  | 0.025           | -0.530 | 0.006 |
| Log (benefits)   |            | -0.010 | 0.001         | -0.073 | 0.001     | 0.003  | 0.002    | -0.003 | 0.001    | -0.033 | 0.014           | 0.032  | 0.001 |
| Log (Earlier Income)   |            | 0.001  | 0.001         | -0.012 | 0.001     | -0.025 | 0.001    | -0.013 | 0.001    | -0.001 | 0.004           | 0.017  | 0.001 |
| Single   |            | -0.197 | 0.005         | 0.402  | 0.008     | 0.287  | 0.013    | -0.129 | 0.007    | 0.166  | 0.022           | -0.183 | 0.006 |
| Entitled to 78 weeks in the new regime for spells in regime I and V                                  |            | -0.101 | 0.006         | 0.030  | 0.009     | 0.224  | 0.010    | 0.270  | 0.013    | 0.020  | 0.026           | -0.128 | 0.006 |
| No benefit entitlements in the new regime for spells in regime I and V                               |            | -0.093 | 0.011         | 0.093  | 0.013     | 0.370  | 0.015    | 0.302  | 0.019    | 0.099  | 0.042           | -0.288 | 0.010 |

Note: The following variables were also included in the model, but not reported in the table: 96 calendar-time dummies, 110 intrinsic duration dependence dummies (from group 6 and above), 19 county dummies.



## Appendix 2




Figure A1 Estimated calendar time effects for insured (solid lines) and non-insured (dotted lines) spells.

Note: The estimates are based on the same model as that described in Section 4, except that calendar time effects are estimated separately for insured spells (Regimes I-VII) and non-insured spells (Regime VIII). To save computational resources, the estimation was terminated after 12 support points were included in the heterogeneity distribution, as there were no indication of further changes in the estimated calendar time effects.