Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons
Elisabeth Thuestad Isaksen, Kjell Arne Brekke, & Andries Richter

Published in:
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Volume 95, May 2019.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.11.005
Abstract
We investigate whether positive framing increases cooperation in three social dilemmas with slightly different properties: a linear public goods (PG) game, a non-linear PG game, and a common pool resource (CPR) game. Results from our laboratory experiments show that contributions to a linear PG are higher if the externality is framed positively, rather than negatively, corroborating earlier findings by Andreoni (1995). By contrast, we find no such framing effects in the non-linear PG game or the CPR game. In these games, the best response in the material payoffs is to contribute less if others contribute more, counteracting effects of pro-social preferences. Positive framing therefore does not help to solve the tragedy of the commons.